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In the first decade of the twenty-first century, China, one of the world’s largest economies, 
undertook both share market structure and financial reporting reforms as part of the 
country’s development towards a more international, market-based economy. The split share 
structure reform (SSSR), implemented in three phases over 2005-2009, made previously 
untradeable shares in state owned enterprises (SOEs) tradeable in the stock market from the 
beginning of 2009; and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)-converged Chinese 
Accounting Standards (CAS) replaced old Chinese GAAP for periods of account beginning on 
or after 1st January 2007. 
Using accounting and market data over the period 2003-2010 (inclusive), this research 
investigates the impact of implementation of the SSSR and the adoption of IRFS-converged 
CAS on the earnings quality of Chinese listed firms. Earnings quality is considered widely, 
across dimensions of accrual quality, earnings persistence, earnings timeliness and earnings 
(and returns) value relevance. Some of the empirical models are applied/interpreted in a 
novel/unconventional manner – as required in Chinese context of this study. The SSSR and 
convergence with IFRS are considered in tandem. 
This study finds strong evidence to support hypotheses that SSSR-related incentives 
led to: (i) downwards earnings management in the first phase of the SSSR implementation 
(negotiation phase, 2005-2006); (ii) upwards earnings management in the second (lock-in) 
phase of the SSSR (lock-in phase, 2007-2008); (iii) downwards earnings management in the 
third phase of the SSSR implementation (trading of previously untradeable shares, 2009-
2010); and (iv) a significant reduction in earnings quality, as variously assessed. Further, that 
the downwards/upwards manipulation of earnings was driven into share prices over 2005-
2008 – when Chinese market was of low liquidity and questionable efficiency. In addition, the 
evidence shows that IFRS-convergence in China from 2007 could not (and did not) significantly 
curtail earnings management in response to SSSR-related incentives. Some evidence, indeed, 
is suggestive that earnings management activities were less constrained under IFRS-





In terms of specific earnings quality results, this study finds that in the first phase of 
SSSR (2005-06), ahead of the adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, there was a net shift away from 
income-increasing to income-decreasing discretionary accruals; earnings persistence and 
predictability decreased; earnings smoothness increased; large loss reports and timeliness of 
loss recognition increased; and earnings value relevance and earnings response coefficient 
increased. In the second phase of SSSR (2007-08), despite the adoption of IFRS-converged CAS 
in 2007, working capital accruals quality reduced; there was a net shift away from income-
decreasing to income-increasing discretionary accruals; earnings persistence and 
predictability reduced; timeliness of loss recognition reduced; and earnings value relevance 
and earnings response coefficient increased. In the final phase of SSSR (2007-10), post-IFRS-
convergence, working capital accruals quality reduced, there was a net shift away from 
income-increasing discretionary accruals to income-decreasing discretionary accruals; 
earnings persistence and predictability reduced; earnings smoothness and large loss 
recognition increased; and earnings value relevance and earnings response coefficient both 
decreased. 
This research adds to the accounting literature on earnings quality/management, and, 
in particular, the association between earnings quality and IFRS adoption (convergence) in 
the context of strong Chinese institutional and country factors – in considering/investigating 
the joint effect of IFRS convergence and SSSR on earnings quality for the first time. The 
findings will be of interest aside from providing a warning to international and Chinese-
domestic investors/analysts as regards the earnings quality of Chinese listed firms. The 
findings of this research will help academics, policy makers, regulators and professional 
bodies to understand better the effect of accounting and market regulatory reforms in China, 
thereby facilitating their ongoing development of the Chinese accounting regulation and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 Topic area and importance 
This study investigates the earnings quality of Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-2010, 
using a range of financial statement and market-based approaches. China is one of the world’s 
largest, and fastest growing economies, being also by far the largest developing economy. 
Over the focal period of this study, China implemented major accounting and market reforms, 
which were significant steps in the country’s development from a closed, centrally directed 
economy, to a (purportedly) more efficient, international and market-based one: adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)-converged Chinese Accounting Standards 
(CAS); and implementation of Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR). 
Financial statements are of great and widespread importance in the worlds of business, 
finance and economics. The fact that security prices, which are influenced by financial 
information, determine the allocation of wealth among firms and individuals has led to a great 
deal of interest from academic researchers, practicing accountants and standards setters 
(Kothari, 2001). Financial statements present corporate financial information, which is 
mandated by legislation/regulation, being required and used by regulators, financial market 
investors, creditors and analysts. Thus, financial information shown in firms’ financial 
statements is of key interest to the financial market participants and other stakeholders. Since 
the seminal publication of Ball and Brown (1968), the research on the relationship between 
financial statement information and capital markets has grown rapidly and dramatically, with 
a great deal of researchers’ attention directed towards investigation into whether financial 
reporting provides useful information for investors in terms of their investment decision 
making (Ali and Hwang, 1999; Ball et al., 2008; Barth et al., 2001, 1998; Bartov et al., 2001). 
Within the field, there is a substantial and growing amount of accounting literature on 
financial reporting quality, i.e. the quality of accounting information disclosed through 
corporate financial statements.  
Financial information users require faithful and reliable financial reporting of sufficient 
quality for it to be useful in decision making. The International Accounting Standards Board 




majority of primary financial report users (investors) in estimating the true value of the 
reporting entity. This demands the entity to report financial information that is both relevant, 
faithful, and without earnings manipulation. It is not practically possible, however, for 
financial information reports to represent a full disclosure of absolute accuracy: analysis of 
business performance and position in complex competitive markets is subject to significant 
accounting estimates and judgements. Hence, an information asymmetry between inside 
financial information generators and outside information users exists in the real world, with 
perfectly faithful representation by financial statements being unachievable (Kimeli, 2017; 
Ball, 2001).There are, of course, structural mechanisms established to mitigate the 
information asymmetry between inside financial information generators and outside users in 
the form of financial reporting and corporate governance systems (Ball, 2001; Bushman and 
Smith, 2001).1 
The IASB has defined two major (and desirable) fundamental qualitative 
characteristics of financial reporting: relevance and faithful representation. Financial 
reporting is considered to be of high quality, if the financial statements provide faithful and 
relevant financial information on corporations that allows outside information users to 
appreciate the underlying economic realities and make appropriate investments and risk 
management decisions. 
In this thesis the quality of published financial information is considered, in particular, 
the quality of corporate earnings, by a variety of means – investigating earnings quality 
(subsuming faithfulness and relevance) across the dimensions of accrual quality, earnings 
persistence, earnings timeliness and value relevance. In addition, there is assessment of the 
extent to which Chinese financial statements, as regards earnings, at least, meet the 
aspirations of the IASB in terms of qualitative characteristics. The IASB aspirations are 
particularly pertinent as regards the impact of China’s mandatory adoption of IFRS-converged 
CAS for the periods of account commencing on or after 1st January 2007.  
The Chinese setting in the first decade of the twenty-first century is particularly 
interesting as regards investigation of earnings quality for the following principal reasons. 
 




First, China’s uptake of IFRS in 2007 was not a complete adoption, rather convergence (as per 
the terminology used above). Second, between 2005 and 2008, China implemented SSSR in 
the stock markets, making a large number of previously non-tradeable (largely government-
controlled) shares tradeable, with the intention of increasing the market discipline of firms 
and hence, their efficiency. As is discussed and developed in a later section of this chapter, 
the SSSR implementation process gave strong and changing earnings management incentives 
to managers. Third, China’s firms and markets were (and remain so, though to not to the same 
degree) characterised by strong political influence, weak legal enforcement and a long 
tradition of social/political network-based transactions in business. The reform in parallel 
with both the accounting regime and financial markets in this context, provides a natural 
laboratory in which to study the impact together of multiple major influencers of accounting 
information quality. Finally, China’s importance in the world economy has increased along 
with its rapid economic growth. In 2010, it reported a nominal GDP of RMB 39.802 trillion and 
a foreign exchange reserve of USD 2.8 trillion, thus overtaking Japan as the second largest 
economy in the world (Bloomberg News, 2010). Poor corporate governance and financial 
reporting quality were becoming major obstacles to China’s further economic growth (Wu 
and Patel, 2015). Zhang and Ma (2005) found that financial fraud is much more common in 
China than in the US, and approximately 15% of listed firms have a record of practising 
accounting fraud, with high-profile corporate scandals involving the falsification of financial 
statements. Extensive corporate fraud and accounting manipulation severely undermine 
investor confidence and hinders the development of China’s business sector. Investigation of 
earnings quality, with a view to better informing investors, regulators and policy-makers - and 
so facilitating quality improvement – is a most important undertaking. 
The perspective and intention of this thesis is investigation of the impact of change of 
accounting regime (to IFRS-converged CAS) alongside implementation of SSSR and other 
contextualising features of the Chinese economy. The nature and content of accounting 
standards are important inputs into accounting information quality; financial reporting 
quality can be affected, however, by other significant institutional factors – in China, certainly, 
including, the degree of market liberalisation, government intervention, legal enforcement, 
 





and the importance of social/political network in business. Within a particular accounting 
environment, China and elsewhere, notwithstanding other factors, accounting standards are 
viewed as the direct impactor on accounting information quality (Barth et al., 2008; 
Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). The direct impact on accounting and accounting quality results 
principally from change in approaches to recognition and measurement (Soderstrom and Sun, 
2007). Other factors such as legal environment, market regulation and structure are 
considered to be indirect parameters (Barth et al., 2001). In order to prepare a set of financial 
statements, firms are required primarily to follow the procedures and rules stated in 
accounting standards. Accounting information quality can be assessed (albeit imperfectly) by 
analysis of information presented in the firms’ financial statements, as prepared according to 
the requirements of each country’s accounting standards. Thus, change in accounting 
standards will have an impact on (the assessment of) accounting information quality (Barth 
et al., 2008; Ding and Su, 2008; Dechow et al., 2010). Soderstrom and Sun (2007) argued that 
a change to a better quality of accounting standards will increase accounting information 
quality by reducing measurement error. At the same time, however, indirect effects may have 
complementary or contra impacts on accounting information quality. In the Chinese context, 
over the period of this study, one potential major indirect impactor, inter alia, is SSSR. Prior 
research has shown that indirect factors, including corporate governance system and capital 
market policy, substantially influence the financial reporting quality (Agrawal and Chadha, 
2005; Bhagat et al., 1999; Bushman and Smith, 2001). 
In sum, this thesis examines accounting information quality, specifically the earnings 
quality of Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-2010. Given the foregoing, the impact 
together of both of the two major reforms completed in China over this period is considered: 
the introduction of IFRS-converged CAS, mandatory for periods of account commencing on or 
after 1st January 2007; and the implementation of SSSR, which was commenced in 2005 and 
completed by the end of 2008. 
This chapter continues in the next sub-section with further discussion on the research 
setting, with the research objective and research questions also being presented. Section 1.3 
then provides further discourse on the drivers of earnings quality in the Chinese context and 




developed. The nature of the methodology adopted is covered in Section 1.4. Finally, Section 
1.5 covers the motivation and intended contribution of this work. 
 Research setting, research objective and research questions 
Since China’s ‘open door’ economic reforms of 1979, the Chinese Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
has launched a series of accounting reforms to mitigate the differences between Chinese 
accounting standards and the international accounting standards issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB). In 1985, the MoF promulgated the Accounting System for Foreign Joint Ventures,3 
requiring Chinese firms to provide consolidated reporting for the first time and intended to 
meet the information needs of foreign investors. Following rapid growth of foreign 
investment in China during the 1990s, the MoF replaced this with the Accounting System for 
Foreign Enterprises in 1992. The MoF also issued the Accounting System for Experimental Joint 
Stock Limited Enterprise in 1992 to meet the needs of new domestic information users, who 
had emerged as a consequence of the establishment of Chinese stock exchanges in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen.4  Only since then have Chinese (listed) firms been required to provide an 
annual balance sheet, income statement and statement of changes in financial position, with 
a structure and presentation recognisably similar to those adopted by UK and USA firms. The 
1992 accounting system for Experimental Joint Stock Limited Enterprises was replaced in 1998 
by the Accounting System for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises, representing a further step in 
adopting internationally recognised and acceptable accounting practices. In January 2001, the 
Accounting System for Business Enterprises (ASBE) was added, applicable to a wider diversity 
of Chinese firms and focusing on the needs of non-governmental information users, whilst 
also representing more widespread progress towards harmonisation with international 
standards. This was developed in 2006 to become Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises, which is substantially in line with IFRS and resulted in IFRS-converged Chinese 
Accounting Standards (CAS), effective from 1st January 2007 onwards. 
 
3 The term ‘foreign joint venture’ here simply means a Chinese firm with both Chinese domestic and foreign 
investors. 
4 Prior to the establishment of the stock exchanges, only government agencies, parent companies and foreign 
investors required firm reporting. The establishment of the exchanges created a broad class of domestic public 




Given the extent of reform of Chinese accounting standards over the last three 
decades, the Chinese MoF appears to be committed to substantial (albeit not complete) 
harmonisation of Chinese accounting standards with internationally accepted ones. The new 
IFRS-converged CAS, albeit not in full alignment with international practice, are mandatory 
for Chinese listed firms, and thus, the international comprehensibility and comparability of 
Chinese financial statements has increased.  
In parallel with reform of accounting standards, there has also been structural reform 
of China’s investment markets. After the establishment of China’s stock exchanges 1991, in 
order to maintain the stock of state-owned assets and state control over listed firms, the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) imposed a ‘split share structure’ in May 
1992, which divided listed firms’ shares into tradable and non-tradable classes. State 
shareholders held a majority of the shares, mainly non-tradable shares, which could not be 
traded on the stock market, while non-government-controlled (commonly private) minority 
investors held tradable shares. This split share structure, however, induced conflict between 
the holders of non-tradable shares and those of tradable ones. The former were unconcerned 
about the firm’s stock performance (Allen et al., 2005), while government interventions 
promoted highly policy-oriented speculative investment behaviour on the part individual 
holders of tradeable shares (Wang et al., 2008), with a short investment horizon (Chen et al., 
2010a). To ease the conflict and improve the incentive for shareholders of non-tradeable 
shares (controlling shareholders) to become concerned with stock performance, in 1998, the 
CSRC proposed some draft ideas about schemes and regulations to make non-tradable shares 
tradable in the financial market. In 1999, the CSRC ran an experiment to sell the non-tradable 
shares of ten selected listed firms, but this failed because the prices demanded for them were 
not attractive to the market. 5  In 2001, the CSRC proposed and implemented a reform 
requiring new issues of tradeable shares by all listed firms in order to dilute the holdings in 
non-tradeable ones, and bring about a 10% reduction in state-ownership via such shares. 
Following the first of the new issues, the stock market declined sharply and there was a three-
month bear market. So, the CSRC had to halt the reform later that year. Following these 
unsuccessful initiatives from the CSRC, in 2004, the central government, from its State Council 
 
5 In the literature, the prices have been described as ‘auction prices’, but they were set by government, with 




meeting,6 produced Nine Provisions of the State Council, which contained, inter alia, new 
ideas about a split share structure reform (SSSR). In particular, the document suggested that 
the reform should seek to respect market principles and exercise diligence in protecting the 
rights and interests of investors, especially public ones. The official SSSR was proposed in April 
2005, and there followed a pilot implementation amongst a small number of listed firms (81 
firms in 2005). In essence, the reform provided for non-tradeable shares to become tradable 
via a three-phase process: 
(i) Phase 1. Negotiation between firms (represented by their majority 
shareholders 7 ) and the holders of their non-tradeable shares as regards 
compensation to be paid by the firms to those shareholders in recompense for 
possible reduction in the value of their shares as a result of a large increase in 
the supply of tradeable shares; 
(ii) Phase 2. A two-year lock-in period, following completion of the negotiations 
described above – in order to avoid an immediate shock to market prices. This 
was so that the owners of tradeable shares should have time to assimilate the 
(likely) impact of the negotiations around different shares and make unhurried 
adjustments to their portfolios as they saw fit; 
(iii) Phase 3. Market trading of formerly non-tradeable shares. 
The first (compensation negotiation) phase was completed by the vast majority of 
listed Chinese firms by about the end of 2006 and, after the lock-in phase, full trading of 
shares came at the beginning of 2009. 
As is evident from the foregoing, reforms concerning/towards international 
accounting harmonisation and split share structure developed over the same (or nearly the 
same) period, following the establishment of Chinese stock market in 1991 and coming to 
completion in the latter half of the first decade of the 21st century. Perhaps coincidentally, 
perhaps partly by design, the accounting development seems often to have followed the 
announcement of developments or ideas regarding split share structure.8 The attempts to 
 
6 Held every four years by the Chinese government. 
7 Being the holders of their non-tradeable shares. 
8 This is an encouraging observation, in that the regulators of Chinese accounting would appear to be serving 




make non-tradable shares tradable in 1999 and in 2001 were followed by the Accounting 
System for Business Enterprises (ASBE) coming into effect in January 2001. Moreover, the SSSR 
in 2005 was followed by mandatory adoption of IFRS-converged CAS in January 2007. Finally, 
both the accounting and split share structure reforms were concurrent with (and coherent 
with) China’s core economic reforms of SOEs. 
The aim is to investigate the impact of the reforms in accounting and in share structure 
in China through acknowledging, discussing and taking into account that there are possible 
(probable) joint/confounding effects – since the reforms ran in parallel, they are both, prima 
facie, consistent with China’s core reforms and the accounting reforms are (or are designed 
or purported) to support the market reforms. One key issue is determining the extent to 
which (if at all) IFRS convergence in China has resulted in increased reported earnings quality9, 
given its implementation alongside the politically-loaded SSSR, and its role in facilitating that 
reform. There may well be conflicting drivers as regards earning quality, and it is not clear 
which will, if any, will be found to dominate. 
In sum, the overall objective of this research is to investigate how earnings quality in 
China evolved against a backdrop of convergence towards IFRS and of split share structure 
reform and to determine whether the advent of IFRS-converged CAS and the SSSR were truly 
complementary in this regard, or whether the impact of one dominated that of the other.  
Accordingly, the following research questions that can be addressed empirically have 
been constructed. A broad view of earnings quality measurement is adopted, given the 
obvious shortcoming in taking a single/narrow view, particularly in the complex Chinese 
context. 
1. What impact, if any, did IFRS convergence and the SSSR have on earnings quality 
as measured by alternative models of accruals quality? 
2. What impact, if any, did IFRS convergence and the SSSR have on earnings quality 
as measured by earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings 
smoothing? 
 




3. What impact, if any, did IFRS convergence and the SSSR have on earnings quality 
as measured by the incidence of recognition of large losses, and timeliness of 
recognition of bad news? 
4. What impact, if any, did IFRS convergence and the SSSR have on earnings quality 
as measured by value relevance of earnings and earnings response? 
 Discussion of drivers and incentives-high-level hypotheses 
 
1.3.1 Chinese convergence to IFRS 
Over 40 years of development in international accounting standards has targeted the 
enhancement of financial reporting quality and comparability of financial statements across 
countries. There are issues, however, as to the achievement and identification of enhanced 
earnings quality, as pointed out by De George et al. (2016). First, there is a need to establish 
what ‘high quality’ means and second, there must be recognition that high quality accounting 
standards may not automatically translate into firms providing high quality earnings reports. 
Reporting quality is affected by the capabilities and incentives of managers, policy makers and 
regulators, auditors etc. (Schipper, 1989; Levitt, 1998; Magrath and Weld, 2002; Houqe et al., 
2012; Abbott et al., 2000; Christensen et al., 2013). Moreover, reporting incentives and 
regulatory enforcement vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (Memis and Cetenak, 2014; 
Christensen et al., 2013; Dechow et al., 1996). Hence, even under the accounting rules, 
outcomes as regards quality may well be quite diverse.  
Proponents of IFRS believe that its adoption improves financial reporting quality as it 
improves financial transparency, lowers information asymmetry, promotes cross-border 
reporting comparability (Carmona and Trombetta, 2008; Horton et al., 2013; Houqe et al., 
2012); and further, it encourages international capital flows and lowers the cost of capital in 
adopting countries (Atwood et al., 2011). Research based on large samples across EU 
countries and the US has found evidence that voluntary IFRS adoption leads to improved 
financial reporting quality. Bartov et al. (2005) compared earnings value relevance across a 
sample of 417 firms in Germany reported under IAS10, US GAAP or local German GAAP, and 
 
10 The IASB was formed in 2001 to replace the IASC. Standards published by the IASB are known as IFRS and 
standards published by the IASC are known as IAS. The first set of IFRS (First-time Adoption of IFRSs) was issued 




found higher value relevance for German firms reporting under IAS than under local GAAP. 
Ball et al. (2003) found that adoption of high-quality accounting standards improves the value 
relevance of earnings reports. An important paper from Barth et al. (2008) studied a matched 
sample of 327 IAS adopters and non-adopters across 21 countries over the period 1994 to 
2003 to test whether the adoption of IAS is associated with better accounting quality. The 
findings suggested that IAS-based financial reports better reflect the economic reality and 
that IAS decrease managerial discretion in terms of accounting choice. Also, it emerged that 
IAS adoption is accompanied by greater enforcement. They found a significant improvement 
in accounting quality of adopters, as compared to non-adopters in the post IAS adoption 
period. They also elicited that IAS adoption lowers earnings management, improves timely 
loss recognition and enhances value relevance. Clarkson et al. (2011) contended IFRS 
adoption enhances comparability of accounting information in both Europe and Australia. 
Moreover, Horton et al. (2013) found that both mandatory and voluntary IFRS adoption are 
associated with reduced forecast errors, concluding that it increases both information quality 
and accounting comparability. All these studies, therefore, support the notion that IFRS 
adoption, relative to local GAAP, increases earnings quality.  
In contrast to the findings of Bartov et al. (2005), however, Hung and Subramanyam 
(2007), when comparing reported earnings under local German GAAP and IAS, found that 
total assets and book value of equity are significantly larger under IAS11 and that IAS adoption 
does not improve the value relevance or timeliness of financial information. Christensen et al. 
(2013) revisited the evidence provided by Barth et al. (2008) in the context of a single country 
(again,  Germany) and found that firms voluntarily adopting IAS exhibit significantly improved 
accounting quality, while mandatory adopters exhibit little or no improvement in it. Ahmed 
et al. (2013) investigated whether IFRS adoption reduces income smoothing, earnings 
aggressiveness and earnings management to meet or beat targets, for a relatively broad set 
of firms from 20 countries that adopted IFRS in 2005. They compared the reporting quality of 
IFRS adopters to a matched sample of non-adopters, countries that did not allow or require 
IFRS adoption. They elicited that IFRS adopters actually exhibit greater income smoothing, 
greater earnings aggressiveness, and more delays in loss recognition.  
 




From review of the early stage of IFRS, Ball (2001) was sceptical about the view that 
simply mandating new accounting standards for public financial reporting improves earnings 
quality, unless the adoption of the standards is accompanied by wholesale revision of the 
infrastructure that determines the financial reporting incentives of managers and auditors. 
He argued that the quality of financial reporting is determined endogenously by the incentives 
that managers and auditors encounter. Hence, an effective system of private litigation does 
more to improve actual practice than does regulation exogenously imposed by government12. 
This argument is reiterated in De George et al. (2016) review paper, they stated that the 
majority of early studies with regard to the impact of IFRS adoption on accounting information 
quality paint IFRS as bringing significant benefits to adopting firms and countries. However, 
more recent studies attribute at least some of earlier documented benefits to factors other 
than adoption of new accounting standards per se, such as enforcement changes, firms’ 
management incentives and corporate governance structure (Christensen et al., 2015; 
Jeanjean, 2012).   
The impact of convergence towards IFRS in the Chinese context is unclear and mixed 
outcomes may have resulted from two key issues. First, the underlying incentive for IFRS 
adoption in China may not be so much about improving reporting quality, but rather, the 
pursuance of a simple and relatively quick route to achieve global recognition of Chinese firms’ 
financial statements (Nobes, 2011; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010). The Chinese MOF has attempted 
to develop accounting standards to achieve such global recognition for the last three decades. 
The development of accounting standards, however, has always been under government 
supervision rather than involving private improvement and enforcement via the Chinese 
accounting and auditing professions. A lack of organisation/capability in the domestic 
accounting profession, and very slow progress in developing a set of Chinese accounting 
standards suitable for meeting the requirements of a fast-growing economy (McGregor, 
2006), all made the 2007 convergence with IFRS almost imperative. 
Second, IFRS convergence in China was not full adoption. In 2006, the Chinese MoF 
promulgated a new set of CAS: Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBEs), 
 
12  Endogenous factors here include management incentive, auditor selection, corporate governance 
improvement; exogenous factors include outside social infrastructure improvement i.e. regulatory and legal 




regarded as being highly converged with IFRS and consisting of a new Basic Standard and 38 
Specific ASBEs. The new CAS was substantially in line with IFRS, but did not represent its 
complete adoption. The differences between the provisions of IFRS-converged CAS and full 
IFRS are discussed in Chapter 2, but the principal differences may be summarised as: (i) 
differences in applicability/application of fair value accounting; (ii) exemption from related 
party transaction disclosures for Chinese SOEs13; (iii) fair value in debt restructuring and asset 
impairment; and (iv) differences in allowable approaches to consolidation. Moreover, there 
was the non-tradable shares reform, SSSR, around the period of IFRS convergence, which 
created reporting incentives (as discussed in the next sub-section below), which may have 
confounded accounting quality expectations as based on IFRS convergence alone and/or have 
had an impact on accounting quality outcomes.  
The literature on accounting quality in China has been developed to consider the 
consequences of Chinese IFRS convergence with partial IFRS adoption. Both Taub (2006) and 
Ding and Su (2008) examined the partial adoption issue in the context of China’s institutional 
setting. Taub (2006) stated that China’s mandatory adoption of the IFRS-converged CAS 
approach was a principle-based approach for translating the new rules into China’s own code. 
The revisions brought Chinese standards closer to the IFRS benchmark of internationally 
recognised quality, but new CAS only will be founded on similar principles with IFRS. Ding and 
Su (2008) suggested that despite the contents of new IFRS-converged CAS now substantially 
being converged with IFRS, Chinese accounting regulations continue to depart from it in 
significant respects, with the differences between IFRS-converged CAS and full IFRS being 
driven by China’s unique institutional environment. Here, the government retains the 
dominant role in China’s accounting regulation and practice, and remains the principal player 
in the Chinese economy, despite multifarious economic reforms over the last forty-years. 
Ball's (2001) claim, as mentioned above, is that the opportunity to improve earnings quality 
comes not by simple changing standards. He implies IFRS adoption should be in full and 
 
13 The exemption of SOEs’ related party disclosure requirement corresponds to IAS No. 24, Paragraph 25: a 
reporting entity is exempt from the disclosure requirements of related party transactions and outstanding 
balances, with: (a) a government that has control, or joint control of, or significance influence over, the reporting 
entity; (b) another entity that is a related party because the same government has control, or joint control of, 
or significance influence over, both the reporting entity and the other entity. In China, at the end of 2012, there 
were 953 SOEs, with a total market value of almost CNY14 trillion – being over 51% of the total market 




accompanied by revision of the infrastructure that determines the financial reporting-related 
incentives of managers, regulators, auditors etc. China, however, adopted only an incomplete 
version of IFRS, rather than taking it on in full, without consideration of the impact of largely 
unchanging politics, culture and legal environments, and fast-changing economic 
development. Hence, the outcomes of Chinese convergence to IFRS are difficult to predict. 
1.3.2 The Chinese split share structure reform (SSSR) 
One of the interesting features of the Chinese setting is the non-tradable shares reform, SSSR, 
concurrent with IFRS convergence. Previous studies testing the impact of IFRS 
adoption/convergence on earnings quality in China have lacked consideration of the joint 
influence of IFRS convergence together with implementation of the SSSR and conversely, 
investigations into the impact of the SSSR on earnings quality have not taken into account the 
joint impact of IFRS adoption. This study differs significantly from previous studies in that, 
inter alia, it involves considering together the impacts of IFRS convergence and SSSR 
implementation and whether one or the other played a dominating role.  
Hou et al. (2015b) examined whether, in the context of SSSR, firms managed earnings 
to meet the performance targets. They found that, firms with weaker financial performance 
had stronger incentives to make an accounting-based performance commitment to reduce 
the share compensation that controlling shareholder had to pay in order to gain liquidity 
rights. The data spanned 2005-2009 and included 157 firms that offered performance 
commitments during the reform and 1,079 firms who did not, focusing on the former cohort. 
The paper does not, however, mention the possible impact of the transition to of IFRS-
converged IFRS over the second half of the sample period. Liu and Tian (2012) investigated 
whether the SSSR had an impact on controlling shareholders’ leverage decisions. With data 
from 2004-2010, they excluded SOEs, financial firms, ST firms and firms that went public after 
SSSR was finished (so, their sample is a minority of the population of 2,215 firm-year 
observations in total). They elicited that more concentrated controlling shareholding was 
associated with: (i) lower post-SSSR leverage; and (ii) more positive market reaction to the 
reporting of related party transactions (given a reduction in tunnelling activities to 
expropriate the interests of minority shareholders were reduced). Hou et al. (2012) examined 




transparency, employing data from 2001-2008, and adopting variation in firm-specific return 
as a proxy for share price informativeness. They found that, improved share price 
informativeness among firms that were more sensitive to the impact of the reform, these 
being those firms that had a higher proportion of state-owned or restricted shares. Concerned 
by the effect of IFRS adoption/convergence in China in 2007, they cut their sample before the 
first quarter of 2008 in order to enable them to make findings supposedly unaffected by IFRS 
convergence. IFRS-converged CAS were mandated from 1st January 2007, so their sample 
period should have been cut at March 2007, rather than 2008, to exclude the time period in 
which mandatory IFRS could have affected the share price movements. The apparent anomaly 
is explained because a cut at March 2007 would have excluded the period during which SSSR 
implementation was still ongoing. 
The study of Liao et al. (2014) examined the privatisation effect of SSSR on SOEs’ 
fundamental performance. Considering 1,032 firms, being 633 SOEs and 399 non-SOEs, over 
2005-2007, they found that the output, profit, and employment increased after SSSR, 
especially for SOEs. Corporate governance and operating efficiency, however, remained 
unchanged. They suggested that the improved performance of SOEs was due to the boosted 
stock market incentives from government agents who operate or control SOEs and they 
benefited from the increasing of market values of state-owned shares. Accordingly, the 
interests of government and the public investors became better aligned after SSSR.  There are 
no extant studies, and so no empirical evidence, as regards the impact of SSSR on earnings 
quality as measured via accruals quality, earnings persistence and timeliness. There is 
restricted evidence as regards the impact of earnings value relevance of this reform (Hou et 
al., 2015a; Hou et al., 2012; Liao et al., 2014), but those studies neglect the possible impact 
of IFRS on share price informativeness. 
1.3.3 Contributions from theory 
Chapter 3 of this thesis discusses agency theory, stakeholder theory, property rights theory 
and behavioural finance theory. These are considered in the Chinese context to help to 
support the development of expectations as regard the impact of the SSSR implementation 





• Local SOE hierarchies14, both majority own (via large/block shareholdings) and wholly 
control (as directors and managers) SOEs. There is an agency conflict between the 
local SOE hierarchies and the minority (private) shareholders in SOEs. 
• Local SOE hierarchies were responsible for implementing SSSR on behalf of the 
Chinese government delivering the desired benefits. There was a classical agency 
conflict between what was desired by the government, and what best served the local 
SOE hierarchy. 
• Local SOE hierarchies are a dominant stakeholder group – having both majority 
ownership of SOEs, and being also the management. 
• The Chinese government is not only a policy maker, regulator, infrastructure provider 
and tax recipient, but also a (direct or indirect) shareholder, ultimate master of local 
SOE hierarchies, and the promoter of significant capital market and accounting 
reforms. 
• The reforms in China, prima face, suggest increasing incentives for managers to act 
efficiently given a transformation of residual property rights arising out of increasing 
separation of ownership and control, so that greater dispersion of shareholdings 
control right may lead managerial incentives to efficiency. But given the context of 
government and local SOE hierarchies may wish to retain ownership and control, then 
the property rights transition is unlikely to happen.  
• In the context of an illiquid and inefficient stock market, managers and majority 
shareholders are able to pursue their self interest in firms, to the detriment of the 
minority. Further, they are able to influence and manipulate prices to an extent that 
would not be possible in a more efficient market setting. 
1.3.4 High-level hypotheses 
The three phases of SSSR implementation are as discussed above: 
(i) Phase 1. Negotiation phase (2005-2006) 
(ii) Phase 2. Lock-in period (2007-2008) 
 
14 The local managers of SOEs, shareholders in SOEs who are government agents or are themselves SOEs (and 




(iii) Phase 3. Market trading of formerly non-tradeable shares. 
Local SOE hierarchies were the agents of the central government in implementing 
SSSR. This agency relationship is discussed in Chapter 3, but, in short: (a) the Chinese central 
government’s intention with SSSR was to bring capital market discipline and efficiency. 
However, (b) the managers of SOEs had ongoing incentives to (be seen to) succeed at the 
local level by preserving value in their SOEs and also preserving levels of state control. These 
incentives applied equally to the managers of non-SOEs, for whom preservation of value and 
retention of control was equally important. Focusing on the drivers on SOE managers, in this 
study, it predicted that in phase 1 of SSSR, the negotiation phase, managers had the incentive 
to drive down earnings and share prices15. This was so that firms minimised the compensation 
they were obliged to pay to external shareholders and also, to avoid possible censure from 
their (political) superiors for loss of value in the firm. With transition to phase 2 of SSSR, the 
lock-in period, in parallel with the transition to IFRS-converged CAS, it is predicted that 
managers had an incentive to drive up earnings and share prices, so that firms received the 
maximum amount from the sale of shares once the lock-in period end, thereby hoping better 
to (be seen to) serve the SOE hierarchy. In the post lock-in period (phase 3 of SSSR), once 
(some) previously non-tradable shares had been sold, it is anticipated that managers had 
incentives to drive down earnings and share prices again. This was so they could buy back 
shares at a lower price than that at which they were sold, thus creating gains, whilst 
maintaining (or re-establishing) government ownership levels.16 As mentioned above, such 
incentives applied equally to the managers of Non-SOEs, albeit their concern was success in 
the eyes of non-governmental investors, rather than the SOE hierarchy. Through a desire to 
preserve value, make profits in trading previously untradeable shares, and retain previous 
levels of ownership/control, it is predicted that managers attempted to manage earnings and 
prices over the implementation of SSSR, and against the backdrop of the transition to IFRS-
 
15 More fully, an incentive to manage earnings downwards, and to make sure this manipulation was reflected in 
share prices. 
16 SSSR was highly driven by the incentives of government agents to boost SOE’s financial performance, with a 
further expectation that it would stimulate an improvement in operating efficiency without fundamentally 
changing SOE ownership structure (Firth et al., 2010). To maintain SOE ownership, holders of non-tradable 
shares might have chosen not to sell the shares, or, more likely, sell then repurchase them back. Hence, if shares 
were sold straight after the lock-in period, then there was a strong incentive to drive down share price to buy 




converged CAS. Table 1.1 summarises the drivers/incentives pertaining to SSSR 
implementation and transition to IFRS-converged CAS. 
 
Further to this discussion and summary, the following are hypothesised at the high 
level. 
H1: In the first phase of SSSR, there is an incentive among Chinese A-share listed 
firms to drive down both earnings and share prices. As a consequence, earnings 
and market prices will fall, and earnings quality will be reduced.  
To test the first hypothesis, this study compares the change of reported earnings, 
share prices and dimensions of earnings quality between 2003-2004, the pre-SSSR 
Table 1.1: SSSR phases and related management incentive predictions  
SSSR IFRS 
2004 and 





SSSR phase 1: negotiation period. 
Managers had the incentive to 
drive down share price, so that 
the local SOE hierarchy minimised 
the compensation it was obliged 
to pay to external shareholders 
2007-2008 
SSSR phase 2: lock-in period: 
managers had incentives to drive 
up share prices, so that local SOE 
hierarchy received the maximum 
amount from sale of shares once 
the lock-in period ended 
2007-2010 
Post-IFRS-convergence: 
Possible influences: (i) EQ-
increasing impact of IFRS in 
general, albeit not universal; 
(ii) EQ-decreasing under the 
impact of IFRS-convergence in 
China: weak legal 
enforcement, strong 
management incentives, lack 
of (minority) investors’ 
protection, heavy government 
intervention, not a full 
adoption of IFRS 
2009-2010 
SSSR phase 3: post lock-in period 
and post-sale of SOE shares. 
Managers had the incentive to 
drive down share prices, so that 
the local SOE hierarchy could buy 
back shares at a lower price than 
that at which it sold them, thus 




implementation period, and 2005-06, the first phase of SSSR. Both of these periods 
preceding China’s adoption IFRS-converged CAS. 
H2: In the second phase of SSSR, coincident with adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, 
there is an incentive among Chinese A-share listed firms to drive up earnings and 
share prices. As a consequence, and despite IFRS convergence, earnings and 
market prices will rise, and earnings quality will be reduced. 
To test the second hypothesis, this study compares the change of reported earnings, 
share prices and dimensions of earnings quality between 2005-2006, the first phase of 
SSSR (pre-IFRS adoption), and 2007-08, the second phase of the SSSR which coincided 
with China’s adoption of IFRS-converged CAS. It should be noted that there is, by design, 
overlap/repeated use of a period: the base case period in testing the second hypothesis, 
2005-06, is the same as the test period adopted in testing the first hypothesis (as 
explained above). 
H3: In the third phase of SSSR, after adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, there is an 
incentive among Chinese A-share listed firms to drive down earnings and share 
prices. As a consequence, earnings and market prices will fall, and earnings 
quality will be reduced. 
To test the third hypothesis, this study compares the change of reported earnings, share 
prices and dimensions of earnings quality between 2007-2008, the second phase of the 
SSSR (post-IFRS adoption), and 2009-10, the final phase of the SSSR (also post IFRS 
adoption). Again, there is overlap/repeated use of a periods: the base case period in 
testing the third hypothesis, 2005-06, is the same as the test period adopted in testing 
the second hypothesis (as explained above). 
These high-level hypotheses are taken and tested in the empirical chapters of this thesis 




 Approach to method 
1.4.1 Research approach and structure for this study 
Guided by the previous literature, for this study, an empirical approach is adopted. 
Hypotheses are derived from analysis of the drivers and incentives facing agents, as 
illuminated by review of the regulatory context, application of theory and findings in the 
extant literature. These hypotheses are then subject to investigation via econometric analysis 
of data from real firms. 
The period of data selected and obtained for this study is 2003-2010 (inclusive), which 
covers two years ahead of commencement of the SSSR implementation, the four years of the 
implementation, and two years after its completion. It also covers four years ahead of IFRS 
convergence in China, and four years after. The principal means of econometric analysis is 
multivariate regression, with models and variables derived, adapted and developed out of the 
literature. In line with the research questions of this study, investigation and analysis is dealt 
with by chapter as follows: 
 
Chapter 5: Accrual quality 
Chapter 6: Earnings persistence, predictability and smoothing 
Chapter 7: Loss recognition 
Chapter 8: Earnings value relevance 
 
Ahead of these empirical chapters, Chapter 2 gives details of the Chinese setting, whilst 
Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive literature review on earnings quality in terms of its 
dimensions, determinants and consequences in general, as well as in relation to IFRS adoption, 
the Chinese context and SSSR. The empirical chapters are largely self-contained, each 
covering presentation/development of pertinent questions and hypotheses, method, results 
and conclusions. Chapter 5, as the first empirical chapter, contains methodological content 
(e.g. on selection and definition of control variables) that is pertinent to the empirical 
chapters that follow. Chapter 9 draws together the findings of the study and concludes the 
thesis. This chapter also deals with difficulties and limitations in the execution of this study, 





1.4.2 Division of the study period 
 
In order to address the research questions and hypotheses of this work, the study period is 
divided into three overlapping sub-periods, as set out in Table 1.2. The first sub-period, 2003-
2006, covers the pre-SSSR period and phase 1 of SSSR; ahead of the arrival of IFRS-converged 
CAS. The second sub-period, 2005-2006, covers the transition to IFRS-converged CAS, and in 
the parallel, the transition from phase 1 to phase 2 of the SSSR implementation. The third and 
final sub period covers post-IFRS-convergence and transition from phase 2 to phase 3 of SSSR 
(its completion). The hypotheses imply that accruals quality, earnings persistence and 
predictability, timeliness of loss recognition and value relevance will have been impacted 
upon by these transitions. 
 
Table 1.2: Separation of periods and phases  
Sub-period Transition from Transition to 
IFRS-converged 
CAS? 
2003-2006 Pre-SSSR SSSR phase 1: negotiation period  No 
2005-2008 











2007-2010 SSSR phase 2: lock-in period 
SSSR phase 3: 
free trading of shares Yes 
1.4.3 Non-conventional interpretation of the estimation results 
Given the Chinese setting, and the nature of the hypotheses of this study, not only is it 
necessary to adapt/develop extant models (as will be seen in Chapters 5-8), for a change in 
perspective in interpretation of the results of the estimation of some of those models is 





Further or contra conventional interpretations are the following:  
• Adopting the modified Jones model, this study implies an increase in income-
increasing [decreasing] accruals as evidence not only of reducing earnings 
quality, but also of upward [downward] management of earnings; 
• Increased incidence of small positive earnings, conventionally interpreted to 
signify increased earning management due to upwards smoothing (to avoid a 
loss), is in this study considered alongside the incidence of small negative 
earnings – in order to deduce whether smoothing to a small positive is from 
above or below (i.e., downwards versus upwards earnings management); 
• For this research, greater incidence or timeliness of large loss recognition is 
interpreted as being consistent with downward management of earnings; 
• Increasing market value relevance (or returns relevance) of earnings over the 
period 2004-2008, when the Chinese stock market was relatively illiquid and 
inefficient, is interpreted as being consistent with earnings (of whatever 
quality) being reflected in prices, thus also being consistent with managed 





17 In China, 2009 onwards, after the completion of SSSR. 
18 In China, pre-2009. 
Table 1.3: Approach to interpretation of model estimations 
Model Standard/basic interpretation Interpretation in the context of the setting and hypotheses of this 
thesis 
Accruals 
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002) 
↑ "# ⇒ %& ↓ same 
Accruals 
(modified Jones 1995) 
↑ |#)| ⇒ %& ↓ 
↑ |#)!| ⇒ %& ↓ 
↑ |#)"| ⇒ %& ↓ 
same 
↑ |#)!| ⇒ upward management of earnings 
↑ |#)"| ⇒ income-decreasing EM 
Persistence ↑ *+,-.-/+01+ ⇒ %& ↑ same 
Predictability ↑ *,+2.1/34.5./6 ⇒ %& ↑ same 
Smoothing ↑ -788/ℎ.0: ⇒ %& ↓ 
smoothing and persistence may give 
contradictory results; and the parts of the 
literature interpret smoother earnings as 
implying greater quality 
↑ -788/ℎ.0: ⇒ %& ↑ 
 
incidence of small positive earnings is considered together with 
incidence of small negative earnings - to deduce whether 
smoothing to a small positive is from above or below 
 
Large loss recognition ↑ ;<%= ⇒ %& ↑ ↑ ;<%= ⇒ downward management of earnings 
Timely loss recognition ↑ /.7+5.0+-- ⇒ %& ↑ ↑ /.7+5.0+-- ⇒ downward management of earnings 
Value relevance ↑ ,+5+>301+ ⇒ %& ↑ In efficient, liquid market:17 same 
In inefficient, illiquid market:18 






Notes: Throughout this table, “and vice versa” should be taken as implicit. So, e.g. !↑ # ⇒ % ↓'⇔ !↓ # ⇒ % ↑'. ↑ = increasing; ↓ = decreasing; SD = standard deviations of 
the estimated error terms of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model; EQ = earnings quality; DA = discretionary accruals estimated by the modified Jones model (1995); LNEG 
= large negative losses reports; ERC= earnings response coefficient. 
 
19 Thus, potentially providing evidence that upward- or downward-managed earnings have been reflected in (driven into) prices and so, resulting in upward- or downward-
managed prices, respectively. 
20 As footnote 1 (above), but now in relation to earnings and returns. 
↑ 18+?[%A"] ⇒ strengthening relationship between earnings 
and share price (whatever the earnings quality)19 
Earnings response ↑ %CD ⇒ %& ↑ In efficient, liquid market: same 
In inefficient, illiquid market: 
↑ %CD ⇒ strengthening relationship between earnings and 




 Motivation and intended contributions 
 
The objective of this study is to investigate whether accounting information quality was 
impacted upon by the adoption of IFRS-converged CAS and SSSR in China and if so, how and 
to what extent. China was using rule-based accounting standards and had a credit-based 
financial system prior to 2007. The accounting and market reforms in China in the first decade 
of this century provided a relatively quick transition to a more western-style accounting and 
financial system. Since then, the accounting standards and SSSR transformation have become 
fully embedded in China’s financial market. 
A focus on a single market can minimise the variations of the economic environment 
when comparing the information quality changes and the previous literature has explored the 
change of accounting quality in response to IFRS adoption in a single market (Chua et al., 2012; 
Dimitropoulos et al., 2013; Leuz et al., 2003). The current study is of particular interest for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, there is China’s unique institutional background and emerging 
financial market stage. China is a centrally controlled economy with a one-party authoritarian 
political system. Despite having a very fast-growing economy and its integration into the 
international market, China has many emerging markets characteristics, such as a desire to 
attract foreign capital, list firms overseas, reduce the cost of preparing multiple sets of 
financial reports, building a credible accounting profession, and facilitating infrastructure 
development, Secondly, as the world’s second largest economy and the largest emerging one, 
China is having increasing influence on worldwide financial markets and IASB activities (see, 
for example Nobes (2009)). As a result, its adoption and implementation of IFRS-converged 
standards, and their impact, are important issues for accounting academics, practitioners, 
regulators and policy makers. Third, previous studies on China’s IFRS adoption and on SSSR 
neglected the joint effects between these two reforms (Hou et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013; 
Cullinan et al., 2012). In this thesis, it is recognised that SSSR has played an important role in 
terms of inducing a change of accounting information quality in China – in line with prior 
studies which have found that quality of accounting information is derived not solely from 
the quality of accounting standards but also from other institutional factors (Ball, 2006; 
Paananen and Lin, 2009). This is the first study to investigate change in accounting 




institutional factor via the implementation of SSSR. The research, therefore, envelopes both 
of the Chinese reforms designed to deliver a more market-based economy – SSSR, which 
greatly expanded tradability of shares, complemented by convergence with IFRS, intended 
better to meet the information needs of investors. 
This research investigates accounting quality under the impact of the transition of 
Chinese accounting and market regimes. Accounting quality is assessed from four 
perspectives, these being: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings timeliness and 
earnings value relevance. Prior literature has found mixed evidence about the change in 
accounting quality after IFRS adoption in different countries. The main contribution of this 
study is to add to this existing literature, which has been silent as regards to the joint impact 
on earnings quality in China of accounting standards reform and market reform. In particular, 
this thesis contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. 
1. This is the first study to take into account both SSSR and IFRS reforms with a 
wide range of analysis. This research adds to the literature in terms of 
accounting quality under the joint impact of the SSSR and IFRS-converged CAS 
adoption in China, on which prior research has been silent, so missing the 
compound/confounding effect of this adoption on earnings quality. 
2. Earnings quality is investigated across a broader range of dimensions than in 
previous studies. The existing published research in China has failed to 
investigate earnings persistence and timely recognition of losses in the Chinese 
capital market, commonly only probing one dimension of earnings quality. This 
study considers accounting-based measures of quality, namely accruals quality, 
earnings persistence, earnings predictability, earnings smoothness, and large 
loss recognition. It also involves investigating market-based measures, i.e. 
timeliness of loss recognition, earnings value relevance and earnings response. 
These accounting-based and market-based earnings quality measures assess, 
respectively, the reliability and the relevance properties of earnings. This 
wide/inclusive approach to earnings quality assessment adds strength to the 




3. The interpretation of model results extends from and in some cases is contra 
to conventional interpretation. It involves analysing/interpreting results and 
accounting quality consistent with China’s unique institutional and stock 
market features, for which traditional interpretation of model results is not 
always sufficient/appropriate. For example, prior research studies 
investigating the value relevance of Chinese accounting information have 
simply interpreted results in accordance with usual practice. That is, they have 
deduced improved earnings quality from an increased association between 
earnings per share and market share price. This study, in Chapter 8, interprets 
such an increase in association to support the notion that, in illiquid and 
inefficient stock markets (as China’s markets were for the majority of the study 
period), earnings manipulations have been driven through to share prices.  
4. The unique Chinese setting of widespread state ownership and political control 
is combined with agency theory, stakeholder theory, property rights theory 
and behavioural finance theory, with, in Chapter 3, a complex and interesting 
‘double agency’ setting being posited. This setting leads to a coincidence of 
interests as between the Chinese central government and private investors – 
since each suffers as a result of a (separate but connected) agency problem 
with the local SOE hierarchies. 
5. The hypotheses tested within this study were formulated based on incentives 
to local SOE hierarchies arising out of the SSSR process, and on IFRS 
convergence. The principal focus is, therefore, regulatory/political, rather than 
the more common one, that of firm-level earnings management incentives and 
firm-level earnings targets. 
6. This study contributes in providing a warning to regulators and policy makers 
concerning confounding events accompanying standards’ development/ 
adoption. This is also in relation to international and Chinese-domestic 





In sum, this study will add further empirical evidence to the accounting literature on the 
association between earnings quality and IFRS adoption in the context of strong Chinese 
institutional and country factors. Moreover, the findings will help policy makers, regulators 
and professional bodies to understand better the effect of accounting and market regulatory 
reforms in China, thereby facilitating their development of the Chinese accounting regulation 
and stock market structure. Most importantly, the joint effect of IFRS convergence and SSSR 
earnings quality is investigated for the first time, as prior studies having concentrated either 
on IFRS or SSSR reforms and thus, neglected their joint timeline. 
 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. As briefly outlined in Section 1.4.2 (above), the 
remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: 
• Chapter 2 discusses the Chinese setting in terms of the institutional environment 
(political, economic, financial, legal, social/cultural), and the Chinese capital market 
and accounting regimes. It elaborates upon the IFRS-convergence and the SSSR, and 
the development and internationalisation of Chinese markets. 
• Chapter 3 considers theoretical frameworks – agency theory, stakeholder theory, 
property rights theory and behavioural finance – and discusses their pertinence and 
application in the Chinese context. 
• Chapter 4 provides an extensive review of the existing academic literature relating to: 
(i) accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings timeliness and earnings value 
relevance; (ii) accounting information quality and IFRS adoption; (iii) accounting 
quality and the accounting/financial reforms in China; (iv) determinants of earnings 
quality; and (v) consequences related to earnings quality. 
• Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 are empirical chapters, investigating, in turn, accruals quality, 
earnings persistence, earnings timeliness and earnings value (and returns) relevance. 
Each of these chapters presents detail of relevant method(s) and development of 
chapter-specific hypotheses. Results and conclusions are provided at chapter level. 
• Chapter 9, the last chapter of this thesis, draws together the findings and conclusions 










Chapter 2: China’s institutional setting  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter elaborates upon the role of institutional factors, as well as the reforms of 
accounting standards and share structure in 2007 in China. Both accounting regulation and 
share structure reforms were accommodated by the special circumstances of China’s strong 
political influence on financial market regulation, strong state-ownership concentration, 
weak accounting and professional management as well as the inertial effect of business 
tradition and culture factors. This chapter demonstrates how considering institutional factors 
that affected the level of transition towards full implementation of IFRS is essential. 
It is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of China’s institutional 
characteristics, including its: political system, economic system, financial system, legal system 
and social culture. Section 3 explains China’s financial and accounting infrastructure, followed 
by consideration of the recent SSSR and IFRS reforms. A conclusion is presented at the end of 
the chapter. 
2.2 Institutional environment 
2.2.1 Political system 
Political forces are the primary determinants of the degree of shareholder diffusion and the 
relationships among managers, owners, and other stakeholders of the firm, all of which shape 
the properties of reported financial information (Roe, 2003).  
Unlike the multiple-party political model in most Western countries, China, as a 
socialist country, has had single-party leadership with one legislative chamber since 1949. 
That is, the political power is assumed by the Communist Party regardless of the existence of 
a number of minority parties. To maintain one-party control over all the key appointments in 
government and other major organisations, such as banks, other financial institutions, and 
universities, China has a parallel hierarchy of party and government leadership at all levels 
nationally (Cai, 2008; Edin, 2003). The head of state is also the leader of the Communist Party 




the economic reforms since the 1970s, the changes in the political system have been 
conservative (Heilmann, 2008; Shirk, 1993). Taking into consideration of the unique political 
structure, the Chinese government seems to have more direct and profound influence on the 
business sectors compared to the most developed countries (Qian, 1996). The government, 
as regulator and policy maker, would offer favourable treatment to those firms that had local 
state or central government as their controlling shareholders, even after 2005 (Wang et al., 
2008). 
Accounting standards setting and implementation are considered as a political 
processes in China (Francis et al., 2009; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Xiao et al., 2004). The 
development of accounting is heavily government driven and largely influenced by a political 
institution, the Ministry of Finance (MoF). That is, the government has played a dominant role 
throughout all the Chinese accounting reforms, with financial reporting being heavily 
influenced by political ideology. Hence, accounting practices in China are closely related to 
the political ideology and thus, the state’s perspective on economic development (Bushman 
and Piotroski, 2006; Piotroski et al., 2015; Xiao et al., 2004; Fan et al., 2007b; Chaney et al., 
2011). Given the vast majority of corporations tightly to national politics, imposing rules and 
business structures found in advanced economies would be unlikely to produce the reformers’ 
desired results, as corporate governance systems in China do not just involve rules and 
institutional set ups (Roe, 2003).  
2.2.2 Economic system 
Consistent with China’s socialist political background, from 1949 to the 1970s, SOEs 
dominated the Chinese economy, which was centrally planned and in public ownership. From 
the 1970s onwards, the ideology shifted from having a central planned economy to a market 
oriented one through a series of economic reforms. These proceeded in different stages (Shirk, 
1993; Lin et al., 2003), but still under the tight control of the Communist Party of China and 
the central government. In other words, China’s market-oriented economy remained being 
based on socialist principles. Since the 1970s up until today, the Chinese government has 
made progress in reducing its intervention in the business sectors, but regardless of this, it 




its political goals through government controlled SOEs and restructured ones (Wang et al., 
2008; Xu et al., 2005). 
Initially the Chinese economy was considered to be overcentralised, and the 
subsequent economic reforms were geared the privatisation of state ownership. In the early 
stages of Chinese market economy, the government directly controlled and managed most of 
the SOEs and consequently, their managers had little incentive or managerial authority to 
enhance economic efficiency, which led to poor performance (Groenewold et al., 2003). Until 
the early 1990s, even after the establishment of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, the 
government retained control over large SOEs; however, medium and small sized SOEs were 
allowed to be merged and privatised. In fact, most SOE business operations became no longer 
subject to state plans, with the exception being large and key ones (Huang et al., 2013). The 
initial objective of the inauguration of China’s two stock exchanges was to raise capital for 
poorly performing SOEs so as to be able to survive in competition with local private and 
foreign companies. Stock market regulators in China gave preferential treatment to local and 
central SOEs by expanding listing privileges based on political rather than economic objectives 
(Shirk, 1993) The SOEs were allowed to report three years of pre-IPO earnings based on 
estimations, because they were typically restructured by the parent company immediately 
prior to the IPO21 and most the latter of those listed SOEs remained unlisted on the  financial 
market after IPO (Wang et al., 2008).  Alongside criticism of government intervention in 
China’s business sector, some studies have also pointed out that such intervention was 
implemented in most Asian developing states to regulate their local economies and to ride 
out economic crises, due to the lagged development stage in their domestic countries in 
comparison with developed Anglo-American ones (Yeung, 2000).   
The Chinese economy has been growing rapidly since the economic reforms from the 
1970s onwards, consistently exhibiting high GDP growth (Oi, 1995; Groenewold, 2004). The 
average growth in China’s GDP was 9.2% over the period 1989-2013, and even after the recent 
world financial crisis, this continued to grow at a healthy rate. In 2014, GDP growth was 7.3%, 
which, took it to over US$10.35 trillion – representing approximately 16.7% of the world 
 




economy22. In 2015, GDP growth of 6.9% was the lowest in last of 25 years, but higher than 
the average world-wide GDP growth of 3.3%23. The booming Chinese economy has been 
heavily supported since the 1990s by investment from developed western countries, with the 
Chinese government having adopted policies designed to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and encouraging the import of advanced technologies. FDI in China averaged US$ 416.01 
billion from 1997 to 2016. In December of 2015, it reached an all-time high of US$ 1262.70 
billion and approximately 30% of Chinese growth was export-based. However, foreign 
investors have had an information disadvantage relative to local investors and thus, there 
have been demands for China’s international accounting harmonisation (Lee et al., 2013). 
2.2.3 Financial system 
Nobes (1998) proposed that the reason for international differences in financial reporting is 
due to its different purposes, depending on the financing system. Zysman (1983) 
distinguished financial markets in capital market based and credit-based systems, where the 
latter can be separated into governmental and financial institutions. The differences between 
market-based and credit-based financial systems are presented in Table 1. Under the 
different financial systems, the purpose of financial reporting relies on their own profit for 
capital, but the external sources of funds differ. In a market-based financial system, such as 
that of the US, UK and Australia, the large firms are mainly financed by external shareholders 
and the control of those firms essentially rests with managers. An agency problem occurs due 
to the separation of corporate ownership and the management group (Franks and Mayer, 
1997), which consequently causes outside shareholders heavily to rely on financial accounting 
information provided by the management group of the company to assist in their investment 
decision. IFRS has developed from the marked-based financial system, primarily with the goal 
of providing fair and balanced information to outside investors (Nobes, 1998). 
In a credit-based system, the capital market is smaller in comparison with the market-
based one. Companies’ funding opportunities are more reliant on whoever grants credit and 
they are controlled by a small number of large shareholders. Nobes (1998) also described 
 
22 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG and 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp 




credit-based systems as relationship-based ones due to the importance of the relationship 
between companies and their influential controlling shareholders. The latter have the power 
to employ and influence the daily management of the companies. This means that under such 
circumstances, the controlling shareholders and managers are closely tied, such that the 
agency problems between outsider shareholders and managers are reduced. However, 
agency problems between closely tied major shareholders and managers and minority 
shareholders can emerge (Nobes, 1998; Nobes and Parker, 2008; Xiao et al., 2004). The 
primary objective of IFRS is to provide useful accounting information to outside investors, 
especially major or controlling shareholders, who are overlooked under a credit-based system 
(Ball et al., 2000; Ball, 2001, 2006). Hence, the demand for investment decision usefulness for 
external investors, especially major controlling ones, is relatively low, because the dominant 
owners have access to detailed internal management accounting information. 
Table 2.1: General characteristics of market-based and credit-based systems 
Market-based System Credit-based System 
Large firms controlled by managers, but owned 
by outside shareholders 
Firms owned by insider shareholders. who also 
have control over management 
Separation of ownership and control, which 
engenders agency problems 
Little separation of ownership and control and 
agency problems are rare, but with other 
problems 
Frequent takeovers acting as a disciplining 
mechanism on company management 
Takeover activity is rare 
Dispersed ownership Concentration of ownership amongst a small 
group of shareholders 
Moderate control by a large range of 
shareholders 
Excessive control by a small group of inside 
shareholders 
No transfer of wealth from minority to majority 
shareholders 
Wealth transfer from minority to majority 
shareholders 
Strong investor protection in company law Weak investor protection in company law 
Potential for shareholder democracy Potential for abuse of power by majority 
shareholders 
Shareholding characterised more by exit than 
by voice 
Majority shareholders tend to have more voice 
in their investee companies 





In China, the financial system is under credit-based governmental and financial 
institutions, which means that the purposes of financial reporting are different to those of 
capital market-based financial systems (Gillis, 2013). The government has control of both debt 
and the equity market, with the incentive for preparing financial information being skewed 
towards contract purposes rather than financial performance (Dai and Chen, 2004; Chen et 
al., 2008b). This is due to the requirements of IPO, right issues and delisting in Chinese 
financial market being directly related to the companies’ profitability.  
First of all, fund resource allocation is under government control. Since 1949, the big 
four stated-owned banks24 have dominated the finance industry and played an important role 
in the Chinese economy. Those four state-owned banks are considered as government 
agencies and operated under government instructions. In China, policy lending has led to a 
large amount of nonperforming loans among the government, state-owned banks and SOEs. 
Moreover, the cheap/non-payback policy loans to SOEs made it difficult to liberalise financial 
markets (Schlevogt, 2000). After the reforms in banking sector, except for the People’s Bank 
of China, the banks were converted into commercial banks to act as intermediaries between 
investors and savers, thereby responding to market forces (García-Herrero et al., 2006). 
However it was unrealistic to expect that the banking/financial institutions could be 
substantially independent of the government, which also explains why Chinese banks still 
have  low profitability (García-Herrero et al., 2009). 
Unlike mature markets, where the stock exchanges are self-regulated entities owned 
by their members, the two Chinese stock exchanges are essentially government organs (Gillis, 
2013). The establishment, administration, and development of both China’s stock exchanges 
are highly government driven. Practically, it retains control over the stock exchange through 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)25 , which is tasked with appointing the 
senior officers and top management group at both exchanges. The split share structure, which 
divides them into tradable and non-tradable shares, was started in 1993, immediately 
 
24 Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Construction Bank of China and the Agriculture Bank 
of China. 
25 The CSRC is the major market regulator in China, which has been under the direct supervision of the State 
Council since its establishment in 1992. From 1998, the CSRC inherited regulatory power from the State Council 
Securities Commission and the People’s Bank of China, becoming the official security market regulator, 




following the establishment of the two Chinese stock exchanges. The objective of issuing the 
non-tradable shares is to maintain state control over listed companies (Qi, 2007). Up until 
December 2004, these shares accounted for over 64% of total shares, that is, before China’s 
Split Share Structure Reform in 2005. 
The quotation system was adopted by both stock exchanges up until 2000. Under this 
system, the approval of a company’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) and obtaining a listing was 
determined by the CSRC on the basis of an annual quota broken down to each province and 
ministry. Then, these entities would select companies to list on the stock exchanges according 
to their allocated quotas. Tam (2002) suggested that the listing of a company under the 
quotation system was decided based on political considerations. In March 2001, the 
quotation system was replaced by the approval system and the government no longer 
allocated specific quotas, but instead IPO candidates were under substantial audit in 
accordance with the relevant regulations drawn up by the CSRC. The requirements for the 
IPOs, right issues, trading suspension and delisting were in accordance with an accounting 
oriented administration, thereafter it became important for the IPO candidates to meet the 
accounting oriented listing requirements to generate sustainable profits (Huang et al., 2013). 
For instance, the rights issue required listed companies to obtain no less than 6% weighted 
average return on equity for the latest three years (SZSE); and a company’s shares would be 
suspended, if it operates at a loss for three consecutive years (SZSE). These accounting-
oriented listing requirements encouraged listing firms to manage reported accounting 
information to be able to list on China’s stock exchanges, make rights issues as well as 
avoiding share suspending and delisting 
The capital markets system, unexpectedly, induced a strong incentive for 
manipulating earnings in China, as those reported are the primary basis for IPO, rights issuing 
and delisting. The reporting incentives were influenced by a certain level of political purpose 
of achieving higher earnings from SOEs, the accounting contracting role for bank loans and 
access to the stock markets, rather than the managerial incentives being influenced by the 




2.2.4 Legal system 
Compared with many advanced jurisdictions, China’s legal system is much younger and 
underdeveloped, with enforcement being ineffective, which offers little protection to 
investors (Allen et al., 2005). The cornerstone of good corporate governance and accounting 
information quality is a well-developed legal system (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Previous studies on investor protection legal enforcement show that its strength, to 
certain extent, affects managers’ incentives, accounting misconduct and misreporting is 
better detected when it is strong. Regarding which, reported earnings quality was enhanced 
after IFRS convergence in countries, bringing with it strong investor protection (DeFond et al., 
2007; La Porta et al., 2000; Jeanjean, 2012; Houqe et al., 2012; Leuz et al., 2003). IFRS is issued 
by the IASB, which does not have enforcement power over nations that adopted it, but rather, 
the implementation and enforcement is determined by the accounting profession, security 
exchanges, and courts of the country where firms are listed (Francis et al., 2005). As principle-
based accounting standards, IFRS requires managers and accounting professions to exercise 
professional judgement in order to present a fair view to outside investors. Low risk of 
litigation is unlikely to improve the accountability of controlling shareholders, managers, 
directors, and auditors. 
Understanding the legal system of a nation is necessary for comprehending the effects 
of implementation of IFRS. Given the need to have strong legal support for its implementation, 
the weak legal system, as in China, is likely to affect the outcome of its adoption.  
2.2.5 Social and culture system 
Social and cultural mores affect business operations and accounting practices by way of 
influencing human behaviour and judgement (Fanto, 1996). According to the cultural 
measures developed by Hofstede and Hofstede (2001), the ties between individuals in China 
tend to be tighter than in developed Western countries, such as the UK, the US and Australia. 
These authors described the culture difference in terms of power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, and individualism, with the Chinese being more likely to prefer a tightly connected 




rooted in Confucian philosophy, which stresses interdependent, stable, and harmonious 
relationships. These values are greatly reflected in China’s unique networks of relationships 
(guanxi), which dominate business and social activities (Lovett et al., 1999; Lin and Ho, 2009; 
Campbell, 1987). Guanxi also facilitates the growth of business (Yang et al., 2015). 
Luo and Chen (1997) pointed out that guanxi has developed beyond its historical 
meanings of family relationships to include unrelated individuals on the basis of common 
interests, which involves the exchange of gifts and benefits. This works based on the 
unspoken principle of reciprocity and consequently, people take responsibility for each other 
only within close connection nets, whilst lacking a sense of accountability towards outside 
parties and the public as a whole. That is, guanxi only benefits people inside its circle and it 
often penalises people outside it (Statman, 2009). Guanxi further extends to businesses and 
organisations in regards to related or unrelated individuals. Fan (2002) points out that guanxi 
involving business people and government officials is at the heart of China’s business dealing, 
which motivates members of Chinese government to take advantage of their positon by 
acting as intermediaries for people who need to establish business connections and hence, 
has resulted in widespread government corruption.  
Under such a business culture, as some studies have suggested, China’s accounting 
practices are likely to support statutory control, uniform practices, a conservative 
measurement approach and secrecy, as opposed to those in countries where there is higher 
accounting professionalism and which thus have lower levels of uniformity, conservatism and 
secrecy (Merchant et al., 1995; Chow et al., 2006; Fleming et al., 2009; Roberts and Scapens, 
1985). In China, a uniform accounting system and accounting policy are at the national level, 
rather than within individual firms, with accountants and managers being required to respond 
to various guidelines issued by government agencies (Fu and Tsui, 2003; Chow et al., 1999). 
Professional education and training for accountants so as to enable them to make 
independent professional judgements is lacking (Ball et al., 2003; Ding and Su, 2008; Chen 
and Zhang, 2010) and thus, such judgements, as emphasised in IFRS, is a new concept in 
Chinese accounting practice. Furthermore, most controlling shareholders of listed companies 
in China are either state-owned enterprises or government agencies that evaluate the 




that management incentives are also obligated by government agencies (Tong et al., 2014; 
Chen et al., 2008b). In addition, CSRC stock market regulations contain specific accounting 
performance based requirements regarding IPOs, rights issuing, trading suspension and 
delisting. China’s government intervention within listing firms’ corporate governance and 
stock market regulations provides strong incentives for top management to manipulate 
accounting information26. Accountants who lack independent professional judgement and 
experience combined with guanxi permeates throughout the business community and this is 
actively promoted by the top leadership to mask the real financial conditions (Zhao, 2013; 
Chen et al., 2008b).  
When IFRS has been imported to a country, the interpretation and realisation of the 
principles will be also shaped by the local culture. Understanding the characteristics of China’s 
social and business culture will help to explain how this has impacted on accounting practices, 
which is particularly important when assessing the effectiveness of IFRS adoption.  
2.3 Capital market and accounting infrastructure 
This section describes China’s capital market and accounting infrastructure. The nation has 
moved its economy from a centrally planned economy to a socialist market economy by 
gradually reforming its state ownership and control in SOEs as well as establishing stock 
exchanges to facilitate stock trading (Liu and Tian, 2012). 
2.3.1 Stock market development 
China set up the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in November 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) in April 1991, to facilitate equity capital acquisition by Chinese SOEs, 
speeding up the reform of state owned enterprises and attracting foreign investment 
(Groenewold, 2004). The listed firms on the SSE and the SZSE were originally only authorised 
to issue A-shares to domestic investors to protect the government’s control over the listed 
SOEs. Shares are split into tradable and non-tradable shares, with the latter representing a 
large proportion and are held by the local or central government. The A-shares are only 
 
26 The World Bank (2009) recommended that the Chinese government implement an awareness programme to 
motivate top management groups to comply with financial reporting standards on the basis of revealing a range 




available to trade amongst domestic investors to control the capital flow of international hot 
money for short speculation, hence protecting the stability of the financial market. In 2002, 
the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme was introduced, allowing foreign 
investor’s direct access to China’s capital market. In 2011, RMB QFII was initiated, which 
allows the use of RMB funds raised in HK by the subsidiaries of domestic fund management 
companies and securities companies there to invest in the domestic stock market. The 
subsidiary must obtain the approval of the CSRC and obtain the investment quota approved 
by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)27.  
Figure 2.1: Progress of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme 
 
In 1992, some listed firms were authorised to issue B shares to foreign investors, 
including those from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau. These are traded in US dollars on the 
SSE and Hong Kong Dollars on the SZSE. From early 2001 onwards, B-shares became 
permissible to trade for investors in mainland China. However, the firms only listing A-shares 
generally have higher financial quality than those only issuing B-shares (Eccher and Healy, 
2000). The liquidity of the B-share market is very poor, and it is difficult for institutional 
investors to make sizeable investments in such firms (Agnes Deng28, 2013). As a result, B-
 
27 http://english.sse.com.cn/investors/qfii/what/ 




share firms started to convert their shares into H-shares (see below) due to the more 
developed capital market in Hong Kong.29  
The shares issued on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) and on the U.S. Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) are called H- and N-shares, respectively, and are traded in the local currency. 
The firms that issued H-shares in the early stage were Chinese state SOEs that had gone 
through major restructuring designed to satisfy the requirements for international issuance 
(Groenewold, 2004). The Chinese government selected firms that were considered the most 
financially sound to list on the HKSE, with most of those also being listed in China’s A-share 
group and on the U.S. stock exchange. The most successful listed firms in China have typically 
been funded by states banks, and the government retained a majority ownership in them 
after the IPO (Eccher and Healy, 2000), while private firms are more likely to list on the U.S. 
stock market through an initial public offering (IPO) or reverse merger30due to the great 
difficulty of their gaining access to capital in China (Gillis, 2013). 
Since China opened the SSE and the SZSE in early 1990s, the Chinese financial market 
has developed remarkably. By the end of December 2015, there were a total of 2,918 listed 
firms, which included 2,81631  A share and 102 B share stocks were listed on both stock 
exchanges, with a total market capitalisation of US$ 6,004,947,670,000, which contributed 
58% of China’s GDP (World Bank, 2015)32. 
2.3.2 Financial requirements 
After the replacement of quotation system by the approval system on the stock market in 
March 2001, the government no longer allocated specific quotas. However, the IPO 
candidates were under substantial audit in accordance with the relevant government 
 
29 www.ft.com: End of the road for China’s ‘B’ market, by Josh Noble, 2013, 
30 Reverse merger, also referred to “backdoor listing”, “reverse takeover” or “shell game”, is a process whereby 
a private firm purchases the control of an IPO firm as a “shell” and then merges this “shell” firm with a private 
firm. At the time of the merger, the IPO firm is actually a non-operating entity that has gone through bankruptcy 
and is now dormant. Reverse merger listed firms are smaller, younger and riskier than IPO firms (Adjei, Cyree, 
and Walker, 2008).  The research of Lee et al. 2013 shows that Chinese reverse merger firms took up to 85% of 
foreign reverse mergers on the U. S. stock market between 2001 and 2010, with 52 being accused of accounting 
fraud among 148 Chinese reverse mergers prior to 2012.  






regulations from CSRC. As mentioned in the previous sections, the requirements for the IPOs, 
rights issues, trading suspension and delisting are in accordance with accounting oriented 
administration, which creates strong management incentives for listing and remaining listed 
on the stock market (Huang et al., 2013; Chen and Yuan, 2004; Haw et al., 2005). 
2.3.2.1 IPO requirements 
Under the Securities Law, the SZSE listed the requirements for IPO on the Main Board or SME 
Board33, which are rather brief: 
(1) “It shall have a proper and well-operating organisational structure; 
(2)  It shall have sustainable profitability and sound financial position; 
(3) In the past three years, there have been no falsehoods in its financial statements, and 
it has not committed any other serious illegal acts; and 
(4) Other requirements prescribed by the securities regulatory authority approved by the 
State Council.” 
The SZSE further explains that enterprises seeking IPO also should meet requirements 
prescribed by the CSRC: 
(1) “It must have been profitable in the last three consecutive years with net profits no 
less than RMB 30 million in aggregate; the net profits shall be calculated based on the 
amount before and after deducting non-recurring profits and losses, whichever is 
smaller; 
(2) The net cash flow from business operation in the last three years shall exceed RMB 50 
million in aggregate; or the revenue in the last three financial years shall exceed RMB 
300 million in aggregate; 
(3) The total share capital before the offer shall not be less than RMB 30 million; 
(4) The intangible assets as at the end of the last reporting period (after deducting land 
use rights, aquaculture rights, mining rights, etc.) shall not account for more than 20% 
of the net assets.” 
 
33The Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Board was established in February 2003, as a major step towards the 




Apart from the detailed accounting oriented administration, there were further 
requirements on what circumstances may have had impact on the sustainable profitability 
and risk considerations. The IPO profitability and sustainability requirement 34  on the 
ChiNext35 is lower than that for Main Board and SME Board. However, the requirements are 
still focused on maintaining return on equity targets and hence, the managers still tend to 
manage earnings in response to listing incentives.  
2.3.2.2 Rights issue requirement 
The requirements for rights issues in China are also based on the accounting information. 
Under the Securities Law and the requirements for rights issue were promulgated on 7th May 
2006 and companies wanting to do so with existing shareholders had to comply with the 
following:  
(1) must have been profitable in the last three consecutive years with weighted average 
return on net assets no less than 6%; the weighted average return on net assets shall 
be calculated based on the amount before and after deducting non-recurring profits 
and losses, whichever is smaller; 
(2) the operating profit decline shall not be more than 50% that of the previous year; 
(3) the accumulated profit from cash or shares in the latest three consecutive years shall 
be no less than 30% of total allocable profit. 
2.3.2.3 Delisting rules 
On the 22nd April 1998, the Chinese stock exchanges adopted “special treatment” (ST) 
regulation on the listed firms with abnormal financial conditions, which included: the net 
profits being negative in two consecutive fiscal years; the net assets per share in one recent 
 
34 (i)It must have been profitable in the most recent two consecutive years, with accumulated profits no less 
than RMB 10 million and in continued growth; or the issuer must have been profitable in the most recent year 
with net profits of no less than RMB 5 million and revenues of no less than RMB 50 million, and its revenue 
growth rate for either of the most recent two years must have been no less than 30%. Net profits shall be 
calculated based on the amount before or after deducting non-recurring profits and losses, whichever is smaller; 
(ii) It must have net assets of no less than RMB 20 million at the end of the most recent reporting period with 
no uncovered losses; (iii) It must have a total share capital of no less than RMB 30 million after the IPO. 
35 ChiNext was embarked upon in the SZSE on Oct 23rd, 2009, as China’s second board market. The purpose of 





fiscal year were lower than the book value per share; auditing firms provided any 
disagreement with the reported financial statement of the firm; and any abnormal financial 
behaviour identified and claimed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) or 
one of stock exchanges in China (Javvin Press, 2008). Listed firms who meet one of the 
abnormal financial conditions will be classified as ST firms, and have an ‘ST’ sign before their 
stock codes. 
The designation of ST was to improve Chinese firms’ corporate governance and 
discipline managers by bringing attention to the firms’ poor financial performance. The 
change for ST firms was that the daily price limits36 were reduced from the normal 10% to 5% 
and for consistent loss-making for two consecutive fiscal years they could be delisted. 
In order to return to normal stock and avoid delisting, ST firms had great incentives to 
manage their earnings. Interestingly, there have only been two companies that have been 
delisted since the ST system started in 199837, and many ST shares soared in the long term 
after experiencing a short term drop (Eger et al., 2007). Moreover, in 2007, a number of ST 
stock listed companies changed back to normal share listing due to debt restructuring (Song, 
2012). Regarding which, whether the IFRS-converged CAS improved reported earnings quality 
in ST firms owing to their earnings management incentive and their abnormal financial 
performance is hard to tell.  
2.3.3 Accounting infrastructure 
After 1949, China’s accounting practices were developed based on the concept of funds and 
sources application and allocation, where the corresponding relationship between fund 
applications and fund resources had to be strictly maintained and specific funds were only to 
be used for specific projects. Under a planned economy system, the government strictly 
controlled the prices of commodities and the resources and goods distribution were pre-
planned, Market-based accounting principles, including accruals, accounting consistency, 
 
36 Chinese stock exchanges adopted daily price limits. A normal stock price is allowed to move upward and 
downward of 10% from its previous day’s closing price within a single day, whilst ST firms’ stock prices are only 
allowed to change in a maximum range of 5% within a single day. China adopted daily price limits from 1996 in 
order to stop stock price manipulators. China Daily (5th Dec, 2001,) reported that before China’s price limits were 
reinstalled, the trading volume at the end of the day was much heavier.  




revenue recognition, historical cost were adopted, but never practised, under China’s central 
planned economy before the main economic reform in 1979. 
Following this reform, the government launched a series of accounting reforms 
towards internationally acceptable ones. The first accounting reform in 1985 was under the 
consideration of the need for foreign investors to consolidate Chinese business operations 
with their parent financial statements. That is, the Chinese MOF promulgated the Accounting 
System for Foreign Joint Venture, which was largely referenced to international accounting 
practices, as balance sheet preparation, historical cost application, and revenue recognition. 
Further, in response to the rapid growth of foreign investment in the early 1990s, the MOF 
issued the Accounting System for Foreign Enterprises to replace the Accounting System for 
Joint Ventures, which for the first time allowed the provision for possible losses arising from 
doubtful debts and stock. In 1992, after the establishment of the two Chinese stock exchanges, 
the MOF issued the Accounting System for Experimental Joint Stock Limited Enterprise since 
new information user groups emerged from the listed enterprises, which for the first time 
required enterprises to provide a balance sheet, income statement, and statement of changes 
in financial position. Moreover, the classification of assets, liabilities and equity were to be in 
with international accounting practices, at the first time for domestic firms. In 1998, the 
Accounting system for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises officially replaced the Accounting 
System for Experimental Joint Stock Limited Enterprise, which meant taking a closer step 
towards international accounting practices. In January 2001, the Accounting System for 
Business Enterprises (ASBE) came into effect, which aimed to achieve the desired uniformity 
and comparability in accounting regardless of ownership structures and industries, except for 
small businesses and financial institutions. The ASBE expanded the prudence accounting 
principle and stressed the needs of other information users besides the government (Xiao et 
al., 2004). The Chinese government was the main accounting information user, but as it 
gradually reduced its direct involvement in the business sector, the information needs of non-
government users increased accordingly. In 1992, ASBE identified investors, creditors, 
government agencies and the public as the user groups of accounting information. This was 
the first time the accounting standards in China acknowledged the information needs of users 
other than government agencies. The ASBE in 2001 represented a comprehensive effort at 




Enterprises, which is considered to be substantially in line with IFRS. This includes one new 
basic standard and 38 specific accounting standards applicable to enterprises established in 
China. 
Figure 2.2: Timeline of accounting reforms in China  
 
Over the last three decades, Chinese accounting has gradually converged towards 
international accounting standards; however, the process has been dominated by the Chinese 
government and this strong political influence in the business context represents a unique 
feature.  
Firstly, Chinese regulators maintain a conservative attitude towards fair value 
measurement and professional judgement, which are essentially at the centre of IFRS; 
however, the former is allowed for debt restructuring, Secondly, Chinese accounting 
regulators have a different view of business combination and have developed alternative 
accounting methods for those transactions. IFRS only allows the acquisition method of 
accounting for business combinations, whereas CAS has created two different methods for 
this: the pooling of interest method for transactions involving entities under common control 
and the purchase method for transactions involving entities not under common control. 
Furthermore, there is the exemption of related party transaction information disclosure for 
SOEs. The partially adopted fair value measurement, different business combination methods, 
and the exemption of SOEs from related party transaction disclosure reflects how IFRS 




the need for industrial reorganisation, rather than to meet the requirements of the global 
capital market (Baker et al., 2010). 
Table 2.2: Key differences between IFRS-converged CAS and IFRS 
IFRS-converged CAS IFRS 
Only allow the cost model for measurement of 
fixed assets and intangible assets  
Allows a revaluation model 
Land use rights are classified as intangible assets. 
The cost model is applied  
The land use rights are classified as operating leases 
and restrict to fair value 
Jointly controlled entities, only allows the equity 
method of accounting  
Also allows proportionate consolidation  
The reversal of all impairment losses  The reversal of only the impairment of goodwill  
State controlled entities are exempted from 
related parties transaction information 
disclosure   
No exemption for state owned entities 
Biological assets measured under the cost model Fair value measurement applied  
Cover reverse acquisitions under business 
combinations involving entities under common 
control  
Does not cover reverse acquisitions 
Throughout all of China’s economic reforms, the government has maintained its 
dominant position. It is still an important information user as either a major or controlling 
shareholders of restructured SOEs even after SSSR. Moreover, as the regulator of the business 
sector, satisfying its information needs still remains a priority of the accounting practices in 
China (Wu and Petal, 2014). Furthermore, the accounting profession is largely government 
regulated. The government imposes it administrative influence over the accounting 
profession in licensing of accounting firms and firms’ day to day operations through its 
agencies, including the MOF, CSRC, and the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(CICPA) (Tang, 2000). IFRS is principle-based and demands extensive professional judgement 
to present a true and fair view of the performance of an entity, which requires highly 
professional accountants, quality auditors, and effective enforcement. China still lacks such 




2.4 Recent stock market and accounting reforms 
There were two reforms around 2007: Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) on the stock 
market and IFRS adoption. This section sets out the details and possible outcomes of SSSR 
and IFRS convergence under China’s institutional environment.  
2.4.1 Split Share Structure Reform 
After the establishment of Chinese stock market in the early 1990s, the Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) imposed a split share structure in May 1992, which divided 
the shares into non-tradable and tradable. The main reason for issuing non-tradable shares is 
the government’s concerns about state-assets reduction and so, it has attempted to maintain 
state control over listed firms (Oi, 1995). Prior to SSSR, state shareholders mainly held non-
tradable shares that could not be freely traded in the stock market. So historically, individual 
shareholders were the dominant shareholder group in the tradable share market. As a result, 
the movement of share price was generated mainly among those individual shareholders.  
The split share structure caused a conflict of interest between tradable and non-
tradable shareholders in respect of the following. Firstly, large state shareholders that 
normally held non-tradable shares were not concerned about listed firms’ financial 
performance, because the shares they held were not tradable in the financial market and 
hence, share price movements in the stock market did not affect their wealth (Allen et al., 
2005). Secondly, government intervention caused speculative investment behaviour by  
individual shareholders (Wang et al., 2008). It promoted policy-oriented speculative 
investment behaviours due to the SOEs continuously receiving various forms of government 
support and the expected government bailouts in times of SOEs facing financial difficulty to 
prevent them from delisting. Hence, individual shareholders exhibited a highly speculative 
tendency with a short investment horizon (Chen et al., 2010a). Finally, there was the agency 
problem between major shareholders and minority investors. Unlike in a market-based 
mature financial system, the main agency problem in China was the expropriation of minority 
interests by controlling shareholders with the concentrated ownership structure, which gave 
them considerable power so as to able to dominate company decisions and benefit 




2006); Zou et al 2008). Most listed companies in China were restructured from former SOEs, 
with the parent groups serving as their largest shareholders, which created strong business 
and personnel connections between the listed companies and their parent ones. Related 
party transactions (lending, borrowing, related party sales) amongst the unlisted parent and 
their listed subsidiary  was the main method used by controlling shareholders to quell 
minority shareholders’ interest (Aharony et al., 2010). Peng and Bewley (2010) estimated that 
more than 80% of listed firms were involved in related party transactions in some years. Those 
trundling or propping activities in these firms undermined the financial reporting quality and 
the public confidence in the stock market.  
To settle the issues caused by the split share structure, since 1998, the CSRC has 
proposed some schemes and regulations to enable non-tradable shares to be traded in the 
financial market to solve the problems of capital shortage in SOEs, to allow allocation of 
capital raised from the stock market to the SOEs’ government funds and to dump state shares 
on public investors (Yang et al., 2015). In 1999, the CSRC selected 10 listed A share firms with 
non-tradable shares and tried to sell these shares to existing shareholders at an auction price. 
This price was based on the firms’ net assets value, but it was too high for investors to 
purchase, so the CSRC had to terminate the reform. Following this, in June 2001, the CSRC 
proposed another reform, which required new share issues and a 10% reduction in state 
owned non-tradable shares, however, the stock market declined sharply three months later, 
falling into an extraordinary bear market, so the CSRC had to halt the reform in 2001.  
Based on these reform attempts, CSRC gained reform experiences. On 2nd February 
2004, the idea of the SSSR was brought up at the of the State Council on Promoting the Reform 
and Liberalisation and Stable Development of the Capital Market, which was known as “Nine 
Provisions of the State Council “. It was held that the reform should respect the rules of the 
market and exercise diligence in protecting the rights and interests of investors, especially 
public investors. The SSSR was proposed in April 2005 and four medium sized listed firms 
adopted it as a pilot. In June 2005, another 42 listed firms announced the reform and 81 SOEs 






Figure 2.3: Progress of non-tradable shares reform 
 
The proposal under the SSSR was that companies or major shareholders should 
compensate about three shares for every ten to tradable shareholders so as to make all non-
tradable shares tradable38. The compensation agreement was negotiated between tradable 
and non-tradable shareholders, with larger SOEs often offering higher compensation. 
Tradable shareholders could accept or reject the compensation offer. If the existing tradable 
shareholders rejected the offer, then the reform would be delayed until both parties had 
agreed upon it. The procedure of turning non-tradable shares into tradable lasted for 24-36 
months.  The procedure of SSSR was designed to prevent steep decreases in share price due 
to a large supply of shares transferring from being non-tradable on the stock market at one 
time.  
It has always been a priority for the CSRC to improve governance quality and the 
marketability of state-owned and legal entity-owned non-tradable shares with respect to the 
ownership structure reforms. China’s SOEs reforms have become the core of its transition to 
a market economy (Qian, 1996). To overcome the issues raised from the split share structure, 
China’s Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) is considered as a landmark event in China’s 
financial liberalisation and marks as a major change in the institutional setting on the Chinese 
stock market (Firth et al., 2010). Given the agreed compensation scheme, this enabled the 
conversion of non-tradable state-owned shares into being tradable ones.  
Prior to the SSSR, the majority shares in the Chinese stock markets were non-tradable, 
comprising 64% of the total in December 2004. Hence, only 36% of the shares were owned 






information from listed companies or to be involved in the decision making process (Lin et al., 
2003). As mentioned above, by December 2006, 96% of the listed firms had completed the 
reform (Qi 2007). However, whilst the completion of the SSSR did transfer non-tradable 
shares into being tradable, this did not necessarily involve changes in the ownership structure 
and being property under state control. The reform was highly driven by the incentives of 
government agents to boost SOEs’ financial performance. That is, the expectation was that 
the SSSR would stimulate the incentive of government agents to improve SOEs’ operating 
efficiency without fundamentally changing their ownership structure (Firth et al., 2010) In 
other words,  the shareholding structure is still characterised as state dominance, simply 
because the majority of listed companies are restructured SOEs and the state is the largest 
shareholder. As a result, the majority of listed firms are still directly or indirectly controlled 
by the government. The fundamental fact of maintaining government ownership structure in 
listed SOEs makes the intended outcome of SSSR debatable in terms of whether those non-
tradable shares became truly tradable, even if technically so, on the financial market (Wu and 
Patel, 2015). Yang et al. (2015) emphasised that SSSR cannot be considered as a full 
privatisation, because it only involved transforming non-tradable shares into tradable ones, 
which meant state owned shares, whilst being tradable, were not necessarily going to be 
traded.  
The empirical evidence on the impact of the reform is still not clear. The investigation 
into SSSR has been generally isolated from IFRS impact regardless of the fact that most firms 
finished it (96%) by end of 2006 and the IFRS convergence mandate was from 1st January 2007, 
which meant that the repercussions of both reforms were to some extent contemporaneous.  
2.4.2 IFRS adoption 
On top of the SSSR, IFRS convergence became mandatory for all the Chinese firms listed on 
mainland stock exchanges from 1st January 2007. Prior to this, firms offering A-shares to 
domestic investors were required to report their accounting information under the old 
Chinese GAAP; firms issuing B-shares to international investors were required to use IFRS; and 
firms with both A- and B-shares were required to do both and prepare two sets of financial 
statements. H-share firms were required to report under either Hong Kong Accounting 




financial statements according to the old GAAP. Since 1st January 2007, all firms listed on 
Chinese stock exchanges have been required to prepare their financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS-converged CAS. Firms with both A- and H-shares were; however, 
required to provide also accounting information compliant with both IFRS and IFRS-converged 
CAS up until 2010, when the need for IFRS financial statements was lifted.  
Figure 2.4: Frim classifications: old GAAP VS new CAS 
 
China’s IFRS convergence is not yet complete, but the new Chinese Accounting 
Standards (CAS) is converging towards it. There are concerns from other countries and 
academies about whether China’s new CAS is truly convergent with IFRS, especially regarding 
related party transactions and disclosure, reversal of impairment of depreciable assets, and 
government subsidies (Taub, 2006). Ding and Su (2008)  suggested that, whilst the contents 
of new CSA has now substantially converged with IFRS, the current accounting regulations 
continue to depart from it, given the unique Chinese institutional setting, as discussed in 
previous section, including: exemption of SOEs from related party transactions and a 
conservative attitude towards fair value adoption. That is, fair value measurement has only 
been applied to investment property, biochemical products, and debt restructuring where 
regulators recognise an active market exists for fair value to be reliably determined and 
verified. There are different accounting methods for business combination and asset 
impairment is different from IFRS, i.e. impairment of long-term tangible assets is considered 
as permanent and recovery of impairment on depreciable ones is not allowed. The different 
requirements under IFRS converged CAS from real IFRS can be attributed to China’s unique 




in accounting regulation and practice. That is, it still is the principal player in the Chinese 
economy despite multifarious economic reforms during the last forty-years (Ding and Su, 
2008; Xiao et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2008b; Bushman et al., 2004). The government still 
controls almost all large listed companies and most resource allocation channels, especially 
banks and the equity market. It played both “referee” and “player” throughout the accounting 
reforms. The IFRS convergence in 2007 was seen as a priority government interest (Wu and 
Patel, 2015) and it was in control of how this would take place.  
Convergence in China gave more scope for professional judgement. That is, the 
change from the rules-based old Chinese GAAP to the more flexible principle-based new CAS 
allowed for a certain degree of subjective judgement, which consequently implies excessive 
earnings management. Further, information disclosure requirements placed on the SOEs 
(related party transactions between SOEs and their subsidiaries) remains unchanged from the 
old GAAP. SSSR encouraged SOEs to boost their financial performance and IFRS convergence 
permitted more professional judgement on accounting practice, but related party 
transactions by SOEs remained free from disclosure to the public. Hence, it is questionable 
whether China’s IFRS convergence could work properly in markets disciplined mainly by state 
regulators, rather than market mechanisms. Moreover, the extent to which accounting 
practice was determined by accounting standards, or IFRS adoption, as happened in 2007, 
was hindered by collusion between the government and listed SOEs, with the former 
encouraging the latter to engage with earnings management incentives to improve financial 
performance39.  
2.4.3 Earnings quality under special Chinese context, SSSR and IFRS adoption  
Jiang et.al (2009) argued that efficient government regulation can have a real, positive 
effect on the economy as whole and is able to assist markets to establish a well-functioning 
mechanism which puts social resources to the most effective use. At the same time, there is 
a need to give the market mechanism itself room to function in an orderly, competitive 
environment in order promote economic efficiency. It is central government’s goal to 
 
39  Chen, X., Lee, C.-W.J. & Li, J., 2008b. Government assisted earnings management in China. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 27(3), pp. 262-274. Chen et al. found that collusion between local/central 




establish a market mechanism which results in a high level of economic efficiency. The central 
government/CSRC of China had, indeed, proposed various non-tradable share reforms well 
before 2004, but these had not succeeded (see 2.4.1). 
Following completion of SSSR implementation and IFRS adoption, whether or not 
economic efficiency actually was (or has been) enhanced is questionable – since the 
incentives and intentions of central government may not be shared by other parties involved. 
Indeed, these other parties may have quite different or competing incentives. Those parties 
with the stronger direct involvement in the implementation of the SSSR, not necessarily 
central government or CSRC, may well obtain (or engineer) the outcomes aligned with their 
incentives and desires desire get results that are better suited with their desires. 
As discussed in section 2.4.1, the SSSR is applicable only to firms with non-tradable 
shares in issue. The majority of such firms are SOEs; and within those SOEs, other SOEs, state-
related bodies and agents own the majority (or all) of the non-tradeable. Consequently, the 
majority, controlling shareholder groups held shares which could not be traded on the stock 
market. Those shareholders (largely individuals) holding tradable shares, albeit the dominant 
shareholder group in the tradable share market, were minority shareholders. The conflict of 
interests between majority and minority shareholders pre-SSSR were: (i) majority 
shareholders holding non-tradable shares showed less concern about firms’ share price 
movements since movements in the stock market did not affect their wealth (Allen et al., 
2005); (ii) minority shareholders exhibited highly policy-oriented and short-term-speculative 
investment behaviours (Chen et al., 2010a); (iii) the expropriation of minority interests by 
majority/controlling shareholders via an appointed management group which gave majority 
shareholders privileges to access company’s inside information, influence financial decisions, 
and benefit themselves at the expense of the minority (Xu et al., 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Zou 
et al 2008). The majority shareholders and managers, being the chief implementors of the 
SSSR for SOEs, had both the incentive and the opportunity to manage firms’ SSSR-
implementation and financial performance for their own benefit, rather than pursue the 
central government’s goal of improving economic efficiency. Minority shareholders, albeit 





In circumstances of potential common/mutual benefit as between 
majority/controlling shareholders and their appointed management group, the managers had 
pronounced incentives to manage earnings so as to maximise benefits for themselves and 
majority/controlling shareholders through the SSSR, at the expense of minority shareholders’ 
interests. Further, IFRS, being principles-based standards with much latitude for management 
discretion, are far less prescriptive than China’s rule-based GAAP. Further, under IFRS-
converged CAS, SOEs are exempted from disclosure of related-party transaction information, 
and fair value measurement is problematic given that financial markets are dominated by 
government interests. China’s convergence towards IFRS in 2007, therefore, may have had 
the unintended consequence of giving majority/controlling shareholders and managers 
greater latitude for earnings manipulation during the period of SSSR implementation. 
Given China’s partial IFRS adoption, SSSR related management incentives, 
government control in the financial market, low regulatory enforcement and guanxi culture 
permeating into business operations, the potential to follow the accounting standards 
robustly was unlikely to happen. Hence, studying the impact of accounting standards on 
reported information quality in line with the approach of international scholarship could not 
give a complete picture of the Chinese context  (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Piotroski and 
Wong, 2012; Piotroski et al., 2015; Ball, 2006).  
2.5 Conclusion 
China’s economy has undergone an incredible transformation over the last four decades, 
including the introduction of public equity markets and the embracing of many Western style 
market arrangements. The market development, along with the arrival of foreign capital, has 
created a demand for better information on China’s listed firms. However, the attributes of 
China’s institutional setting that militate against this are likely to continue in the foreseeable 
future (Ding and Su, 2008). The Chinese market is still tightly regulated after much economic 
reform, with the Chinese government remaining as the principal player in the economy.  The 
role of political connections and incentives, the state ownership of the majority of listed firms, 
and the concentrated share structure, have remained pretty much unchanged over this same 
period (Wu and Petal, 2014). This, coupled with the underdeveloped legal system and a 




market participants. A higher public financial information quality would require a shift in the 
abovementioned institutional arrangements, not just in the accounting standards and 
financial market regulations, but also regarding the political, legal and financial systems. (Ball, 
2001; Piotroski and Wong, 2012; Piotroski et al., 2015; Xiao et al., 2004).  
While China is moving towards higher market liberalisation and internationally 
acceptable accounting practices at the practical level, the changes at the institutional level 
have been largely superficial. The mismatch between the desire for market liberalisation and 
international regulatory adoption and the Chinese institutional environment is likely to 
continue, which will compromise the effectiveness of SSSR and IFRS convergence (Ding and 
Su, 2008). SSSR is one of the unique features of the Chinese financial market, whether it has 
been a success is debatable owing to the remaining share structure after its implementation. 
Whether the non-tradable shares become practically tradable or only technically so in name 
in the market is an unknown, because this depends on the degree to which the state wants 
to remain in control. Furthermore, the SSSR aim of encouraging SOEs managers to take into 
consideration financial performance will boost the management incentives for them. 
In general, IFRS adoption has been predicted and tested to improve earnings quality 
in most developed economies. Incontestably, China, as a fast-growing emerging economy, is 
also characterised by significant government involvement and control in the financial market 
and accounting regulation and practice, with lower law enforcement, personal networks and 
domination of Guanxi in business operations. All of these factors will have a major impact on 
the outcome of higher earnings quality after China’s IFRS adoption, not to mention, the new 
CAS only being partially converged with IFRS, rather than being adopted in full. Hence, in the 
Chinese context, the simple prediction that the adoption of IFRS-converged CAS would lead 
to improved earnings quality does not hold.  This is, inter alia, because the confounding factor 
of the SSSR, to a certain extent, has encouraged earnings management incentives by listed 
SOEs, which could be undermining the reported earnings quality in the post-IFRS convergence 




Chapter 3: Theoretical framework 
3.1  Introduction  
This chapter discusses theory and develops insights through which to contextualise SSSR 
implementation and IFRS convergence on earnings quality in the context of China’s unique 
institutional setting. The chapter considers, in turn, agency theory, modern property rights 
theory and behavioural finance, then drawing together pertinent aspects for this research.  
Agency theory is focused on the relationship and relative interests of agents (being 
firm’s managers/directors in the common business setting) acting on behalf of principals (firm 
shareholders), highlighting the agency problem and associated agency costs when the latter 
cede authority to the former. Property rights theory, on the other hand, supports the notion 
that the separation of ownership and management improves economic efficiency. 
Behavioural finance theory holds that markets are (to a significant extent) inefficient, since 
market participants’ actions are based in human psychology rather than strict adherence to 
classical rationality, then associated issues with availability and usage (perception) of 
information and the information content of prices are strongly influenced by human 
psychology. With this perspective, behaviour and actions are influenced by emotions, biases 
and illusions, which cannot be rationalised. For this study, these three theories are considered 
together to assist contextualising and hypothesising the outcomes from China’s recent 
accounting and finance reforms. This chapter continues as follows: section 3.2 outlines the 
research philosophy and framework adopted by this study; section 3.3 discusses agency 
theory; section 3.4 explores property rights theory; and section 3.5 addresses behavioural 
finance theory; finally, section 3.6 considers the theories together and proposes the 
hypotheses in the context of this study. 
3.2 Research philosophy and framework 
Extended from Burrell and Morgan (1979), Laughlin (1995) argued that there is actually a 
five-part schema related to ontology, human nature, nature of science, epistemology and 
methodology in the multiple nature of the social science continuum. Research theory 




knowledge either past or present and how it relates to the current focus of investigation 
(epistemology); and how to define the nature of discovery methods (methodology).  
Ontological considerations 
Ontological Assumption: Objectivism – Ontological views concern the ways in which we see 
reality: (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). The study of Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggested that 
there are two major ways of viewing the world: objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism is 
the view that “asserts that social phenomena and their meaning have an existence that is 
independent of social actors” (Bryman, 2008a, p.22). In the view of objectivism, there is only 
one truth (or a limited number of universal truths) and the truth is measurable. Hence, in the 
paradigm of objectivism, the response to the question of “how we see the reality” is that 
there is a singly objective truth affected by a consistent set of laws. Alternatively, subjectivism 
argues that “reality is created internally through [the responses/interactions of] actors” 
(Bryman, 2008). Subjectivism suggests that the world is widely subject to various 
interpretations and that measurement is not always possible or accurate. In the perspective 
of the subjectivist paradigm, there is no such thing as one single objective truth, rather a 
number of subjective truths. Those who believe that there is a single objective truth (or set of 
universal truths) and that the truth can be tested or measured numerically are commonly 
referred to as positivists; those who believe there is no reality other than that which 
individuals create internally via their own opinions/interpretations are referred to as 
constructivists or interpretivists. Under a maintained assumption that there is a single truth 
or set universal truths, it may be held that truth(s) can be discovered by collecting 
measurement and testing in neutral and objective research, providing unbiased knowledge in 
a positivist manner. 
Epistemological considerations 
Epistemological Assumption: Positivism – Following the above discussion, after determining 
the ontological view of the nature of reality, the research paradigm can then move to the 
epistemological consideration of: how do we obtain knowledge about reality (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007). Epistemology “concerns the question of what is/or should be regarded as 




epistemological approach should be in line with the choice of ontological assumption 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Having taken objectivism as the ontological view for the present 
study, the choice of epistemological approach is positivism. This stands in terms of an 
observable, measurable and quantifiable perspective framed by objective, scientific and 
experimental traditionalism, which thus fits with the ontological view of seeing reality (Collis 
and Hussey, 2009). In the field of earnings quality investigation, most of the studies have 
adopted a positivist stance. Pure positivism contends that, given sufficient resource, 
everything can be measured and quantified; albeit this is, clearly open to challenge in practice. 
The positivist approach can involve pitfalls, and unreliable/invalid results, if the 
method is not correctly selected and applied, and/or, if care is not taken as regards to the 
measurements. There is a constant challenge, therefore, to ensure well-founded model 
development and deployment, careful data collection and handling, and thoughtful 
interpretation. 
Axiological and methodological consideration 
Having adopted positivism as the epistemological assumption, consideration of the research 
paradigm moves on to the specific approach. Research approaches can be categorised into 
two types, inductive and deductive (Bryman and Bell 2007). For this thesis, a deductive route 
is taken. A standard deductive approach is primarily based on existing theories or others’ 
findings in order to provide supportive justification in raising hypotheses. Having arrived at 
the hypotheses, the approach of this research follows a typical deductive style (Figure 3.1). 











                  Figure 3.1: Flow chart of deductive research 
 
The deductive, empirical research method has been of considerable importance to the 
accounting academic community and has taken central stage since the early 1970s (Laughlin, 
1995). Jensen (1976) contended that accounting research should be conducted with a 
positivist epistemology and empirical research methodology, arguing that “a positive 
accounting theory which will explain why accounting is what it is, why accountants do what 
they do, and what effects these phenomena have on people and resource utilization.” 
Developments in financial economics, the formulation of the efficient market hypothesis and 
agency theory have, inter alia, created a context ripe for the application of positive accounting 
theory and the deductive empirical research method by accounting academics (Laughlin, 
1995). 
The following sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 discuss the existing theories, and section 3.6 
covers the development of the high-level hypotheses of this study. Empirical work, with full 




3.3 Agency theory  
Agency theory has emerged as the dominant paradigm in the financial economics literature 
since Ross (1973) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). As developed by those studies, it was 
primarily concerned with the relationship between managers and shareholders. An earlier 
study by Berle and Means (1932) suggested that separation of ownership and control is a 
typical feature of modern corporations. Without using the term “agency theory”, they first 
showed a keen awareness of the concerns of modern agency theory and stated that the 
separation of ownership and control may eliminate the checks and balances that owners once 
had over management. Jensen and Meckling (1979) elaborated that the modern, diffuse 
ownership corporation is intimately associated with the agency problem, because of the 
separation of ownership and control, whereby the diverging interests between shareholders 
and managers result in a nexus of contracts among these parties in order to minimise the 
conflicts of interest.  
So, agency theory concerns the relationship between principals or the owners of firms 
and their agents, the managers, with an agency problem rooted in the separation of 
ownership and control in the modern corporation structure (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). When a principal assigns substantial decision making power to an agent, 
the latter may not always exercise that power in the best interest of the former and hence, 
there is an agency problem and agency cost arises. The agency problem is typified by 
circumstances of asymmetric information (the agent has information further to and better 
than that of the principal); bounded rationality (an inability, in a complex world and with 
limited time and other resources, for agents perfectly and consistently to optimise on behalf 
of their principals – whatever their best intentions); and moral hazard (that agents act largely 
in circumstances unobserved by the principals they serve, and are not commonly subject to 
censure for divergence from the best interests of the principals). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
defined agency costs as the sum of: (i) monitoring costs - costs incurred to monitor alignment 
of the agent’s actions with the principal’s best interests, e.g. audit, non-executive directors 
and committees, etc.; (ii) costs incurred voluntarily by agents to demonstrate their pursuit of 
the principal’s best interests (e.g. shareholder briefings, newsletters, provision of easy share-




contracting costs are also recognised a substantial contributor to agency cost – being the costs 
of negotiating and drafting agency contracts, proscriptive and prescriptive contract terms as 
well as the rewards/inducements to act as the principal(s) desire, e.g. performance-related 
salary/reward structures, bonuses, share options, etc. In modern corporate structures, there 
are commonly a large number of diverse shareholders (principals), who are not involved in 
decision making; with directors (agents) appointed to act on their behalf. In accordance with 
the above, principals aim to limit divergence from their interests by establishing appropriate 
incentives for the agent, and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit undesirable (and 
promote desirable) activities of the agent. It is impossible for the principal and the agent to 
ensure at zero cost that the latter will take optimal actions from the former’s point of view; 
nor to eliminate the agency problem via contracting, monitoring and bonding efforts: the 
difference in outcome as between that resulting from the agent’s actions and that possible 
assuming maximisation of the welfare of the principle is the residual cost (or residual loss) 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory has developed along two lines: positivist and principal-agent (Jensen, 
1983). Positivist researchers have focused on identifying situations in which the principal and 
the agent are most likely to have conflicts of interests, and have been more concerned with 
describing governance mechanisms, such as independent boards of directors, to solve the 
agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). Whilst positivist agency theory can be regarded as 
enriching economics by offering a more complex view of corporations, it has been criticised 
as minimalist and lacking in rigour by organisational theorists and microeconomists (Jensen, 
1983). In comparison to the positivist agency theory, principal-agency theory is abstract and 
mathematical, thus being less accessible to many scholars. Principal-agency researchers are 
more concerned with a general theory of the principal and agent relationship, one that can 
be applied to employer and employee, buyer and supplier, lawyer and client, and to any other 
agency relationships (Harris and Raviv, 1978). It has a broader focus and greater interest in 
theoretical implications. However, scholars have been primarily focused on the more well-
known positivism stream of the agency theory, mainly concentrating on the special case of 




As a normative consequence of recognising the agency relationship, the approach to 
the agency problem is about how to structure the contractual relation between the owners 
and managers in order that the latter to act to maximise the former’s welfare under 
conditions of uncertainty and imperfect monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1979). According 
to normative agency theory, corporations should use incentive structures that align the 
interests of owners and managers as well as increasing the monitoring and control oversight 
of the latter (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). The means of mitigation of the agency problem 
caused by the separation of ownership and control is a corporate governance system that can 
act as the monitoring mechanism. In this context, greater concentration of ownership and 
closer influence of management by controlling shareholders may be seen as leading to a 
reduction in the separation between ownership and control, with controlling shareholders 
having the ability to make sure the managers do not misappropriate the interests of either 
the controlling shareholders or the minority (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Miller and Sardais, 
2011). 
In addition to the classic corporate agency problem, however, there is another issue 
in relation to a conflict of interest between minority shareholders and controlling block 
holders when the latter have the power to oppress the former (Berkman et al., 2009; Miller 
and Sardais, 2011; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Under such circumstances, the large, majority 
shareholders may be opportunists; and agent (director) independence and uniform 
information asymmetries (i.e. similar for the majority and the minority) may support an 
outcome of equal efforts on behalf of all shareholder and stakeholder groups, and lead to a 
more sustainability firm structure over the longer term than non-separation between agent 
and shareholders (Miller and Sardais, 2011). Gomes (2000) suggested that, in many countries, 
the issue is not the traditional agency problem between managers and shareholders, but 
rather, the agency problem between the controlling and minority shareholders. The agency 
problem between these two cohorts is due to the lack of protection of minority shareholders 
and large controlling shareholders often being involved in the firm’s management – under 
such structure, the role of monitoring moot. Gomes (2000) further argued that, firms are 
more likely to have a controlling shareholder or controlling shareholder block (and poor 
governance structures) in market environments with less effective minority investor 




are likely to see the formation of a controlling block of shareholders. Controlling shareholders 
(or a controlling block) have incentives and the power to extract benefits for themselves, 
instead of acting as a monitor to ensure value maximisation for all shareholders, including the 
minority. Accordingly, large/block shareholders (and other stakeholders), such as institutional 
investors and banks, are less likely to act as effective monitors: it may be more profitable for 
those large block holders to derive value for themselves than to spend resources on 
monitoring and challenging management. 
Under China’s environment of weak legal protection of investors and inefficient 
corporate governance structures, controlling blocks of shareholdings were likely to form, both 
before and after SSSR. Hence, controlling shareholder groups - the state, central government 
agents or local SOE hierarchies – may have remained in control (or re-acquired control) of 
firms via control of shareholding blocks after SSSR. However, the controlling blocks of shares 
in SOEs became tradeable in the market – so the controlling shareholders would have had 
increased ability (via market trading) to extract value for themselves from SOE firms, to the 
detriment of minority (private) shareholders. Conversely, prior to SSSR, with the controlling 
block in SOEs being non-tradable shares, controlling shareholders and managers would have 
been less able to expropriate value from minority shareholders. Majority/block shareholders 
are not expected to monitor management on behalf of the minority, nor be concerned with 
the wealth of the minority, but rather, to extract private benefits for themselves (Novaes, 
1999). The conversion of non-tradeable shares in SOEs to become tradeable would, therefore, 
have made minority shareholders more vulnerable. 
In China, before SSSR implementation, 80% of the listed companies had controlling 
shareholders, most of which were represented by non-tradeable shares (Liao et al., 2014). La 
Porta et al. (2000) denoted a firm as having a large shareholder, if it has one with more than 
20% of the shares and as having multiple large shareholders, if the largest has more than 20% 
and the second largest has at least 10%. In such cases, they argued, the main agency problem 
is likely to be that between majority and minority shareholders. In China, this translates to 
implying an agency problem between the holders of non-tradeable shares and the holders of 
tradeable one. The holder of non-tradeable shares in SOEs are the Chinese government, its 




between government representatives/agents and private investors. Prior to SSSR, the non-
tradable share prices were based on book value of assets, while the price of tradeable shares, 
post SSSR, is based on the capital-market-based mechanism of price discovery. As a result, 
the companies subject to SSSR had not only incentives (see Chapter 1), but also the capability 
to manipulate both earnings and prices prior to completion of the lock-in phase of SSSR. 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) suggested that agency theory has traditionally focused on 
aligning the interest between principals and managers and it has been widely adopted in the 
Western corporate governance literature. They criticised this literature on agency theory for 
failing to account for key differences across countries, and argued that ownership and control 
is not clearly separated in many jurisdictions. For example, in Eastern Europe and Asian 
countries, block holders such as governments, banks, and families retain significant capacity 
to exercise direct control. In these contexts, there are fewer market-oriented rules for 
information disclosure, weaker managerial incentives, and/or a greater use of debt (as 
compared to equity). 
For China’s institutional setting, similar to Eastern Europe and Japan (where the 
ownership and control are not as separate as in typical modern, Western corporate 
structures), the effective control rights of managers vary considerably. In the Western 
literature, the agency problem results from the separation of ownership and control, whilst 
for China, such separation might be viewed as a solution for management inefficiency and 
high political cost (Qian, 1996). Hence, unlike most Western literature, which focuses on the 
normative aspects of the agency relationship in terms of the problems of separation of 
ownership and control, the potentially positive aspects of such separation must be recognised 
in the Chinese context. Jensen and Meckling (1979) argued that the most important conflict 
arises when the owners overshadow the managers insofar as the latter’s initiative to search 
out possible profitable ventures is reduced and the effort of monitoring increases.  
The core intent of China’s economic reforms – including the establishment of two 
stock exchanges in the early 1990s and implementation of SSSR from 2005 to 2008 – was to 
reform SOEs. The objective was to improve SOEs’ management efficiency by means of 
“expanding enterprise autonomy” and “increasing retained profits”(Qian, 1996). Emphasis 




efficiency. Hence, the classical agency problem of the Western literature was not a concern, 
but rather, a separation of management and control was regarded as desirable, with 
managers to have ownership of decision-making under market discipline. 
In study, therefore, two key agency relationships/conflicts are relevant: 
1. Local SOE hierarchies both majority owned (via large/block shareholdings) 
and wholly controlled (as directors and managers) SOEs. There was an 
agency conflict between the local SOE hierarchies and the minority (private) 
shareholders in SOEs; 
2. Local SOE hierarchies were responsible for implementing SSSR on behalf of 
the Chinese government, delivering the desired benefits. There was a 
classical agency conflict between what was desired by the government, 
and what best served the local SOE hierarchy. 
3.4 Property rights theory 
Property rights are “the rights of individuals to the use of resources … supported by the force 
of etiquette, social custom, ostracism, and formal legal enacted laws supported by the states’ 
power of violence or punishment” (Alchian, 1965, P817). All economic activities, including the 
use of assets, earned income, transfer or exchange of assets and resources, trade and 
production can be seen as the exchange of bundles of property rights. Kim and Mahoney 
(2005) defined the economic aspects of property rights as a complementary concept within a 
legal framework that gives these rights legal protection and third-party enforcement. 
The general perspective of modern property rights theory is that in a world of 
incomplete contracts, the ownership of physical assets matters for the efficiency of 
investment (De Meza and Lockwood, 1998). The modern property rights theory of the firm 
was first introduced by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1991), being termed 
the ‘GHM approach’. They made a distinction between specific and residual rights of control, 
stating that when it is costly to list all the former over assets in the contract, then it is optimal 
to let one party purchase all of the latter from the ownership. In both papers, it was asserted 




and Tirole (1994) further distinguished between formal and real authorities. They argued that 
one party that has formal control rights may delegate to another partial real control, because 
of the latter’s information advantage. One of the important insights of property rights theory 
is that different specifications of these arise in response to the economic problem of 
allocating scarce resources, and that the prevailing specification of property rights affects 
economic behaviour and outcomes (Coase, 1960; Pejovich, 1982; Pejovich, 1995). Economic 
inefficiency occurs when many different people are able to hold partial rights to facets of a 
single resource. When there are more than two contracting parties, this can affect the income 
flow from a set of property rights and delineating each party’s respective right becomes 
difficult. The issue of distributing income generated by the collective efforts of different 
contracting parties needs consideration. Both the initial assignment of property rights and 
expected distribution will impact on individuals participating in collective effort (Libecap, 
1989). A configuration of property rights that is posited to be an economically efficient 
response is one which provides appropriate economic incentives for the owner of each 
bundle of property rights. 
Modern property rights theory emphasises the importance of the allocation of control 
rights in analysing firms’ performance. The theory more fully accounts for business sectors 
where inefficient economic outcomes persist, while agency theory adopts a perspective more 
based on management opportunism (Kim and Mahoney, 2005). Beyond agency theory, 
property rights theory brings elements into the analysis of contracts and of institutions that 
account for circumstances where there is potentially failure to reach satisfactory contractual 
agreements or where there is no need for a contract between counterparties (Kim and 
Mahoney, 2002, 2005). Unlike agency theory, the unit of analysis is the principal-agent 
contractual relationship, and emphasis is placed on the economic incentives of the 
contracting individuals within the context of this relationship. Moreover, the focus of 
property rights theory is on the institution level, the political environment and analysis of 
public policy regarding the contract cost at a micro-analytic level (Kim and Mahoney, 2005). 
On the institutional level, property rights theory provides an evolutionary perspective of the 
processes through which institutional choices are made (Anderson and Hill, 1975), where the 
vested economic interests of the contracting parties and potential distributional conflicts are 




Under property rights theory, the reasons why governments may be ineffective in 
resolving economic inefficiencies are that an expanding set of property rights owners can lead 
to widespread contractual failure (Wiggins and Libecap, 1985; Libecap and Wiggins, 1985), 
whereby not only will the managers pursue their self-interest within the rules, for they will 
also allocate resources towards changing property rights rules to their own benefit (Qian and 
Stiglitz, 1996). This is particularly the case in China, with the non-state sector developing at a 
fast speed, managers, or their relatives and friends, often have their own businesses, which 
provide opportunities for diverting state assets into private benefits.  
Agency theory, as discussed above, concentrates on aligning the economic incentives 
of the agent with those of the principal in order to maximise shareholder wealth. Agency 
problems result from information asymmetry, bounded rationality and moral hazard issues, 
arising in the business context through separation of ownership and control. In terms of 
property rights, an agent can appropriate a principal’s ownership rights by shirking his/her 
duty in circumstances where information asymmetry and measurement problems exist. 
Property rights theory concentrates on the failure between contracting parties. However, this 
can also be a feature of the agency problem, where potential holdout motives can lead to 
inflexible economic and political positions, thus making contracting difficult, especially if the 
number of contracting parties is large and/or there are different levels of access to 
information (De Meza and Lockwood, 1998).  
The control of different levels of residual rights gives different levels of influence for 
the rights purchasing groups (Berglöf, 1991). In China, the level of residual rights is different 
between SOEs under central government control, those under local government control and 
non-SOEs. Whilst management efficiency may increase with increasing separation between 
ownership and control, albeit agency cost may increase, the residual rights of control are 
extended in diversification of the shareholder group (as would be expected as a result of SSSR) 
and the possibility of contracting failure may also reduce.  
3.5 Behavioural finance theory  
Shiller (2003) suggested that behavioural finance theory stands in sharp contradiction to 




such as stock prices, always incorporate the best information about fundamental values and 
that prices change only because information meshed well with appropriate theory. The 
efficient markets theory was ascendant and dominant in academic circles during the 1970s. 
Later, however, studies found that the level of volatility of the stock market could not be well 
explained by the efficient markets model in which stock prices are derived from the present 
value of future returns. To explain the volatility of the market, behavioural finance theory 
posits that there is substantial noise introduced by human psychology – so substantial that it 
can dominate market movements. The emergence of behavioural finance in the early 1990s 
challenged the efficient market hypothesis as the widely-accepted theoretical framework to 
understand investing and prices: investing rationality and efficient market processes over 
time contradict investors’ psychology, biased behavioural rules and market bubbles 
(Konstantinidis et al., 2012).  
Behaviour finance theory pertains to how human psychological behaviour affects 
investment decision making and the financial market (De Bondt and Thaler, 1995; Shefrin, 
2001; Sewell, 2007; Fairchild, 2007). Instead of the traditional assumption that managers and 
investors are fully rational, it is assumed that they are not always so, because their emotions, 
biases, and illusions cannot be rationalised. Under the behavioural finance perspective, it is 
held that stock markets are informationally inefficient both in terms of accessibility and the 
availability of information (Subrahmanyam, 2008). Owing to the irrationality of investors and 
inefficiency of the financial market, stock prices are unpredictable; however, a more highly 
efficient market with high level of information availability will improve rationality behaviour 
and result in fewer behavioural finance outcomes and investing failures (Shiller, 2003). 
In this thesis, it is recognised that in the Chinese context of an illiquid and inefficient 
stock market, managers and majority shareholders are able to pursue their self interest in 
firms, to the detriment of the minority. Moreover, it is acknowledged that they are able to 





3.6 Combined theory in the Chinese context 
For this study, agency theory, property rights theory and behavioural finance theory are all 
taken into account to help contextualise and inform predictions.  
As previously discussed in the agency theory section (above), principal-principal issues 
are the major concern in China, rather than principal-agent problems. The traditional agency 
theory in western literature after Ross (1973) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) cannot be 
applied wholesale in the Chinese context due to the controlling shareholders’ power to direct 
and override managers. In contrast to the position in developed western economies, in China, 
the power differentials are not skewed towards the managers, but rather, maintained by the 
controlling shareholders. A significant difference in the Chinese finance and capital markets 
is that there is heavy government intervention, with a large proportion of listed firms being 
government owned enterprises. Local governments or government institutions (as controlling 
shareholders) then appoint government officers as enterprises’ managers to maximise their 
benefit. Since the early 1980s the institutional transitions and reforms of corporate 
governance in China have purportedly started to pursue decentralisation of the states’ 
controlling roles in SOEs and empowerment of their managers. But Conyon and He (2011) 
argue that business reforms in China are merely window-dressing or ineffective, and China 
has experienced difficulties in achieving the separation of government and enterprise which 
has been advocated for many years (Nolan 2002). Application of the traditional principal-
agent model remains problematic. Firstly, the effective external governance 
mechanisms/conditions, such as competitive product and labour markets and strong 
shareholder protection (Young et al,.2008), are not well/fully developed. Secondly, guanxi 
(relationship)-based governance regimes continues to help firms secure critical resources and 
is contra to a key assumptions of agency theory regarding self-interested agent and principal 
conflicts (Luen et al., 2013). 
Most Chinese listed firms are SOEs or former SOEs and the state and/or government 
institutions are the majority/controlling shareholders. The dominance of state ownership 
means that the government exerts control over managerial appointments and incentives, and 
that most managers are political appointees (Liu and Ren, 2003). Further, the roles of 




usefulness in monitoring managers’ behaviour (Wei, 2003). And, according to Conyon and He, 
(2011), Chinese economic reforms seem to be ineffective as regards rebalancing control from 
controlling shareholders to managers. 
As regards the minority, individual minority shareholders are in a relatively extremely 
weak position and are unable to counter the influence of majority/controlling shareholders. 
Chinese minority shareholders are often regarded as mere speculators whose only desire is 
to gain a ‘’free ride” on the firm’s performance (Lin, 2004); and the protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights is potentially problematic (Mei, 2005). Indeed, Shan and Round (2012) 
report disadvantage of minority shareholders from relatively recently listed firms being 
allowed to engage in accounting practices deferring reported losses and transferring assets 
out of the company. Therefore, this study follows the principal-principal agency theory model 
modified to predict that managers are more likely to manager earnings on behalf of 
controlling shareholders, while less concerned about or ignoring the interests of minority 
shareholders. The circumstances and relationships are illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 
3.2. 
Since the 1980s, the Chinese central government has advocated reform with the aim 
of decentralisation of government control over enterprises and of empowering their 
managers. For a much of the time, however, the issue of non-tradable shares was facilitated 
by (the continuation of) state-controlled majority ownership in listed/listing firms. There were 
several attempts at non-tradable share reform, but it was not until the SSSR that reform was 
widely implemented. But whilst the SSSR effected the transition of previously non-tradable 
shares to become tradable, its effectiveness in transitioning listed firms from state-controlled 
ownership is far from clear – indeed, commonly, it was largely ineffective. At the local 
government and local SOE hierarchy level, there remained a strong incentive to maintain (or 
quickly re-obtain) control over firms subject to the SSSR, and so retain power over the firms 
and the ability to influence management. The conflict of interest between 
majority/controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, therefore, remains; and 
managers who are appointed by majority/controlling shareholders will pursue their common 





Figure 3.2: Agency theory under Chinese context 
 
Based on property rights theory, non-separation of ownership and control means that 
the managers in Chinese SOEs do not pursue full control rights, but rather, only the residual 
rights of control. For example, managers can decide on how to use assets, but not on buying 
or selling assets. However, since they are under the control of local governments and may 
pursue only residual control, delineating each party’s control rights becomes difficult. The 
contract failure between managers and enterprises leads to management inefficiency, 
economic inefficiency and government ineffectiveness, thus resulting in widespread 
contractual failure (Wiggins and Libecap, 1985; Libecap and Wiggins, 1985).  
Reverting to Figure 3.2, in China managers are appointed by majority/controlling 
shareholders and are expected to serve the majority/controlling shareholders’ interests. This 
does not mean, however, that conflicts of interests between majority/controlling 
shareholders and managers is eliminated. On the contrary,  according to property rights 
theory, when ownership and control are not separated managers will not just pursue their 
self-interest within the rules but will also allocate resources towards diverting property rights 
to their own benefit (Qian and Stiglitz, 1996). Hence, the apparent increase in separation 
between ownership and control might be expected to have led to a transformation of 
property rights resulting in improved efficiency, but in the Chinese context where central 
government and SOEs retain effective ownership and control, the efficiency effect certainly 




The main concern in China’s economic reforms, especially as regards SOEs, was to 
reduce the burden and cost of political bureaucracy, and this was given priority over potential 
agency cost concerns. The separation of ownership and control can encourage managerial 
incentives via, inter alia, property rights transfer. But in the Chinese context, despite having 
delegated many effective control rights to the autonomous divisions, ultimate control rights, 
such as selection and dismissal of top managers, approval of large investment projects and 
veto powers over the disposal of major assets, still remained in the hands of the Communist 
Party and the government. This would consequently either have increased the agency costs, 
because of managers lacking accountability, or increased political costs, because the 
government engaged in political interference, or both (Qian, 1996; Faccio et al., 2006; Francis 
et al., 2009; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Piotroski et al., 2015). The interaction between the effective 
control by managers over some decisions and the ultimate control by the Communist Party 
and government over others is the key to understanding the problems with SSSR and the 
issues to be addressed in this study. In this thesis, it is recognised that the reforms in China, 
prima face, suggest increasing incentives for managers to act efficiently given a 
transformation of residual property rights arising out of increasing separation of ownership 
and control. Given the context of state control and local SOE hierarchies wishing to retain 
ownership and control, however, property rights transition was unlikely. If the majority are, 
however, willing to transfer some control rights to managers, then conflicts of interest 
between minority shareholders and majority/controlling shareholders may be mitigated; and 
management efficiency may be enhanced. 
According to behavioural finance theory, when the market is inefficient, human 
psychology will have a great impact on financial markets, i.e. emotions, biases and illusions 
will play a strong part. In China, with illiquid and lesser efficient capital markets along with a 
rapidly expanding non-state sector, managers (and their private, business and political 
networks) have the opportunity to manipulate market and prices and to appropriate wealth 
from private investors on behalf of SOE hierarchies, or from the state for private benefit.  
The objective of SSSR was to boost management incentives to achieve better financial 
performance and improved economic efficiency under market discipline by transforming non-




managers/local agents were appointed by local SOE hierarchies, then the boosted 
management incentives would, in reality, have been to maximise the benefit for local SOE 
hierarchies, i.e. to best serve immediate bosses / local political masters. Hence, the high-level 
efficiency objectives of central government and concern for minority (private) shareholders 
could have been absent from managers’ goals. 
Before SSSR, shares in China were officially classified into non-tradable shares and 
tradable shares. Non-tradable shares were mainly held by controlling shareholders and 
tradable shares were mainly held by minority shareholders. Du (2014) states that controlling 
shareholders were usually not able or inclined to trade their shares or disrupt share prices 
and sought other, unethical channels in order to expropriate the interests of minority 
shareholders and so self-compensate for not benefiting from share price appreciation. The 
SSSR, in transforming previously non-tradable shares to become tradable, enabled controlling 
shareholders to receive wealth gains from rise in share prices, as minority shareholders did 
(Sun et al.,2017). As a result, the incentives for controlling shareholders (and managers) to 
manage share prices may have increased as a result of the SSSR. 
In China, the financial markets are less efficient than those of fully developed western 
economies (Lovett et al., 1999). As discussed in 3.3, the agency problem is between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders: managers of SOEs are appointed by 
central or local government and their behaviour is under the supervision of central or local 
government controlling shareholders. Managers as representative of controlling 
shareholders’ have strong incentive to manage earnings in order to fulfil controlling 
shareholders’ interests (Young et al., 2009). In an inefficient financial market, minority 
shareholders have limited access to financial information and are more prone to investing 
failures than are majority/controlling shareholders (George and Prabhu, 2000). Market 
inefficiency issues and agency problems are pervasive in the many Chinese corporate scandals 
which listed firms, together with their controlling shareholders, expropriate minority 
shareholder interests (Wang and Xiao, 2011). In the concentrated ownership structure of 
Chinese firms, managers usually represent controlling shareholders - which makes the agency 
problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders more pronounced and 




(Claessens and Fan, 2002). But those managers with (even limited) power over the controlling 
shareholders will pursue their self-interest within the rules, and allocate resources towards 
changing property rights rules to their own benefit (Qian and Stiglitz, 1996).  
From the theories discussed in this Chapter, for this research, the following key points 
regarding the Chinese context are recognised. 
• Local SOE hierarchies both majority own (via large/block shareholdings) and wholly 
control (as directors and managers) SOEs. There is an agency conflict between the 
local SOE hierarchies and the minority (private) shareholders in SOEs. 
• Local SOE hierarchies were responsible for implementing SSSR on behalf of the 
Chinese government, delivering the desired benefits. There was a classical agency 
conflict between what was desired by the government, and what best served the local 
SOE hierarchy. 
• Local SOE hierarchies as a dominant stakeholder group have both majority ownership 
of SOEs, whilst also being the management. 
• The Chinese government is not only a policy maker, regulator, infrastructure provider 
and tax recipient, but also a (direct or indirect) shareholder, ultimate master of local 
SOE hierarchies, and the promoter of a significant capital market and accounting 
reforms. 
• The reforms in China, prima face, suggest there were increasing incentives for 
managers to act efficiently given a transformation of residual property rights arising 
out of increasing separation of ownership and control as well as greater dispersion of 
shareholdings to increase managerial incentives to better efficiency. However, given 
the context of a government and local SOE hierarchies that wished to retain ownership 
and control, property rights transition was unlikely. 
• In the context of an illiquid and inefficient stock market, managers and majority 
shareholders are able to pursue their self interest in firms, to the detriment of the 
minority and, further, that they are able to influence and manipulate prices to an 
extent that would not be possible in a more efficient market setting. 
By combining principal-principal agency theory, property rights theory and 




institutions will lose their dominant role as the majority/controlling shareholders in list firms, 
which were, and are likely to remain, SOEs. Control rights are not likely to shift towards 
managers – who will still be appointed to serve the interests of majority/controlling 
shareholders and are likely to ignore or exploit the interests of minority shareholders. In short, 
this study predicts that the circumstances and relationships will remain largely as depicted in 
Figure 3.2 after the SSSR. This study predicts that, in pursuit of the interests of 
majority/controlling shareholders and themselves, managers had strong incentives to 
manage earnings and share prices in the manner depicted in Figure 3.3; and that these strong 
earnings management and financial market incentives resulted in decreased earnings quality. 
Figure 3.3: The predicted impact on earnings and share prices of SSSR-related incentives 
 
 
In the first phase of the SSSR implementation, from 2005 to 2007, managers and 
controlling shareholders were going through a negotiation with minority shareholders. 
Managers as the representative of controlling shareholders had an incentive to manage 
earnings downwards and to drive share prices downwards in order to reduce/minimise the 
compensation payable to minority shareholders in respect of the SSSR. After the completion 
of negotiation with minority shareholders, non-tradable shares remained in a lock-in period 
for twelve to 24 months – the second phase of SSSR. In this phase, from 2007 to 2008, 




controlling shareholders have incentives to drive share prices up in order to be able to gain 
from the share price appreciation when first able to sell previously non-tradable share after 
the lock-in period. In the final phase, 2009-10, previously-non tradable shares became 
tradable. After taking early advantage of selling shares at a high price at the beginning of this 
phase (see preceding point), managers, on behalf of majority/controlling shareholders have 
an incentive to drive down share prices in order that majority/controlling shareholders can 
regain their full previous levels of control at a relatively modest price. As regards the pre-SSSR 
period, the ability of majority/controlling shareholders to influence share prices in pursuit of 
their own interests was limited – since their shares could not then be traded in the financial 
market – and this may have led to low value relevance of earnings in the market at that time. 
Further to this theoretical discussion and summary, the following hypotheses are 
made: 
H1: In the first phase of the SSSR implementation, from 2005 to 2006, managers 
of Chinese A-share listed firms have an incentive to drive down both earnings 
and share prices. As a consequence, earnings and market prices will fall, and 
earnings quality will be reduced.  
H2: In the second phase of the SSSR implementation, from 2007 to 2008, 
coincident with China’s adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, managers of Chinese A-
share listed firms have an incentive drive up earnings and share prices. As a 
consequence, and despite IFRS convergence, earnings and market prices will rise, 
and earnings quality will be reduced. 
H3: In the third phase of the SSSR implementation, from 2009 to 2010, after 
adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, managers of Chinese A-share listed firms have 
an incentive to drive down both earnings and share prices. As a consequence, 
earnings and market prices will fall, and earnings quality will be reduced. 
To test the first hypothesis, this study compares the change of reported earnings, share 
prices and dimensions of earnings quality between 2003-2004, the pre-SSSR 




these periods preceding China’s adoption IFRS-converged CAS. To test the second 
hypothesis, this study compares the change of reported earnings, share prices and 
dimensions of earnings quality between 2005-2006, the first phase of SSSR (pre-IFRS 
adoption), and 2007-08, the second phase of the SSSR which coincided with China’s 
adoption of IFRS-converged CAS. It should be noted that there is, by design, 
overlap/repeated use of a period: the base case period in testing the second hypothesis, 
2005-06, is the same as the test period adopted in testing the first hypothesis  the pre-
IFRS adoption period, and the second phase of the SSSR implementation, 2007-08, 08. 
To test the third hypothesis, this study compares the change of reported earnings, share 
prices and dimensions of earnings quality between 2007-2008, the second phase of the 
SSSR (post-IFRS adoption), and 2009-10, the final phase of the SSSR (also post IFRS 
adoption). Again, there is overlap/repeated use of a periods: the base case period in 
testing the third hypothesis, 2005-06, is the same as the test period adopted in testing 





Chapter 4: Earnings quality  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general understanding of earnings quality from different viewpoints 
regarding definitions, determinants and consequences. Thus, this chapter discusses the 
corner stones of the earnings quality in the light of previous literature on the phenomenon.  
This chapter is organised as follows: Figure 4.1 on the next page summarises the main 
determinants and consequences of earnings quality according to the literature. In Section 4.2, 
the different definitions that have been developed and applied in the previous research are 
discussed. Section 4.3 addresses the different dimensions of earnings quality, whilst Section 
4.4 reviews the relevant literature in China. Section 4.5 discusses the different determinants 
of earnings quality and Section 4.6 explores the different consequences of earnings quality 
dimensions according to the prior literature. Finally, a conclusion for the chapter is presented 




Figure 4.1: Earnings quality: determinants, consequences and dimensions 
 
4.2 Earnings quality 
According Dechow et al.'s (2010) definition:  
“Higher quality earnings provide more information about the features of a firm’s 
financial performances that are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific 
decision-maker”. Moreover, higher earnings quality means that “earnings reflect 
current performance, that earnings data are useful for predicting future performance, 
and that the earnings data accurately annuitizes intrinsic firm value” (Dechow and 
Schrand 2004). 
Assessing the information usefulness of earnings in financial markets has drawn much 
research effort due to the prominent role of accounting earnings in the capital market (Ball 
and Brown, 1968). Ball and Brown (1968) first started capital market research in accounting 




empirically investigated the association between accounting earnings in the financial 
statements and market stock returns, thereby assessing the usefulness of accounting 
information in the financial market. Under the market efficiency hypothesis, all information 
in this market will be reflected timely into the security price and thus, net income is a number 
of particular interest to investors; the outcome serves as a predictive criterion for the 
investment decision as it is reflected in security prices (Ball and Brown, 1968). The results of 
Ball and Brown (1968) show that the market had forecasted 85-90% of the news before the 
announcement, which is in line with the hypothesis. Beaver (1968), in another important 
paper on the early stage of accounting research, examined the behaviour of security returns 
after an earnings announcement. The author established that both trading volume and return 
volatility increase at the time of earnings announcements and indicated that the behaviour 
of the price changes supports the contention that earnings reports possess information 
content. However, news announcements occurring prior to the earnings report do not 
entirely pre-empt the information content of reported earnings.  
There have been a number of studies in the accounting literature researching the value 
relevance of financial reports (Dechow et al., 1994; Sloan, 1996; Francis and Schipper, 1999; 
Barth et al., 2008; Collins et al., 2009; Landsman and Maydew, 2002; Ball and Brown, 1968; 
Beaver, 1968). The earnings term is the most important explanatory variable in the Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) valuation equation. Since Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968), the 
empirical studies in accounting research have grown rapidly with numerous published papers 
in leading academic accounting and finance journals. Both these papers demonstrated that 
earnings numbers have information content in the financial market.  Thereafter, assessing the 
information usefulness of reported earnings numbers to investors, became the most 
concerted research objective in accounting research (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; DeFond et al., 
2007; Collins et al., 2009; Collins et al., 1987; Beaver, 1968; Bartov, 1998; Ball and Brown, 
1968; Ali and Hwang, 1999; Francis et al., 2002; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Landsman and 
Maydew, 2002).  
Most of these studies involved exploration of the value relevance of earnings, accruals 
and cash flows reported in financial statements; however, opinions about the level of 




higher explanatory power for earnings than with cash flows (Dechow, 1994; Sloan, 1996). 
However, Dechow et al. (1995) pointed out that discretionary accruals are often used to 
manipulate earnings and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggested that managers may use 
their information advantage to manipulate accruals opportunistically, and they prefer to use 
cash flow multiples. 
Dechow (1994) investigated the different circumstances under which accruals are 
predicted to improve earnings’ ability to measure firm performance, as reflected in stock price. 
The results illustrate that cash flows experience more timing and matching problems in 
comparison with accruals and hence, are less able to reflect a firm’s performance. Dechow's 
(1994) paper also indicates earnings have a higher association with stock returns than realised 
cash flows. Moreover, the evidence from the work shows that earnings suffer from timing 
and matching problems over short measurement intervals, but realised cash flows suffer 
more greatly than earnings in this respect, and accruals help to mitigate these problems.  
A paper by Sloan (1996) provided deeper insight into the information content of 
accounting earnings, examined whether stock prices reflect information about future 
earnings contained in the accrual and cash flow components of current earnings. He also 
investigated, to what extent current earnings performance persists into the future is 
dependent on the relative magnitudes of the cash flow and accrual components of current 
earnings. In this paper, Sloan (1996) defined accruals as representing the difference between 
accounting earnings and cash flow. Linking market returns to cash flow and the accrual 
components of earnings, he found that firms with relatively low accruals experience higher 
abnormal returns in the future and vice versa. The results indicate the persistence of earnings 
performance depends on the relative magnitudes of the cash and accrual components of 
earnings. Moreover, Sloan (1996) elicited that stock prices act as if investors fixate on earnings 
and fail to identify correctly the different properties of the cash and accrual components of 
earnings. Further, if the stock is overpriced when the accrual component earnings is relatively 
high, the future earnings will be lower than expected, because of lower abnormal stock 
returns. Sloan (1996) questioned the extent to which the lower persistence of earnings 





Dechow (1994) concluded that accruals improve earnings’ ability to measure firm 
performance, rather than cash flow, because the latter suffers more timing and mismatching 
problems. Sloan (1996) contended that the accrual component of earnings is less persistent 
than the cash flow one, and that firms have higher level of accruals associated with lower 
level earnings quality. Reconciling Dechow (1994) and Sloan (1996) suggests that earnings 
performance and quality depend on both the components of cash flow and accrual. Moreover, 
the accrual anomaly falls closely together with the dimensions of earnings quality, whilst 
accruals quality is an important indicator for earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995). 
Many researchers in accounting have investigated the quality of information usefulness 
of reported earnings numbers. Whilst the research of the earnings value was related to the 
security prices (McInnis and Collins, 2011; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Lev, 1989; Dechow, 1994; 
Beaver, 1968; Ball and Brown, 1968; Liu and Thomas, 2000), accruals accounting is also now 
at the heart of earnings measurement and financial reporting. That is, the fundamental 
element of any test for earnings quality is a measure of management discretionary accruals 
over earnings in accounting studies (Badertscher et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2008; Francis et al., 
2005; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 2010). Moreover, based on the time series 
properties of earnings, persistence and high timely loss recognition indicate high quality of 
earnings (Watts, 2003a, b; Basu, 1997; Richardson et al., 2005; Penman and Zhang, 2002).  
Earnings quality is important for users of accounting data (Penman and Zhang, 2002); 
however, there is no single conclusion as to what it actually is.  Dechow et al. (2010) argued 
that the word “quality” is contingent on the decision context. Higher quality earnings ought 
to provide more decision usefulness information about a firm’s underlying financial 
performance. However, accruals earnings manipulation can misrepresent the true underlying 
economic performance (McVay, 2006), because it damages the information transparency and 
this can seriously affect its decision usefulness to investors (Scott 2014). All these factors 
make the earnings quality difficult to investigate.   
In Dechow et al.'s (2010) paper, they classified earnings quality proxies from three 
aspects: properties of earnings, investor responsiveness of earnings and external indicators 
of earnings misstatements. Since the current study is aimed at investigating the impact of 




enforcements and restatements will be neglected. Drawing on Dechow et al. (2010) research, 
in this study, the literature that considers earnings quality according the aspects of the 
accounting based earnings reliability and market-based earnings value relevance is reviewed, 
which is divided into four dimensions: accruals quality, earnings persistence and smoothness, 
earnings timeliness, and earnings value relevance.   
4.3 Dimensions of earnings quality 
There are extensive inter-related literatures on earnings quality, its dimensions and the 
impact of changes in accounting regulation on this quality. This section covers the literature 
regarding abovementioned four dimensions. 
4.3.1 Accruals quality 
There has been significant growth in academic research on earnings management in the last 
two decades. Walker (2013) reviewed published earnings management papers from 10 
leading accounting journals for the period of 2000-2010 and elicited that the journals have 
published roughly 30 earnings management articles per year for the past 11 years. This sub-
section reviews the literature regarding what earnings management is, its measurements and 
research design issues.  
4.3.1.1 Earnings management definition  
There is no single agreed definition of earnings management; however, it has to be defined 
before further discussion and the final stage of interpretation. 
Schipper (1989) defined earnings management as: 
“a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of 
obtaining some private gain” 
This definition from the information usefulness perspective illustrates that earnings 
management contrast as with merely facilitating the neutral operating of the process. Apart 
from management incentives, Schipper (1989) argued that the rules of accruals accounting 




measurement with error and thus, unmanaged earnings or true income are noisy measures, 
which means that non-discretionary accruals are a poor benchmark within the GAAP. The 
author suggested that the concept of true earnings does not exist nor is needed, because 
earnings management is inherent in the accounting procedures even within the GAAP. Hence, 
the financial market reacts to information that is subject to earnings management, rather 
than real earnings numbers, which means that the properties of the noise, such as the 
earnings amount, bias, and/or variance will impact upon the estimation of the discretionary 
accruals.  
Healy and Wahlen (1999) took a different perspective on the role of the GAAP in 
earnings management to that of Schipper (1989). In their view, financial reporting and 
standards setting add value to the information decision usefulness when the financial 
statement enables effective portrayal of the differences in firms’ economic positions and 
performance in a timely and credible manner. Moreover, all accounting standards permit 
managers to exercise judgement by using their knowledge about the business, offering 
opportunities to select methods for preparing financial reporting that conveys their preferred 
information on firm performance to external financial statement users (Schipper, 1989; Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999). Based on how much judgement management is permitted to exercise in 
financial reporting, (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) held that earnings management:  
“occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” 
The definition of Healy and Wahlen (1999) contains the negative term to “mislead” or 
“influence contractual outcomes”. Hence, their earnings management definition moves away 
from the information decision usefulness perspective to management incentives one. 
However, the management incentive is unobservable and in fact, the most extreme forms of 
financial fraud might be the only observable form of earnings management, according Healy 
and Wahlen (1999). Dechow and Skinner (2000) defined earnings management in their study 




“the intentional, deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or accounting 
data, which is misleading and, when considered with all the information made available, 
would cause the reader to change or alter his or her judgment or decision” 
In accounting research, earnings management is considered as a negative concept since 
Healy and Wahlen (1999). It is considered as referring to earnings manipulation and 
misleading investors, being strongly associated with the negative side of management 
incentives, rather than the decision usefulness of information to outside investors. Scott 
(2005) illustrated how earnings management can be good as it conveys inside information to 
outside investors. However, there is a fine line between earnings management and earnings 
mismanagement (ibid). Walker (2013) defined earnings management in broader and more 
neutral terms:  
“the use of managerial discretion over (within GAAP) accounting choices, earnings 
reporting choices, and real economic decisions to influence how underlying economic 
events are reflected in one or more measure of earnings” 
The underlying assumption of Walker (2013) is that, if a pure clean surplus accounting 
income is obtained and free cash flows are given, then net income will become the only 
measure of earnings, which can be managed only via the accounting choice regarding accruals. 
However, in reality, a pure clean surplus accounting income does not exist, for reported 
earnings figures are not only affected by accounting choice, but also, are influenced by the 
incentives that arise for firms and/or managers. 
4.3.1.2 Accrual quality measures 
In prior studies several proxies for earnings management have been used. Some of these 
relate to the properties of earnings distribution, such as earnings smoothness (Burgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997; Guidry et al., 1999; Collins et al., 1995; Guay et al., 1996), accrual-based 
earnings management (Dechow, 1994; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 1995; 
Capalbo et al., 2014; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Collins and Hribar, 2000) and analyst 
benchmark (Degeorge et al., 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000). The desire regarding earnings 
management is to increase share returns and to reduce a firm’s capital cost in the financial 




studies are from an opportunistic agency theory perspective aimed at detecting whether 
earnings are manipulated to achieve personal gain (Beneish, 1999; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; 
Healy, 1985).  
However, it is believed that using accrual models to capture the level of earnings 
management is the most effective measurement (Dechow et al., 2010). The next subsection 
discusses two streams of accrual models: abnormal accrual quality models and working 
capital accrual quality models 
4.3.1.2.1 Accruals models 
An essential part of earnings management research is the measure of management’s 
discretion over reported earnings (McNichols, 2001). There is a vast literature that has 
attempted to identify discretionary accrual-based on the relation between total accruals and 
hypothesised explanatory factors, with several different approaches being deployed. In 
accounting study, the majority of studies have involved using discretionary accruals 
generated from an accruals model to separate total accruals into these and nondiscretionary 
accrual components (DeAngelo, 1986; Dechow et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Kang 
and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995; McNichols and Wilson, 1988). Discretionary accruals have been 
the focus of most empirical research in accounting, being used as a proxy for earnings 
management in many of the studies. Non-discretionary accruals are meant to capture 
adjustments that reflect fundamental financial performance, while discretionary ones pertain 
to capturing distortions within or outside GAAP regulations to measure accrual quality. 
The most widely used accruals quality investigation models are those of Jones (1991), 
modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995), performance matched discretionary accruals (Kothari 
et al. (2005), the Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach and the  modified Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) approach (McNichols (2002). These models are summarised in Table 4.2.   
4.3.1.2.1.1 Jones’ (1991) model  
Jones (1991) model uses discretionary accruals to measure earnings manipulation. This was 
the first time a regression approach was utilised to control for nondiscretionary factors: the 




(1985) and DeAngelo (1986) used total accruals and change in total accruals, respectively, as 
measures of management’s discretion over earnings, with both studies assuming that the 
component of normal accruals/non-discretionary accruals is constant. McNichols and Wilson 
(1988) pointed out that this assumption is constrained, because the component of 
nondiscretionary accrual is not constant, as it changes in response to different economic 
circumstances. Thus, the omission of relevant variables in models of Healy (1985) and 
DeAngelo (1986) showing the impact of economic performance on non-discretionary accruals 
will result in inflated standard errors. Thereafter, McNichols and Wilson (1988), for first time, 
generated a discretionary accruals framework, with total accruals being separated into two 
components: normal accruals (non-discretionary accruals) and abnormal accruals 
(discretionary accruals); however, the method of how to separate total accruals was not 
explained in their study. McNichols and Wilson (1988) adopted a dummy variable in their 
model to determine whether a firm is associated with earnings management.  
Jones (1991) model enables the separation of discretionary accruals from total 
accruals to capture earnings management but, the abnormal earnings are not considered as 
a component relating to the fundamental financial performance. The author defined the total 
accruals, including working capital and depreciation, as a function of sales growth and PPE, 
where sales growth controls for non-discretionary working capital and PPE for non-
discretionary depreciation expense. Total accruals are measured as the change in, before 
income taxes payable, noncash working capital, less total depreciation expenses of PPE 
(Bernard and Skinner, 1996). After the model is estimated, the forecasted value stands for 
non-discretionary accruals, whilst the estimation error stands for discretionary accruals, 
which achieves the objective of separating total accruals into normal accruals and abnormal 
ones. Jones (1991) model has been most used in earnings management study; however, it has 
been heavily criticised for its low explanatory power and being subject to Type 1 and Type 2 
errors40 (Dechow et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 1995).  
 
40 Type 1 error in discretionary accruals estimation: classifies the component of non-discretionary accruals, 
which represents fundamental financial performance as discretionary accruals. Type 2 error classifies the 




4.3.1.2.1.2 Modified Jones (1991) model 
Dechow et al. (1995) modified Jones (1991) model by subtracting change in account 
receivables from change in revenue to reduce Type 2 errors. They explained that it is easier 
to manage earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on credit sales 
than cash sales, and argued that Jones (1991) model “orthogonalises the total accruals with 
respect to revenues and will therefore extract this discretionary component of accruals, 
causing an estimate bias of earnings management”. The Dechow et al. (1995) modified model 
was designed to reduce or even eliminate the measurement errors or bias in the original 
model. In the modified Jones model, the non-discretionary accruals are estimated during the 
periods in which the sample firms have extreme financial performance and earnings 
management is expected. The modified Jones model increased the explanatory power, thus 
better reflecting earnings management (Peasnell et al., 2000; Young, 1999). However, the 
problem that remained unsolved is that the model still presents Type 1 and Type 2 errors, 
with the former being more likely than the latter as the model experiences high correlations 
between residuals and earnings performance (Young, 1999; Dechow et al., 2010). 
Both aforementioned accrual models were originally proxies for opportunism earnings 
management and are now adopted broadly to capture both intentional and unintentional 
factors that influence earnings quality. Both models have been criticised for their levels of 
estimation errors.  First of all, the discretionary accruals tend to be positively correlated with 
the level of total accruals, which will lead to high total accruals firms generating a high level 
of discretionary accruals.   The question is whether discretionary accruals reflect accounting 
distortions, if the level of total accruals is positively correlated with abnormal ones or the 
discretionary accruals are poorly estimated by the accrual models in that a normal accruals 
component is included in them (Dechow et al., 2010; McNichols, 2001; Young, 1999). 
Secondly, both models reject the null hypothesis of no earnings management, the higher 
rejection rate of the Jones and modified-Jones model is due largely to misspecification of the 
control variables, which led to a low explanation power in abnormal accruals quality 




4.3.1.2.1.3 Performance matched (Kothari et al., 2005) model 
Empirical evidence suggests that discretionary accruals are correlated with firm performance. 
To address the estimation error and low explanatory power issues of the Jones and modified 
Jones models, Kothari et al. (2005) proposed a performance matching approach by matching 
the treatment and control firms based on current return on assets (ROA). The authors 
identified firms as a treatment group from the same industry and a close ROA to the sample 
firms, deducting the control firms’ discretionary accruals from those of the sample ones to 
generate the performance matched discretionary accruals. They assumed that firms with the 
same ROA would have the same amount of performance related abnormal accruals. 
Thereafter, they changed the estimated discretionary accruals of the treatment and control 
firms matched on the ROA, claiming that this approach would extract the discretionary 
accruals caused by the event of managers’ opportunistic interest. 
However, the performance matching approach increases the frequency of Type 2 
errors and the residuals produced by the model can only explain a minimal amount of the 
variance in accruals (Keung and Shih, 2014). As a result, Kothari et al. (2005) approach is likely 
to add noise to the measure of discretionary accruals, which can lead to the extraction of too 
many and consequently, generates low power accrual quality tests (Dechow et al., 2010).  
4.3.1.2.1.4 Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
The concern with the discretionary accrual models is whether they can detect earnings 
manipulation when it actually occurs. Dechow and Dichev (2002) argued that, in the absence 
of intentional earnings manipulation, accruals will be systematically related to firm and 
industry characteristics. Moreover, according to them, since both intentional and 
unintentional estimation errors imply lower quality accruals and earnings, it is pointless to 
separate accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary, further suggesting that the benefit 
of accruals is to adjust for cash flow timing problems. Dechow and Dichev (2002)  (DD 
thereafter) model developed a new measure in the form of working capital accruals and 
earnings quality. The model estimates accruals as a function of current, past and future cash 
flows, because the lattermost can be expected through accruals. The residuals from firm-




accruals estimation errors, with the standard deviation of these residuals indicating the 
quality of these accruals and earnings.  
The DD model is aimed at improving upon the Jones and modified Jones models by 
more explicitly mapping cash flows into the accruals generating process. The model focuses 
on investigating the short-term working capital and its reaction to cash flows in the current, 
past and future periods. The model was designed from the outset as a proxy for both 
intentional and unintentional factors affecting earnings quality, which is more advanced than 
the Jones model, being designed to capture earnings management incentives (Dechow et al., 
2010). However, the drawback of the model is that it is an unsigned measure41, which is only 
intended to capture which firms are more likely to managing earnings, in the absence of a 
specific discretional prediction. An unsigned measure of accrual quality will lower the power 
of tests when research predicts earnings management in a specific direction, upwards or 
downwards. Moreover, it implies a lack of fit in estimation and produces biasness leading to 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of no earnings management (Hribar and Craig Nichols, 
2007).  
4.3.1.2.1.5 Modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
McNichols (2002) found misspecification in both the Jones (1991) and DD models in that the 
residuals from the latter are significantly correlated with the change in sales and those of the 
former are significantly associated with current, past and future cash flows. McNichols (2002) 
suggested that the researchers should consider the implications of both models and develop 
a more powerful approach to estimate earnings quality and the role of management 
discretion in earnings quality.  
Following McNichols (2002), Francis et al. (2005) adopted the DD model using working 
capital accruals reflecting managerial estimates of cash flows and the extent to which those 
accruals do not map into cash flows, changes in revenue and PPE as an inverse measure of 
accruals quality due to estimation errors. This primarily disaggregates the variation in 
 
41 The term of “unsigned” refers to the estimation not differentiating income-increasing from income-decreasing 
earnings management; the most commonly used unsigned measure is the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (Hribar, P. & Craig Nichols, D., 2007. The use of unsigned earnings quality measures in tests of earnings 





earnings quality into the portion resulting from the innate application of the accounting 
system and that resulting from management discretion by adding a discretionary component 
to the DD model. Dechow et al. (2010) argued that the discretionary estimated errors could 
still reflect estimation errors, which reduce the power of the test. Moreover, the model could 
induce bias in an unknown direction into the proxy for managerial discretion. Finally, there 
have been few studies aimed at evaluating the model’s test power and biasness.  
Owing to the limitation of investigating management incentives, for this research, both 
modified Jones and DD models will be adopted to investigate the absolute change of 
discretionary accruals and to what extent short term accruals map into cash flow from 
operation. First of all, the DD (2002) approach suggests both intentional and unintentional 
accrual estimation errors as low accruals quality. So, it is pointless to detect earnings 
management incentives by examining discretional accruals. Hence, the model only 
investigates the working capital accruals quality without separating accruals into 
discretionary and non-discretionary. Furthermore, the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals can avoid the detection of management direction. The unsigned approach can 
circumvent the investigation of the incentive/opportunistic earnings management aspect. In 
simple terms of understanding accruals quality without incentives investigation, higher 
quality of accruals indicates higher earnings quality. Accruals quality is used as a direct proxy 
for earnings quality investigation (Dechow et al., 2010) 
Accruals quality and abnormal accruals 
Francis et al. (2008) defined accruals quality as a measure of earnings quality based on the 
view of how closely the accruals are mapped into cash flows, which is measured by the DD 
model. They pointed out that the limitation of accruals quality measurement by the DD model 
is that the measure does not capture the effects of more complicated accruals, such as 
pensions, depreciation, deferred tax assets etc., focusing only on current accruals quality. 
Whilst abnormal accruals are accruals that are not well explained by firms accounting 
fundamentals and they are typically estimated by the Jones (1991) or modified Jones (1995) 
approaches. The absolute value of abnormal accruals is adopted to measure earnings quality, 
which does not impose a directional sign on management incentives. Whereas, the signed 




incentives. Differentiating absolute value and signed value of abnormal accruals, Francis et al. 
(2008) suggested, distinguishes earnings management (signed value) from earnings quality 
research (unsigned value).  
Taking both accrual quality and absolute value of abnormal accruals quality as proxies 
to measure earnings quality, the difference in capturing accruals between the DD model and 
the Jones or modified Jones model is that the measure in the foremost includes accruals that 
arise from both accounting fundamentals and discretionary sources, whereas the latter two 
are intended to reflect the portion of accruals that is not driven by accounting fundamentals 
(Francis et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2010; McNichols, 2002). The measure of abnormal 
accruals shows these are determined by taking estimated normal accruals away from total 
accruals. Moreover, abnormal accruals are intended to reflect reporting influences on 
accruals quality, not accounting fundamental influences. So, the question isdo these two 
accruals quality measures capture similar constructs for earnings? Francis et al. (2008) 
suggested how these two measures vary depends on the completeness of the accounting 
fundamentals (maybe not only including revenues and fixed assets) used to capture the 
determinants of normal accruals to be subtracted from total accruals. Expanding the 
accounting fundamentals (SD of CF, SD of sales revenues etc.) to increase the accuracy of 
accrual quality measures was suggested in their previous study (Francis et al., 2005). In a 
recently study by Owens et al. (2016), the Jones approach was adopted and the accounting 
fundamentals were expanded by including not only PPE and change of sales, but also, ROA, 
CF, abnormal stock return, change of CF and change of abnormal stock return. The authors 
argued that the unsigned residual from Jones (1991) most likely contains both non-
discretionary (normal accruals) and discretionary (abnormal) accruals due to model 
misspecification. They found that idiosyncratic shocks to the firm’s underlying economics 
exacerbate accrual model misspecification, which causes false inferences in studies using 





Table 4.1: Accrual quality estimation models and limitations 
Models Accrual Quality Proxies Limitations 
Jones (1991) model 
 
!"" = $ + &!∆()" + &"**+ + , 
 
Sales growth and depreciation of PPE, all the 
variables are scaled by total assets. 
Low explanatory power  
Residuals are highly positively correlated with 
total accruals and cash flow which creates 
estimate bias. 
Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
 
!"" = $ + &!(∆(). − ∆()") + &"**+ + , 
 
Adjusts the Jones model by excluding growth in 
credit sales (account receivable) in years 
identified as manipulation years. 
Improves the explanatory power from the 
Jones model only when revenue is 
manipulated from credit sales. 
 
Performance matched (Kothari et al., 2005) 
 
123!"" −456"ℎ)8	:2;<3	123!"" 
Based on the Jones and Modified Jones 
accruals models; matches firm-year 
observation with another from the same 
industry and year with the closest ROA. 
Low test power  
Only applies when correlated performance is 
an important concern  
DD model (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) 
 
∆="# = &$ + &!>:?#%! + &">:?# + &&>:?#'! + ,# 
 
Accruals are estimated as a function of present, 
past and future cash flows. The standard 
deviation is the proxy for earning quality, to 
evaluate the timeliness of short term accruals 
mapping into the cash flows. 
@(,) is an unsigned accrual quality measure. 
Only focuses on short term working capital 
and thus, does not attempt to model long 
term accruals and their reaction to cash 
flows.  
Discretionary estimation errors (Francis et al., 2005) 
 
∆="# = &$ + &!>:?#%! + &">:?# + &&>:?#'!
+ &(∆()" + &)**+ + ,# 
 
@(,) = $ + A!@(>:?) + A"@(B5C)3) + A&?D);>E"C)
+ A(F)G+5;H + I 
Adjusted DD model by adding managerial 
components (McNichols, 2002). It also 
decomposes the SD of the residual from the 
adjusted DD model into an innate component 
to reflect the operating environment and 
managerial choice. 
Innate estimation errors are the predicted 
components from	@(,). 
They did not investigate whether these 
adjustments help to reduce Type 1 and 2 




4.3.1.2.2 Earnings smoothness 
Smoothing transitory cash flows can improve earnings persistence and earnings 
informativeness (Dechow et al., 2010). Moreover, earnings smoothness captures the degree 
to which managers use discretion over financial reporting to reduce the variability of earnings 
relative to the variability of cash flows, which takes place by altering the accounting earnings’ 
component by accruals (Leuz et al., 2003; LaFond et al., 2007; Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012). 
If managers attempt to smooth permanent changes in cash flows, this will lead to a less timely 
and less informative earnings number. There are contradictory views on earnings smoothness 
as being a proxy of earnings quality, i.e. whether more earnings smoothness indicates higher 
level of earnings quality or whether the smoothness is through management incentives. 
Prior research (Leuz et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2006; Lang et al., 2003; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005, 2006) has found that companies with less earnings smoothing exhibit more 
earnings variability. Managing towards a small positive income is a sign of earnings smoothing 
to obtain a lower variability of reported earnings. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) elicited that 
firms manage reported earnings to avoid earnings losses and decreases; the frequencies of 
small decreases and losses in earnings are unusually low, whilst those of small increases in 
earnings and small positive income are unusually high. Hence, from a loss avoidance reporting 
incentive perspective, firms reporting a higher frequency of small positive net income will 
thus indicate a higher accounting quality (Barth et al., 2008). In contrast, smoother earnings 
may obtain better quality of financial reporting information, if the earnings management is 
not associated with an opportunistic incentive. If the accounting choice is motivated by 
opportunistic behaviour, this would impede the informativeness of smoother earnings 
(Dechow et al., 2010).   
Ball and Shivakumar (2006) investigated the role of accruals in asymmetrically timely 
gains or losses recognition and found that timeliness increased the variability of earnings 
relative to cash flows, which leads to less negative correlation between accruals and current 
period cash flow. A high negative correlation between accruals and cash flows indicates 
managers increase accruals in response to poor cash flow, which is a sign of earnings 
smoothing (Myers et al., 2007). This implies that a less negative correlation between accruals 




In contrast, the findings of an earlier study by Healy (1985) suggest that the higher variability 
of earnings can be associated with “big bath”42 accounting. Some researchers have revealed 
that if there are errors in estimating accruals, a less negative correlation between accruals 
and cash flows could be a sign of lower earnings quality (Richardson et al., 2006, 2005; 
Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Xie, 2001). 
Moreover, the survey evidence from Graham et al. (2005) and Dichev et al. (2013) 
shows a strong preference for a smooth earnings path. That is, financial executives claimed 
they adopted earnings smoothing, because inconsistency of earnings would influence the 
future share price and thus, harm investors’ interest. Moreover, it would increase firms’ risk 
and cost of capital, because if they broke the pattern of consistent earnings growth, they may 
experience a negative abnormal share return in that year (DeAngelo, 1986). Both Graham et 
al. (2005) and Dichev et al. (2013) claimed that the intention of earnings management is not 
for management’s own benefit and it that it prefers not to use discretionary accruals to 
manage earnings. Bypassing the focus of the opportunistic incentives in earnings smoothness 
studies, smooth reported earnings will benefit both firms and investors in the financial market. 
For, for as has been expounded in prior studies, the main reasons for earnings management 
is to increase firms’ share returns as well as reduce financial risk and the cost of capital (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986; Dechow et al., 1996; Francis et al., 2002; Schipper and Vincent, 2003) 
to maintain the stability of the  financial market. 
While prior studies have not provided a clear conclusion about earnings smoothness 
as a proxy for earnings quality. To understand better the consequences of earnings 
smoothness, a measure of smoothness that is capable to distinguish artificial smoothness 
from that of fundamental performance is needed (Dechow et al., 2010).  
4.3.1.3 Research design issues of earnings management 
It has been remarkably difficult for researchers convincingly to document earnings 
management. The major design issue for researchers is that they have to estimate earnings 
before the effects of earnings have been managed under managerial intention. However, 
 
42 Firms (normally already in financial difficulty) may manipulate the financial statement to make the accounting 




managerial intent unobservable, so researchers have to identify the conditions under which 
managers’ incentives are likely to be high. Previous studies come up with different types of 
incentives, such the opportunistic perspective of earnings management. Regarding which, 
less variability of reported earnings is preferred by the managers, who can maximise their 
benefits from bonus plans (Guidry et al., 1999), reduce attention from regulatory bodies 
(Collins et al., 1995), mitigate the range of extreme gains or losses (Guay et al., 1996) and 
meet the earnings expectations of investors and analysers (Degeorge et al., 1999). 
Ball (2013) considered earnings management theory regarding the management 
incentives perspective as incorrect. He argued that researchers have strong prior, ethical and 
moral views of management incentives: bonus and/or tax avoidance. Schipper (1989) pointed 
that the earnings management is also inherent in the current reporting system, which allows 
for a variety of accrual options available across all countries’ accounting standards. Within the 
accounting standards or principles, some changes in the amount of managerial discretion 
might even increase the earnings relevance value level in the financial market (Schipper, 1989; 
Graham et al., 2005). Schipper (1989) paper questioned whether there are adverse 
consequences of earnings management, referring to “managerial productivity”, which will 
send potentially informative signals to the investors. The paper questioned what financial 
information would be produced in the absence of purposeful intervention.  
Moreover, there is no widely accepted measurement of discretionary accruals, which 
is a proxy measure of earnings quality (previous section). Dechow et al. (1996) suggested such 
accruals are not directly related to underlying economy conditions and can be easily 
manipulated. Most research in the earnings management field has used the accrual principle 
in testing earnings variability. However, the most used Jones (1991) model in separating 
discretionary accruals from total accruals has been heavily criticised. All the models for the 
earnings management investigations reject the null hypothesis of no earnings management 
and hence, the knowledge of the determinants of accruals in the absence of manipulation is 
limited.  
There is no theory that provides general support for earnings management (Ball, 2013). 
Managerial discretion can also improve the ability of earnings to reflect economic value 




has been highlighted in a way that complements the studies with information content of cash 
flows versus accruals (Subramanyam, 1996; Sloan, 1996; McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Jones, 
1991; Holthausen et al., 1995; Francis et al., 2005; Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 
2002; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Thereafter, the major earnings management study 
concerns have been how to define earnings quality in the presence of earnings manipulation, 
whether earnings management always decreases earnings quality or whether are there 
special circumstances in which earnings management could be considered as a positive 
management instrument to increase some measure of earnings quality. 
This subsection has reviewed literature on earnings management measurement and 
considered the issues of research design, which have led to contested empirical evidence and 
conclusions in the earnings quality studies. The aggregate accruals testing Jones and modified 
Jones models has received the most criticism, despite being the most adopted for detecting 
managerial choices. The current study’s design involves adopting both the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals from the modified Jones model and the SD of working capital accruals 
from the DD model. Both abnormal accruals quality and working capital accruals quality 
models enable the investigation of accruals quality with an intuitive explanation, whilst 
evading the major issue of opportunism in earnings management research.  
4.3.2 Earnings persistence 
Following on from the previous section regarding accrual quality as one of the earnings quality 
attributes, this subsection reviews earnings persistence literature as another proxy for 
earnings quality. Among the four aspects of earnings quality, much prior research has 
involved analysis of discretional accruals, value relevance and earnings timeliness in recent 
years, whilst earnings persistence has been explored in accounting research for decades. This 
part of the chapter, firstly, presents reviews from the existing literature regarding earnings 
persistence, which is followed by consideration of the earnings persistence measurement 




4.3.2.1 Prior literature on earnings persistence  
There are two streams regarding earnings persistence studies: the first, focuses on the 
predictive aspect of persistent earnings and assumes that more of these will provide better 
inputs to equity valuation models, thus more persistent earnings are of a higher quality than 
less persistent ones (Sloan, 1996; Richardson et al., 2006, 2005; Dechow and Ge, 2006; 
Dechow et al., 2008). The second stream is aimed at addressing whether earnings is decision 
useful and after their release, whether this improves equity valuation outcomes (Lev and 
Thiagarajan, 1993b; Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997). However, this stream faces research 
design difficulty since the true value of firms is unobservable (Dechow et al., 2010). 
4.3.2.1.1 Earnings  persistence  
In the early stage of the earnings persistence study, the evidence showed that earnings follow 
a “random walk”, whereby changes in accounting earnings are unpredictable for the future 
earnings’ performance (Ball and Watts, 1972; Watts and Leftwich, 1977; Foster, 1977). Ball 
and Watts (1972) further argued that due to earnings smoothing attempts in the corporation, 
earnings persistence cannot successfully provide interpretations for a firm’s future earnings. 
Freeman et al. (1982) contended that the evidence that earnings are following a “random 
walk” is only true in a limited sense. A modest enlargement of the predictive information set 
will lead to rejection of the hypothesis that earnings changes are unpredictable, so the 
earnings “random walk hypothesis” is incorrect. For their study, they investigated the 
predictablity of book rate-of-return on earnings changes and found that book rate-of-return 
has predictive content with respect to earnings changes, hence rejecting the “random walk” 
hypothesis. Ou and Penman (1989), using a random walk model, elicited that market prices 
naively react to future earnings, and showed the possiblity of predicting future stock price 
given only current earnings along with the historical behaviour of earnings. Bernard and 
Thomas (1990) were the first to use a less restrictive model than a random walk model to 
investigate whether present quarterly earnings can predict future quarterly earnings and 
assessing the extent to which the predictable stock returns are consistent with the predictions 




Dechow et al. (2010) contended that accruals have been the most studied earnings 
component in the earnings persistence studies since Sloan (1996). Sloan (1996) argued that 
the random walk model regresses current earnings on past ones without seperating the cash 
flows and accruals component. In his study, he decomposed earnings into cash flows and 
accruals earnings to investigate the predictability of both components on future earnings, 
suggesting that the persistence of earnings performance attributable to the accruals is smaller 
than that forcash flows. He further investigated whether stock prices are captured differently 
by the accruals and cash flows components of earnings. The results revealed that market 
prices act only towards earnings and fail to reflect fully information contained in the accrual 
and cash flow components of current earnings until that information impacts on future ones. 
Fairfield et al. (2003) extend the work of Sloan (1996) by suggesting that accruals are 
a component of the growth of net operating assets and of profitability. They investigated 
whether the lower persistence of accruals is driven by the profitability or growth in accruals. 
They found that both the components of growth in net operating assets accruals and growth 
in long term net operating assets have a negative association with a one-year-ahead return 
on total assets. Similar evidence also emerged after controlling for current profitability. The 
evidence shows that the market overvalues accruals and growth in the long-term, whilst the 
net operating assets relate to their one-year-ahead return on total assets. So, they concluded 
that their findings were more general and criticised the finding of Sloan (1996): lower 
persistence of accruals is relative to operating cash flows, which is a specific manifestation of 
their research.  They declared that the lower persistence of accruals arises, because they are 
a component of growth in net operating assets. The different persistence level of accruals is 
less likely to result from other features, such as accrual manipulation. The evidence of low 
persistence of accruals is related to operating cash flows and is more likely to result from 
conservative accounting than manipulation.  
The paper of Richardson et al. (2005) also built on the work of Sloan (1996) and further 
drew a link between accrual subjectivity and accounting information reliability. They 
separated accruals into different categories: total accruals, change in working capital, change 
in current operating assets, change in current operating liabilities, change in non-current 




change in financial liabilities as well as change in short term and long-term investment. They 
further classified these components into different hierarchy levels of reliability, by regressing 
the one-year-ahead return on total assets on different components of accruals, concluding 
that less reliable accruals are associated with lower earnings persistence. In another paper by 
Richardson et al. (2006), it was argued that other than the growth and profitability 
components, as proposed by Fairfield et al. (2003), accrual estimation error is another 
important factor inducing the lower persistence of accruals. They further decomposed 
accruals into growth and efficiency accounting distortion, finding a significant negative 
relationship between the one-year-ahead return on total assets and accruals, which is 
consistent with the findings of both Sloan (1996) and Fairfield et al. (2003).  
Dechow et al. (2008) expanded upon the work of Sloan (1996) by investigating 
whether the cash component of earnings is more persistent than the accruals one. They 
decomposed the cash component of earnings into: the change in the cash balance, including 
annual cash and short-term investment balance, net cash distributions to debt holders and 
net cash distributions to equity holders. The findings are consistent with those of Sloan (1996), 
that the cash flow component of earnings is associated with a higher level of persistence than 
the accruals component. They further elicited that the cash component level of persistence 
depends on its subcomponent relating to equity; the persistence of a change of net cash 
distributions to equity holders is higher than that of a change in net non-interest cash 
contributions to debt holders. Both subcomponents of cash earnings have higher earnings 
persistence than the change in annual cash flow and short-term investment balance. 
Moreover, both have the same persistence level as accruals. They suggested that investors 
not only misprice accrual earnings, for they also do so regarding the change in the cash 
balance. In a study by Dechow and Ge (2006), it was also found that accruals improve the 
persistence of earnings relative to cash flows in high accrual firms, whilst reducing this 
persistence in low accrual ones. They suggested that the reason for this is that it is driven by 
special items. They explained that investors misunderstand the transitory nature of special 
items, which leads to the low accrual-special item firms having higher future equity returns 




Thomas and Zhang (2002) documented that the negative relation between accruals 
and future returns is mainly due to inventory changes, Allen et al. (2013) suggested that 
inventory accruals result in less persistent earnings, because of measurement error relating 
to the inventory write-downs or write-offs. They claimed that the mispricing of accruals is 
driven by both accrual estimation error and firm growth. Moreover, accrual estimation error 
is the least persistent component of earnings, while accruals relating to firm growth are less 
persistent than cash flows (ibid). The study of Allen et al. (2013) regarding the time-series 
properties of accruals, involved testing the accruals reversing process. It was concluded that 
most accrual reversals represent “good” accruals that correctly anticipate temporary 
fluctuations in working capital. This further demonstrates that the modified Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model by adding “Sales Growth Rate” and “Employee Growth Rate” variables 
can be used to control for “good” accrual reversals. 
4.3.2.1.2 Fundamental outcome and earnings persistence 
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993a) recommended 12 fundamental signals43 based on the level of 
estimating firm value and future earnings performance, suggesting that two, namely accounts 
receivable and inventories, are the leading indicators for future earnings. They argued that an 
increase in these two indicators is regarded as bad news for future earnings, because it 
increases the difficulty in generating sales and further, reduces firm value. Abarbanell and 
Bushee (1997) investigated whether changes in fundamental information induce subsequent 
changes in earnings information, by employing fundamental signals from Lev and Thiagarajan 
(1993a) and an empirical approach put forward by Penman (1992). They found that accounts 
receivables are positively related with future earnings (one year-ahead) changes and that 
receivable growth also indicates sales growth. In respect of inventory, they elicited consistent 
evidence with that of Lev and Thiagarajan (1993a) that poor inventory accruals quality has 
positive future changes in per share earnings. Both studies findings suggested that 
fundamental information affects earnings property.  
 
43 Inventories, accounts receivable, capital expenditure, R&D expenditure, gross margin, sales and 
administrative expenses, provision for doubtful receivables, effective tax, order backlog, labour force, LIFO 




4.3.2.2 Earnings persistence approaches 
This subsection presents two approaches from prior research: the time-series and economic 
determinants approaches. Both approaches are from the earnings predictive aspect of study 
and are designed to estimate the predictability of current earnings on future ones.  
A simple model to estimate earnings persistence was proposed Freeman et al. (1982) 
as: 
!"#$%$&'!"# = ) + +!"#$%$&'! + ,! 
Earnings are operating income scaled by total assets. A higher β implies more 
persistent earnings, thus indicating a better earnings quality. 
Sloan (1996) extended the above simple model by decomposing total earnings into 
cash flow and accrual components of earnings to test whether the latter is less persistent than 
earnings performance attributable to the cash flow component: 
!"#$%$&'!"# = ) + +#-.! + +$/00#1"2'! + ,! 
 +$ < +# implies that the cash flow component of earnings is more persistent than the 
accrual one. 
Based on both Freeman et al. (1982) and Sloan’s (1996) approaches, the estimation 
model for earnings persistence is extended by adding extra control variables: 
!"#$%$&'!"# = ) + +#!"#$%$&'! + +$45ℎ7#	9%$"$%0"2	'5"57:7$5	0;:<;$7$5' + ,! 
 Dechow et al. (2010) argued that the time-series models from Freeman et al. (1982) 
and Sloan (1996) neglect the impact of firms’ fundermental performance and accounting 
choice, suggest that earnings persistence is likely to be driven by the business in which the 
firm operates and the accrual accounting choice.  
An earlier study of Lev (1983) involved investigating whether inter-firm differences in 
product type, industry competition, capital intensity and firm size are associated with 




the fundamentof economic and argued that, if accounting choices affect firms’ earnings 
generating process, the effect will be examined by the parameter estimated in a time series 
model (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979). Researchers adopted the economic determinant 
approach since Lev (1983) to find similar evidence that the variablity of annual earnings is 
associated with some economic factors, including: firm size, product-type, the degree of 
capital intensity, the industry entrying barriers (Baginski et al., 1999; Richardson et al., 2006). 
In this study, the persistence of earnings is considered to predict future earnings, 
thereby facilitating decision-making to accounting information users. Hence, a time-series 
approach is adopted for measuring the property of earnings’ predictability for the future 
earnings, whilst the economic determinants approach for identifying the property of earnings 
at the individual firm level will not be utilised. 
4.3.2.3 Limitations of earnings persistence studies  
In prior studies, the persistence of earnings was taken as being an important earnings quality 
property. Researchers attempted to identify different determinants of earnings persistence 
by applying time-series and fundamental outcome approaches to investigate the role of 
persistent earnings guidance in the financial market and smooth earnings management 
incentives (Ball and Watts, 1972). In general, the outcomes of the studies have suggested that 
managers of firms with more volatile earnings are less likely to provide guidance for the 
investors to forecast firms’ future earnings performance (Waymire, 1985). Hence, a higher 
level of earnings persistence indicates better earnings quality for outside investors and 
investment efficiency. However, it is difficult to identify whether firms tend to smooth 
earnings to achieve a certain level persistence or that the earnings are fundamentally 
persistent. To overcome the identification issues of earnings persistence study, researchers 
have attempted to find the determinants of earnings persistence. Earnings persistence 
studies are not only investigated at the whole annual earnings persistent level, for they have 
also decomposed earnings into different components to identify the factors that may induce 
the persistence of earnings information.  
To summarise the prior research, it has considered whether current earnings could be 




persistence is an appropriate proxy for earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010). The earnings 
persistence study issues raised include the method used to identify earnings persistence and 





4.3.3 Earnings timeliness  
Following the previous subsections regarding accrual quality and earnings persistence proxies 
of earnings quality, in this one the literature of earnings timeliness is reviewed as another 
proxy for earnings quality adopted for this study. This part of the chapter, firstly, presents 
reviews from the existing literature regarding earnings timeliness, followed by earnings 
timeliness estimation models and the research design issues in this field of study.  
4.3.3.1 Prior literature on earnings timeliness  
Timely loss recognition is a significant property of accounting earnings (Basu, 1997). The 
relevance and reliability are limited by earnings timeliness (Watts, 2003b, a). Watts (2003a) 
suggested that, if firms do not report earnings in a timely manner, but rather, gather all 
information before presenting it to the public, then, whilst it is more reliable, it might no 
longer be relevant. On the other hand, if firms present timely information, but it is insufficient, 
then its reliability may be reduced, which leads to inaccuracy. 
4.3.3.1.1 Earnings timeliness definition  
Accounting recognition is considered as conservative when firms recognise losses timelier 
than for gains (Basu, 1997). Basu (1997) predicted and found that earnings respond more to 
negative returns (bad news) than to positive ones (good news). Since this study, earnings’ 
timely losses recognition or accounting conservatism has been extensively explored in the 
accounting literature. There have been a number of accounting research studies about 
earnings timeliness that employed Basu (1997) approach. 
Beaver and Ryan (2005) divided conservatism in conditional and unconditional forms. 
They defined accounting conservatism as the understatement of the book value of net assets 
relative to their market value of net assets. Regarding unconditional conservatism (ex ante or 
news independent), they defined this as “aspects of the accounting process determined at the 
inception of assets and liability yield expected unrecorded goodwill”, such as immediate 
expensing a recognition of intangibles and accelerated depreciation of PPE. Conditional 
conservatism (ex post or new dependent) refers to “book values are written down under 




explained that the reason for conditional conservatism is to counterbalance managers’ 
income- increasing incentives. For the current study, earnings timeliness regarding 
conditional conservatism is investigated. The following reviewed literature is in respect of the 
timely losses’ recognition perspective.  
4.3.3.1.2 Information demand of the equity market and timeliness  
There are some studies that have provided evidence that equity market demand for decision 
usefulness information is one of the determinants of earnings timeliness. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) adopted Basu (1997) tendency-to-reverse measure to compare timely loss recognition 
between public and private firms in the UK, finding that loss recognition is more timely in the 
former than the latter due to the equity market information demanding investment decision 
usefulness. Their study involved examining timely loss recognition by employing market-
based and accrual-based models to test data during the period between 1990 and 2000 in the 
UK. They found that negative earnings changes tend to reverse in the next period, whilst 
positive earnings changes tend to persist. The results are consistent regarding accounting 
timeliness, when adopting both the accrual-based earnings timeliness measurement model 
and the market-based earnings timeliness measurement model. These authors were the first 
to propose time-series measurement of accounting conservatism by not interpreting bad 
news as negative stock returns.  
Ball et al. (2003) also adopted Basu (1997) reverse regression to investigate whether 
there is difference in timely losses recognition in East Asian countries (Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand), who share same accounting standards and legal system origins. They 
found that Hong Kong exhibits the highest timeliness, which is consistent with its better equity 
market-oriented reputation. Whilst Thailand has the lowest timeliness owing to the country’s 
less developed equity market, which is under strong political influence. They concluded that 
timely losses recognition is endogenously related to the countries’ equity capital market 
incentives, thus not being driven purely by their accounting standards and law system. 
Ball et al. (2008) contended that debt markets demand high scores on timeliness, 
because debt covenants utilise reported numbers and equity markets do not rate financial 




incorporated in share prices. They used the R2 estimation from Lev (1989), finding that loss 
recognition is more timely for firms in countries with greater importance of the debt market 
relative to the equity market. In other words, countries relying on the debt market for firms 
financing have lower levels of timely loss recognition in the equity market than those relying 
on the latter market to raise capital.  
The above studies suggest that timeliness has an endogenous component that is 
related to the equity market development and incentives. That is, it is not purely determined 
by the orientation of the countries’ accounting standards or legal system.  
4.3.3.1.3 Institutional factors and timeliness 
In addition to identifying the equity market incentive as a determinant of earnings timeliness, 
there are studies that have examined the regulatory system and enforcement as its 
determinants. Ball et al. (2000) examined over 40,000 firm-year accounting incomes reported 
during 1985-1995 across seven countries and found that the reported earnings are less timely 
and less conservative in code-law countries than in common-law ones, which is entirely due 
to the greater sensitivity to economic losses from the equity market for the latter. They 
further explained that accounting information prepared under common-law accounting 
standards is of contemporary interest and that the IFRS reflects a largely common-law 
approach to timely disclosure. They then extended the sample by bringing in other 18 
countries and concluded that important properties of accounting income are a function of 
the varying demands that it satisfies under different institutional arrangements.  
Building on the study of Ball et al. (2000), Lara and Mora (2004) investigated whether 
there is difference regarding earnings timeliness in common law and code law countries in 
Europe, by employing two accounting conservatism measures: market-to-book and earnings 
asymmetry. They elicited that code law countries in Europe have larger balance sheet 
conservatism, there is no significant difference between code law and common law countries 
in earnings conservative practices. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) researched whether key 
characteristics of country-level institutional factors induce differential asymmetric 
recognition of economic losses and gains. The key characteristics of country-level institutional 




Those factors create incentives that influence the behaviour of market participants. They 
included all the countries with sufficient firm-level accounting and returns data during 1992-
2001 and estimated using a model modified from Ball et al. (2000) and Ball et al. (2003). They 
found that firms in countries with strong investor protection have more timely losses 
recognition than those with weak investor protection after controlling for legal origin: 
common or code law. Strong public enforcement aspects of securities law slow timely gains 
recognition and private enforcement aspects of securities law have no impact on 
conservatism. Low risk of expropriation of assets by the state and low state ownership of 
enterprises encourage timely losses recognition. Firms in code-law countries with high state 
involvement in the economy have more timely losses recognition than code-law ones with 
low state involvement. In contrast, firms in common-law countries with low state involvement 
are associated with higher timely losses recognition than in common-law ones with high state 
involvement in the economy. Moreover, financial managers seem to be able to adjust their 
financial reporting in response to the nature of the state’s involvement. On the findings, they 
suggested that cross country variation should be considered as an additional explanation for 
accounting conservatism.  
However, Barth et al. (2008) estimated timely loss recognition in 21 countries after 
adopting common-law oriented accounting standards and did not find a statistical difference 
in earnings timeliness between different accounting regimes. Francis and Wang (2008) 
suggested that accounting quality varies across countries mainly according to whether or not 
there is enforcement by the Big 4 auditors, with timely loss recognition being higher for firms 
with Big 4 auditors. They documented that the enforcement by the Big 4 auditors is higher in 
countries with stronger investor protection and that common-law countries, in general, have 
this.  
The aforementioned studies suggest that country-level institutional factors should be 
considered for accounting conservatism. Pope and Walker (1999) also held that country 
institutional differences should be taken into account, arguing that earnings measures are 
essential for the analysis of earnings timeliness in different accounting regimes. Their study 
was based on Basu’s model to compare the earnings timeliness between US and UK firms 




ordinary earnings and earnings after extraordinary times. They reported that write-offs of 
large transitory losses through extraordinary items were tolerated during their research 
period in the UK before the introduction of IFRS No.3 and hence, UK firms were more likely 
to categorise a bad news earnings component as extraordinary items relative to US firms. 
Thereafter, they found that earnings before extraordinary items under US GAAP were timelier 
than under UK GAAP. However, earnings after extraordinary items were more sensitive to 
loss reporting under UK GAAP than under US GAAP. They concluded that the relative of timely 
losses recognition are sensitive to the earnings measures under different accounting regimes.  
In China, the introduction of conservatism was only after 1993 since China had long 
been a socialist economy and accounting practices were controlled by the government, which 
rejected implementing accounting conservatism and remained hostile even after that date. 
Xiaohui and Yuehua (2007) suggested that conservatism did not exist during 1995-2000 in 
China, but did gain acceptance after the 2001 implementation of the Accounting System for 
Business Enterprises. Cullinan et al. (2012) examined the relationships between ownership 
structure and accounting conservatism in China. They considered three ownership structure 
issues: the influence of the largest shareholders, whether the largest shareholder was the 
government, and the power of minority shareholders. They found that the high proportion of 
shares held by the largest shareholders leads to low accounting conservatism, state 
ownership does not influence the relationship between the largest shareholders’ ownership 
and accounting conservatism, whilst privately owned firms where the state owns a minority 
interest are more conservative than those without this form of ownership. Lin and Tian (2012) 
investigated the impact of accounting conservatism on IPO under-pricing in China and elicited 
that conservatism helps to reduce information asymmetry facing IPO firms and mitigates IPO 
under-pricing.  
The literature regarding accounting conservatism is limited. With regard to the impact 
of China’s change in accounting standards on earnings timeliness and conservatism, the 
literature is absent. Currently a code-law country, will introducing common-law oriented 




4.3.3.2 Estimation models of earnings timeliness 
There are two categories regarding earnings timeliness models: market-based and accrual-
based.   
4.3.3.2.1 Market-based model 
Some researchers have contended that the information reflected in share prices is richer than 
that in accounting earnings and that share returns reflect the present value of future net cash 
flows expected by the financial market (Beaver et al., 1980; Kothari, 2001). Whilst accounting 
earnings regarding the accrual processes will lag up to four years of price changes in the stock 
market (Basu, 1997) and hence, share prices lead earnings. The most frequently used measure 
of earnings timeliness is the reverse earnings-return regression of Basu (1997), which is aimed 
at proving asymmetric earnings timeliness, that earnings are more strongly associated with 
concurrent unexpected losses than unexpected gains. 
=%!
>%!&#
? = )' + )#@A%! + +'A%! + +#A%! ∗ @A%! + ,%! 
where, =%!is  earnings per share, 	>%!&# is price per share at the beginning of the fiscal 
year, A%!is the stock return from 9 months before fiscal year-end to 3 months after fiscal year-
end and @A%!represents the dummy variable =1, if A%! < 0, =0 otherwise.  Higher +# implies 
more timeliness of the incurred losses in earnings.  
Basu (1997) suggested that the property of earnings persistence differs from that of 
earnings timeliness, whereby higher loss recognition will consequently lead to lower earnings 
persistence. If earnings information persists, it is less likely to capture economic outcome on 
a timely basis. Hence, the author provided a second measure, one not based on share returns, 
but rather, on the change in income to test the timley loss recognition and to explain how 
negative earnings are more likely to reverse in the following period. The model is adopted 
from Ball and Shivakumar (2005) as follows:  
∆FG! = )' + )#@∆FG!&# + )$∆FG!&# + )(@∆FG!&# ∗ ∆FG!&# + ,! 
where, ∆FG! is the change in income from t-1 to t scaled by a beginning book value of 




implies that timely losses recognition is transitory and hence, reverse, whilst )( < 0 implies 
that economic losses are recognised in a timelier manner than gains and therefore, negative 
earnings changes will be less persistent and will tend to deliver reverse more than positive 
earnings changes.  Following the first model in Basu’s paper, the second model developed by 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) was designed to test whether negative earnings are less persistent 
than positive earnings since these are more than likely to reverse in the following year. In this 
study, earnings persistence is investigated in a separate chapter.  
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) investigated the relation between market-to-book 
ratio and the earnings timeliness measure from Basu’s reverse model by employing forward 
and backward accumulated earnings and stock returns instead of single year earnings and 
stock returns. They found a positive correlation between backward accumulated returns and 
the year-end market-to-book ratio. This suggests that market-to-book ratio is positively 
correlated to Basu’s earnings timeliness measure and they concluded that Basu’s earnings 
timeliness model is more powerful when employing accumulated earnings and returns for 
empirical analysis than adopting single-year earnings and returns. 
4.3.3.2.2 Accrual-based model 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) suggested that timely gain and loss recognition are based on 
expected not realised cash flows and thus, are accomplished through accruals. They argued 
that Basu’s (1997) reverse model cannot distinguish transitory gain or loss components in 
earnings from random accrual estimation errors and developed an alternative model that 
exploits the likelihood that timely loss recognition occurs through accounting accruals. 
!""! = $" + $#&"'(! + $$"'(! + $%&"'(! ∗ "'(! + *! 
The model provides roles for accruals to: mitigate the noise in cash flow and 
asymmetric recognition of unrealised gains and losses. Where, -.4!  is the difference 
between earnings and accruals; @-.4! is a dummy =1, if -.4! is negative, and 0 otherwise; 
and !""! is measured as:  
/--! = ∆G$H7$5;#I + ∆@7J5;#' + ∆;5ℎ7#	01##7$5	"''75' − ∆0#7L%5;#'




+$ < 0 is due to the noise reduction role of accruals and +$ > 0 is due to the timely 
gain and loss recognition; and positive +( implies that accrual losses are more likely in periods 
of negative cash flows. The higher $% indicates more asymmetric recognition of unrealised 
gains and losses by mitigating the noise in cash flows.  In Ball and Shivakumar (2005) study, 
they expanded losses timely recognition to how timely negative accruals are recognised in 
total accruals. 
The concern of the market-based timeliness model is the underlying assumption of 
market efficiency and hence, the variation in timeliness could be cause by the variation of the 
market return generating process rather, than variation in earnings quality (Dechow et al., 
2010). Furthermore, the market-based model uses per share return as a proxy for earnings 
quality; however, per share returns reflect all other market information, but not just 
information on earnings (Givoly and Hayn, 2002).  
Take into consideration the limitations of Basu’s market-based asymmetry timeliness 
model, and accruals quality will be investigated in a separate chapter. Hence, in the timely 
recognition of losses chapter, the accrual-based timely recognition model developed from 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) will not be adopted.  For this study accrual quality and earnings 
persistence are taken as accounting-based earnings quality investigation and timely losses 
recognition and value relevance as market-based earnings quality investigation. Accordingly, 
the Basu (1997) market-based timely losses recognition model is adopted, but modified with 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) model and the tested dependent variable is accumulated 
earnings deflated by the share price. Furthermore, this study tests the frequency of large 
losses reports from Barth et al. (2008).  
4.3.3.3 Limitations of earnings timeliness studies  
Prior studies have shown that earnings timeliness has been widely used in accounting 
research. It is held that earnings timeliness delays the recognition of positive earnings to a 
future period and recognises negative earnings in the current one. Hence, a change in positive 
earnings tends to be more persistent than a change in negative earnings (Basu, 1997; 
Bushman et al., 2011). Up until now, the market-based earnings timeliness model has been 




However, the limitation of market-base model is that it only applies to equity market 
demand as an earnings quality proxy. Dechow et al. (2010) argued that this does not provide 
evidence as to whether the equity market should demand more timely recognition and thus, 
it cannot be concluded that better earnings timeliness improves decision outcomes. 
Furthermore, researchers have also found  that timeliness estimated from Basu’s market-
based model has a negative relation with firm-specific conservatism (unconditional 
conservatism) (Givoly and Hayn, 2002) and thus, it cannot measure unconditional accounting 
conservatism.  
In conclusion, since Basu’s (1997) paper, studies have distinguished conditional 
conservativism, more timely losses recognition is better than more timely gains recognition, 
from unconditional conservatism, lower book value of assets in the early periods of an asset 
life from an ex ante policy adoption. However, whether accounting conservativism increases 
or decreases the decision usefulness remains a controversial issue (Watts, 2003b, a). 
Moreover, the proxy used to measure accounting conservatism by Basu’s (1997) model is 
problematic. Furthermore, institutional factors play an important role in the quality of 
earnings timeliness; a more timely recognition of losses is often associated with a 
conservative accounting system and legal system (Pope and Walker, 1999). Last but not least, 
the accrual earnings component is still a significant information source for the analysis of 





4.3.4 Earnings value relevance  
Following the previous subsections regarding accrual quality, earnings persistence and 
timeliness as proxies of earnings quality, this subsection reviews literature on earnings value 
relevance as another attribute for earnings quality adopted for this PhD study. This part of 
the chapter, firstly, presents reviews from the existing literature regarding earnings value 
relevance, followed by consideration of earnings value relevant estimation models and then, 
the research design issues in earnings value relevance study are discussed. 
4.3.4.1 Prior literature on earnings value relevance  
The value relevance of accounting information has been studied from many perspectives. One 
of the first value relevance studies was undertaken by Miller and Modigliani (1966), who used 
data on the market values of stocks to identify drivers that influence stock returns. Miller and 
Modigliani (1966) did not use the term value relevance; however, they did attempt to develop 
effective methods for inferring the cost of capital relevant for optimal investment decisions 
from data on the market value of stocks. 
Ball and Brown (1968) examined the associations between accounting earnings and 
stock returns. Their paper has had an enormous influence on modern empirical accounting 
research, for it has led to an era of research into the information perspective of accounting 
data (Ohlson, 1995). Subsequently, further research involved examining the relation between 
stock returns and accounting information without utilising the notion of “value relevance”. 
Amir et al. (1993) were the first to use the term for describing the association between 
accounting earnings and stock returns. Accounting information is drawn upon in value 
relevance analysis to determine the market value of the company. Francis and Schipper (1999) 
defined value relevance in two ways: the ability of the financial information contained in the 
financial statement and the explanatory power of accounting information for measuring 
market value, such as the ability of earnings to explain annual market-adjusted returns and 
the ability of earnings and book values of assets and liabilities to explain market values of 
equity. The definition of earnings quality contains financial information reliability and 
explanatory power in the financial market. The accruals reliability literature has been 




The next subsection is focused on the explanatory power of accounting information in the 
financial market. 
4.3.4.1.1 Explanatory power of accounting information in the stock market 
From the perspective of detecting the ability of financial information contained in the 
financial statement, in vast numbers of studies the value relevance of earnings, accruals and 
cash flows reported in financial statements has been explored (Sloan, 1996; McInnis and 
Collins, 2011; Dechow, 1994; Badertscher et al., 2012). However, there are different 
perceptions about the explanatory power of earnings, accruals and cash flows. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) suggested that management can use its information advantage to 
manipulate accruals opportunistically, especially discretionary accruals, such as accounts 
receivables and inventory accounts. These are greatly subject to earnings manipulation 
through accounting techniques like premature revenue recognition, asset write down or write 
off (Dechow et al., 1995, 1996) and hence, the cash flow component of earnings is preferred 
to estimate their explanatory power. 
In contrast, Dechow (1994) argued that firm performance depends ultimately on the 
ability to generate cash receipts in excess of disbursement. They investigated different 
circumstances under which accruals are predicted to improve earnings’ ability to measure 
firm’s performance, as reflected in stock price. The authors proposed that realised cash flows 
could be used to measure underlying performance; however, Dechow (1994) argued that, 
over finite intervals, reporting realised cash flows is not necessarily informative, because 
these experience more timing and matching problems in comparison with accruals in 
measuring a firm’s performance. The evidence in Dechow (1994) paper shows that accrual 
earnings can mitigate the timing and matching problems of cash flows recognition and that  
earnings will also suffer from such problems over short time intervals, but to a lesser extent 
than realised cash flows.  
Dechow (1994) debated whether accruals play a bilateral role in improving the ability 
of earnings to measure firm underlying performance. On the one hand, accrual rules can 
improve the timing of cash flow recognition in earnings and so, earnings will more closely 




verifiable requirements of accruals can limit management’s discretion, reduce the possibility 
of providing false information for a private gain, whilst also reducing the usefulness of 
reporting earnings in circumstances where there is private information of management 
concerning firm performance. Therefore, earnings can be a preferred proxy for measuring 
firm’s performance, while the existing accruals are the outcome of efficient contracting, 
which provides management with limited flexibility to manipulate earnings.  
The findings in Dechow (1994) paper are coherent with those of Sloan (1996) that stock 
price is strongly associated with earnings and not with recognised cash flows. Sloan (1996) 
provided deeper insight into the information content of accounting earnings. He examined 
whether stock prices reflect information about future earnings contained in the accrual and 
cash flow components of current earnings. He also probed to what extent current earnings 
performance persisting into the future depends on the relative magnitudes of the cash flow 
and accrual components of current earnings. In his paper, Sloan (1996) defined accruals as 
representing the difference between accounting earnings and cash flow, linked market 
returns to cash flow and accrual components of earnings and found firms with relatively low 
accruals experience higher abnormal returns in the future, whilst those with relatively high 
levels of accruals obtain lower ones in the future. The results indicate the persistence of 
earnings performance depends on the relative magnitudes of the cash and accrual 
components of earnings. Moreover, Sloan (1996) elicited that stock prices act as if investors 
fixate on earnings and fail to identify correctly the different properties of the cash and accrual 
components of earnings. Hence, accruals perform better in improving earnings’ ability to 
measure a firm’s underlying economy, as reflected in the stock price (Sloan, 1996; Dechow, 
1994). 
Dechow (1994) and Sloan (1996) stated that earnings are the summary measure of a 
firm’s performance produced under the accrual basis of accounting, which emphasises the 
role of the accrual component in predicting firm performance. However, the use of accruals 
introduces management incentives and earnings reliability problems. Management has some 
discretion over the recognition of accruals, which can be used to manipulate earnings 
depending varied management incentives. Since managers have superior information about 




1979; Holthausen et al., 1995; Healy, 1985), they will use their discretion to manipulate 
accrual earnings and thus, the earnings of accrual component will become less reliable than 
cash flows one.  
From the explanatory power of accounting information perspective, in the extant 
literature, value relevance has been measured by examining the statistical relations between 
financial statements information and stock market returns or book value of equity. However, 
a large portion of the current value relevance literature involves using and developing theory 
based on Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model. Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) 
developed the Feltham-Ohlson model, which has been commonly used in value relevance 
studies in many countries. This model, which is adopted for the current study, uses per share 
market value as dependent and present earnings and total book value of equity as 
independent, with added interaction terms. 
4.3.4.1.2 Market environments and earnings value relevance 
Bartov et al. (2001) compared whether earnings or cash flows value relevance is different 
across different countries, including: the US, the UK, Canada, Germany and Japan. By 
regressing returns on earnings and cash flow metrics, they found that earnings in Anglo-Saxon 
countries have greater explanatory power for stock returns than cash flows. Conversely, they 
discovered that earnings in non-Anglo-Saxon countries do not have superior explanatory 
power for the equity market than cash flows. They explained that capital in Anglo-Saxon 
countries is traditionally raised on the public equity market and earnings are under stronger 
equity market incentives, whereas in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, it is raised from private 
sources, thus reported earnings are less influenced by financial market incentives. 
Similar to the study of Bartov et al. (2001), Arce and Mora (2002) investigated the 
differences in accounting practices between earnings and book value, and the stock market 
value of the firm for eight European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain and the UK) from 1990-98, with 22,436 non-financial firm-
year observations. They further divided the countries into two groups: the investor-
orientated common-law countries versus the creditor-orientated code-law countries. With 




compared the explanatory power, examined by the Vuong test and found that earnings are 
more relevant than book value in investor-orientated countries, whilst book value is more 
relevant than earnings in creditor-orientated ones. However, both earnings and book value 
information have incremental explanatory power to explain market prices, except for the 
cases of Germany and Spain. They concluded that accounting practices are affected by 
different accounting rules and different institutional factors. Hence, the use of a common set 
of standards could mitigate the differences caused by the accounting rules, but not those 
down to institutional and cultural factors.  
Both of the above studies came to a similar conclusion, that earnings are more 
relevant in common law countries with investor-orientated capital markets than in code law 
ones with creditor-orientated capital markets, based on the European and US capital market 
data. In contrast, Charitou et al. (2000) elicited that earnings and cash flows are value relevant 
in Japan at much the same level as in the US market. For their study, they examined the 
explanatory power of earnings and cash flows on stocks returns by using data from the 
Japanese stock market for the period 1984-93, with 6,662 firm-year observations. The 
Japanese financial market is heavily based on creditor orientation rather than an investor one.  
The following studies involved examining accounting information quality in terms of 
value relevance in the Chinese economy. Haw et al. (1999) investigated earnings value 
relevance in China by examining the information content of accounting earnings measured 
under the old Chinese GAAP based on A-shares during 1994-1997. They first evaluated the 
association between one year adjusted stock returns and the change of accounting earnings 
as a long-window of 12-month period. Then, they tested the association between a three-day 
adjusted market rate of return and the change of accounting earnings as a short-window. 
They adopted the random-walk model to proxy market expected returns before the earnings 
announcement since there were no financial analysts following the Chinese market at the 
early stage. They found that adjusted stock returns under a short- or long-window are 
significantly associated with a change of earnings and suggested that earnings provide useful 
information to investors for decision usefulness in China. They further elicited that the 




in more mature markets and thus concluded that reported earnings carry more useful 
information in China than in a mature market.  
Chen and Wang (2004) investigated the value relevance of operating earnings and 
below-the-line items in the Chinese financial market. They found that below-the-line items 
are overused to fulfil the income-increasing purpose and frequently account for a large 
proportion of listed firms’ net income. They tested data covering the period 1997-2000, with 
only A-share companies of 2,202 firm-year observations and adopted both a return and price 
model. They found both operating income and below-the-line items are value relevant; 
however, the former is more persistent and has significantly larger power in predicting future 
earnings than the latter, even though below-the-line items also persist into the future value. 
Moreover, the earnings component (including a nonoperation earnings component from 
below-the-line items) is impounded in stock prices as long as it is persistent.  
The findings by Chen and Wang (2004) contradict those of Burgstahler et al. (2002), 
who elicited that stock prices do not fully impound for either speical items or a recurring 
component of earnings. Chen and Wang (2004) argued that the different findings could be 
attributed to the speical Chinese institutional environment. Under China’s unique 
institutional environment, the majority shareholders of listed firms are SOEs. Chinese 
investors place s larger valuation weight on below-the-line items due to those listed SOEs 
being able to improve their bottom line earnings through these items when needed. 
Moreover, it is easy and convenient for state-owned unlisted parent firms to arrange 
nonoperating transactions to boost their listed firms’ earnings through below-the-line items. 
Chen et al. (2001) were the first to investigate whether the A-share market in China is 
value relevant by comparing it with the B-share market, finding that accounting information 
is value relevant in China’s domestic market. Sami and Zhou (2004) further investigated 
whether there was a difference in the earnings value relevance under the old Chinese GAAP 
for A-share firms and IFRS for B-share firms. They adopted a price model drawn from the 
studies of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Barth et al. (1998) and test data during 1994 to 
2000 with 401 A-share and 401 B-share firm-year observations. They elicited that the 
accounting information in the B-share market under IFRS was more value relevant than in the 




(2007) also investigated the difference of value relevance of accounting information in China’s 
different stock segments, by bringing H-share firms into their study. They found that 
accounting information is value relevant in the different stock market segments, being more 
value relevant in the B- and H-share markets than in A-share.  
The review of related literature with regards to the accounting regime in China will be 
discussed in the future section 4.4, when the focus is on the transition of the accounting 
regime from the old Chinese GAAP to IFRS adoption, which is conceptually different from the 
value relevance study of accounting information. 
Apart from the legal and market system, the country’s disclosure quality also has an 
impact on the earnings value relevance. Kang and Hoong Pang (2005) investigated whether 
disclosure quality has an association with the value-relevance of accounting measures. They 
found accounting measures are more value relevant in developed economies than those of 
emerging ones.   
4.3.4.1.3 Firm fundamentals and earnings value relevance 
In an earlier subsection, accounting changes and country capital market environment effects 
were explored. This section reviews the literature with regards to the firm fundamentals as a 
determinant of earnings value relevance.  
Some early studies showed that earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are positively 
related to earnings persistence. Collins and Kothari (1989) suggested that ERCs are a function 
of riskless interest rates, the riskiness growth and persistence of earnings. They used the 
discount dividends valuation model and find ERCs are positively related with firm growth and 
earnings persistence, which is similar with the findings of Kormendi and Lipe (1987). Hayn 
(1995) explained that the reason for ERCs being positively related with persistent earnings is 
because losses are not expected to perpetuate and hence, they are less informative than 
profits about the firm’s future earnings. To study further the relation between losses and REC, 
Li (2011) tested the loss of firms’ future earnings based on the model developed from Joos 
and Plesko (2005) and elicited that investors underestimate losses and expect losses to 
reverse more quickly than they actually do. Dechow et al. (2010) argued that the use of 




investigate the earnings response in the financial market only provides indirect evidence, and 
that the accuracy of earnings persistence quality is not directly considered. 
Some researchers have studied the implications of firm fundamentals on value 
relevance more directly. Ballas and Hevas (2005) investigated how income, accruals and book 
value of equity are perceived by the stock market in four European countries: France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK).  The total number of firm-year observations was 
5,957 during 1995 to 2003 across seven industries. They adopted the price model to examine 
the association between the market value of the firms and accounting measures in the 
different countries and industries, finding that industry differences have stronger implications 
on the value relevance of earnings and book value of equity than country differences.  
Martinez (2003) examined the value relevance of accounting information, including firm size, 
debt leverage and business life cycle. The author used data from the French stock market of 
918 firm-years observations during 1994-2001 and adopted the quadratic model by 
incorporating non-linear information between accounting information and firm-specific 
attributes. For this study, it was found that the relevance of earnings is conditional on size, 
debt level and life cycle of the firm. Moreover, it emerged that a change of earnings reveals 
more information when the firm is large with a low leverage level of debt.  
4.3.4.1.4 Accounting methods and earnings value relevance 
Some studies have involved examining the relation between earnings measured under 
alternative accounting methods and earnings value relevance. Collins and Salatka (1993) 
investigated whether earnings response coefficients are influenced by firms’ accounting 
methods for foreign currency translation of gains and losses, following a Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) N0. 52. They selected 30 firms with the highest 
variance of foreign currency adjustments from the Value Line during 1977 to 1981. They held 
that the changes in the translation methods and the removal of certain exchange adjustment 
gains and losses from the income statement in SFAS No. 52 have made reported earnings 
more informative.  
Loudder and Behn (1995) examined whether the mandatory changes in income 




determination rules in their study referred to the switch of the research and development 
(R&D) accounting method as a result of the introduction of the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 2. They compared the earnings usefulness after the change 
to SFAS No. 2, which mandated firms to switch from capitalising to the expensing R&D 
accounting method. They selected firms that had R&D outlays over at least one percent of 
sales revenue pre SFAS No. 2 and then, matched those firms with a control group of expensing 
firms based on size, industry, and relative magnitude of R&D outlay. They found that 
capitalising firms’ R&D activities has significantly higher earnings usefulness than for 
expensing ones.   
Altamuro et al. (2005) examined the effects of the SEC’s Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 
101 adoption on earnings management and informativeness regarding accelerated revenue 
recognition. They deployed a difference-in-difference approach using a sample of firms that 
accelerated revenue recognition prior to SAB No. 101 adoption and a matched set of firms 
that are unaffected by the adoption. They found that firms affected by SAB No. 101 adoption 
had greater earnings informativeness in the pre-adoption period. They concluded that 
accelerated revenue recognition practices targeted by SAB No.101 led to less informative 
earnings since unearned revenues also provide value-relevance information.  
Hanlon et al. (2008) investigated whether the tax-induced changes in financial 
reporting behaviour have impacts on earnings value relevance, using the 94 firms identified 
by Guenther et al. (1997). Those firms were only deploying the cash method of accounting for 
tax purposes prior to TRA 86 and they compared those firms post TRA 86, which required 
them to switch to the accruals for tax purposes. They found that firms that converted to an 
accrual-based accounting method for tax purposes had a lower earnings response coefficient.  
To summarise, among the four earnings qualities, value relevance analysis has been 
most widely studied in prior research. The most influential approach for value relevance 
analysis has been explained and presented by Ohlson (1995). However, the debate on the 
usefulness of accounting information to explain firm value remains unresolved. The following 




4.3.4.2 Estimation models of value relevance  
As financial statements fundalmentally serve a stock market investment purpose, researchers 
have long been investigating whether accounting data are value relevant in stock markets 
(Kothari, 2001). This subsection reviews the valuation models employed by researchers in 
terms of earnings value relevance studies. 
4.3.4.2.1 Price and return models 
In earnings value relevance research, many scholars have used a price and/or a return model 
for their study since Kothari and Zimmerman (1995). The price model indicates whether the 
accounting number is value relevant with respect to its association with firm value, while the 
return model tests information about whether an accounting amount is reflected in changes 
in value over the return period (Barth et al., 2001). Often, empirical value relevance studies 
have credited Ohlson (1995) (details in 4.3.4.2.4) for how the price model is orientated. Collins 
et al. (1997) noted that the price model of Ohlson (1995) simply involved  taking out the 
discounting earnings term from the original model.  
Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) pointed out that the use of both models to permit 
more definitive inferences has become a common practice in the literature (Francis and 
Schipper, 1999; Eccher and Healy, 2000; Haw et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2001; Chen and Wang, 
2004) to examine the earnings response coefficient (ERC). 
Price model:                                >! = ) + +!! + ,! 
Return Model:                            >! >!&#? = ) + +
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>!&#
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where, >!  is the ex-dividend share price,  !!  is reported earnings >!&#  is the ex-
dividend share price at the previous period and + is the estimation for ERC.  
To yield a stationary series, Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) also provided the 
differenced-price model to overcome the econometric problems in using the price model: 




Beaver (2002) suggested that when the research design is for estimating what 
accounting measures are reflected in firm value, the price model will be more appropriate. 
Whilst when estimating the change in firm value over a specific time period, the return model 
will be more appropriate and time is an important element when using this model. Both the 
price and return models are employed to estimate share mispricing during the change of 
accounting regimes by comparing the explanatory power of earnings on stock price or returns 
between alternative accounting methods. Further, expanding on the study of Kothari and 
Zimmerman (1995), research papers also include other variables as regressors, such as book 
value of equity and special items, into the models (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Martinez, 
2003; Chen and Wang, 2004). 
4.3.4.2.2 Dividend-discounting model  
The aformentioned price and return valuation models are derived from the dividend-
discounting model, which is attributed to Williams (1938)  (Kothari, 2001). In addition to the 
price and return models, the earnings capitalisation model and the residual income valuation 








where, >!  is share price at t, !![@!")] is the market’s expected dividends of period 
t+k	and			#!",  is the risk-adjusted discount rate in period t+j.  
The above equation illustrates how the basic theory of the dividend-discounting 
model is that the market value of the firm is the present value of expected future dividend 
discounted at a risk adjusted expected return rate. Gordon (1962) simplified the dividend-
discounting model by assuming that market value is based on a discount rate (r) that is 
constant through time and dividends are growing at a constant growth rate (g) in perpetuity, 
r<g, Then, the model is simplified as follows: 




Building on the Gordon’s (1962) growth model,  Kaplan and Ruback (1995) applied the 
expected difference between opearating cash flow and cash investment as the denominator 
in the model.  
4.3.4.2.3 Earnings capitalisation  
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that market value depends on the expected profitability 
and  return of investment, whilst dividend policy does not affect a firm’s market value. Fama 
and Miller (1972) reformed the simplified dividend-discounting model in terms of the 
forecasted value of future earnings and future invesments, rather than dividends and their 
model is known as the earnings capitalisation model. They argued that the growth rate itself 
does not increase present market value unless the return on future investment exceeds the 
discount rate, so: 
>! =
=!"# #?  
where, =!"# is expected earnings for the next period. 
Fama and Miller (1972) referred the above valuation model as earnings capitalisation 
based on the assets that the firm currently holds and exlained that share price will only be 
higher than =!"# #?  , if the firm invests in projects and the return rate on these is above normal 
discount rate of return. Kothari (2001) criticised this, arguing that the earnings capitalisation 
model overlooks the equity return and growth through issusing new shares, but not 
reinvestments. 
4.3.4.2.4 Residual income valuation model  
The residual income valuation model (Feltham and Ohlson, 1995; Ohlson, 1995) is another 
transformation of the dividend-discounting model. It defines prices as the sum of current 
book value of equity and the discounted present value of expected future residual earnings 
(abnormal earnings). Moreover, it expresses firm value directly in terms of current and future 
accounting numbers, book values and earnings (Lee, 1999; Kothari, 2001), as follows: 
>! = [\! +N!![=!") − #[\!")&#]
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where, [\!  is book value at year t, !![=!") − #[\!")&#]  is expected abnormal 
earnings, X is the earnings for period t and r is the risk-adjusted discount rate.  
Bernard (1995, noted in Kothari 2001) contended that the residual income model is 
an unbiased  of accounting method , as it does not affect the model’s implementation. He 
further explained that when a firm employs aggressive accounting, both current book value 
and current earnings will be high. However, the forcasted earnings will be lower and the 
normal earnings higher than were it otherwise and hence, the under estimated future 
abnormal earnings will offset the consequences of the aggressive accounting choice that is 
increasing current earnings. Kothari (2001) criticised this, arguing that the choice of different 
accounting methods on earnings has other consequences. Firstly, because none of the market 
valuation models offer any guidance or predictions about the firm’s accounting methods. 
Secoundly, market analysts consider accounting choice in future earnings forcasts. Finally, if 
future abnormal earnings are viewed as economic rents and that firms use different 
accounting treatments to pursue different purposes, then the choice of accounting methods 
will become important. 
The model simplified as the price model combined with the return model has been 
the most utilised in earnings value relevance research since Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) 
work. Both models have been discussed in an earlier subsection. The earnings valuation 
models attempt to investigate the relevance of accounting earnings information and the 
valuation method is particularly useful for the investigation of accounting changes. 
4.3.4.3 Issues of earnings value relevance study 
It appears that earnings value relevance analysis has been widely used by researchers as a 
proxy for earnings quality to investigate a change in the accounting system. After the review 
on the existing literature with regards to the value relevance studies, some conclusions can 
be made.  
Firstly, scholars have adopted ERC as a proxy for earnings quality to capture 
intentional earnings management, but this may result in a false inference. Altamuro et al. 
(2005) found that earnings under a more aggressive accounting policy are associated with a 




earnings value relevance; however, it reduces earnings reliability. In contrast, Barth et al. 
(2001) suggested that value relevance analysis is a joint test between earnings relevance and 
reliability. It is a useful method to distinguish the impact of accounting changes as a whole in 
terms of accounting information quality, because all the valuation models have been silent 
on accounting choice. Hence, ERC as a proxy can explain economic consequences by 
comparing it and the explanatory power of R2 under different accounting standards and 
reporting methods. Meanwhile, Dechow et al. (2010) argued that because the ERC captures 
the overall earnings quality and does not distinguish whether the change of the overall 
earnings quality is the contribution of a firm’s fundamental performance or the accounting 
system, then, the earnings value relevance measure is a noisy measure for earnings quality 
under different accounting polity, because it embeds the effects of other determinants of this 
quality.  
Secondly, there are the issues of the utilisation of the price and return models in the 
study of earnings value relevance and their limitations. The models are rather practical and 
understandable in terms of proxies for the estimation. As aforementioned, suggested by 
Beaver (2002), the price model is better suited for estimating what accounting measures are 
reflected in firm value, whereas time is an important element when using the return model 
and hence, it is suitable for a specific time period. Nevertheless, both the price and return 
models have been employed to estimate share mispricing during the change of accounting 
regimes by comparing the explanatory power of earnings on stock price or returns between 
alternative accounting methods. Whilst most studies have typically involved using linear 
regression to measure ERCs, Martinez (2003) and Dechow et al. (2010) pointed out the 
possibility of using non-linear regression for this purpose. 
Other than the models generated from the dividend-discounting model, prior 
research has also involved using the Voung test to compare explanatory power. Barth et al. 
(2008) adopted Cramer’s methodology to investigate the association between market value 
and accounting information by revising the calculation of the explanatory power. These 
different methodologies have provided support for the earnings value relevance inference. 
Furthermore, both the price and return models have been modified and applied in many 




accounting policy, dividend policy and non-financial information. Since some value relevance 
researchers have investigated the different ERCs across alternative accounting standards, the 
models can be straightforwardly modified by allowing the research design to add dummy 
variables or running the regression twice. The modified regressions can provide more 
insightful information about the value relevance analysis.  
In conclusion, the study of value relevance of earnings information has extensively 
caught the attention of accounting academics. Even though there are limitations in both 
estimation models in distinguishing accounting content, their ways of measuring the book 
value of equity and earnings to back up the investigation of the changes under different 
accounting policy, are still widely accepted in value relevance studies as facilitating the user’s 





4.4  Earnings quality, IFRS adoption and SSSR 
This section presents a summary from the existing research regarding earnings quality and 
IFRS adoption. Prior research, widely exploring the influence of IFRS adoption as one of the 
determinants on earnings quality in the EU and US markets, suggests that, abstracting from 
institutional factors, the introduction of high quality accounting standards should lead to 
better reported earnings quality. Christensen et al. (2013), in their study, pointed out that 
due to many countries having adopted IFRS reporting around the same time, it is difficult to 
isolate the effects of this reporting from other confounding institutional changes and/or 
economics shocks that happened during the same time period.  They used EU adoption as an 
example and suggested that improved earnings quality after IFRS adoption could be explained 
by the starting of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in 1999 to improve financial market 
regulation. They further opined that why regulatory changes and IFRS adoption occurred 
concurrently is possibly due to the institutional changes being explicitly tied to IFRS adoption. 
In contrast, China’s institutional change of SSSR in the capital market happened just before 
IFRS adoption and this change was not associated with enhancing regulatory or legal system 
enforcement, but may have encouraged earnings management incentives in China’s capital 
market. Hence, the outcome of IFRS adoption in China could be opposite to that regarding EU 
countries’ adoption. The following subsections review the literature on earnings quality and 
IFRS adoption in advanced economies as well as earnings quality, IFRS adoption and SSSR in 
China. 
4.4.1 Earnings quality and IFRS adoption  
De George et al. (2016) reviewed the literature on the effects of IFRS adoption on reporting 
quality, capital market, corporate decision making, stewardship and governance, debt 
contracting, and auditing. Under the section on IFRS and financial reporting quality, they 
reviewed the impact of both voluntary and mandatory adoption on reporting quality, 
asserting that voluntary IFRS adoption leads to improved financial reporting quality. There is 
mixed evidence relating to the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on reporting quality.  
Ahmed et al. (2013) investigated whether IFRS adoption lowers income smoothing, 




targets. They compared the reporting quality of IFRS adopters to a matched sample of non-
adopters, and found that the former experienced greater income smoothing, greater earnings 
aggressiveness, and a more delayed losses recognition. Ball et al. (2003) elicited that adoption 
of high quality accounting standards improves the value relevance of earnings reports, whilst 
Clarkson et al. (2011) asserted that IFRS adoption enhances comparability of accounting 
information in Europe and Australia. Horton et al. (2013) found that both mandatory and 
voluntary IFRS adoption firms are associated with less forecast errors and concluded that IFRS 
adoption increases both information quality and accounting comparability. An online survey 
across European countries showed that 63% of investors believe that IFRS has improved the 
quality of consolidated financial statements against 24%, who think the opposite (ICAEW, 
2007). 
Following the mixed findings of the impact from mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings 
quality, Brüggemann et al. (2013) study distinguished between intended and unintended 
consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption. They defined economic consequences to be 
intended (unintended), if they can (cannot) be reconciled with the IAS regulation’s stated 
objective, which is to improve earnings reporting quality. They concluded that the intended 
consequences generally fail to result in an increase in the comparability or transparency of 
financial statements. However, there is rich evidence regarding the positive effects on capital 
markets at the macroeconomic level. The findings suggest that the previous literature has 
failed to find evidence of mandatory IFRS adoption improving accounting-based earnings 
quality, but there is almost unanimous evidence of it improving market-based reporting 
quality.  
In other studies (Nobes and Parker, 2008; Nobes, 2011; Alali and Cao, 2010), it has been 
argued that, since IFRS are principle-based, their application and interpretation are 
inconsistent, and that enforceability is an issue. Due to the differences of local politics, culture, 
legal environments, and economic developing stages, many jurisdictions have adopted only 
some version of the standards, rather taking on full IFRS compliance. So, there is concern as 





Ball (2001) was sceptical regarding the view that simply mandating new accounting 
standards for public financial reporting would improve earnings quality, for the adoption 
should be accompanied by wholesale revision of the infrastructure that determines the 
financial reporting incentives of managers and auditors. Fama (1970) and Ball (2001) pointed 
out that the development of economically efficient public corporations and public securities 
markets are both crucial to the efficiency of the financial reporting system. Ball (2001) further 
argued that the quality of financial reporting is determined endogenously by the incentives 
that managers and auditors encounter. Hence, an effective system of private litigation does 
more to improve actual practice than that exogenously imposed by government. 
4.4.1.1 IFRS adoption and earnings management  
The evidence as to whether or not IFRS adoption reduces earnings management is mixed. 
Barth et al. (2008) considered 24 jurisdictions over the period 1994-2003, and found that firms 
that had adopted IFRS had a higher variance of changes in net income, higher correlation 
between net incomes and cash flows, higher correlation between accruals and cash flows, 
lower frequency of small positive net income and higher frequency of large losses, which 
together indicate a lower level of earnings management. Zéghal et al. (2011) concluded that 
the mandatory adoption of IAS/IFRS was associated with a reduction in the earnings 
management amongst 353 French listed companies over the period 2003-2006. Iatridis (2012) 
elicited that IFRS adoption has led to a higher number of UK firms using hedging rather than 
managing earnings. Moreover, the author posited that more effective corporate governance 
and stricter accounting disclosure requirements restrain earnings-manipulative managerial 
behaviours. Dimitropoulos et al. (2013) found evidence that the implementation of IFRS in 
Greece is associated with reduced earnings management, more timely loss recognition and 
greater value relevance of accounting figures. 
Other empirical studies have suggested that the quality of financial information is 
affected not only by the use of IFRS versus the local GAAP, but also, by institutional factors. 
In these works, it is argued that whether or not IFRS adoption reduces earnings management 
depends upon factors such as legal enforcement, market transparency, audit efficiency and 
investor protection. Landsman et al. (2012) compared the information content of earnings 




IFRS adoption reduces reporting lag, increases analyst following and increases foreign 
investment. They elicited further that strength of legal enforcement was the main underlying 
factor as regards the effectiveness of mandatory IFRS adoption.  Shelton et al. (2011) found 
that better legal enforcement is associated with less earnings manipulation and smaller 
restatement amounts. Houqe et al. (2012) discovered that IFRS adoption reduces earnings 
management in countries with strong investor protection, whilst Marra et al. (2011) 
concluded that board independence and audit committees played an important and effective 
role in reducing earnings management after IFRS adoption in Italy. 
In contrast, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) found that IFRS adoption did not reduce 
earnings management in either the UK or Australia, and was associated with an increase in 
earnings management in France. They concluded that management incentives and national 
institutional factors play a more important role in framing financial reporting characteristics 
than do accounting standards. This is consistent with the earlier work of Ball et al. (2003), who 
elicited that managers’ incentives appeared to dominate accounting standards as a 
determinant of accounting quality in four East Asian countries. Watrin and Ullmann (2012) 
reported that IFRS may have led to more homogenous earnings quality in Germany, but under 
it reporting quality on average decreased. 
4.4.1.2 IFRS adoption and earnings persistence  
There is little literature upon the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings persistence, and none 
in respect of the Chinese market since 2007. Atwood et al. (2011) examined how earnings 
persistence and the association between current accounting earnings and future cash flows 
differ for firms reporting under IFRS versus various domestic accounting standards regimes 
across 33 countries over the period 2002-2008. They found that positive earnings are similarly 
persistent under IFRS and other accounting standards regimes, but losses reported under IFRS 
are less persistent than those reported under the US GAAP. Further, earnings reported under 





4.4.1.3 IFRS adoption and timeliness 
More timeliness, being more timely recognition of gains and losses, implies that accounting 
information is of better quality in that it is more up-to-date and relevant. Similar to the 
foregoing, there is scant literature regarding the effects of IFRS adoption on timely loss 
recognition, and none in respect of China. Barth et al. (2008) found that firms that have 
adopted IFRS recognise losses in a timelier fashion than do non-adopters and have more 
timely loss recognition. In contrast, however, Paananen and Lin (2009) discovered  a reduction 
in the timeline of loss recognition following mandatory IFRS adoption in Germany. Moreover, 
both Ahmed et al. (2013), considering twenty countries over the period 2002-2007, and Chen 
et al. (2010b), for fifteen EU states over the period 2000-2007, found a significant increase in 
income smoothing and a reduction in the timeliness of loss recognition following the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
4.4.1.4 IFRS adoption and value relevance 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) criticised the theories of accounting and standards setting 
underlying value relevance studies for not being specific and failing to identify the most 
relevant parameters.  
Barth et al. (2008) and Clarkson et al. (2011) contended that the value relevance of 
aggregate book value and earnings is the natural place to look for the impact of IFRS adoption 
on earnings quality and that examining earnings value relevance is an approach for testing 
the criteria of relevance and reliability in accounting information reported under IFRS. 
There is quite a breadth of literature regarding the effects of IFRS adoption on the value 
relevance of earnings. Barth et al. (2008) tested the impact of voluntarily adopting IFRS on 
earnings value relevance amongst 327 firms over the period 1994-2003. They found that firms 
applying IFRS produce accounting figures that are more value-relevant that those produced 
by firms applying their local GAAP. Similarly, Bartov et al. (2005) elicited an increase in the 
value relevance of reported earnings when firms switched to IFRS from the German GAAP. 
Christensen et al. (2007), considering the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the UK and voluntary 
adoption of IFRS in Germany, suggested that IFRS adoption has an effect on firms’ cost of 




framework. Clarkson et al. (2011) examined 3,488 firms in fourteen EU countries and Australia, 
finding that IFRS adoption has a greater impact on earnings relevance in code law countries 
as opposed to common law ones. 
4.4.2 Earnings quality, IFRS adoption and SSSR in China 
In China, there were both accounting and financial market reforms proposed and 
implemented by end of 2006. Whilst both these reforms had impacts on market incentives 
and reporting quality. However, whilst the previous literature on China with regards to 
earnings quality investigation has considered whether or not the change of accounting 
information quality is either from IFRS adoption or SSSR, there have been no studies on the 
confounding impact of both reforms on earnings quality.  
4.4.2.1 Earnings quality and IFRS adoption in China 
There have been a few studies about the relationship between earnings management and 
IFRS convergence in China. The first, Wang and Campbell (2012), considered IFRS adoption 
and governance variables amongst 1,329 listed Chinese companies over the period 1998-2009 
and it was concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that IFRS implementation deters 
earnings management at any level of state ownership. Critically, in comparison with the 
previous study, this research will not restrict itself to A-share-only listed firms and will 
consider a longer period after the first adoption of IFRS-converged CAS. Zhang et al. (2013) 
investigated how accounting standards and insiders’ incentives affect earnings management 
in China. They found that IFRS adoption in China actually increases earnings management, but 
the reform to non-tradable shares reduces it. These results are, however, open to question 
insofar as the testing was based on insiders’ incentives as regards non-tradable shares – for 
which, theoretically, there should be no incentive to increase share value through earnings 
management.  
There have been a few studies that involved investigating the association between 
value relevance and IFRS convergence in China since 2007. Liu et al. (2011) suggested that the 
accounting quality of Chinese listed companies has improved since the adoption of IFRS-
converged CAS in 2007, but they only considered data one year either side of the adoption. 




listed companies’ annual reports and found that compliance with IFRS was significantly lower 
than that with the old Chinese GAAP. Lee et al. (2013) elicited that the effect upon value 
relevance of earnings after the adoption of IFRS-converged CAS is more pronounced for those 
firms receiving a lower government subsidy. 
However, there has been no research investigating the association between earnings 
persistence and timeliness and IFRS adoption. Moreover, researchers have ignored the 
confounding factor of SSSR, which was started in 2005. With a limited number of listed firms 
being non-SOEs and a large amount of having finished the reform by the end of 2006, it is 
predicted here that SSSR also impacted on earnings quality. 
4.4.2.2 Earnings quality and SSSR 
The aim of China’s SSSR was to transfer non-tradable shares into tradable ones, thus 
encouraging SOE management to be sensitive to the share price in the stock market as well 
as enhancing its management and market efficiency. The SSSR in China has had some impact 
on the SOEs and firms holding non-tradable shares in terms of corporate governance and 
accounting information quality.  
Hou et al. (2015b) examined whether in the context of SSSR, firms manage earnings 
to meet performance targets. Their data included 157 firms that offered performance 
commitments during the reform to make the transfer from non-tradable to tradable shares 
possible. They controlled for a further 1,079 listed firms that were not making any 
commitment regarding non-tradable reform. The sample period covered from 2005 to 2009. 
Given their focus was on investigating the 157 firms that offered commitment to SSSR, they 
did not mention the possible effects of IFRS adoption from 2007 to 2009. They found the firms 
with weaker financial performance had stronger incentives to make an accounting-based 
performance commitment to reduce the initial cost of obtaining the liquidity right for 
controlling shareholders.  
Liu and Tian (2012) investigated whether the SSSR has had impact on controlling 
shareholders’ leverage decisions. The data covered the period from 2004 to 2010 from 
CSMAR and they excluded SOEs with the state as the controlling shareholder, i.e. ST firms. 




SSSR and the market reaction to the announcement of related party transactions was more 
positive, with tunnelling activities to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders being 
reduced. 
Hou et al. (2012) examined whether SSSR has improved SOEs’ share price 
informativeness by improving corporate transparency. They employed the data over the 
period 2001-08 and adopted a firm-specific return variation as a proxy for share price 
informativeness. They found improved share price informativeness among firms that were 
more sensitive to the impact of the reform. Those were firms that had a higher proportion of 
state or restricted shares. Their interest lay in the effect of IFRS adoption in China in 2007, 
and so they cut their sample before the first quarter of 2008 to enable them to conclude that 
the findings were not due to this adoption. However, the problem is that the IFRS adoption 
was mandated from 1st January 2007, so the sample should have been curtailed before March 
2007 rather than 2008 so as to exclude the time period in which mandatory IFRS could affect 
the share price movements. Nevertheless, if they had done so, their data would have needed 
to exclude the period while the SSSR was still ongoing. 
A study by Liao et al. (2014) examined the privatisation effect of SSSR on SOEs’ 
fundamental performance. They included 1,032 firms, of which, 633 were SOEs, during 2005-
07 and used Fama and French (1993) three factor model to estimate the stock returns. They 
found that the output, profit, and employment increased after SSSR implementation, 
especially for SOEs; however, the corporate governance and operating efficiency remained 
unchanged. They suggested that the improved performance of SOEs was due to the boosted 
stock market incentives from government agents that operate or controlled SOEs. Moreover, 
it was argued that pre-existing non-tradable shareholders benefited from increasing market 
values of state-owned shares. If so, the government and the public investors would have 
become better aligned after SSSR.  
In terms of the impact of SSSR on earnings quality, no empirical evidence shows that 
it has an influence on accruals quality, earnings persistence or timeliness, with the exception 
being value relevance. As with the studies reviewed in the previous subsection that ignored 
SSSR from 2005 to 2007, the literature covered in this one neglected the possible impact of 




4.5 Earnings quality determinants  
Earnings quality is an important accounting issue for accounting practitioners, investors and 
academics. A large body of academic research has examined the causes and consequences of 
earnings quality (Penman and Zhang, 2002; McNichols, 2002; Schipper and Vincent, 2003; 
DeFond, 2010; Watrin and Ullmann, 2012; Dechow et al., 2010; Capalbo et al., 2014; Dechow 
et al., 2012). The aim of this section is to provide a review of earnings quality determinants. 
In particular, this section discusses the relationship between earnings quality and corporate 
governance, on the one hand and the relationship between earnings quality and other firm 
and institutional characteristics, on the other. In accordance with Dechow et al.’s (2010) 
perspective, this section annotates six main factors that influence earnings quality, these 
being: (1) financial reporting practices, (2) firm characteristics, (3) goverance and controls, (4) 
auditors, (5) equity market incentives, and (6) external institutional factors.   
4.5.1 Financial reporting practices 
Dechow et al. (2010) highlighted three features of finanical reporting practices that 
researchers have predicted as affecting earnings quality, namely: the flexibility of accounting 
methods, other finanical reporting practices, including finanical statement classification and 
interim reporting as well as principles versus rules based accounting standards. 
Early studies provided some evidence on the relation between the flexibility of 
accounting methods and earnings quality. Barefield and Comiskey (1971) found that the use 
of straight-line depreciation, in general produces smoother earnings than does an accelerated 
depreciation method. However, the latter, in general, produces a higher earnings growth rate 
than a straight-line deprececiation method, further suggesting that the choice of depreciation 
method can affect earnings quality. Beidleman (1973) argued that firms select accounting 
methods that provide them with increased discretion to influence reported earnings. Both 
Barefield and Comiskey's (1971) and Beidleman's (1973) research designs were based on 
when the accounting method was non-mandatory, so different earnings reporting would have 
happened depending on the method used (Moses, 1987). In a mandatory reporting regime, 
there is no-cross-sectional variation to examine.  Later studies regarding accounting methods 




them to overcome the design issues, with the accounting methods being mandatory 
(DHARAN, 1987; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Sivakumar and Waymire, 2003; Altamuro et al., 
2005).  
However, the aformentioned studies not only faced research desgin issues regarding 
whether the accounting methods were mandatory, but also, in relation to the assumption 
about management’s opportunisitic behaviour. The view that accounting method choice 
leads to lower earnings quality, because managers make opportunisitc choices rather than 
choices that improve earnings informativeness, does not have much support (Dechow et al., 
2010). There have been a small number of studies on the association between earnings 
quality and other finanical reporting practices, like finanical statement classification and 
interim reporting. McVay (2006) and Fan et al. (2010) exmined the classfication of “core” 
earnings and special items within income statements. They found that managers 
opportunistically shift expenses from core expenses (cost of sales and administrative 
expenses) to special items to overstate core earnings without changing bottom-line earnings  
to meet the analyst forecast, thereby avoiding market panelties. There is contrasting 
directional evidence relating to interim reporting. Kerstein and Rai (2007) adopted the “kink” 
in the distribution of earnings approach and documented how this kink is strongest for the 
fiscal year end in comparision with the that at interim quarters. Conversely, Brown and Pinello 
(2007) suggested that firms manage earnings to avoid reporting loss at interim quarters rather 
than at fiscal year end.  
Last but not the least, the third feature of financial reporting that can be a determinant 
of earnings quality relates to the adoption of principles or rule-based accounting standards. 
Researchers have been interested in the impact of principle-based versus rule-based 
standards on earnings quality in accounting studies for the last decade; however, the 
evidence is mixed. Barth et al. (2008) considered 24 jurisdictions over the period 1994-2003, 
and elicited that firms that have adopted IFRS have higher variance of changes in net income, 
higher correlation between net incomes and cash flows, higher correlation between accruals 
and cash flows, lower frequency of small positive net income, higher frequency of large losses 
and greater value relevance, which together indicate improved earnings quality after 




Watrin and Ullmann (2012) found that principle-based standards cannot alleviate 
management incentives and do not improve earnings quality.  
Dechow et al. (2010) argued that International Financial Reporting Standards as 
principle-based standards have the potential advantage of removing allowable alternative 
accounting treatments for a single transaction in favour of a single principle, which requires 
accounting measures that can better reflect a firm’s underlying economic performance, thus 
increasing earnings quality. However, a potential disadvantage is that principle-based 
standards constrain a manager’s use of discretion allowed within the standards to provide 
relevant information. In some studies (Nobes and Parker, 2008; Nobes, 2011; Alali and Cao, 
2010), it has been argued that, since IFRS are principle-based, their application and 
interpretation are inconsistent. Moreover, enforceability is an issue when adopting them, 
because under such a system other institutional factors and individual firm characteristics are 
also involved.  
4.5.2 Firm characteristics  
Previous studies have found evidence that firm operating characteristics, like performance, 
debt, growth and size, are associated with the various proxies for earnings quality (Collins et 
al., 1987; Lev, 1983; Dechow et al., 1994). In several, the effect of firm profitability 
performance on earnings quality has been investigated and some has reported that poorly 
performing firms have higher incentives to engage in earnings management (DeFond and Park, 
1997; Doyle et al., 2007b; Doyle et al., 2007a; Balsam et al., 1995; Keating and Zimmerman, 
1999). On the other hand, DeAngelo et al. (1994) suggested that firms with financial 
difficulties have limited accounting choices to manage earnings to inflate income.  
Debt and constraints around the use and acquisition of debt financing has been found 
to encourage earnings management incentives to avoid default probability of a debt covenant 
and to improve a firm’s bargaining power during debt negotiation.  Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) suggested that higher leverage firms are more likely to boost earnings or manipulate 
the financial statements through income-increasing accruals and other income-increasing 
accounting choices (Sweeney, 1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002), 




between accruals for firms with and without binding covenants. Dechow et al. (2010) 
contended that managers making accounting choices to avoid covenant violation may not 
necessarily imply a lower earnings quality. 
Other researchers have investigated the role of firm growth in earnings quality. In 
terms of sales growth or net operating asset growth, it appears that high growth firms have 
higher measurement error in earnings, higher management incentives and lower earnings 
persistence (Nissim and Penman, 2001; Richardson et al., 2005; McVay, 2006). On the other 
hand, Lee et al. (2006) did not find any significant association between growth and earnings 
management.  
Firm size also has been suggested as a determinant of earnings quality; however, the 
evidence is mixed regarding this. Early studies predicted that larger firms, in general, would 
engage in income-decreasing accounting choice in response to greater political or regulatory 
obligations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Moses, 1987) and thus, 
they would have lower earnings quality, which means that firm size would be negatively 
associated with earnings quality. On the contrary, recent studies found that firm size is 
positively associated with earnings quality, because small firms are more likely to have 
internal control deficiencies and are more likely to correct previously reported earnings 
(Doyle et al., 2007b; Doyle et al., 2007a; Ge and McVay, 2005). 
The aforementioned studies have shown that firm characteristics can act as a 
determinant of earnings quality and that different firm characteristics (firm performance, size, 
debt, and growth) are, in general, associated with accounting method choice so as to 
influence earnings quality. Hence, earnings quality research must not only control for the 
opportunistic accounting choice, but also, for the fundamental differences in firm 
characteristics to make sure that any change in earnings quality is explained primarily by the 
independent variables and not influenced by firm performance, debt, growth and size. This 




4.5.3 Governance and controls  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), internal controls include monitoring mechanisms 
chosen according to the principles and bonding mechanisms selected by the agent. 
Monitoring and bonding are afforded cost in the principle-agent relationship under the 
modern corporate structure. This subsection discusses the governance and internal control 
mechanisms including the board of directors, internal control procedures as well as 
managerial ownership and compensation.  
4.5.3.1 Board of directors 
The board of directors (BOD) is a tool that could be used by shareholders to monitor top 
managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983a), yet boards are not always capable of exercising this 
monitoring role effectively. Boards, in general, consist of two different types of directors: 
executive and non-executive. Executive directors are the subordinates of the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), being responsible for daily management issues and business strategies. 
However, they are not in a strong position to monitor or discipline the CEO, especially in large-
scale firms (Daily and Dalton, 1993) and hence, there is lack of monitoring of effectiveness 
issues given the board of directors structure. Prior research has highlighted that the most 
important board issue is board independence in the company structure (Cadbury, 1992; Weir 
and Laing, 2000). Regarding which, Larcker et al. (2007) examined the association between 
14 dimensions of corporate governance and earnings quality, as measured by discretionary 
accruals and restatement and found mixed evidence on board independence and earnings 
quality.  
Beasley (1996) found that larger proportions of outside members on the board of 
directors significantly reduces the likelihood of accounting fraud and improves the reported 
earnings quality. Both Klein (2002) and Xie et al. (2003) studies elicited that the number of 
independent members on a BOD is negatively related with the abnormal accruals and that 
BOD independence is associated with less earnings management. Consequently, the more 
independent the board structure from the CEO, the more effective the monitoring of the 
corporate financial and accounting process (Klein, 2002; Johnson et al., 1993). However, other 




earnings management (Haniffa et al., 2006; Osma and Noguer, 2007). Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005) found that earnings quality is not related to the independence of boards, but rather, 
to the financial expertise of independent directors, who are valuable in providing oversight of 
a firm’s financial reporting practices.  
Following the introduction of independent directors in China, researchers have been 
investigating whether this has led to improved accounting quality. The evidence of the 
association between independent directors and earnings quality is mixed. Some studies have 
found that the higher the proportion of independent directors the better the earnings quality 
(Firth et al., 2007; Lo et al., 2010). However, Chen and Cheng (2007) suggested that board 
independence has yet to be effective in improving accounting quality in China. In sum, the 
effectiveness of independent directors in different countries is largely unclear and has 
received scant attention from researchers.  
4.5.3.2 Internal control procedures  
The evidence consistently suggests that stronger internal control procedures are associated 
with less earnings management (Doyle et al., 2007a; Doyle et al., 2007b; Dechow et al., 2010). 
Doyle et al. (2007b) examined the relationship between accruals quality and internal control, 
eliciting that weakness in the internal control environment is associated with higher levels of 
earnings management, measured in terms of accruals quality. The weak internal controls and 
lower accruals quality is driven by weakness in disclosures which are relevant to overall 
company level controls. In general, the conclusion can be drawn that the monitoring nature 
of internal controls is to ensure the informativeness of earnings so that the financial 
statements can reflect a real picture of the firm’s performance, i.e. internal control can affect 
earnings quality positively.  
4.5.3.3 Managerial ownership and compensation 
The evidence on managerial ownership structure and earnings quality is even more mixed. 
Since the agency problem introduced by Berle and Means (1932), finance and accounting 
researchers have focused on the agency cost from the professional managers’ opportunistic 




Managerial ownership has been traditionally viewed as providing direct economic 
incentives for managers to engage in active monitoring and aligning ownership and 
controlling through stock ownership (Bhagat et al., 1999). Warfield et al. (1995) found a 
positive association between managerial ownership and earnings explanatory power for 
returns and negative association with the magnitude of accrual adjustments. However, if the 
managerial ownership is greater, then the manager, as the controlling shareholder may 
achieve private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders’ interest (Smith, 1976; 
Dhaliwal et al., 1982) and there will be less conservatism (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). 
Based on the ownership structure of the firms, prior research has involved comparing owner 
controlled versus manager-controlled firms and has elicited that managerial ownership 
influences the choice of accounting method. Moreover, manager-owner firms are more 
engaged with earnings smoothing and an income-increasing accounting method, thus being 
associated with lower earnings quality.  
The amount of studies that have investigated the relationship between the 
characteristics of managerial compensation and earnings management is vast, covering bonus 
plans (Healy, 1985; Guidry et al., 1999; Holthausen et al., 1995; Skinner, 1993; Hagerman and 
Zmijewski, 1979), earning-based compensation (Guidry et al., 1999), and equity-based 
compensations (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Armstrong et al., 
2010), executive stock options and insider trading. The evidence of whether managerial 
compensation is associated with a lower earnings quality is mixed. However, it is not feasible 
to summarise and compare the results of those studies as each identifies a specific form of 
compensation related incentives to a specific earnings management objective with a specific 
tool of earnings management (Dechow et al., 2010). 
4.5.4 Auditors 
It is expected that auditors and audit practices are a determining factor in earnings quality, 
because of their role in mitigating intentional and unintentional misreporting in the financial 
statements. The objective of an audit of financial statements prepared within a framework of 
recognised accounting politics is to enable an auditor to express an opinion on such financial 
statements, for the auditor’s opinion helps establish the credibility of the financial statements 




her ability to detect them and to adjust for or report these (DeAngelo, 1981). In prior research, 
it was hypothesised that the ability of the auditor to detect errors relies on the effect and the 
effectiveness of the auditor. The auditor’s incentives to report or adjust errors are driven by 
high standards of ethics, independence and a reputation for detecting errors or fraud in the 
financial reports (Nelson et al., 2002). 
The auditing quality is unobservable as with earnings quality, hence in previous studies 
different proxies have been used to measure auditing effectiveness and incentives. Caramanis 
and Lennox (2008) adopted the most direct proxies for auditing effectiveness and found a 
negative association between audit effectiveness and the level of discretionary accruals. 
Moreover, some evidence has shown that the familiarity of the auditor with the industry in 
which the client operates is also negatively associated with earnings management and that 
an industry specialist auditor provides higher quality in the audit process (Balsam et al., 2003; 
Solomon et al., 1999). 
Other studies, using auditor tenure as a proxy for audit effectiveness, elicited 
contradicting evidence. Johnson et al. (2002) examined whether the length of the relationship 
between a company and an audit firm is associated with financial-reporting quality, finding 
that medium and short audit-firm tenures are associated with lower quality of financial 
reports. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2008a) elicited that long audit-firm tenure is 
associated with lower earnings quality, whilst short audit-firm tenure is associated with better 
earnings quality. 
Evidence from prior research also suggests there is relation between audit firm size 
and earnings quality. Big audit firms are predicted to provide better audit quality, thus 
enhancing reporting quality and the informativeness of financial statements (DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Becker et al., 1998). However, studies have shown 
mixed evidence between audit fees and earnings quality; the relationship depends on the 
type of fees, sample of firms, and the accrual measurement. 
Finally, In China, auditing firms and auditors are also subject to the political influence, 
so the evidence from western literature may not apply to audit effectiveness there. Auditors 




1998. After this, local auditors had specialised knowledge of local government units and thus, 
local state-owned firms controlled by province, city, and country governments tended to hire 
small local auditors (Wang et al., 2008). The same local government serves as controlling 
shareholders of a large portion of these audit firms’ clients and local audit firms’ partners, 
which thus reducing the auditors’ independence and hence, may not able to offer effective 
audit opinion (Reynolds and Francis, 2000). DeFond et al. (1999) suggested the affiliation 
between accounting firms and the government was a major threat to auditor independence 
in China and find that government affiliated auditing firms audited about 70% of listed 
companies. Moreover, the authors pointed out how auditing firms were protected from 
litigation risks, because the ultimate liability was borne by the sponsoring government 
agencies, which increased the likelihood of accounting scandals. As regard to the big 
international auditing firms, the entrance of foreign auditing firms into China has been a slow 
procedure. They have only been allowed to provide certain services for those international 
firms and limited consultancy services to Chinese clients. Since 1992, the big international 
auditing firms have been allowed to enter the domestic accounting and audit serviced market, 
but only by forming joint ventures with domestic Chinese accounting firms. The evidence 
between auditing effectiveness and earnings quality in China is also mixed.  
4.5.5 Capital market incentives 
In addition to the managerial incentives from opportunistic behaviour, the capital market 
incentives also have an influence on firms’ accounting choices, which are the potential 
determinant of earnings quality. Capital market incentives arise when a firm needs to raise 
capital from the financial market to meet a particular target.  
Several studies have examined the use of accounting choices to boost earnings prior 
to an IPO or rights issues. Teoh et al. (1998) found evidence that firms in the IPO year have 
unusually high accruals and experience poor stock return performance in the three years 
thereafter. Aharony et al. (2000) investigated the earnings pattern pre and post firms’ IPO in 
China and found that the sample firms used accrual-based earnings management to boost 
earnings prior to the IPO and that earnings in the post-IPO period declined significantly. 
Inflating earnings in the pre-IPO period is further motivated by the prospect of tunnelling 




shareholders for the benefit of the parent company (Aharony et al., 2010). Both findings are 
consistent with China’s unique accounting earnings based IPO and rights issue requirements 
and dominant position of controlling shareholders in corporate governance, which create 
strong capital market incentives for managing earnings upwards to meet the IPO 
requirements. Dietrich et al. (2000) examined whether raising capital in debt markets 
provides incentives for earnings management and found that managers adopt accounting 
methods that will yield high reported earnings in order to raise new debt. 
The above reviewed literature is based on raising capital from financial market 
incentives. A number of studies have provided evidence of earnings management to meet or 
beat a particular earnings benchmark: zero or analyst benchmark to obtain stable or high 
stock returns. Bartov et al. (2002) discovered that firms that meet or beat the current analysts’ 
earnings benchmark experience a higher return than those that do not. However, the studies 
(Bartov et al., 2002; Yu, 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006; Koh et al., 2007) do not provide evidence 
on how firms choose among different accounting methods to influence reported earnings. In 
China, zero earnings thresholds are used as delisting criteria on the stock market; firms 
reporting two consecutive annual losses are subject to stock suspension and delisting. Jiang 
and Wang (2008) contended that the earning-based delisting requirement induces listed firms 
in China to engage in earnings increase management to avoid this.  
4.5.6 Institutional factors 
In additional to all the above mentioned determinants of earnings quality, there are other 
external factors, like capital market requirement, political influence in the business circle and 
the regulation enforcement level  that also have impacts on the accounting choice and 
earnings quality. Dechow et al. (2010) suggested that when earnings quality measures relating 
to incentives are provided by external factors, equity market incentives receive little support 
as a determinant of accounting choice. So, whether the capital market determinants are 
accurate depends on whether the factors outside of the financial market can constrain the 
incentives for managing earnings. 
Taking China as an example, for a firm to be qualified for IPO, the net profits have to 




for last three years to meet the rights issue requirement; and firms with two years loss reports 
will face share suspension or delisting. Therefore, in China, managers have greater incentive 
to adopt income-increasing accruals to meet regulatory requirements (Haw et al., 2005). 
Chinese political influence also has penetrated into the financial market, especially for the 
firms that are still under government control. For those SOE firms, accounting choice and 
earnings quality are further determined by the political incentives, rather than only financial 
market ones (Piotroski et al., 2015). Furthermore, the regional factor has an impact on 





4.6  The consequences of earnings quality 
Previous studies have highlighted several consequences for earnings quality and this section 
discusses those that are relevant to the context of this research. Hence, this section reviews 
literature providing evidence for the following consequences of earnings quality: investment 
efficiency, market valuations and the cost of capital.  
4.6.1 Investment efficiency  
Biddle and Hilary (2006) found that higher earnings quality enhances investment efficiency 
through reducing information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. 
McNichols and Stubben (2008) further discovered that firms manipulating their earnings to 
target external investors can also influence internal investment decisions. However, they did 
not explain why lower earnings quality would be associated with poor internal investment 
decisions. In their paper, they suggested that the positive association between earnings 
quality and investment efficiency is based on the condition that capital is largely provided by 
arm’s length transactions in the financial market. Whereas in the countries where capital in 
the financial market is supplied mainly by creditors like banks and other financial institutions, 
the association between earnings quality and investment efficiency is not strong. As in China 
the creditors are the main capital suppliers rather than the financial market, then the 
consequence of higher earnings quality may not be associated with higher investment 
efficiency. 
4.6.2 Market valuations 
Prior research has shown that firms manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases 
and losses, thereby meeting analysts’ forecasts (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Burgstahler 
and Eames, 2003; Dichev and Tang, 2009). They also do so to meet or beat analysts’ 
expectations for the rewards of higher valuation (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002), even if there 
is evidence of earnings management to achieve the results (Myers et al., 2007). Some studies 
have provided evidence that managing earnings through discretionary loss reserves is not 
rewarded with higher firm valuation (Beaver and McNichols, 1998) and when firms 
subsequently fail to achieve a target, they are more likely to lose the extra valuation (Skinner 




earnings management, but not others and there is greater market mispricing of less 
transparent earnings techniques. 
4.6.3 Cost of capital 
Previous studies have documented that lower earnings quality is associated with higher cost 
of equity (Dechow et al., 1996; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Francis et al., 2004). Francis et al. 
(2004) examined the relationship between the cost of equity and seven attributes of earnings: 
accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and 
conservatism. The first four attributes are considered as accounting-based earnings quality 
proxies, the last three are seen as market-based earnings ones. They found a positive 
association between information quality and cost of equity, that accounting-based attributes 
have more pronounced cost of equity effects than do market-based ones and accrual quality 
has the largest effects on the cost of equity. Jayaraman (2008) elicited that when discretionary 
accounting choices lead to smoother or more volatile earnings than cash flows, the financial 
market information suffers greater asymmetry.  
Similar evidence also exists for the debt capital market, that lower earnings quality is 
associated with a higher cost of debt. Francis et al. (2005) suggested that accrual quality has 
the most effect on both the cost of equity and cost of debt, with firms with poor accruals 
quality incurring higher interest expense in the debt market. Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2009) 
found evidence that corporate bonds with high operating accruals underperform corporate 
bonds with low operating accruals. They also elicited that bond investors misprice high and 





4.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has presented a general understanding of earnings quality. First, the definitions 
of earnings quality were discussed. This was followed by the dimensions of earnings quality, 
different models and proxies of earnings quality as well as their strengths and weaknesses 
being discussed.  Subsequently, the possible impacts of China’s accounting and market 
reforms on earnings quality were covered. Then, the different determinants of earnings 
quality were presented accompanied with evidence from prior research on the importance of 
each of these determinants with regards to earnings quality. The final section identified the 
different consequences of earnings quality in the light of capital market effectiveness and the 
cost of capital.  
From the literature review, firstly, it appears that the researchers have been searching 
for a general theory to explain earnings quality. However, there seems have been no concrete 
approach to date, to explain the differences in managerial behaviour and no concrete 
manifestation of earnings quality. Secondly, accruals quality would seem to be at the centre 
of the earnings quality investigation: firstly, regarding managerial incentives detection; and 
secondly, in respect of accruals persistence to determine earnings quality. However, the 
studies have shown no interest in controlling the estimation errors in the discretionary 
accruals models. In addition, the value relevance concept has been widely employed in the 
earnings quality literature in terms of the change in accounting standards and similarly to 
accruals models, its models also have limitations. Other than limited accruals quality and 
value relevance analysis, it is rare to find existing literature with regards to earnings 
persistence and timeliness in emerging markets. Finally, accounting standards are not the 
only parameter influencing earnings quality, for there are other determinants like 
institutional and firm specific factors that have an impact on accounting information quality. 
Moreover, the research conducted on emerging markets has largely failed at controlling for 
institutional differences between countries when investigating earnings quality under a 





Chapter 5: Accrual quality 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the first dimension of earnings quality: accruals quality. As discussed 
earlier in this thesis, in the literature, accrual quality investigation is at the centre of many 
managerial incentives and earnings quality studies. A lower level of discretionary accruals 
indicates the higher accrual quality and thus, higher reported earnings quality.  
As aforementioned, the Chinese stock market underwent two regulatory reforms 
around 2007: the split share structure reform (SSSR), implemented over the period 2005-2008, 
and mandatory IFRS-converged CAS adoption from 1st January 2007. This study is aimed at 
examining whether accounting information quality was enhanced after China’s adoption of 
IFRS-converged CAS in 2007, taking into consideration the possible impact of SSSR on earnings 
manipulation and performance. Even though IFRS is considered to be an improved set of more 
advanced accounting standards according to some literature (Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; 
Bartov et al., 2000), the benefit to Chinese accounting information quality from IFRS 
convergence is by no means certain, for several reasons. Firstly, the IFRS-converged CAS does 
not represent a full adoption of IFRS. Secondly, IFRS were developed out of a mindset of 
advanced economies with common law legal systems – and the standards are, therefore, 
principle-based. Moreover, their application requires professional accountants to make 
sound judgements, especially regarding fair value measurement.  
In comparison to the world’s major developed economies, China is still an 
underdeveloped economy with a weak financial and legal system. Amongst its accounting and 
finance workers and firms over the period of this study, there was a lack of professional 
expertise to provide independent judgement on fair value estimation, and the financial 
markets lacked the liquidity and efficiency to give credible fair value indications. At this time, 
implementation of SSSR not only gave rise to stock market incentives to improve firms’ 
performance/efficiency, but also, potentially boosted management incentives to manipulate 
earnings. SSSR emerged a couple of years ahead of China’s IFRS convergence, with the 
objective of converting non-tradable shares to become tradable in the stock market, thus 




discipline of firms arrived only after completion of SSSR, once the non-tradeable shares had 
become tradeable. Based on boosted SSSR-related management incentives over the course 
of implementation of SSSR, and the relatively weak Chinese legal and economic systems 
around (only) partial IFRS convergence, it is predicted that accrual quality decreased over the 
focal period of this study. Accrual quality is estimated by both standard deviation (SD) of 
working capital accrual estimation errors, as suggested by Dechow and Dichev (2002), and 
also by the absolute value of discretionary accruals deduced from the modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al., 1995).  
Firstly, the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is implemented by estimating the SD of 
accrual estimation errors, and it is found that the accrual quality of Chinese listed firms 
declined over the three testing sub-periods. The SDs do not change significantly between 
2003-04 and 2005-06, with the advent of the first phase of implementation of SSSR; they 
significantly increase from 2005-06 to 2007-08, with transition to the second phase of SSSR 
alongside transition to the use of IFRS-converged CAS; and finally they increase again from 
2007-08 to 2009-10 with completion SSSR in the post-IFRS-convergence phase. The findings 
suggest, therefore, that accrual quality significantly reduced over the last two sub-periods of 
the study. SSSR-related management incentives to manipulate earnings dominated any 
possible positive impact from IFRS convergence in China and led to significantly reduced 
earnings quality.  
Second, the modified Jones model is adopted to test abnormal (discretionary) accruals 
quality. In a conventional application of the model, based on all discretionary accruals (DA) 
(whether income-increasing or -decreasing), the empirical evidence shows that the absolute 
value of DA does not change significantly between 2003-04 and 2005-06 in the first testing 
period, thus suggesting that the first phase of the SSSR implementation did not have a 
significant impact on accrual quality. The evidence from the last two testing periods shows 
that the absolute value of DA significantly reduced between 2005-06 and 2007-08 in the 
second testing period and between 2007-08 and 2009-10, which suggests that accrual quality 
improved after the SSSR negotiation and the adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, being 
apparently contra to the findings from the DD model. Given the nature of the incentives and 




income-decreasing accruals is vital. Hence, separate estimations are performed for positive 
DA and for the absolute negative value. The findings suggest that income-increasing accruals 
significantly reduced between 2003-04 to 2005-06 in the first testing period; income-
increasing accruals significantly increased and income-deceasing accruals significantly 
reduced between 2005-06 to 2007-08 in the second testing period; income-increasing 
accruals significantly reduced in the final phase of SSSR implementation between 2007-08 to 
2009-10.  
The findings are consistent with the predictions in this thesis as regards SSSR-related 
management incentives, these being: (i) management of earnings downward during the first 
(negotiation) phase of SSSR in order to drive down the compensation payable to external, 
private shareholders; (ii) management of earnings upward to boost share prices in the second 
phase of SSSR, the lock in period, to maximise the receipts from share sales into the market 
once they became tradeable; and (iii) management of earnings downward soon after 
completion of SSSR, in order to re-acquire the shares at lower price than that at which they 
were sold, thus making a share trading profit whilst maintaining (regaining) ownership levels. 
It is concluded that the significant reduced absolute value of (all) DA in the second and final 
periods was driven by management incentives and fulfilled by increasing income-increasing 
accruals and reducing income-decreasing accruals in the second phase and reduced income-
increasing accruals in the final phase. Contrary to the standard interpretation of abnormal 
accrual quality estimation in the previous literature, it is held here that accrual quality 
reduced through the SSSR implementation, despite IFRS convergence, even though the 
absolute value of DA decreased in the second and final testing period. 
In confirmation of China’s relatively underdeveloped legal and financial systems, and 
weak accounting/finance profession, control variables for use of ‘Big 4’ auditors and for 
difference corporate governance mechanisms are commonly insignificant: variables found to 
reduce earnings management activity in developed economies do not appear to be effective 
in the Chinese context. 
This chapter begins with the research objective and research questions in section 5.2. 




presented in section 5.4, whilst the results are provided in section 5.5. The chapter summary 
and conclusions are presented in section 5.6. 
5.2 Research objective and questions 
There have been a number of studies investigating the impact of IFRS adoption on accounting 
information quality in developed economies, of which a number have shown that IFRS 
adoption adds value to accounting information in developed institutional settings (Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2007; Bartov et al., 2005; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Horton et al., 2013). 
Studies for developing countries, however, are rather limited; and the evidence is not clear 
as to whether or not IFRS adoption benefits emerging economies. A paper by Ball et al. (2000) 
suggested that lower transparency of accounting information in the emerging markets, which 
is attributable to weak enforcement of accounting standards in these countries, could lead to 
lower reported earnings quality under IFRS. 
In this chapter, the earnings quality is approached via accrual quality, which is 
consistent with a large number of prior studies (Defond and Park, 2001; Dechow and Dichev, 
2002; Haw et al., 2001; Francis et al., 2005; McInnis and Collins, 2011; Badertscher et al., 2012; 
Mouselli et al., 2012; Doyle et al., 2007b; Richardson et al., 2005). Accrual quality in this study 
is investigated in terms of both discretionary accrual quality (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995) 
and working capital accrual quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; McNichols, 2002; Francis et 
al., 2005).  
There have been only a limited number studies examining the impact of IFRS-
converged CAS adoption on listed firms’ accrual quality (Wang and Campbell, 2012; Zhang et 
al., 2013). There are some that have investigated the impact of SSSR on the share price 
informativeness, but there is no empirical evidence as regards its impact on accrual quality. 
Liao et al. (2014) examined the influence of SSSR on SOEs’ fundamental performance. They 
found that performance was improved due to the boosted stock market incentives from the 
government agents and management group who benefitted from the increasing of share 
values. There is no research, however, considering both the accounting and the market 




influence on accounting information quality as well as on managerial and market 
incentives/opportunities. 
Estimating models for both discretionary accruals and for working capital accruals, the 
objective of this chapter, in particular, is to examine whether SSSR implementation and the 
adoption of IFRS-converged CAS in China had an impact upon accrual quality. To address the 
objective, the research questions of this chapter are: 
1. Was there a change in working capital accruals quality, as assessed by the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, through the phases of implementation of 
the non-tradable shares reform (SSSR); and in the transition from old Chinese 
GAAP to IFRS-converged CAS?  
2. Also, was there a change in discretionary accruals quality, as assessed by the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995), through the phases of the non-
tradable shares reform (SSSR); and in the transition from old Chinese GAAP to 
IFRS-converged CAS? 
5.3 Hypothesis development 
As China’s IFRS convergence was not a full adoption of IFRS and given its emerging market 
characteristics, the outcome of implementation of IFRS-converged CAS is unclear. Around the 
same time, implementation of SSSR boosted management’s earnings manipulation and stock 
market incentives. Hence, a joint effect on accrual quality is posited for those firms that were 
subject to SSSR.44 
SSSR should have increased the stock market sensitivities of controlling shareholders 
since they could sell their shares at market price after the reform; stock performance and 
controlling shareholders’ wealth were closely tied since they could trade the shares at market 
value (Liu and Tian, 2012). Hence, at the very least, financial market incentives became 
 
44 The vast majority of Chinese firms had non-tradable shares and were subject to SSSR. In the data set for this 
study, 11,760 firm-year observations were from firms subject to it, of which most completed SSSR and had 
previously non-tradeable shares actually tradeable by 1st January 2008. Only 120 observations are from firms 





stronger and more adapted to serve the needs of the controlling shareholders in the post 
SSSR period.  
In order to test the research questions of this chapter, the study period is separated 
into three overlapping sub-periods. Please Refer to Table 5.1, which is Table 1.1 reproduced 




Table 5.1: SSSR phases and related management incentive predictions  









SSSR phase 1: negotiation period. 
Managers had the incentive to 
drive down share price, so that 
the local SOE hierarchy minimised 
the compensation it was obliged 
to pay to external shareholders 
2007-2008 
SSSR phase 2: lock-in period: 
managers had incentives to drive 
up share prices, so that local SOE 
hierarchy received the maximum 
amount from sale of shares once 
the lock-in period ended 
2007-2010 
Post-IFRS-convergence: 
Possible influences: (i) EQ-
increasing impact of IFRS in 
general, albeit not universal; 
(ii) EQ-decreasing under the 
impact of IFRS-convergence in 
China: weak legal 
enforcement, strong 
management incentives, lack 
of (minority) investors’ 
protection, heavy government 
intervention, not a full 
adoption of IFRS 
2009-2010 
SSSR phase 3: post lock-in period 
and post-sale of SOE shares. 
Managers had the incentive to 
drive down share prices, so that 
the local SOE hierarchy could buy 
back shares at a lower price than 
that at which it sold them, thus 




As previously discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the first phase of SSSR is pre-IFRS 
convergence in China – so estimations are free from the impact of IFRS adoption, thus 
highlighting the influence of the first phase of SSSR. The majority/controlling shareholders 
were holders of non-tradable shares and had to compensate to the (private) holders of 
tradable shares for the market effect of converting substantial numbers of non-tradeable 
shares into become tradeable. To limit/minimise the compensation payable, the 
agents/managers, who represented the controlling shareholders, had a strong incentive to 
manage earnings downwards. Hypothesis 5.1 is designed to investigate the association 
between SSSR and accrual quality in Chinese A-share listed firms with the advent of the first 
phase of SSSR. Accordingly, hypothesis 5.1, pertaining to the first sub-period this study, is as 
follows:  
H5.1: In the first phase of SSSR, earnings quality as measured by accruals quality 
will be reduced. 
To test the H5.1, this study separates accruals to income-increasing accruals and 
income-decreasing accruals. If earnings are managed downwards, there should be a net shift 
away from income-increasing accruals towards income-decreasing ones. Therefore, a shift 
away from income-increasing accruals to income-decreasing accruals would provide evidence 
of a management incentive to drive earnings downwards, and that those incentives were 
acted upon; and so of reduced earnings quality in the first phase of the SSSR implementation. 
The second testing period / sub-period is from 2005 to 2008, which includes adoption 
of IFRS-converged CAS in 2007 and the transition from the negotiation phase to the lock-in 
phase of SSSR. As abovementioned, China’s IFRS adoption was partial and, given the country’s 
emerging market characteristics, it is difficult to predict whether earnings quality was 
enhanced by IFRS convergence. In addition to China’s mandatory adoption of IFRS-converged 
CAS on 1st January 2007, after completion of the first phase of SSSR, the negotiation phase, 
SSSR moved into a lock-in period, i.e. previously non-tradable shares remained for a further 
24 months. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the second high-level hypothesis of this study 
concerns a desire among holders of non-tradable shares to be able to sell shares at higher 
price after the lock-in period, and the incentive for their agents/managers to manage earnings 




etc.), the move toward principle-based standards under IFRS-converged CAS adoption may 
not have mitigated against management’s ability to manipulate earnings, indeed, this might 
even have made manipulation easier. In this chapter, it is argued that continuation into the 
lock-in phase of the SSSR, in spite of IFRS-convergence, resulted in lower accounting 
information quality as measured by accruals quality. Accordingly, Hypothesis 5.2 is as follows:  
H5.2: In the second phase of SSSR, earnings quality as measured by accruals quality 
will be reduced. 
To test the H5.2, the same approach as used for H5.1 (above), with separation of 
accruals into income-increasing accruals and income-decreasing accruals. But here, the 
hypothesis is that earnings are managed upwards. If earnings are, indeed, managed upwards, 
there should be a net shift towards income-increasing accruals and away from income-
decreasing ones. Therefore, a shift towards income-increasing accruals and away from 
income-decreasing accruals management would provide evidence of management incentives 
to drive earnings upwards, and that such incentives were acted upon. Further, any such 
evidence here would be of upwards earnings management and reduced earnings quality in 
the second phase of the SSSR implements despite (or perhaps even facilitated by) the 
transition to IFRS-converged CAS. 
The final testing period is from 2007 to 2010, all of which was after China’s IFRS 
convergence adoption, and during which the SSSR implementation moved from the lock-in 
phase to completion, with previously non-tradable becoming tradable from the beginning of 
2009. Hence, changes in accrual quality in this testing period may be deduced to be primarily 
as a result of progress with SSSR implementation, rather than changes in accounting 
standards. Completion of SSSR was a milestone for Chinese stock market liberalisation, with 
the removal of the non-tradable share structure supporting transition towards a free market 
model. According to previous literature (Firth et al., 2010; Hou et al., 2012; Liao et al., 2014; 
Yang et al., 2015), however, the objective of SSSR was to make non-tradable shares tradable, 
but without giving up state control of SOEs. Having sold previously untradeable shares after 
the lock period (and sold them ‘high’ – see above), the third-high level hypothesis of this study 
concerns a desire by SOEs and majority/controlling shareholders to re-acquire these shares 




Consequently, after the initial sales of newly tradeable shares in early 2009, there is an 
incentive for firms’ agents/managers to manage earnings downwards, with the foregoing 
discussion concerning the lack of efficacy of IFRS-converged CAS to mitigate earnings 
management still pertaining. Hypothesis 5.3 is stated as follows: 
H5.3: In the third phase of SSSR, earnings quality as measured by accruals quality will 
be reduced.  
To test the H5.3, the same approach as used for H5.1 (above) is used. Here again, a 
shift away from income-increasing accruals to income-decreasing accruals would provide 
evidence of a management incentive to drive earnings downwards, and that those incentives 
were acted upon; and so of reduced earnings quality in the third phase of the SSSR 
implementation despite the transition to IFRS-converged CAS. 
5.4 Research method 
This section presents the empirical method. First, it discusses the measurement of accrual 
quality used to identify the impact of SSSR implementation and IFRS convergence on earnings 
quality. It is followed by explanation of the data collection and estimations. 
5.4.1 Measures of accrual quality  
This subsection focus on two accrual quality estimation models: the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model and the modified Jones Model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). The models’ 
limitations were discussed in Chapter 4, and so, are not reiterated here. 
Firstly, the Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model (model 5.1) is adopted to test working 
capital accrual quality. It starts with the premise that the purpose/benefit of accruals is to 
adjust for cash flow timing problems. The authors argued that, in the absence of intentional 
earnings manipulation, accrual quality will be systematically related to firm and industry 
characteristics. Moreover, since both intentional and unintentional estimation errors imply 
lower quality accruals and earnings, it is unnecessary to separate discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals. They took the residuals from firm-specific regressions of changes in 
working capital on previous, current and one-year-ahead cash flows from operations to 




these residuals to indicate the quality of accruals and earnings – the higher the standard 
deviation signifying lower quality. 
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where, DWC is the change in working capital accruals, being the change in current 
non-cash assets, DWCA, less the change in current liabilities, DCL. All other variables are as 
previously defined. 
The higher the standard deviation of accrual estimation errors from Model (5.1), SD[e], 
the lower the implied working capital accrual quality. The SD estimation is, as with |DA|, an 
unsigned accrual quality measure, which does not give indication of the direction of accruals 
management, but rather, focuses on the magnitude of working capital accrual changes. In the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, accruals quality is measured by the extent to which 
working capital accruals map into operating cash flow realisations. Unlike the Modified Jones 
model, there is no separation between discretionary (intentional or manipulative) accrual 
changes and other changes. Nor is there the opportunity to separate the estimations as 
between income-increasing and income-decreasing accrual activity. 
To estimate the accrual quality, the focus is then on the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (DA), as measured by the difference between total accruals (TA) and non-
discretionary accruals (NDA), scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. Non-
discretionary accruals capture adjustments that reflect fundamental financial performance, 
whilst discretionary accruals are regarded as capturing distortions (through application of the 
GAAP or otherwise) in earnings. Discretionary accruals were first modelled by Jones (1991), 
since when, such modelling, in its original and modified forms, has become a widely used 
empirical technique in earning quality assessment, but it has also been subject to criticism 
(see Chapter 4) (Dechow et al., 2010).  
Following previous studies (Dechow et al., 1995; Bartov et al., 2000), NDA is estimated 
by adopting a cross-sectional Modified Jones Model (model 5.2). The model is fitted to cross-
sectional or time series data. In either case, the model has methodological limitations 




predict non-discretionary accruals, and thus, the deduced discretionary accruals suffer from 
measurement error. Dechow et al. (2010), however, suggested that the cross-sectional 
Modified Jones Model has greater explanatory power than the original Jones Model, since it 
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where, TA is as previously specified; A represents assets; DREV represents change in 
revenue; DREC represents change in receivables; PPE represents property, plant and 
equipment; and e is a stochastic error term. The subscripts relate to firm and time, 
respectively. The definitions of all variables used in this chapter are presented in Table 5.3. 
There are two alternative approaches to calculating total accruals: the balance sheet 
and income statement approaches. Hribar and Collins (2002) criticised the balance sheet 
approach in that it might lead to changes in working capital accounts related to the non-
operating events being mistaken as accruals. In this research, therefore, the income 
statement approach from Collins and Hribar (2000) is adopted:  
4!&,! = =(&,! − "'(&,!	                                            (5.3) 
where, TA is as previously specified, IO represents operating income and CFO 
represents cash flow from operations. 
Total accruals calculated from model (5.3), deflated by 	/%,!&# , is used as the 
dependent variable in model (5.2); and the residuals from estimating (model 5.2) provide 
measurement of discretionary accruals as follows: 
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where all variables are as previously defined. 
Since this study is focused initially on the magnitude of DA, rather than direction, the 




With this treatment, as is usual, both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals lead to an increased |DA| - conventionally interpreted to mean a greater level of 
earnings management and hence, lower earnings quality. Subsequently, and most 
illuminating, income-increasing discretionary accruals, |DA+| and the absolute value of 
income-decreasing accruals, |DA-|, are separated. 
5.4.2 Research design  
To test the hypotheses, the extent/variation in the two measures of accruals quality (|DA| 
and SD) around the implementation of IFRS-converged CAS and SSSR is investigated. 
Multivariate regressions are adopted with panel estimation to test the association between 
accrual quality and the IFRS and SSSR reforms.45 Given the setting and objectives of this study, 
dummy variables are employed to represent phases through the accounting and market 
reforms, which includes a number of firm-and year-specific control variables designed to 
allow for firms’ specific characters, institutional factors, corporate governance, and 
ownership structures. Model (5.5) is expressed as follows: 
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where, AccQua represents the accruals quality variable (either SD or |DA|); DUM 
represents, in turn, phase dummy variables SSSR1 (for model estimated from 2003-2006), 
IFRS_SSSR2 (for model estimated over the period 2005-2008) and SSSR3 (for model estimated 
for 2007-2010), which are as defined in Table 5.2, as discussed below. 
In sum, in this chapter accrual quality is examined via estimating the working capital 
accrual quality through the accrual estimation errors model (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) as 
well as the absolute level of discretionary accruals using Dechow et al. (1995) modification of 
the Jones (1991) model. Both standard deviation of accrual estimation errors and absolute 
discretionary accruals are unsigned measures of accrual quality. The limitation of unsigned 
accrual quality measures is that they cannot reveal the direction of accrual management as 
 
45 The estimation of Model (5.5), like all model estimations in this study unless otherwise specified, was 
performed using a panel regression with fixed effects at the firm level. This was after appropriate prior 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests for each model/estimation. All estimations in this thesis were performed 




income-increasing or income-decreasing (Hribar and Craig Nichols, 2007). Hence the 
abnormal accruals are subsequently separated into income-increasing and income-
decreasing accruals in order to test specifically accruals activity in relation to directional 
hypotheses concerning earnings management. 
Increased SD and absolute level of discretionary accruals indicate decreased working 
accrual and discretionary accrual quality. Negative association between IFRS/SSSR adoption 
and absolute value of discretionary accruals indicates a reduced level of these accruals, which 
implies less accruals management after the reforms in China and thus, enhanced accrual 
quality. Likewise, with the SD from the accrual estimation errors, a negative correlation 
between it and IFRS/SSSR indicates that reforms decreased the estimation error in short term 
working capital accrual, thus implying increased accrual quality.  
The hypothesis H5.1 predicts that |DA| and SD increased after the commencement of 
the first (negotiation) phase of the SSSR in 2005 - due to management incentives to manage 
earnings downwards and thus, there was lower accrual quality. In this regard, the association 
of SD and |DA| with the phase dummy SSSR1 in Model 5.5 is tested. Under hypothesis 5.2, it 
is predicted that the incentives created by transition to the second (lock-in) phase of SSSR 
dominated the possible positive impact of IFRS-convergence and led to a continued reduction 
in accrual quality. Accounting standards alone do not change the firms’ fundamental financial 
condition and management incentives/activities. To test H5.2, the association of SD and |DA| 
is examined with the phase dummy IFRS_SSSR2 within Model 5.5. Given the parallel course 
of the accounting and market reforms, the IFRS_SSSR2 variable not only represents IFRS 





Hypothesis H5.3 predicts that, post-IFRS-convergence, transition to phase 3 of the 
SSSR – the free trading of previously untradeable shares – there was a management incentive 
to manage earnings downwards again. Accordingly, the association of SD and |DA| with 
phase dummy SSSR3 in Model 5.5 is tested. The final testing period, 2007-2010 was free from 
(first order) the impact of the transition IFRS-converged CAS, which was adopted from 1st 
January 2007 onwards.  
5.4.3 Control variables 
In order to help to isolate/identify the impact of the accounting and financial market reforms 
on accrual quality, firm-specific and institutional factors, corporate governance, and 
ownership structure are controlled for. The control variables are as listed in Table 5.3 and as 
discussed next. The control variables selected from firm-specific financial characteristics are:  
 
operating cash flows scaled by total assets, CFO; the natural logarithm of total market value 
of equity, SIZE; financial leverage, LEV, being total liabilities scaled by total book value of 
equity; a dummy for current year profitability, PROFIT, being 1 for profit, 0 otherwise; credit 
ratio, CR, being total assets divided by total liabilities; and inventory to asset ratio, INV. 
The control variables CR and INV measure firms’ financial health in terms of liquidity 
and efficiency, respectively, with the estimated coefficient expected to be positive with CR 
and negative with INV – greater liquidity and efficiency suggest less incentive/need for 
accruals manipulation (Allen et al., 2013). The inclusion of CFO is to control for the potential 
Table 5.2: Phase dummy variables employed 
Estimation period Model base case Dummy intercept and interactions for 




2005-2006 [SSSR1 = 1] 
SSSR phase 1: negotiation of 
compensation 
Remains pre-IFRS convergence 
2005-2008 2005-2006 [IFRS_SSSR2 = 0] 
SSSR phase 1: negotiation of 
compensation 
Pre-IFRS convergence 
2007-2008 [IFRS_SSSR2 = 1] 
SSSR phase 2: lock-in period 
 
Post-IFRS convergence 
2007-2010 2007-2008 [SSSR3 = 0] 
SSSR phase 2: lock-in period 
 
Post-IFRS convergence 
2009-2010 [SSSR3 = 1] 
SSSR phase 3: trading of previously 
untradeable shares 




correlation between discretionary accruals and operating cash flows, with a negative 
estimated coefficient expected (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005; Myers et al., 2003; 
Peasnell et al., 2000; Carey and Simnett, 2006; Iatridis, 2012). SIZE controls for firm size effects, 
and the previous literature has found mixed evidence of the association between this and 
accrual quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Chung et al., 2002; Iatridis and Rouvolis, 2010). 
LEV is included because highly leveraged firms may have greater incentives for earnings 
management (Peasnell et al., 2005; Carey and Simnett, 2006; DeFond and Park, 1997), and 
the estimated coefficient is expected to be positive, i.e. greater leverage is associated with 
lower accrual/earnings quality. PROFIT is a dummy variable as a loss indicator and examines 
the potential differences in discretionary accruals between loss and profit firms, with a 
negative sign being expected on the estimated coefficient (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).  
The level of related party transactions is also controlled for. Prior studies in China 
(Wong and Jian, 2003; Dai and Chen, 2004; Jiang and Wang, 2008) have found that Chinese 
listed firms not only manage accruals to boost earnings and avoid losses, but also employ a 
number of other means. Firms engage widely in the manipulation of related party 
transactions, asset impairment, debt restructuring, or outright fraudulent activities in 
addition to manipulation of accruals. While accruals manipulation is often regarded as the 
main method of earnings management in the literature on western firms/economies, related 
party transactions, particularly in loss making firms, is an increasingly important issue in the 
Chinese stock market (Wong and Jian, 2003). Jian and Wong (2006) suggested that when 
management incentives to manipulate earnings are strong, mechanisms include: (i) related 
party transactions to manage non-operating earnings; (ii) related party sales to manage 
operating earnings; and (iii) accruals management. They concluded that managers are only 
more likely to use the accruals method to manage earnings when the non-operating earnings 
opportunity is less readily available. Non-operating income (NOI) is used as the indicator of 
related party transactions, which expected exhibit a positive relationship with accrual quality, 
and so a negative sign on the estimated coefficient.46 
 
46 A positive estimated coefficient in Model 5.5 implies a positive association between the variable and accruals 




In addition, ownership concentration, nature of controlling shareholders and top 
management group (including chief executive officers) have been found to affect 
discretionary accruals (Firth et al., 2007; Fan et al., 2007b; Roe, 2003; Fan et al., 2007a). Firms 
with highly concentrated ownership have lower earnings quality, due to large shareholders’ 
ability to influence firms’ reporting policies for their own benefit, rather than trying to reflect 
the underlying economic status (Fan et al., 2007b). For this study controls ownership 
concentration is controlled for (variable CONCEN, being the proportion of the firm owned by 
controlling shareholders), which is expected to be negatively related to accrual quality (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983b; Beuselinck and Manigart, 2007; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), and a 
positive estimated coefficient is expected in Model (5.5). It is noted that it is unclear whether 
the control rights of large shareholders were significantly changed after SSSR, since the sale 
and re-acquisition of previously untradeable shares is envisaged (see discussion above). 
Jensen (1993) contended that board monitoring is more effective, if directors also hold 
company shares. If board leadership and the CEO position are vested in the same person, the 
board members will be in a difficult position to oversee managers’ behaviour (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1979; Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen, 1993). Warfield et al. (1995) found that 
higher managerial ownership decreases the incentive for earnings management motivated by 
self-interested purposes. In China, however, the selection of top managers and directors, 
especially in SOEs, is often influenced by the state and the managerial ownership is very low 
(Chung et al., 2002). Managers are rewarded mainly through fixed salaries, according to their 
seniority, age and position. Moreover, share-based payments and bonuses have not been 
applied widely by listed firms. Managers’ performance in Chinese listed firms is commonly 
evaluated based on total profits rather than on the companies’ equity returns or the growth 
in earnings per share. In this study, the proportion of the firm owned by managers is 
controlled for through variable MOWN, and it is expected (based on findings in the west) that 
there will be a positive association with accrual quality, i.e. a negative estimated coefficient 
in Model (5.5). 
Finally for controls, some studies have found that large audit firms (e.g. the ‘Big 4’) 
enhance the credibility of financial statements and have a direct influence on their quality 




and a higher accrual quality for firms who use the Big 4 auditors (KPMG, Deloitte, PwC and 
Ernst & Young) is anticipated. The dummy variable AUDIT, being 1 for firms with Big 4 auditors 
and 0, otherwise, is expected to have an estimated coefficient with a negative sign in Model 
(5.5). 
The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007, 2008 and beyond falls within the period of 
this study, however, this is not controlled. This for three reasons. First, albeit many (most) 
world economies suffered significantly in the GFC, China was largely unaffected (Morrison, 
2009). Indeed, as shown in Figure 5.1, Chinese GDP growth continued at near 10% throughout 
the period, which is exceptional in comparison to the growth seen elsewhere in Asia Pacific 
(see Australia in Fig 5.1), the UK and the USA. Second, Chinese financial markets are strictly 
regulated and international capital flows are restricted, with only domestic investors being 
allowed to trade in the A share market. Hence, there is restricted scope for international 
contagion into China. Third, a methodological constraint: control for the GFC, conventionally 
in the literature, involves incorporation of a GFC time-dummy(s) into econometric models. As 
will be clear from the foregoing, time dummies are necessary to investigate the effects of the 
transitions set out in Table 5.2 and there is no scope for incorporation of a further GFC time 
dummy. Further, it is hypothesised that there was manipulation to increase earnings (and 
market prices) over the period 2007-08 – a period in which the heat of the GFC caused 
widespread price drops. Hence, significant results found in support of the study hypotheses 
over 2007-08 are despite the impact of the GFC, certainly not with its assistance and may, 










        Figure 5.1: GDP growth rate: China, Australia, US and UK  
 
          Data source: World Bank 
Finally, industry effects are not controlled for: as discussed earlier, appropriate pre-
testing indicated panel estimation with fixed effects at the firm level. Given firm fixed effects, 
industry fixed effects have no place in the estimations.47 
5.4.4 Sample separation 
One of the unique features of Chinese corporate governance is state control over many firms, 
the SOEs. For this study, estimations over the whole population of Chinese listed firms’ firm-
years are made with separate estimations for SOEs and for Non-SOEs also being found. 
Following Jian and Wong (2006), firms are identified as SOEs, if (i) their ultimate controlling 
party is attested to be the state (since 2003, listed firms have been required to disclose their 
ultimate controlling parties in their annual financial reports); and/or (ii) the state controls 
directly or indirectly over 30% of total voting rights; and/or (iii) the state voting rights allow it 
to elect over 50% of the board directors. SOEs are less engaged with market incentives or 
 
47 The common error in the literature is to include industry fixed effects along with firm level fixed effects. These 
should only be considered if there are significant in-sample inter-industry transitions, which is not the case in 




incentives to maximise large shareholders’ wealth but more likely manage earnings to achieve 
certain political goals. Due to their unique position in the Chinese economy, they are 
financially supported by central or local government and politically exempt from related party 
transaction disclosure (Jian and Wong, 2006; Tong et al., 2014; Wong and Jian, 2003; Lo et al., 
2010). 
Another feature of the Chinese environment is the existence of special treatment (or 
ST) designation for firms that have suffered two consecutive loss-making years and are under 
threat of delisting (see Chapter 2). Separate estimations are made for Non-ST and ST firms to 
ascertain whether: the response of ST firms to the incentives created by SSSR implementation 
was less predictable that that of Non-ST firms.  
5.4.5 Full list of variables with definitions and treatment of outliers 
The definitions of all the variables used in this chapter are presented in Table 5.3., which 
includes summary information on the treatment of outliers and estimated sign expectations 
where pertinent. The treatment of outliers can be to: (i) keep and treat them like any data 
point; (ii) Winsorise outliers, assign them lesser weight, or otherwise modify outlier values to 
be closer to the other sample values; or (iii) drop the outliers. Winsorisation can avoid 
overvaluing/undervaluing outliers and maintain the estimation accuracy with the true 
population value (Ghosh and Vogt, 2012). Most of the continuous (non-dummy) independent 
variables required for the estimation of models (5.1), (5.4) and (5.5) (after deflation) were 
Winsorised up to the 1st and beyond the 99th percentile points, which was in order to 
eliminate extreme outliers and potential data errors. Such treatment is common in the accrual 





Table 5.3: Definition of variables   
 
Variable name 
Definition Treatment of outlier Hypothesised sign 
Panel A: Accrual quality estimation variables 
!!,#$% Opening total assets in year t Deflator n/a 
∆#$%!,# Change in revenues from year t-1 to t, scaled by 
opening total assets in year t 
Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile  
no prediction 
∆#$&!,# Change in net receivables from year t-1 to t, 
scaled by opening total assets in year t 
Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile 
no prediction 
PPE Property, plant and equipment, scaled by 
opening total assets in year t 
Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile 
no prediction 
TA Total accruals, scaled by opening total assets in 
year t 
Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile 
n/a 
IO Net operating income, scaled by opening total 
assets in year t 
Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile 
Not applicable 
CFO Net operating cash flows deflated by opening 
total assets in year t 
Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile 
+ve 
∆'&!,# Change in working capital from year t-1 to t, 
scaled by opening total assets in year t 
Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile 
no prediction 
Panel B: Alternative dependent variables 
DA Discretionary accruals. The cross-sectional 
Modified Jones Model is adopted for estimation 
n/a n/a 
|DA| The absolute value of discretionary accruals 
Unsigned DA  
n/a n/a 
|)!&| Unsigned income-increasing DA n/a n/a 




SD Working capital accrual quality. The standard 
deviation of saved residuals from the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model 
n/a n/a 
Panel C: Independent focal (phase dummy) variables 
SSSR1 A dummy variable that takes a value of 1, if 
after the announcement of SSSR in negotiation 
period from 2005 to 2006; takes a value of 0 
before the announcement of 2005.  
n/a +ve 
IFRS_SSSR2  A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 from 
2007 to 2008; takes a value of 0 before 2007. 
This variable also represents SSSR from the 
negotiation period (2005-2006) to the lock-in 
period (2007-2008). 
n/a +ve 
SSSR3 A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 after 
the non-tradable shares lock-in period from 
2009 to 2010; takes a value of 0 when non-
tradable shares remain in lock-in from 2007 to 
2008 
n/a +ve 
Panel D: Independent control variables 
SIZE  The natural logarithm of total assets Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile 
no prediction  
LEV Total liabilities divided by total book value of 
equity  
Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile 
+ve 
CR Total assets divided by total liabilities  Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile 
-ve 
INV Total inventory divided by total assets Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile 
-ve 
NOI Non-operating income divided by total assets Winsorised up to the first percentile 
and beyond the 99th percentile 
-ve 
PROFIT A dummy variable that takes a value of 1, if net 
profit is positive, otherwise 0 




AUDIT A dummy variable that takes a value of 1, if the 
firm uses the Big Four, otherwise 0 
n/a -ve 
CONCEN  The proportion owned by controlling 
shareholders 
n/a +ve 
MOWN The proportion of the number of shares owned 





5.4.6 Data collection 
The data cover all A-share firms listed on the SSE and the SZSE exchanges during the period 
2003 to 2010 (inclusive). They have been downloaded from the Chinese Securities Market & 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and from firms’ annual reports. CSMAR is designed 
and developed by GTA Information Technology. The database is one of the major providers 
of Chinese financial and accounting research data, covering the Chinese stock market as well 
as the financial statements and corporate governance of Chinese listed firms. The datasets 
within CSMAR used for the purposes of this chapter are: the Chinese Stock Market Financial 
Statements Database, the China Stock Market Split Share Structure Reform Database, the 
China Stock Special Treatment Research Database, the China Listed Firms’ Corporate 
Governance Research Database, the China Listed Firm’s Shareholder Research Database, and 
the China Stock Market Financial Database of Audit Opinions. 
This study is focused on the A-share-only listed firms. As discussed in Chapter 2, firms 
with B-shares were required to produce their financial statement under both old CAS and IFRS 
prior China’s IFRS convergence 2007, whereas for A-share-only firms there was a clear 
transition as from 1st January 2007. Hence, it is for the A-share firms that the impact of 
Chinese IFRS convergence would have been most pronounced and clear as regards the 
transition point. Further, the impact of SSSR implementation on accruals quality is 
investigated. Only A-share firms who owned non-tradable shares prior SSSR (mostly SOEs) 
were subject to SSSR. 
The old Chinese GAAP, which here is compared with IFRS-converged CAS, was 
implemented from 2001, whilst a Chinese code of corporate governance (CCG) was 
promulgated in 2002. Further, the requirement for firms to disclose the controlling 
shareholders’ names and proportions started from 2003 after the CCG. Hence, in order to 
avoid confounding effects of the introduction of the CCG on earnings quality, and to allow for 
ownership interest of controlling shareholders, the period of this study starts in 200348. To 
 
482003 is not itself a sample year; rather observations and data items for 2003 are required as lagged variables 




cover the transition IFRS converged CAS in 2007, the implementation of SSSR from 2005-2008, 
and to allow for two years beyond, the study period runs through to 2010.49 
The data are organised according to firm-years, with an initial collected population of 
circa 15,000 firm-year observations. As regards data availability/continuity the following were 
excluded: 
• Firm-years for firms with less than three firm-year observations (93 
observations), since the estimation of working capital accrual quality requires 
at least three firm-year observations; 
• Firm-years for 33 ST firms delisted from the Main Board and reduced to the 
Third Board before 2006 are also excluded; 50,51 
• Firm-years for firms that are from China’s GEM Board (whose stock code starts 
with “300XXX”), being 1,273 observations. The GEM board was established in 
2009, which is after the mandatory adoption of IFRS-converged CAS in 2007; 
• Firm-years of firms from the SME Board (3,464 observations), since the 
majority of the SME Board firms were listed only after 2006, with only one such 
firm listed before IFRS convergence in 2007. 
Given the aim of this chapter is comparing the change of accrual quality under a 
change in accounting standards and implementation of SSSR in China, and the desire for firm 
time-series spanning different phases of the reforms (and so, two of the exclusions set out 
above), there may be concerns about survivorship bias. This is common in this kind of study. 
In the Chinese context, the majority of the population survived over the sample period, with, 
 
49 With some required data items collected for 2011, as regards the forward variable in the DD model and, for 
Chapter 8, market returns to beyond the year end. 
50 See Appendix 5.2 for those firms delisted so. 
51 In China, the term “board” in this context refers to a segment of the stock exchange. The Main Board, similar 
to the UK’s “Main market” is the principal market in which the shares of large companies, including SOEs, are 
traded and it holds the listings for the majority of firms in this study. The SME Board holds these listings for small 
and medium firms; and the GEM Board is for high technology stock. The Third Board lists predominantly ST firms, 
and has restricted trading – with a stock transfer agent system as its trading platform, via over-the-counter 
markets in local exchanges. The original Third Board was established in 2001 and includes mainly delisted firms 
from the Main Board, GEM Board and SME Board. The new Third Board was born in 2006 with an experimental 
scheme to bring in non-listed firms from Zhongguancun Science and Technology Park (China’s “Silicon Valley”) 




for example, the majority of ST firms surviving in the data set in their own right or via M&A 
activity with healthier firms. 
After the exclusions discussed above, the final data size for this chapter is as set out 
in Table 5.4, with the number of firm-year observation split by SSSR phase, and by ST versus 
Non-ST firms and alternatively, by SOEs versus Non-SOEs. Note that ST versus Non-ST, and 
SOE versus Non-SOEs are two alternative ways of splitting the same sample or firm years. The 
distribution of the sample of firm-years by industry groups is showed in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.4: Total number of A-share firm-year observations  
SSSR phases Pre-SSSR Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 TOTAL 
Sub-period 2003-2004 2005-06 2007-08 2009-10  
ST firms 612 586 560 569 2,327 
Non-ST firms 1,758 1,946 2,258 2,978 8,940 
SOEs 1,520 1,610 1,606 1,606 6,342 
Non-SOEs 850 922 1,212 1,941 4,925 
Total Observations 2,370 2,532 2,818 3,547 11,267 
Table 5.4 shows there are total of 11,267 A-share firm-year observations. Amongst the 
11,267 observations, there are 2,327 ST firm-year observations and 8,940 Non-ST firm-year 
observations. There are 6,342 SOE observations and 4,925 Non-SOE observations. The 
number of SOE observations remains similar throughout the testing periods, while the 
number of Non-SOE observations has more than doubled by the third phase of the SSSR. 
Table 5.5: Industry firm-year distribution  
SSSR Phases  Pre-SSSR Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 TOTAL 
Industry 2003-04 2005-06 2007-08 2009-10  
Finance 30 31 40 47 148 







Natural Resource 108 105 111 132 456 
Manufactory  1,463 1,601 1,823 2,370 7,257 
Commerce 244 250 255 280 1,029 
Total Observations 2,370 2,532 2,818 3,547 11,267 
Table 5.5 shows that manufacturing and industrial firms dominate the Chinese A-share 




government control: the number of financial firms listed is only eighteen, with sixteen of 
those being under government control. Firms in finance, utilities, and property & construction 
are not included in the data set used in Chapters 5, 6 and 7; but are included in the data set 
for Chapter 8. 
5.5 Results  
The following three subsections, 5.5.1, 5.5.2 and 5.5.3, provide a comprehensive and detailed 
report on the data and results - both univariate results and multivariate regression results. 
Subsection 5.5.4 presents and discusses the key findings. 
5.5.1 The pattern of accrual quality  
Figure 5.2 illustrates the changing levels of the measure of working capital accrual quality (SD) 
and the absolute value of discretionary accruals (|DA|) over the period of 2003-2010. Figure 
5.2 shows that the mean of SD increases over the testing period from 2003 to 2010, which 
suggests a decreasing working capital accrual quality over the study period. The mean of |DA| 
also shows a continuing increasing profile over the majority of the study period, albeit with a 
maximum in 2009 and then, a sharp reduction in 2010. 








2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year




The changes of SD and |DA| in the testing period are consistent with the prediction 
that there was an incentive to manipulate earnings throughout the period – to drive them 
down, then up, and then down again. The increased managerial manipulation incentives in 
the three phases of the SSSR led to an increase in SD and |DA| and thus, a decrease in accrual 
quality. From this very simple overview, it is not possible to detect any evidence that IFRS-
convergence in 2007 reduced (the impact of) earnings manipulation via accruals manipulation. 
5.5.2 Univariate analysis 
Table 5.6 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the working capital accrual 
and abnormal accrual quality estimations, split by the different implementation phases of the 
SSSR. In this table, the variables shown in the last two are dummies in respect of sample 
composition, defined as follows: STDUM is 1 for ST firm-years, 0 otherwise; and SOEDUM is 1 
for SOE firm-years, 0 otherwise. 
Accrual quality: SD and |DA| 
From the pre-SSSR period, 2003-2004, to SSSR 1 phase 1, the 2005-2006 negotiation period, 
the mean of SD and |DA| both increased, implying a decrease in accrual quality. These 
changes are, however, not significant. From phase 1 of the SSSR (negotiation period, pre-IFRS-
convergence, 2005-2006) to phase 2 (lock-in period, post-IFRS-convergence, 2007-2008), the 
mean of SD significantly increases from 0.347 to 0.374 (+0.027**); and |DA| also significantly 
increases from 0.448 to 0.465 (+0.017[*]).52 These changes imply a significant reduction in 
accrual quality between phases 1 and 2 of the SSSR implementation, thus both providing 
support for hypothesis H5.2. 
From phase 2 of the SSSR implementation (lock-in period, 2007-2008) to phase 3 (free 
trading of previously untradeable shares, 2009-2010), both phases being post-IFRS-
convergence, the mean SD significantly increases again, from 0.374 to 0.483 (+0.109***) and 
mean |DA| also increases again, from 0.466 to 0.493 (+0.027[*]). These changes imply a 
 
52 In the interests of brevity in the text, the notation *** represents significance at the 1% level; ** significance 
at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level. If (some) significance ‘stars’ are placed in square brackets 
(e.g. [*]), represents improved significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of 
this chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square 




significant further reduction in accrual quality between phases 2 and 3 of the SSSR 
implementation, and give positive evidence for hypothesis H5.3. 
The conformity of the univariate data with hypotheses/expectations is suggestive that 
the changes in accounting-based accrual earnings quality were driven principally by the 
regulatory reform of the financial market, and that the accounting standards reform did not 
(for whatever reason – be it design, application or whatever) result in an accruals quality 
improvement effect sufficient to counteract this.  
The firm specific characteristics  
From 2003-04 to 2005-06 (i.e. between the pre-SSSR phase and SSSR phase 1), the means of 
firm-level characteristics of net inventory (INV), log market value of equity (SIZE), debt 
leverage level (LEV), and operating cash flow (CFO) all increase, but only SIZE does so 
significantly (+0.097***). Mean credit ratio (CR) and profitability dummy both decrease 
significantly (-0.206*** and -0.029***, respectively), whilst non-operating income (NOI) also 
decreases, but not significantly. The decreases in CR and PROFIT are consistent, albeit only on 
a simple univariate basis, with the hypothesised incentive and action to downwards 
manipulate earnings over the period 2005-06. 
From 2005-06 to 2007-08 (i.e. between SSSR implementation phases 1 and 2), the 
mean of INV, SIZE, CR and NOI all increased significantly (0.019**, 0.139***, 0.269*** and 
0.014***, respectively). The changes in CFO (increase) and LEV (decrease) were insignificant. 
The significant increases in SIZE, CR and NOI, alongside reducing accrual quality, are consistent 
(albeit only on a simple, univariate basis) with the hypothesised incentive and action to 
upwards manipulate earnings from 2007-08. 
From 2007-08 to 2009-10 (i.e. from SSSR phases 2 to phase 3), mean INV, SIZE and CR 
increases significantly (by +0.038***, +0.107*** and +1.227***, respectively), while mean 
LEV and NOI decreases significantly (-1.607* and -0.004*, respectively). The mean of CFO 
increases, but insignificantly. The significant reduction in NOI, alongside reducing accrual 
quality, is consistent (albeit only on a simple, univariate basis) with the hypothesised incentive 




in CR might suggest the opposite. The only control variable that shows consistent and 
significant change period to period is SIZE, the mean of which grows in a monotonic fashion. 
Corporate governance variables  
The number of firm-year observations with auditors from the Big 4 is relatively small, being 
900 in total. The mean of AUDIT over the study period phases varies between 0.030 and 0.038, 
that is, only 3-4% of firm-years were subject to audit from the Big 4 external auditors. Huang 
et al. (2014) stated that Chinese listed firms prefer local auditing firms rather that the Big 4. 
They pointed out that the entry of the large, international auditing firms into China has been 
a slow process, and that the services those international firms are permitted to offer Chinese 
clients is restricted. As a means of market entry, the Big 4 firms have affiliated with Chinese 
domestic accounting firms.53 
There is a series of significant increases, phase to phase, in the mean proportion of 
managerial ownership (MOWN): from 0.012 to 0.018 (+0.008***), then to 0.044 (+0.026***), 
then finally to 0.096 (0.064***) which represents a nine fold increase from a mean of 1.2% at 
the beginning of the study period to nearly 10% at the end. The mean controlling shareholder 
ownership proportion, mean CONCEN, decreases significantly from 0.422 from 2003-04 to 
0.385 over the period 2005-06 (-0.037***), whilst decreasing significantly again to 0.369 in 
2007-08 (-0.014***). It then significantly increases, however, to 0.390 from 2009-10 
(0.021***) in phase 3 of the SSSR. 
The corporate board is an important governance device which is required to monitor 
management behaviour, given separation of ownership and control (Beasley, 1996; Klein, 
2002; Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen, 1993). In China, however, as per the foregoing, over 
the period of this study, there was preservation of a mean of around 40% controlling 
shareholder ownership proportion, whilst the mean managerial ownership proportion rose 
to around 10%. Wu and Petal (2014) pointed out that in Chinese listed firms, corporate 
managers backed by controlling shareholders are the dominant group. Hence, the local SOE 
hierarchy (as previously discussed/defined) had the opportunity to act in its own interest, 
 





with protection of the minority and reduction in agency costs being unlikely to be a primary 
concern and hence, there would appear to have been scope for the hypothesised 









Phase 1  
(2005-06) 




 Mean Median St Dev Obs Mean Median St Dev Obs Mean Median St Dev Obs. Mean Median St Dev Obs. 
SD 0.345 0.223 0.469 867 0.347 0.221 0.498 1841 0.374 0.238 0.521 2035 0.483 0.263 1.491 2349 
|DA| 0.447 0.345 0.404 884 0.449 0.363 0.400 1880 0.466 0.349 0.639 2055 0.493 0.376 1.143 2361 
SIZE 21.085 21.030 0.892 1815 21.181 21.118 0.975 1956 21.317 21.227 1.109 2188 21.423 21.309 1.183 2781 
LEV 1.403 0.930 6.903 1815 1.720 1.067 6.890 1956 2.130 0.992 42.160 2188 0.523 0.817 29.078 2782 
CR 2.559 2.030 1.960 1815 2.352 1.869 1.714 1948 2.622 1.968 3.330 2188 3.902 2.102 11.394 2782 
INV 0.146 0.067 0.784 1810 0.146 0.086 0.561 1946 0.166 0.103 0.221 2186 0.203 0.103 0.446 2779 
NOI 0.008 0.001 0.119 1767 0.008 0.005 0.001 1911 0.019 0.003 0.150 2186 0.015 0.004 0.066 2779 
PROFIT 0.878 1 0.328 1815 0.836 1 0.370 2532 0.880 1 0.325 2817 0.918 1 0.274 3546 
CFO 0.061 0.053 0.104 886 0.067 0.057 0.124 1881 0.063 0.057 0.228 2055 0.065 0.056 0.235 2363 
AUDIT 0.034 0 0.182 1815 0.038 0 0.192 2532 0.032 0 0.177 2817 0.030 0 0.173 3457 
CONCEN 0.422 0.356 0.195 1942 0.385 0.295 0.180 2381 0.370 0.284 0.170 2667 0.390 0.311 0.179 3374 
MOWN 0.012 0.000 0.071 2343 0.018 0.000 0.081 2435 0.044 0.000 0.134 2605 0.098 0.000 0.195 3306 
STDUM 0.258 0 0.438 2370 0.231 0 0.422 2532 0.200 0 0.399 2817 0.160 0 0.367 3545 
SOEDUM 0.641 1 0.480 2370 0.636 1 0.481 2532 0.570 1 0.495 2817 0.453 0 0.498 3545 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the accrual quality estimations (mean, 50 percentile, standard deviation and number of observations. The 




Accrual quality: SD and |DA| in subsamples  
 
 Table 5.7 presents the mean values of the accrual manipulation proxies, SD and |DA|, 
estimated in this chapter for the full sample for firm-years; and also, with the sample split by: 
(i) ST versus Non-ST firms; and (ii) SOEs versus Non-SOEs. As discussed above, for the full 
sample data, the increase in the means of both SD and |DA| between 2003-04 and 2005-06 
is insignificant, but the subsequent increases (2007-08 and finally, for 2009-10) are significant. 
The overall picture is that there was a decline in accrual quality over the course of the market 
and accounting reforms. The pattern of increase in SD, and the significance of the increases, 
is similar for ST firms (the increases being insig, +0.465*[*] and +0.711*[*], respectively), but 
while |DA| increases each phase, the only significant one is from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
(+0.777*[*]). By contrast, the mean SD for Non-ST firms significantly decreases (-0.026**) 
from the pre-SSSR phase to SSSR phase 1, but then significantly increases in each for the 
following two phases (by +0.027**, then +0.043***). The mean |DA| for Non-ST firms drops 
only insignificantly with the arrival of phase 1 of SSSR and then, significantly increases in the 
following phase (+0.014*[*]), whilst finally dropping insignificantly again between this and 
the last phase. 
 







SSSR Phase 1 
(2005-06) 
SSSR Phase 2 
(2007-08) 
SSSR Phase 3 
(2009-10) 
Full Sample SD 0.381 0.442 0.549 0.695 
|DA| 0.462 0.468 0.644 0.934 
ST firms vs. … SD 0.456 0.810 1.275 1.986 
|DA| 0.419 0.443 1.220 2.883 
Non-ST firms SD 0.356 0.330 0.357 0.400 
|DA| 0.477 0.476 0.490 0.485 
SOEs vs. … SD 0.346 0.410 0.473 0.582 
|DA| 0.493 0.501 0.524 1.317 
Non-SOEs SD 0.450 0.500 0.662 0.820 
|DA| 0.404 0.409 0.826 0.505 
This table presents the mean comparison of the estimated accrual manipulation proxies used in 
the analyses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the 
basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test 
is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is 
permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, is simply in order to convey 




 For SOEs, mean SD increases insignificantly from pre-SSSR to phase 1 of SSSR and then, 
increases significantly (+0.063*[*]) from phase 1 to phase 2, whilst finally increasing 
insignificantly from phase 2 to phase 3. Similar findings apply for |DA| among SOEs. The SD 
of Non-SOEs increases with each passing phase, but significantly only in the transition from 
phase 1 to phase 2 of SSSR (+0.162*[*]). The |DA| increases for Non-SOEs over the first two 
phases are insignificant and it decreases in the final phase, but this is significant (-0.321*[*]). 
The overall finding is one of increasing accrual manipulation over the progress of the 
market and financial reforms, largely consistent across SOEs/Non-SOEs and ST firms/Non-ST 
firms. In comparison for ST versus Non-ST, the former has higher SD in all phases and the 
difference grows by phase. Moreover, ST firms have higher |DA| post IFRS convergence. The 
findings seem to suggest that IFRS convergence was exploited particularly by ST firms. When 
comparing SOEs and Non-SOEs, the latter have higher SD in all phases; SOEs have higher |DA| 
in most (not in phase 2 of SSSR) especially in the final phase, which may have been caused by 
the boosted incentives after the shares became tradable.  
5.5.3 Regression results-detailed report  
This subsection provides a comprehensive report on the multivariate regression results, 
whilst the next highlights and discusses the key results.  
The managerial incentives related to the implementation of SSSR, despite the 
adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, might have resulted in decreased in accruals and earnings 
quality. The phasing of SSSR is key here, in this chapter there is separation between: (i) pre-
SSSR, pre-IFRS convergence (2003-04); (ii) SSSR phase 1 (negotiation phase, 2005-06), still pre-
IFRS convergence (with associated dummy variable SSSR1); (iii) SSSR phase 2 (lock-in phase, 
2007-08) and IFRS convergence (with associated dummy variable IFRS); and SSSR phase 3 
(SSSR complete, free trading of previously non-tradeable shares, 2009-10) post-IFRS-
convergence (with associated dummy variable SSSR3).  
In this section, results are reported from estimations of Model (5.5) with SD and |DA|, 
in turn, the dependent variable in Model (5.5). Further, also reported are estimations of 




decreasing discretionary accruals, respectively) as the dependent variable, in turn, for Model 
(5.5).  
To test the first hypothesis, H5.1, Model (5.5) (with different dependant variables as 
above) is estimated with DUM replaced by the variable SSSR1, which takes the value 1 for the 
period 2005-06 and 0 for the period 2003-04. It takes one for the post-SSSR1 period of 2005-
2006 after SSSR is announced and during the negotiation period. To test hypothesis H5.2, 
Model (5.5) is estimated with DUM replaced by variable IFRS, which takes the value 1 for the 
period 2007-08 and 0 for the period 2005-06. As regards hypothesis H5.3, Model (5.5) is 
estimated with DUM replaced by variable SSSR3, which takes the value 1 for the period 2009-
10 and 0 for the period 2007-08. The multivariate results reported in this chapter are from 
panel estimation of regression models, with fixed effects at the firm level. In all cases the 
Hausman test (prob>chi2=0.000 in all cases) points to a fixed-effects model. 
Pre-SSSR to Phase 1: 2003-2006   
Over the period 2003-2006, there was no impact from a change of accounting standards: IFRS-
converged CAS came into force with effect from 2007. The first columns of Tables 5.8 and 
Table 5.9 present the results of estimation of accrual quality Model 5.5 based on all firm-year 
observations over the period 2003-2006. Tables 5.8 and Table 5.9 also show the results of the 
estimation performed separately for Non-ST firm-years, ST firm-years, Non-SOE firm-years 
and SOE firm-years with regard to SD, with |DA+| and |DA-| as the dependent variables. 
Table 5.8 presents the results of the estimation of Model (5.5) with SD as the 
dependent variable. The results of the first column of Table 5.8 show that the estimated 
coefficient on SSSR1 is not significant for the whole sample of firm years and, looking across 
the second to fifth columns of the table, an insignificant coefficient is returned when 
considering, in turn, just Non-ST firms, ST firms, Non-SOEs and SOEs. Hence, the results of the 
estimation of Model (5.5) from 2003-2006 with SD as the dependent variable do not provide 
any evidence as regards H5.1. Of more interest in the results of Table 5.8, however, are 
another set of consistent “not significant” estimated coefficients, i.e. those for AUDIT. These 
suggest that there was no mitigating effect upon accrual manipulation from Big 4 audits, thus 




Chinese context.54 Lack of significance on the AUDIT control variable is repeated in all the 
estimations in this chapter and is revisited in the discussion below on the control variable 
results. 
Table 5.9 presents the results of estimation of Model (5.5) with discretionary accruals 
(three versions) as the dependent variable. In the first column of Table 5.9, no significance is 
seen on the estimated coefficient of SSSR1 considering all firm-years, and with |DA| as the 
dependant variable. This dependent variable includes both income-increasing and income-
decreasing discretionary accruals. More insight may be gained by considering income-
increasing accruals, |DA+| and income-decreasing accruals, |DA-|, separately as dependent 
variables. Whilst a significant estimated coefficient on SSSR1 cannot be found in the |DA-| 
regression estimations, the |DA+| regression estimations give significant results: the 
estimated coefficient on SSSR1 is -0.039**[*] for the whole sample of firm-years, -0.054**[*] 
for Non-ST firms and -0.051** for SOEs, thus indicating a significant reduction in income-
increasing accruals for these two sub-samples with the arrival of the first phase of SSSR. With 
there being no corresponding decrease in income-reducing accruals, this is consistent with 
net downward pressure on earnings via a cessation of upward manipulation of earnings, and 
so a net shift in balance away from income-increasing accruals towards income-decreasing 
ones. This provides some (albeit weak) evidence in line with H5.1 amongst SOEs and firms not 
subject to ST designation. 
For completeness, the table in Appendix 5.3 shows the results for the |DA| regression 
for Non-ST versus ST firms, and for Non-SOEs versus SOEs. Here, a significant negative 
estimated coefficient for SSSR1 is found for Non-ST firms, and for SOEs. But, contrary to 
conventional interpretation (i.e. reduced discretionary accruals implying high accrual quality), 
these results can be seen to be driven by an asymmetric reduction in discretionary accruals – 
a reduction only in income-increasing accruals, as discussed above. 
  
 






 Table 5.8: Estimations of accrual quality: SD (Model 5.5): firm years 2003-2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
SSSR1 -0.017 -0.020 -0.021 -0.048 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.050) (0.036) (0.017) 
SIZE -0.149*** -0.128** -0.235** -0.376*** -0.030 
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.114) (0.093) (0.052) 
LEV -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CR -0.004 -0.008 0.031 -0.019 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.063) (0.022) (0.010) 
INV -0.005 -0.003 -0.011 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.030) (0.018) (0.064) 
NOI -0.052 -0.077 0.200 0.070 -0.030 
 (0.155) (0.136) (0.634) (0.622) (0.133) 
PROFIT -0.031 0.008 -0.074 -0.035 -0.021 
 (0.029) (0.036) (0.059) (0.060) (0.031) 
CFO 1.490*** 0.892*** 1.815*** 1.877*** 0.734*** 
 (0.081) (0.115) (0.147) (0.123) (0.121) 
MOWN -1.051 -1.030 -1.128 -1.329 1.599 
 (0.976) (1.054) (2.227) (1.244) (8.754) 
CONCEN -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.006** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
AUDIT -0.150 -0.161 -0.083 -0.111 -0.147 
 (0.116) (0.100) (0.605) (0.525) (0.098) 
Constant 3.484*** 3.018*** 5.308** 8.442*** 0.815 
 (1.021) (1.140) (2.396) (1.947) (1.126) 
Observations 2,432 1,878 554 834 1,598 
R-squared 0.189 0.062 0.325 0.325 0.044 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2006 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-2004; 1 
for 2005-2006. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA 
as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, 
if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so 
adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, 








Table 5.9: Estimations of accrual quality: DA (Model 5.5): firm years 2003-2006 























SSSR1 -0.022 -0.039**[*] -0.054**[*] -0.008 -0.021 -0.051** -0.025 -0.036 -0.027 -0.055 -0.016 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.021) (0.046) (0.031) (0.024) 
SIZE 0.253*** -0.008 -0.011 0.004 -0.015 0.009 0.356*** 0.393*** 0.308** 0.366*** 0.387*** 
 (0.039) (0.049) (0.077) (0.065) (0.051) (0.088) (0.062) (0.079) (0.120) (0.105) (0.077) 
LEV -0.001 0.004 0.026** 0.002 0.001 0.010* -0.000 0.026 -0.000 0.001 -0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.023) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
CR -0.012 -0.000 0.000 0.037 -0.003 0.001 -0.029 0.006 -0.307** 0.002 -0.049* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.035) (0.013) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) (0.085) (0.031) (0.029) 
INV -0.010 -0.009 0.147* -0.019 -0.011 0.120 -0.095 -0.101 -0.130 -0.065 -0.091 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.079) (0.012) (0.012) (0.082) (0.064) (0.068) (0.172) (0.081) (0.100) 
NOI 0.116 0.111 -0.171 0.279 -0.107 0.285 0.124 0.146 -0.399 0.546 0.115 
 (0.128) (0.384) (0.695) (0.396) (0.563) (0.504) (0.129) (0.125) (1.198) (1.064) (0.135) 
PROFIT -0.018 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.014 0.018 0.031 -0.011 0.159*** -0.043 0.043 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.051) (0.036) (0.039) (0.047) (0.034) (0.048) (0.059) (0.060) (0.043) 
CFO 0.116* 0.555*** 0.596*** 0.193 0.061 0.779*** -0.171** -0.088 -0.130 -0.216** 0.018 
 (0.066) (0.106) (0.125) (0.215) (0.160) (0.139) (0.087) (0.194) (0.114) (0.093) (0.220) 
MOWN 0.778 0.776 2.130 0.299 0.739 9.445 0.448 0.356 26.280 0.356 -27.220** 
 (0.810) (0.873) (1.981) (0.872) (0.709) (8.096) 0.002 0.003** -0.001 0.000 0.003* 
CONCEN 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.005* 0.001 -0.000 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 0.071 0.169 -0.500 0.133 0.069 
AUDIT 0.029 0.108 0.130 ᵯ ᵯ 0.110 (0.114) (0.117) (0.358) (0.294) (0.126)  (0.091) (0.164) (0.171) (0.178) -7.090** -8.036*** -5.403** -7.228*** -7.633*** 
Constant -4.919*** 0.487 0.514 0.044 0.608 0.084 (1.334) (1.703) (2.547) (2.222) (1.677) 
 (0.835) (1.037) (1.640) (1.338) (1.057) (1.867) 0.002 0.003** -0.001 0.000 0.003* 
Observations 2,314 1,049 780 269 395 654 1,265 986 279 393 872 
R-squared 0.057 0.064 0.097 0.058 0.020 0.112 0.058 0.062 0.178 0.073 0.083 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2006 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-2004; 1 for 2005-2006. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 
5.3. Estimations performed in STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this 
chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, is simply in order to convey 




Arrival of IFRS-converged CAS and transition from phase 1 to phase 2 in the SSSR: 2005-2008 
In this sub-period, there is a concurrent transition from phase 1 (negotiation) to phase 2 (lock-
in) of the SSSR implementation, and from the old Chinese GAAP to IFRS-converged CAS from 
phase 1 (convergence) to phase 2 (lock-in period). From the beginning of 2007, when IFRS-
converged CAS came into force, previously non-tradable shares remained untradeable for 
two years. Over this lock-in period, management had the incentive to drive earnings upwards 
in order to drive share prices also upwards and then be able to sell high when the non-
tradeable shares became tradeable after 2008. 
Table 5.10 shows the results of estimation of the SD regression. The first column 
shows an estimated coefficient for IFRS_SSSR2 that is positive and highly significant 
(0.311***). So, the transition from 2005-06 to 2007-08 begins a significant deterioration in 
working capital accrual quality. This result is borne out in the sub-divided samples (results in 
columns 2 to 5 of Table 5.10), with the estimated coefficients on IFRS_SSSR2 being 0.064***, 
0.699***, 0.526*** and 0.311*** for Non-ST firms, ST firms, Non-SOEs and SOEs, respectively. 
Hence, based on SD, there is strong and consistent evidence of a deterioration in working 
capital accrual quality in the transition from phase 1 to phase 2 of SSSR, concurrent with the 
adoption of IFRS-converged CAS. This provides strong support for the accrual quality 
prediction of hypothesis H5.2. 
Table 5.11 presents the results of the discretionary accruals regressions. In the first 
column, with |DA| as the dependent variable, the estimated coefficient on IFRS_SSSR2 is 
(weakly) significant and negative (-0.037*). Conventional interpretation at this point would 
be to deduce a small improvement in accrual quality. In the context of this study, however, it 
is important to distinguish between income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals. In the directional discretionary accrual investigations, the second column of Table 
5.11 shows there is a highly significant and positive relationship between income-increasing 
discretionary accruals and the IFRS_SSSR2 dummy (0.074***), which indicates that there was 
a significant increase in the level of income-increasing accruals with the arrival of the second 
phase of the SSSR, despite (or perhaps even assisted by) the adoption of IFRS-converged CAS. 
This result is seen also in the sub-sample regressions in columns three to six of Table 5.11, 




0.100***, respectively. At the same time, as regards income-decreasing accruals, a negative 
and significant estimated coefficient on IFRS_SSSR2 (-0.113**) is seen in the seventh column 
of Table 5.11, thus indicating a significant reduction in income-decreasing accruals over the 
period 2007-08. As per columns eight and eleven of the table, the result is similar for Non-ST 
firms and SOEs (estimated coefficients being -0.123*** and -0.071[*], respectively), but there 
is no significance found for the estimated IFRS_SSSR2 coefficients for ST firms or Non-SOEs. 
Overall, the significant increase detected in income-increasing accruals and significant 
decrease detected in income-decreasing accruals in the transition to the second phase of the 
SSSR implementation presents compelling evidence of a shift towards income-increasing 
discretionary accruals and away from income-decreasing accruals and so, the upwards 
management of earnings. This is strong evidence supporting the accruals shift element of 
hypothesis H5.2. In the light of this, the small decrease found as regards all/unsigned accruals 
(|DA|) may not be interpreted, as would be conventional, as a modest increase in accruals 
and earnings quality, but rather, simply as a result of a netting off between increased 
incidence/size of income-increasing accruals and decreased incidence/size of income-
decreasing accruals. For completeness, the table in Appendix 5.4 shows the results for the 
|DA| regression for Non-ST versus ST firms, and for Non-SOEs versus SOEs. Here, a significant 
negative estimated coefficient for IFRS_SSSR2 is found only for the Non-ST sub-sample, with 
there being no significance in the estimated coefficient amongst the ST, Non-SOE or SOE 
groups. Again, the result for ST firms is driven by an asymmetric reduction in discretionary 
accruals between those which are income-increasing, and those which are income-decreasing. 
The results here, as regards the transition from the first (negotiation) phase of SSSR 
to the second (lock-in) phase, and support for the associated chapter hypothesis, are strong 
and consistent, In fact, they are stronger and more consistent than the results/hypothesis 
support as regards the transition from pre-SSSR to the first (negotiation) phase of SSSR. This 
is particularly interesting, since the second transition was accompanied by adoption of IFRS-
converged CAS. It is consistent with the notion that IFRS-convergence in China from 2007 
could not (and did not) curtail earnings management in response to SSSR-related incentives. 
Indeed, it might be seen as suggesting that managers’ earnings management activities were 






Table 5.10: Estimations of accrual quality: SD (Model 5.5): firm years 2005-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
IFRS_SSSR2 0.311*** 0.064*** 0.699*** 0.526*** 0.311*** 
 (0.055) (0.012) (0.240) (0.119) (0.055) 
SIZE -0.254*** -0.052*** -0.649*** -0.473*** -0.254*** 
 (0.044) (0.010) (0.183) (0.090) (0.044) 
LEV -0.000 0.018*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
CR -0.002 0.001 -0.014 -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.039) (0.011) (0.007) 
INV 0.016 -0.001 0.310** -0.025*** 0.016 
 (0.014) (0.003) (0.135) (0.057) (0.014) 
NOI 0.082* -0.043 -0.134 1.098*** 0.082* 
 (0.191) (0.102) (0.485) (0.332) (0.191) 
PROFIT -0.092* -0.016 -0.134 -0.158 -0.092* 
 (0.068) (0.016) (0.246) (0.145) (0.068) 
CFO 2.016*** 0.479*** 2.222*** 2.287*** 2.016*** 
 (0.067) (0.036) (0.170) (0.104) (0.067) 
MOWN -0.057 0.075 -1.204 -0.137 -0.057 
 (0.581) (0.106) (4.493) (0.827) (0.581) 
CONCEN 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.003* 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.013) (0.006) (0.003) 
AUDIT -0.037 -0.071 0.233 0.021 -0.037 
 (0.239) (0.045) (1.435) (0.657) (0.239) 
Constant 5.548*** 1.289*** 13.780*** 10.156*** 5.548*** 
 (0.921) (0.211) (3.729) (1.911) (0.921) 
Observations 10,670 8,908 1,762 5,458 10,670 
R-squared 0.096 0.031 0.112 0.112 0.096 
Based on firm-year observations 2005-2008 from Chinese listed firms. IFRS_SSSR2=0 for 
2005-2006; 1 for 2007-2008. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations 
performed in STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed 
tests. [*] represents improved significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. 
The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is 
permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, is simply in order to 




Table 5.11: Estimations of accrual quality: DA (Model 5.5): firm years 2005-2008 























IFRS_SSSR2 -0.037* 0.074*** 0.063*** 0.133*[*] 0.080**[*] 0.100*** -0.113** -0.123*** 0.053 -0.148 -0.071[*] 
 (0.034) (0.025) (0.019) (0.077) (0.034) (0.031) (0.055) (0.025) (0.221) (0.123) (0.048) 
SIZE 0.293*** 0.045** 0.038** 0.048 0.050* 0.051** 0.297*** 0.173*** 0.681*** 0.313*** 0.315*** 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.015) (0.055) (0.028) (0.024) (0.047) (0.023) (0.203) (0.101) (0.042) 
LEV 0.000 0.006*** 0.024*** 0.004 0.009*** 0.001 -0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
CR 0.004* -0.006 -0.001 -0.054** -0.002 -0.026*** 0.008 -0.016** 0.015 -0.009 0.014* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.023) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.026) (0.026) (0.008) 
INV -0.026* -0.008* 0.007 0.012 0.055*** 0.005 -0.064** -0.027** -1.007*** -0.011 -0.188*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.034) (0.018) (0.004) (0.032) (0.013) (0.378) (0.050) (0.049) 
NOI 1.006*** 0.378*** -0.430** 0.387*** 0.417*** -0.352*** 0.243 -0.143 0.843 -1.049 0.576** 
 (0.120) (0.060) (0.206) (0.112) (0.066) (0.118) (0.301) (0.189) (0.822) (1.003) (0.225) 
PROFIT -0.116*** 0.064** 0.080*** 0.058 0.037 0.043 -0.183*** -0.033 -0.317[*] -0.217[*] -0.166*** 
 (0.042) (0.031) (0.027) (0.077) (0.043) (0.040) (0.061) (0.030) (0.210) (0.138) (0.052) 
CFO 2.737*** 0.692*** 0.530*** 0.700*** 0.227*** 2.325*** 4.728*** 1.267*** 5.529*** 4.587*** 4.921*** 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.066) (0.093) (0.050) (0.095) (0.086) (0.074) (0.201) (0.159) (0.084) 
MOWN 0.850** 1.800*** 0.096 3.247*** 1.868*** 0.094 0.752 0.424* -1.680 0.724 22.295*** 
 (0.341) (0.461) (0.429) (1.055) (0.473) (1.347) (0.626) (0.245) (5.552) (0.845) (5.559) 
CONCEN 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003 0.001 0.005*** 0.004* 0.005*** 0.002 -0.001 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.011) (0.006) (0.002) 
AUDIT -0.102 -0.047 -0.070 0.297 -0.085 -0.035 0.006 0.138 -0.400 0.221 -0.077 
 (0.150) (0.110) (0.067) (0.728) (0.221) (0.117) (0.215) (0.091) (1.035) (0.578) (0.169) 
Constant -6.174*** -0.845** -0.756** -0.711 -0.844 -1.058** -6.155*** -3.362*** -13.644*** -6.213*** -6.741*** 
 (0.562) (0.399) (0.323) (1.121) (0.577) (0.515) (0.993) (0.489) (4.126) (2.131) (0.886) 
Observations 8,818 3,553 2,690 863 1,335 2,218 5,265 4,363 902 2,361 2,904 
R-squared 0.271 0.107 0.059 0.137 0.152 0.265 0.437 0.105 0.528 0.337 0.604 
Based on firm-year observations 2005-2008 from Chinese listed firms. IFRS_SSSR2= 0 for 2005-2006; 1 for 2007-2008. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
Estimations performed in STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on 
the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so 




Completion of the SSSR in the post IFRS-convergence period: 2007-2010 
In this sub-period, 2007-2010, with SSSR completed at the end of 2008 when its lock-in period 
ended and previously non-tradeable A shares became tradeable - what is called in this study 
phase 3 of the SSSR implementation - there was no change in accounting standards since IFRS-
converged CAS was adopted from 1st January 2007. Table 5.12 show the results of the SD 
regressions. In the first column of the table, the estimated coefficient on SSSR3 is positive and 
highly significant (0.072***), indicating for the full sample a reduction in working capital 
accruals quality in the transition to phase 3 of SSSR. The results for the sub-divided samples, 
in columns two to five of Table 5.12, are qualitatively similar, with the estimated SSSR3 
coefficients being 0.035**[*], 0.141[*], 0.063** and 0.083*** for Non-ST firms, ST firms, Non-
SOEs and SOEs, respectively (the result for ST firms is only marginally significant). Hence, there 
is consistent and commonly strong evidence that working capital accruals quality further 
declined in the transition to phase 3 of the SSSR implementation, which provides strong 
support for the accrual quality prediction of hypothesis H5.3. 
The results from the estimation of the discretionary accruals regressions are set out 
in Table 5.13. The first column shows that the estimated coefficient on SSSR3 in the |DA| 
regression is negative and significant, being -0.043***. Once again, however, conventional 
interpretation of this as representing an improvement in accrual/earnings quality, is not 
appropriate in the context of this study, in which there are directional predictions as regards 
earnings management and thus, concerning income-increasing versus income-decreasing 
accruals. As regards the directional discretionary accrual investigations, column two of Table 
5.13 shows a significant negative estimated coefficient for SSSR3, implying a significant 
reduction in income-increasing accruals for the full sample. Significant reductions are seen for 
the Non-ST sub-sample (-0.080***) and the SOE sub-sample (-0.058*[*]), albeit not for the ST 
or Non-SOE groups. As regards income-decreasing accruals, columns seven to eleven of Table 
5.13 show positive estimated coefficients in all cases for SSSR3, but significant only in the case 
of ST firms (0.167**[*]). As for the 2003-2006 sub-period (results discussed earlier), the 
reduction in income-increasing accruals, along with maintenance/increase in income-
decreasing accruals is consistent with net downward pressure on earnings. This is via a 




income-increasing accruals towards income-decreasing ones. This provides some evidence in 
line with H5.3. 
For completeness, the table in Appendix 5.5 shows the results for the |DA| regression 
for Non-ST versus ST firms, and for Non-SOEs versus SOEs. Here, a significant negative 
estimated coefficient for SSSR3 is found for the Non-ST and SOE sub-samples, with there being 
no significance in the estimated coefficient amongst ST and Non-SOE groups. But, as before, 
the significant results are driven by an asymmetric reduction in discretionary accruals 
between those that are income-increasing, and those that are income-decreasing. Hence, 
these may not be interpreted to represent increasing accruals/earnings quality. It is 
concluded here that earnings quality as measured by accruals quality (via both working capital 
accruals and abnormal accruals) was reduced. 
The results lend support for the associated hypothesis over this 2007-2010 period that 
is stronger and more comprehensive than those for the earlier 2003-2006 period, but not 
quite not as strongly or comprehensively as those for the middle (2005-2008) period. It is 
interesting to note that earnings management appears to have been more prolific (to the 
extent that it may accurately be detected via accruals investigation) in the period after China’s 
adoption of IFRS-converged CAS. The evidence continues to be consistent with the notion that 
IFRS-convergence in China from 2007 could not (and did not) curtail earnings management in 
response to SSSR-related incentives. Indeed, it might be seen as suggesting that managers’ 










Table 5.12: Estimations of accrual quality: SD (Model 5.5): firm years 2007-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
SSSR3 0.072*** 0.035**[*] 0.141[*] 0.063** 0.083*** 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.095) (0.032) (0.023) 
SIZE -0.066 0.065 -0.272 -0.245*** 0.013 
 (0.055) (0.046) (0.184) (0.093) (0.052) 
LEV -0.000 0.026* -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
CR 0.001 0.005 -0.012 -0.001 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.082) (0.010) (0.014) 
INV 0.123** -0.012 -0.060 0.230** -0.099* 
 (0.057) (0.044) (0.340) (0.090) (0.053) 
NOI -2.767*** 0.197 -2.975*** -4.709*** 0.640*** 
 (0.111) (0.468) (0.221) (0.130) (0.142) 
PROFIT 0.136*** -0.010 0.374*** 0.232*** 0.044 
 (0.041) (0.034) (0.127) (0.061) (0.040) 
CFO 0.234** 0.161* 0.496 0.826*** -0.002 
 (0.106) (0.088) (0.318) (0.141) (0.115) 
MOWN -0.468 -0.320 -3.335 -0.656 -15.791*** 
 (0.686) (0.435) (8.408) (0.651) (5.112) 
CONCEN -0.001 0.001 -0.007 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) 
AUDIT 0.105 0.100 0.426 0.122 0.083 
 (0.172) (0.117) (0.840) (0.258) (0.167) 
Constant 1.735 -1.135 6.311* 5.381*** 0.054 
 (1.165) (0.983) (3.687) (1.938) (1.106) 
Observations 2,752 2,239 513 1,186 1,566 
R-squared 0.273 0.019 0.383 0.657 0.048 
Based on firm-year observations 2009-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR3=0 for 2007-2008; 1 
for 2009-2010. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA 
as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, 





Table 5.13: Estimations of accrual quality: DA (Model 5.5): firm years 2007-2010 























SSSR3 -0.043*** -0.038*[*] -0.080*** 0.006 -0.007 -0.058*[*] 0.007 0.006 0.167**[*] 0.025 0.016 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.025) (0.036) (0.025) (0.030) (0.034) (0.040) (0.072) (0.034) (0.050) 
SIZE 0.431*** 0.142*** 0.240*** -0.057 -0.103 0.192*** 0.488*** 0.275** 0.834*** 0.322*** 0.595*** 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.067) (0.062) (0.070) (0.070) (0.089) (0.119) (0.151) (0.123) (0.119) 
LEV 0.000 0.003 0.148*** 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.029) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
CR 0.012** 0.006 0.022** -0.030 0.004 0.009 -0.028 -0.024 -0.195** -0.046** 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.030) (0.011) (0.017) (0.023) (0.024) (0.097) (0.019) (0.040) 
INV -0.068** -0.034 -0.007 -0.060 0.072 -0.078 0.075 0.136 -0.570[*] -0.097 0.194 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.054) (0.093) (0.059) (0.052) (0.112) (0.125) (0.410) (0.115) (0.161) 
NOI -0.455*** 0.087 -0.384 0.071 0.098 0.071 -0.481 -1.367 -0.870 1.175 -0.644 
 (0.108) (0.064) (0.559) (0.056) (0.070) (0.117) (0.732) (1.279) (0.884) (0.949) (0.986) 
PROFIT -0.110*** 0.026 0.070 0.044 0.067 0.029 -0.048 -0.027 -0.060 -0.005 -0.102[*] 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.057) (0.047) (0.049) (0.062) (0.059) (0.072) (0.102) (0.069) (0.080) 
CFO 3.325*** 0.263*** 0.296*** 0.105 0.088 0.275** 0.981*** 0.567** 1.244*** 0.808*** 1.424*** 
 (0.061) (0.093) (0.113) (0.141) (0.152) (0.121) (0.164) (0.246) (0.242) (0.158) (0.322) 
MOWN 1.165[*] 0.289 0.098 0.721 -0.201 -0.471 -0.440 -0.614 3.663 -0.683 -75.442[*] 
 (0.580) (0.940) (1.030) (2.031) (0.845) (4.737) (1.089) (1.095) (40.716) (0.677) (57.236) 
CONCEN -0.003* 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.004 0.005** 0.021*** 0.002 -0.003 0.012 0.004 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) 
AUDIT 0.051 -0.151 -0.117 ᵯ -0.095 -0.163 0.192 0.313 -0.110 0.809*** -0.320 
 (0.181) (0.153) (0.153) (0.206) (0.217) (0.236) (0.280) (0.411) (0.219) (0.362) 
Constant -8.859*** -3.048*** -5.546*** 1.484 2.309 -4.510*** -10.007*** -5.305** -16.983*** -6.349** -12.417*** 
 (0.948) (1.007) (1.428) (1.231) (1.477) (1.445) (1.902) (2.545) (3.078) (2.588) (2.550) 
Observations 2,774 1,369 1,094 275 631 738 1,405 1,161 244 556 849 
R-squared 0.059 0.083 0.172 0.064 0.053 0.145 0.131 0.034 0.552 0.350 0.112 
Based on firm-year observations 2009-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR3=0 for 2007-2008; 1 for 2009-2010. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
Estimations performed in STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on 
the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so 




The firm specific characteristics 
The findings for the full sample, as set out in Tables 5.8 to 5.13, show that regarding firm size 
(SIZE) in the SD regressions, given the mainly negative and significant estimated coefficients 
for SIZE, this provides evidence of larger firms being associated with better working capital 
accrual quality, which would be consistent with the political costs hypothesis (larger firms 
being more subject to scrutiny and censure). LEV (total liabilities/total book value of equity) 
is insignificantly associated with SD and |DA| in all three testing periods, only showing 
significant positive associated with |"#!| in the transition period of IFRS convergence. The 
findings suggest that high leverage firms had high income-increasing policies after IFRS 
convergence. It again seems that IFRS convergence in China assisted in pursuing the purpose 
of driving up earnings. Credit ratio (CR: total assets/total liability) shows no significant 
association with SD all three testing periods. INV (total inventory/total assets) shows no 
significant association with SD in the first and the second testing periods, whilst there is a 
positive and significant coefficient with it in the final one. The findings with regard to both 
control variables CR and INV indicate that there was no impact on earnings quality from firm 
liquidity and efficiency in China, only showing a significant reduction in earnings quality in the 
last phase of SSSR.  
There was further control for related party transactions by adopting non-operating 
incomes (NOI: non-operating income divided by total assets) (Jian and Wong, 2006). A 
negative negatively correlation was expected between NOI and accrual quality. As explained 
in previous studies (Wong and Jiang, 2003; Dai and Chen, 2004), Chinese firms are widely 
engaged with related party transactions, rather than accruals manipulation to manage 
earnings. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show that there is no significant relation between NOI and either 
SD or |DA| in the first testing period of 2003-06. The findings from Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 
support that the association of NOI and either SD or |DA| are significantly positive in the 
second testing period of 2005-08, which indicates that high NOI is associated with low accrual 
quality. The results suggest that related party transactions and accrual quality manipulation 
are not trade off activities, firms that used related party transactions also utilised accrual 
management to adjust earnings during the transition of IFRS convergence. In the final testing 
period of 2007-10, the findings from Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 are in line with previous 




Chinese listing A-share firms using related party transactions were less likely to adopt accrual 
management to manage earnings in the final testing period. The finding from the final testing 
period is consistent with those from previous literature (Jian and Wong, 2006; Wong and Jian, 
2003), however, regarding those in the second testing period under the joint impact of both 
IFRS convergence and SSSR, Chinese firms were managing earnings not only through the 
related party transaction, but also, through accruals manipulation.  
PROFIT is insignificantly associated with both SD and |DA| in the first testing period; 
PROFIT has significant and negative association with both SD and |DA| in the second testing 
period, which indicates firms which reported positive profit are associated with better accrual 
quality than firms reported a loss. The findings are consistent with the prediction that 
profitable firms are less likely to manipulate earnings. Cash flow from operations (CFO) shows 
significant positive association with both SD and |DA| in all three testing periods, which 
implies that firms with strong operating cash flows were also likely to use discretionary 
accruals to manage earnings. Positive correlation between accrual quality proxies and CFO 
has rarely been found in western literature, however, a recent study by Hou et al. (2015b) 
also elicited positive association between |DA| and CFO in the Chinese context. Dechow and 
Ge (2006) suggested that the accrual anomaly (positive correlation between |DA| and CFO) 
is caused by the regular use of special items. 
Corporate governance variables  
Tables 5.8 to 5.13 reveal that corporate governance hardly has any significantly association 
with accrual quality proxies in China. The MOWN is insignificantly associated with both SD 
and |DA| in both the 2003-2006 and 2007-2010 testing periods, whilst being positively and 
significantly associated with |DA| and |"#!| in the transition period of IFRS convergence 
(SSSR phase 1 to phase 2). Similarly, The CONCEN has no significant association with SD and 
|DA| in the first testing period and is significantly positively correlated with |DA| and |DA+| 
under the second testing period, which indicates that a higher proportion of shares owned by 
the controlling shareholders was associated with a higher level of income-increasing accruals 
management in the second testing period. Both findings, with regards to the association of 
MOWN and CONCEN with |DA+| in the second period, suggest that high management 




adopting income-increasing accruals. The significance of the estimated coefficients between 
|DA+| and MOWN or CONCEN only appears in the transition period of IFRS convergence 
(phase 1 to phase 2 of SSSR), which further suggests that IFRS convergence in China assisted 
the SSSR-related incentive of managing earnings upwards.  AUDIT does not have significant 
association with SD and |DA| in all three testing periods, which indicates that whether firms 
chose the Big 4 as their auditing firm or not had no association with their abnormal accrual 
quality. The findings again suggest that the Big 4 auditors did not play a significant role in 
mitigating the discretionary accruals manipulation, which was probably as a result of their 
lack of strength/effectiveness in the auditing process and profession in the Chinese context.  
5.5.4 Summary of the principal results 
This subsection summarises the key findings of this chapter, as collated into Table 5.14. In 
this chapter, it has been hypothesised that: in the negotiation phase of the SSSR, 
earnings/accruals quality reduced and there was a net shift from earnings-increasing to 
earnings-decreasing accruals (H5.1); in the lock-in phase of the SSSR, earnings/accruals 
quality reduced and there was a net shift from income-decreasing to income-increasing 
accruals (H5.2); and after completion of the SSSR, earnings/accruals quality reduced and 
there was a net shift form income-increasing to income-decreasing accruals (H5.3). 
Consistent with and supporting hypotheses H5.1, H5.2 and H5.3, the principal multivariate 
regression estimation results show the following.  
1. Whilst working capital accrual quality (measured by SD) did not change 
significantly with the arrival of the first phase (negotiation) of the SSSR 
implementation, it reduced significantly in the transition to phase 2 (lock-in), 
concurrent with the transition to IFRS-converged CAS (estimated coefficient on 
IFRS_SSSR2 = +0.311*** in SD regression) and reduced significantly again with 
the transition to phase 3 (trading of previously non-tradeable shares) of the 
SSSR implementation (estimated coefficient on IFRS_SSSR2 = +0.072*** in SD 
regression). There is strong support for the accrual quality predictions of 
hypotheses H5.2 and H5.3. Working capital accrual quality among Chinese 





2. The results of regressions of all/unsigned discretionary accruals, |DA|, are not 
susceptible to conventional interpretation given the Chinese context and the 
hypotheses of this chapter, which have included directional predictions as 
regards accruals manipulation. It has been necessary instead to estimate and 
interpret regressions separately for income-increasing accruals, |"#!|  and 
income-decreasingones	|"#−|. 
3. With the transition to phase 1 of the SSSR, there was a reduction in income-
increasing accruals (estimated coefficient on SSSR1 = -0.039**[*] in |"#!| 
regression), but no significant impact on income-decreasing accruals. So, there 
was a net shift in balance away from income-increasing accruals towards 
income-decreasing accruals, with a net downwards effect on earnings. In the 
transition to phase 2 (lock-in) of the SSSR, concurrent with the transition to 
IFRS-converged CAS, there was an increase in income-increasing accruals 
(estimated coefficient on IFRS_SSSR2 = +0.074*** in |"#!| regression) along 
with a decrease in income-decreasing ones (estimated coefficient on 
IFRS_SSSR2 = -0.113** in |"##| regression), thus providing clear evidence of 
upwards earnings manipulation activity. In the transition to phase 3 (trading of 
previously non-tradeable shares) of the SSSR implementation, in the post IFRS-
convergence period, there was a reduction in income-increasing accruals 
(estimated coefficient on SSSR1 = -0.038*[*] in |"#!| regression), but without 
significant change in income-decreasing accruals. So, there was another net 
shift in balance away from income-increasing accruals towards income-
decreasing ones, with a net downwards effect on earnings. 
4. These results were found despite the transition to IFRS-converged CAS on 1st 
January 2007. Moreover, the results and support for the associated hypothesis 
over this 2007-2010 period are stronger and more comprehensive than those 
for the earlier 2003-2006 period, but quite not as strong or comprehensive as 
those for the middle (2005-2008) period. The evidence is consistent with the 
notion that IFRS-convergence in China from 2007 could not (and did not) curtail 




be seen as indicating that managers’ earnings management activities were less 
constrained under IFRS-converged CAS than they were under the old CAS. 
5. Given non-significant estimated coefficients for AUDIT, there has been no 
detected mitigating effect on accrual manipulation by Big 4 audits, which 
speaks to the lack of strength/effectiveness of the auditing process and 
profession in the Chinese context. 
As regards the changes in accrual quality over the SSSR implementation phases and 
convergence with IFRS, the foregoing results give clear support to the hypotheses of the 
chapter. Specifically, there was a decrease in income-increasing accruals in the negotiation 
phase of SSSR (part of H5.1), decrease in working capital accrual quality, increase in income-
increasing and decrease in income-decreasing discretionary accruals after IFRS convergence 
during the lock-in phase of SSSR (part of H5.2), and a decrease in working capital accrual 
quality as well as a decrease in income-increasing discretional accruals after completion of 
SSSR (part of H5.3).  
In conclusion, during the sample period, given the Chinese special circumstances, 
namely non-tradable share reform since 2005, IFRS-converged CAS adoption in early 2007 
and the nature of ownership, in this chapter, it was predicted that accrual quality decreased 
in the testing period due to the boosted incentives by the non-tradable share reform. The 
findings suggest that the working capital accruals quality declined in all three testing sub- 
periods. The discretional accruals quality seems to have improved since the |DA| was 
significantly decreased in the testing periods. The decreased |DA| was due to the decreases 
in income-increasing accruals in the first and the last testing periods, which supports the 
prediction of managing earnings downwards (H5.1 and H5.3) and increase in income-
increasing and decrease in income-decreasing in the second testing period, which supports 
the prediction of managing earnings upwards (H5.2). In sum, the finding this study 





Table 5.14: Summary of the chapter results 
Period Transition from Transition to IFRS-converged CAS? Key results 
2003-
2006 Pre-SSSR 
SSSR phase 1: 
negotiation period  
No 
• SD regression: est. coeff. on SSSR1= -0.017 
• |DA+|regression: est. coeff. SSSR1= -0.039**[*] 
• |DA-|regression: est. coeff. on SSSR1 = -0.025 
2005-
2008 











• SD regression:           est. coeff. on IFRS_SSSR2=       -0.311*** 
• |DA+|regression:      est. coeff. on IFRS_SSSR2=        0.074*** 
• |DA-|regression:       est. coeff. on IFRS_SSSR2=      -0.113** 
2007-
2010 
SSSR phase 2: 
lock-in period 
SSSR phase 3: 
free trading of shares 
Yes 
• SD regression:             est. coeff. on SSSR3=      0.072*** 
• |DA+|regression:        est. coeff. on SSSR3=     -0.038*[*] 
• |DA-|regression:         est. coeff. on SSSR3=       0.007 
Results extracted from Tables 5.8-5.13. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] 
represents improved significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed 




5.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the working capital accrual model (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) and the 
modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995) have been employed in order to 
investigate the accrual quality amongst the Chinese A-share listed firms over the period 2003-
2010 (inclusive). Separate analyses were performed for Non-ST versus ST firms, and for Non-
SOEs versus SOEs. The chapter has provided a non-conventional interpretation of the results 
on discretionary accrual investigations, given the incentives of earnings manipulation 
presented. In this regard, this study methodologically expands on the existing literature. 
The results obtained provide various levels of support for the chapter hypotheses: the 
level of income-increasing accruals decreased in the negotiation phase of SSSR (consistent 
with H5.1); working capital accrual quality decreased, income-increasing discretionary 
accruals increased and income-decreasing accruals reduced in the lock-in phase of SSSR 
(strong support for H5.2); and working capital accrual quality decreased again, and the level 
of income-increasing accruals decreased after completion of SSSR (support for H8.3). Hence, 
reverting to the rationale underlying the hypotheses and extending for the results, the 
following can be concluded. 
1. In the first phase of SSSR, the accrual quality decreases. Results suggest that 
there was indeed an incentive among Chinese A-share listed firms to drive 
down earnings, and that managers acted upon this incentive by reducing the 
extent of income-increasing discretionary accruals manipulation. 
2. In the second phase of SSSR, coincident with adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, 
results are consistent with there having been an incentive among Chinese A-
share listed firms to drive up earnings, and that managers acted upon this 
incentive by manipulating earnings upwards via both income-increasing and 
income-decreasing accruals manipulation – so reducing earnings/accruals 
quality was reduced. 
3. In the third phase of SSSR, and after adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, findings 
are consistent with the existence of an incentive among Chinese A-share listed 




managers reducing the extent of income-increasing discretionary accruals 
manipulation, and so reducing earnings/accruals quality. 
Since the second testing period (2005-08) covers both transitions from the SSSR phase 
2 to 3 and from pre-IFRS to post-IFRS convergence, it cannot be asserted that the results over 
the transition to the second (lock-in) phase were driven entirely by SSSR-related incentives 
and actions. There was the concurrent arrival of IFRS-converged CAS, which surely had an 
effect and the impact of IFRS convergence cannot be fully be discounted. The results from the 
second period, however, give strong support for H5.2, consistent across different sub-samples. 
This might suggest that IFRS convergence in China, rather than mitigating earnings 
management in pursuit of SSSR-related incentives, may actually have helped to facilitate it. 
But this is at most suggestive, and no firm claim may be made in this respect based on the 
empirical work of this study. 
During the three testing periods, the corporate governance control variables did not 
show significance regarding the accrual quality, which suggests that there was no mitigating 
effect upon accrual manipulation from Big 4 audits, nor for the concentration level of 
controlling shareholders not even for the level of management ownership. The findings 
suggest a lack of strength/effectiveness of the auditing process and profession in the Chinese 
context as well as the possible shift of the ownership of shares seeming not to have happened. 
Thereafter, the dominant position of controlling shareholders joined by the managers may 
not have change following SSSR. 
The empirical-statistical findings suggest that IFRS convergence and SSSR 
implementation together induced a decrease in accrual quality in China. The impact of SSSR-
related management incentives seems to have outweighed any positive impact on accrual 
quality which might otherwise have resulted from the change of accounting standards. The 
changes in accounting standards or tradable share trading volume, in general, would appear 
to have had no substantive positive impact on accounting information quality. Interrelated 
changes, including minority investor protection, governance structure, i.e. controlling 
shareholder-oriented management approaches, separation of management and control, 
independence of supervisory board etc., together may have the potential to enhance the 




Chapter 6: Earnings persistence, predictability and smoothness 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the earnings persistence property. As aforementioned in the 
previous literature review chapter, the persistence of earnings is conduced to the 
predictability of earnings. Higher earnings persistence indicates better earnings quality, with 
an enhanced ability of present earnings information to predict future earnings performance.  
In this chapter, earnings smoothness is extended to test whether the incentive related 
earnings smoothness led to a more earnings persistence in China’s context. The objective of 
this chapter is to examine the change in earnings persistence, smoothness and predictability 
after China’s most recent reforms of Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) and IFRS-converged 
CAS adoption. A fixed panel data approach is used for the model estimations. This study is the 
first to compare and contrast the earnings quality properties between earnings persistence 
and earnings smoothness in the Chinese context.  
The findings suggest that earnings persistence and earnings prediction reduced 
throughout all three phases of reforms’ periods. For the first period, from 2003 to 2006, the 
impact of SSSR on its first stage is tested and the results show that the announcement of non-
tradable share reform significantly reduced earnings persistence and earnings prediction 
quality; and the announcement of SSSR significantly increased earnings smoothness. The 
second period is from 2005 to 2008, with the impact of mandatory IFRS convergence in China 
on earnings quality being tested (SSSR from phase 1 to phase 2). The results show that both 
earnings persistence and prediction declined after IFRS convergence in 2007 and that there 
was no significant impact on earnings smoothness. Thereafter, this study concludes that 
earnings quality declined with regards to earnings persistence and predictability in the second 
testing period (2005-08). The third period is from 2007 to 2010 and tests the impact of SSSR 
transition from phase 2 to phase 3 on earnings persistence, predictability and smoothness by 
comparing pre- and post- non-tradable shares becoming practically tradable. The results 
show that earnings persistence and predictability significantly declined and there was a 
significant increase in earnings smoothness in this period, whilst earnings quality decreased 




From the earnings management incentive perspective (SSSR related incentives in 
three phases), to be able to conclude that increased earnings smoothness in the first phase 
and the last phase of the SSSR, managers have incentives to manage earnings downwards but 
also to make sure earnings staying positive, that increased earnings smoothness indicates a 
reduction in earnings quality. This study further investigates the change of small negative 
earnings under the impact of the reforms and finds there is no significant change on small 
negative earnings in the first and the last phases of the SSSR. increased small positive earnings 
with no significant change in small negative earnings suggests that the increasing in small 
positive earnings is induced by managing positive earnings downwards rather managing 
negative earnings upwards to avoid loss report under the conventional interpretation of 
earnings smoothing. Hence, it is concluded the increased earnings smoothness in the first and 
the last phases of the SSSR is to fulfil the management incentives of driving earnings 
downwards.  
The overall findings suggest that earnings quality declined around the SSSR and IFRS 
convergence in China with regard to earnings persistence and predictability; earnings 
smoothness in the first and the last phase is consistent with the predication that managers 
have an incentive to drive down earnings. This study investigates both earnings persistence 
and earnings smoothness as properties of earnings quality and finds high level of earnings 
smoothness has negative relation with earnings persistence in a short time interval.  
This chapter is organised as follows: the first section begins with the research objective 
and research question in section 6.2; there is hypothesis development in section 6.3; the 
research method and data collection are presented in section 6.4; section 6.5 provides the 
empirical results; and final, section 6.6 contains a summary of this chapter.  
6.2 Research objective and question 
Here, accounting quality is defined as earnings persistence, which implies the predictability 
of accounting information. Dechow et al. (2010) paper refers to earnings persistence as the 
first property of earnings quality from the aspect of information usefulness to equity investors. 
A more persistent earnings number yields better accounting information quality than a less 




for equity valuation (Sloan, 1996; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Francis et al., 2005; Richardson 
et al., 2006). There is little research that has investigated the association between IFRS 
adoption and earnings persistence (Artikis and Doukakis, 2010; Atwood et al., 2011). Despite 
being an important property of earnings quality, there has no research undertaken with 
respect to earnings persistence or predictability under the impact of China’s IFRS convergence 
or SSSR. 
With regard to earnings smoothness and from an earnings management perspective, 
Capkun et al. (2013) investigated the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings smoothing between 
firms who voluntarily and mandatorily adopted IFRS. They suggested that earnings are 
smoother around IFRS adoption, however, they interpreted this as that the earnings 
smoothing indicates more earnings management after IFRS adoption due to increased 
flexibility and less clear guidance in the implementation of IFRS. Barth et al. (2008) study 
investigated earnings smoothness also from the earnings management perspective and it was 
found that earnings are less smooth after IFRS adoption. Paglietti (2010) investigated the 
impact of the EU’s IFRS adoption on earnings quality. This paper documents that IFRS 
adoption is associated with an increase in earnings smoothness and thus, a subsequent 
increase in earnings management, which suggests that IFRS decreased earnings quality after 
the EU’s mandatory adoption. There has been one study (Liu et al., 2011) that considered 
earnings smoothness in China, with the researchers closely following the methodology of 
Barth (2008). They used a sample from 2005 to 2008 and found that the level of earnings 
smoothing after IFRS adoption was lower. Moreover, they documented that the lower level 
of earnings smooth indicated higher earnings quality after adoption. They did not mention 
the non-tradable share reform starting in 2005, whilst the majority of firms finished SSSR 
negotiation by 2007 and their sample of firms was also under the impact of the SSSR. For the 
current study the testing period is extended to 2003-2010 to consider further the possible 
impact of SSSR on earnings incentives related earnings smoothness.  
In this study, the property of earnings smoothness and earnings persistence are 
distinguished. There has been limited study considering the possible relation between 
earnings persistence and earnings smoothness. Earnings smooth is investigated to test 




to avoid loss reports, because these signals negative information of a firm’s financial 
performance to the stock market. From the loss avoidance perspective, some researchers 
have investigated earnings smoothness and concluded that smoother earnings indicates 
higher earnings manipulation and thereafter, a lower accounting information quality (Leuz et 
al., 2003; Lang et al., 2006; Lang et al., 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005, 2006) . On the other 
hand, the property of earnings persistence has been considered from the earnings prediction 
perspective. A higher persistence of earnings implies a stable financial performance, which 
improves earnings predictability, hence, there being better earnings quality (Lee, 2010; Artikis 
and Doukakis, 2010; Dechow et al., 2008; Li, 2008; Richardson et al., 2005). Persistent 
earnings will benefit both firms and investors in the financial market through an increase in 
share returns, reduction in financial risk and lower cost of capital in the financial market 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Dechow et al., 1996; Francis et al., 2002; Schipper and Vincent, 
2003; Graham et al., 2005; Dichev et al., 2013), which will help maintain its stability. Therefore, 
from a financial market information usefulness perspective, a firm with higher earnings 
persistence will impound future earnings in its current stock price to a larger extent than that 
of a lower earnings persistence firm. This implies that stock price reflect more information 
about future earnings when firms smooth their reported income (Collins et al., 1994; Tucker 
and Zarowin, 2006). However, whether the incentive related earnings smoothness will lead 
to improved earnings persistence is unclear. A study by Kolozsvari and Macedo (2016) shows 
evidence that increased reported stability, which is denoted by the presence of income 
smoothing, decreases the sustainability of reported performance captured by persistence of 
earnings. By investigating the property of earnings persistence and earnings smoothness, this 
study also gives the opportunity to provide some evidence on the relation between earnings 
smoothness and earnings persistence.  
The objective of this chapter is to examine how persistence, predictability and 
smoothness of earnings in China evolved against a backdrop of IFRS-converged CAS adoption 
and of the implementation SSSR. The research question addressed is: 
What impact, if any, did IFRS convergence and SSSR have on earnings quality as 




6.3 Hypothesis development  
Under principle-based IFRS-converged CAS, the reported earnings number is predicted to be 
more volatile due to the adoption of fair value measurement, which fluctuates according to 
the market value and is more volatile than historical cost measurement. At the beginning of 
IFRS adoption, the change of accounting rules would have directly influenced the earnings 
numbers, which can be detected in the adjusted sections from the old Chinese GAAP to the 
new CAS in 2007 annual report. Thereafter, it is anticipated that earnings were less persistent, 
with lower earnings predictability.  
Furthermore, the financial market system plays a significant role when the accounting 
system is changed from rule-based to a principle-based, because a different financial 
reporting purpose is required under different capital- and credit-based financial market 
systems (Zysman, 1983; Franks and Mayer, 1997; Nobes, 1998). There has been no study with 
regard to the impact of SSSR on earnings persistence, predictability and smoothness. In terms 
of financial market system reform in China, when the principle-based accounting standard 
was adopted in 2007, the system was also undergoing a milestone and expecting to transform 
from a credit-based to a capital-based financial system (Firth et al., 2010; Gillis, 2013). In this 
study, it is argued that China, as the largest emerging market, shares the same characteristics 
with other emerging countries e.g. attracting overseas capital, reducing the cost of preparing 
multiple sets of financial reports, lagged infrastructure, and has its own characteristics  e.g. 
government intervention and control in the business circle. Hence, the reforms were unlikely 
to change China’s emerging market characteristics in a short period and thus, the outcome of 
SSSR may not have transformed the Chinese financial market system into a capital-based one, 
like those of the US and UK. Take into consideration of the most likely unchanged 
fundamental of institutional background and firms’ financial performance; moreover, with 
encouraged SSSR related incentives in financial markets (see Table 6.1), this study predicts 








With regard to earnings smoothing, the incidence of small positive earnings may 
greater in periods where there is an incentive to engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management; and vice versa in periods where there is an incentive to engage in income-
increasing earnings management. The notion here is to consider earnings smoothing 
downwards from above (but not down to/below zero) when there is an incentive to manage 
earnings downwards. 
The hypotheses developed and discussed in earlier Chapters relate to a downwards 
earnings management incentive in the first phase of the SSSR, an upwards earnings 
management incentive in the second phase, and return to a downwards earnings 
Table 6.1: SSSR phases and related management incentive predictions  









SSSR phase 1: negotiation period. 
Managers had the incentive to 
drive down share price, so that 
the local SOE hierarchy minimised 
the compensation it was obliged 
to pay to external shareholders 
2007-2008 
SSSR phase 2: lock-in period: 
managers had incentives to drive 
up share prices, so that local SOE 
hierarchy received the maximum 
amount from sale of shares once 
the lock-in period ended 
2007-2010 
Post-IFRS-convergence: 
Possible influences: (i) EQ-
increasing impact of IFRS in 
general, albeit not universal; 
(ii) EQ-decreasing under the 
impact of IFRS-convergence in 
China: weak legal 
enforcement, strong 
management incentives, lack 
of (minority) investors’ 
protection, heavy government 
intervention, not a full 
adoption of IFRS 
2009-2010 
SSSR phase 3: post lock-in period 
and post-sale of SOE shares. 
Managers had the incentive to 
drive down share prices, so that 
the local SOE hierarchy could buy 
back shares at a lower price than 
that at which it sold them, thus 




management incentive in the third phase. Accordingly, the hypotheses to be tested in this 
chapter are as follows:  
H6.1: In the first phase of SSSR, earnings will have reduced persistence, reduced 
predictability and increased smoothness. 
H6.2 In the second phase of SSSR, earnings will have reduced persistence, 
reduced predictability and reduced smoothness. 
H6.3 In the third phase of SSSR, earnings will have reduced persistence, reduced 
predictability and increased smoothness. 
6.4 Research method 
As aforementioned, in this study both earnings persistence and earnings predictability are 
considered from an investors information usefulness perspective to compare and contrast 
whether the earnings were of better persistence and predictability under both reforms. The 
first subsection shows the earnings persistence and earnings predictability estimation models 
and this is followed by the estimation models for earnings smoothness investigation, which 
further allows for investigation into whether the earnings persistence experiences interaction 
with earnings smoothness.  
6.4.1 Empirical models  
 
6.4.1.1 Earnings persistence empirical models 
This subsection presents the empirical investigation strategy for earnings persistence. 
Consistent with a large body of prior research (Freeman et al., 1982; Sloan, 1996), a cross 
sectional time series analysis is employed to estimate the earnings persistence by regressing 
future period earnings on current period earnings and examining earnings smoothness by 
regression of the change of accruals on the change of cash flow from operations.  




where, !"#$%$&'!"# is the future period operating income scaled by total assets at 
the begining of the year	and	!"#$%$&'! is the current period opearating income scaled by 
total assets at the begining of the year. Higher +  indicates a better level of earnings 
persistence and thus, higher earnings quality. 
Sloan (1996) further separated earnings into accrual and cash flow components, 
however, since there is no desire to compare the persistence between the two, this approach 
is not adopted in this chapter. Dechow et al. (2010) argued that the time-series model from 
Freeman et al. (1982) and Sloan (1996) neglect the impacts of firms’ fundermental 
performance and accounting choice and that earnings persistence is likely to be driven by the 
business in which the firm operates and the accrual accounting choice. Motivated by Dechow 
et al. (2010) study, in this chapter, the aim is to test earnings persistence driven by accounting 
choices, stock market incentives and controls firm’s fundermental performance.  
In order to test the hypothese on the impact of IFRS and SSSR on earnings persistence, 
Model (6.1) is expanded as:  




DUM represents the dummy variables SSSR1 (model estimated over the period 2003-
2006), IFRS_SSSR2 (model estimated from 2005-2008) and SSSR3 (model run for 2007-2010) 
in turn, whilst the explanatory and control variables have been previously defined in Table 5.1 
and Table 6.1. Negative 	+%	 implies that IFRS and SSSR individually decreased earnings 
perisitence, thus indicating lower earnings quality.  
The Arellano-Bond dynamic model is adopted to estimate the regression 6.2. Unlike 
static panel data models, Model 6.2  includes a lagged level of the dependent variable as the 
regressor. These lags are correlated with the idiosyncratic error, because a fixed effects or 






6.4.1.2 Earnings predictability empirical models  
 
?#@A(,! = )+ + )#123 + ∑ )&67$8#79&,(,!&)$ + ,(,!														6.3               
?#@A(,! = DE$FG(,!				 
?#@A(,! are calculated from model 6.1 by estimating standard deviation of the error 
variance (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Francis et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 2010). The control 
variables and DUM are as defined in previous section.  
6.4.1.3 Earnings smoothness empirical models  
Dechow et al. (2010) stated that earnings smooth random fluctuation in the timing of cash 
payments and receipts as well as smoothness of earnings, is an outcome of an accrual-based 
accounting system and assumed to improve decision usefulness. From the frequency of small 
positive reporting perspective, the regression from Barth et al. (2008) is adapted to test 
earnings smoothness further. Model (6.4) is designed to compare the small positive earnings 
before and after the reforms to examine whether firms were more likely to report a high 
smoothed earnings after the reforms, as measured by the correlation on small positive net 
income (SPOS), IFRS, and SSSR (Barth et al., 2008; Paananen and Lin, 2009). 
!"#!!,# = % + '$()* ++ %%,-./0-1%,!,#
%&'
+ 2#																																								(6.4) 
where, SPOS is a dummy variable that takes on 1, if net income scaled by total assets is 
between 0 and 0.01, otherwise SPOS = 0. All other variables are as previously defined in 
Chapter 5. A positive coefficient for +# in model 6.4 indicates that the reforms have improved 
the smoothness of earnings. The metric for SPOS is modified from Barth et al. (2008), which 
uses IFRS as a dependent variable. It is argued here that IFRS should be an explanatory 
variable rather than the dependent and thereafter, SPOS is adopted as the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, considering SPOS is a binary dependent variable, fixed effects logit 
estimation is utilised rather than OLS estimation as in Barth et al. (2008) study.  
To test whether the increased smoothness is induced by driving earnings downwards to 




smoothness is induced by driving earnings upwards to more positive or by driving earnings 
downwards to a negative. This study applies small negative earnings (SNEG) to model (6.4) as 
dependent. SNEG is a dummy variable that takes on 1, if net income scaled by total assets is 
between 0 and -0.01, otherwise SNEG = 0 
6.4.2 Data collection  
The data collection procedure is the same as in Chapter 5. The period of 2003 to 2010 is 
adopted for the above described estimations in this chapter.   
Table 6.2: Definition of the chapter variables 
EOAt+1 the future period operating income scaled by total assets at the begining of 
the year 
EOAt the future period operating income scaled by total assets at the begining of 
the year 
SDPred standard deviation of the error variance 
SPOS A dummy variable that takes on 1, if net income scaled by total assets is 
between 0 and 0.01, otherwise SPOS = 0 
SNEG A dummy variable that takes on 1, if net income scaled by total assets is 
between 0 and -0.01, otherwise SNEG = 0 
6.5 Results  
This section interprets and discusses the results with regard to earnings persistence, 
predictability and smoothness. The following three subsections, 6.5.1, 6.5.2 and 6.5.3, 
provide a comprehensive and detailed report on the data and results for both univariate and 
multivariate regressions. Subsequently, subsection 6.5.4 then highlights and discusses the key 
results.  
6.5.1 The pattern of earnings  
Figure 6.1 shows the different levels of persistence of earnings over the period 2003-
2010. It seems that earnings persistence became less so after 2006. The persistence breaks 
at 2007 with a dramatic increase of EOA, then falls to its lowest in 2009. The EOA drops mildly 
from pre-SSSR (2003-2004) to phase 1 of SSSR in 2005 and follows a small increase in 2006. 
After phase 1 of SSSR, EOA climbs up noticeably in 2007 and reverses downwards in 2008, 
however, EOA in 2008 is still much higher than in previous years (exclude 2007). In phase 3, 




The changes of EOA in the testing period are consistent with the hypothesis that, firstly, 
there was an incentive to drive down earnings during the phase 1: negotiation period; then, 
there was an incentive to drive up earnings at phase 2: lock in period; finally, there was an 
incentive to drive down the earnings at phase 3 after lock-in period. Figure 6.1 shows earnings 
were less persistent after 2006. After 2006, firstly, the mandatory adoption of IFRS-converged 
CAS was on 1st January 2007, whilst secondly, SSSR transited to phase 2 of the lock-in period. 
If SSSR encouraged management incentives to manage earnings towards benefiting non-
tradable/controlling shareholders, then IFRS adoption seems to have assisted managers’ 
objective. Both reforms increased the instability of earnings reports.  
Figure 6.1: The pattern of earnings among Chinese A-share firms 
 
6.5.2 Univariate analysis 
Table 6.3 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability and earnings smoothness estimations. Control variables’ summary statistics 
















setting of the different phases in SSSR. Phase 1: negotiation period is from 2005 to 2006; 
phase 2: lock in period is from 2007 to 2008; and phase 3: free trading of previously 
untradeable shares.  
From the pre-SSSR period to phase 1, the mean of EOA decreases, however, 
insignificantly from pre-SSSR (0.022) to the first phase of SSSR (0.021). Then the mean of EOA 
increases significantly (0.031*) from 0.021 in the first phase of SSSR to 0.052 in the second 
phase. Finally, EOA decreases from 0.052 to 0.040, significantly (0.012*). The findings are 
consistent with Figure 6.1 and support the hypotheses that managers had an incentive to 
drive down earnings in the first phase of SSSR; managers had an incentive to drive up earnings 
in the second phase of SSSR; and finally, that managers had an inventive to drive down 
earnings in the final phase of SSSR. The EOA experienced a dramatic increase straight after 
IFRS adoption, while SSSR transited to the second phase.  
Furthermore, the predictability of earnings (SDPred) is investigated by estimating the 
standard deviation of errors from Model 6.1. The mean of SDPred increases from 0.034 in 
pre-SSSR to 0.059 in the first phase, significantly (0.045[*]); the mean of SDPred decreases 
from 0.059 to 0.056 from the first phase to the second phase, insignificantly; and the mean 
of SDPred increases from 0.056 to 0.063, insignificantly. The findings suggest that earnings 
predictability decreased in the first phase, whilst this was insignificant in the second and third 
phases.  
Moreover, the mean of small positive earnings (SPOS) increases from 0.143 pre -SSSR 
to 0.146 in phase 1, insignificantly; then the mean of SPOS further declines from phase 1 
(0.146) to phase 2 (0.105), significantly (0.041***); and finally, the mean of SPOS increases 
from phase 2 (0.105) to phase 3 (0.119), but insignificantly. The evidence of the change of 
means in the transition period from the old Chinese GAAP (phase 1 of the SSSR) to the new 
IFRS-converged CAS (phase 2 of the SSSR) is consistent with the hypotheses that earnings 
smoothness increases when there exists earnings downward management incentives and it 
decreases when earnings upwards management incentives exist55. 
 




Given the support of the univariate data with expectations, it appears that the change 
of accounting-based earnings performance related directly to the reforms rather than a 
fundamental change of firms’ financial status over the testing period. Now, the focus is turned 
to testing the association of the reforms with earnings persistence, earnings predictability and 













Table 6.3: Chapter summary statistics 
Pre SSSR 
(2003-04) 






 Mean Median St Dev Obs Mean Median St Dev Obs Mean Median St Dev Obs. Mean Median St Dev Obs 
EOA 0.022 0.029 0.103 866 0.021 0.025 0.104 1880 0.052 0.037 0.262 2055 0.040 0.036 0.138 1122 
SDPred 0.034 0.011 0.078 866 0.059 0.018 0.273 1840 0.056 0.017 0.222 2036 0.063 0.016 0.326 1115 
SPOS 0.143 0 0.351 886 0.146 0 0.350 1880 0.105 0 0.311 2055 0.119 0 0.324 1122 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the earnings persistence analyses (mean, 50 percentile, standard deviation and number of observations. 




6.5.3 Regression results-detailed report 
This subsection begins with a comprehensive report on the results, whilst the next one 
highlights and discusses the key ones. 
To test the first hypothesis, 6.1, models 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 are executed with DUM taken 
as SSSR1 and introducing the interaction term SSSR1*EOA in model 6.2. To test hypothesis 
6.2, models 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 are run with DUM taken as IFRS_SSSR2 and introducing the 
interaction term IFRS_SSSR2*EOA in model 6.2. To test hypothesis 6.3, estimates models 6.2, 
6.3 and 6.4 are estimated with DUM taken as SSSR3 and introducing the interaction term 
SSSR3*EOA in model 6.2. The three models are adopted to test whether earnings persistence, 
earnings predictability and earnings smoothness improved under China’s IFRS-converged CAS 
adoption and the different phases of SSSR. To test whether specific firm factors namely ST 
and SOE had impacts on earnings persistence, the regression are further run for ST, non-ST, 
SOE and non-SOE to investigate whether the reforms impacted on earnings persistence, 
earnings predictability and earnings smoothness differently across these. 
Persistence  
The results from table 6.4 are generated from Arellano-Bond GMM estimation from model 
6.2, since the dependent variable is a lagged variable, as explained above. Firstly, it emerges 
that there is first order autocorrelation (p-value<0.05) and no second order (p-value>0.10) in 
the model. Furthermore, the result rejects the null hypothesis: the over identifying 
restrictions are valid (p-value>0.10). Thereafter, the model satisfies the Arellano-Bond model 
estimation and the results are shown in Table 6.4. Table 6.4 shows the change of earnings 
persistence from pre-SSSR to the first phase of SSSR. The results reveal that EOA1 is 
significantly negatively associated with the interaction term EOA*SSSR1 (-0.999***), which 
indicates that the announcement of SSSR significantly reduced earnings persistence. To test 
the further firm specific factors, Table 6.4 presents the findings of how SSSR1 has impacted 
on earnings persistence with regard to whether the firms are ST or non-ST and SOE or non-
SOE. Consistent with the overall findings in this period, it can be seen that earnings 




were SOEs or Non-SOEs, however, this was insignificant SOEs. The findings suggest that the 
announcement of SSSR was associated with lower earnings persistence.  
Table 6.4: Estimations of earnings persistence (Model 6.2): firm years 2003-06 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
L.EOA1 0.531 -0.174* 0.748 0.996** 0.261 
 (0.427) (0.089) (0.573) (0.473) (0.192) 
SSSR1 0.038*** 0.014*** 0.038 0.061*** 0.018*** 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.044) (0.016) (0.004) 
SSSR1*EOA -0.999*** -0.156** -1.482*** -1.552*** -0.167 
 (0.376) (0.074) (0.530) (0.442) (0.114) 
SIZE 0.031 -0.006 -0.279 -0.029 -0.031 
 (0.064) (0.022) (0.179) (0.142) (0.029) 
LEV -0.001** 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CR -0.003 -0.001 0.026 -0.007 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.088) (0.011) (0.003) 
INV 0.002 0.004*** 0.005 0.007** -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012) 
NOI 0.361 -0.053 0.055 -0.098 0.787 
 (0.283) (0.108) (0.799) (0.378) (0.547) 
PROFIT 0.022 -0.014 0.164* 0.024 -0.022 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.093) (0.036) (0.018) 
CFO -0.040 0.050** 0.077 -0.075 0.072** 
 (0.090) (0.020) (0.170) (0.129) (0.033) 
MOWN -0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.015 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.028) (0.020) (0.006) 
CONCEN -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.001 -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
AUDIT 0.021 0.029 -3.934** 0.007 0.000 
 (0.046) (0.019) (1.808) (0.018) (0.028) 
Constant -0.628 0.172 5.797 0.455 0.811 
 (1.361) (0.436) (3.818) (2.947) (0.602) 
      
Observations 1,010 798 212 342 668 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2006 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-2004; 1 
for 2005-2006. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA 
as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, 
if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so 
adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, 
is simply in order to convey completely the nature of the significance. 
Table 6.5 shows the association of IFRS adoption on earnings persistence, which also 
indicates the change of earnings persistence from phase one to phase two of SSSR. The results 




EOA*IFRS_SSSR2 (-0.303***), which indicates that earnings persistence significantly declined 
after China’s IFRS convergence (SSSR moves from its first phase to the second). With regard 
to ST, Non-ST, SOEs or Non-SOEs, Table 6.5 shows that there is significant negative association 
between the interaction term IFRS_SSSR2*EOA and EOA1, which indicate that earnings 
persistence significantly declined regardless whether the firms were ST, Non-ST, SOEs or Non-
SOEs.  
Table 6.5:  Estimations of earnings persistence (Model 6.2): firm years 2005-08 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var:  All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
EOA -0.303*** -0.265*** -0.551*** -0.308*** -0.018 
 (0.096) (0.054) (0.174) (0.098) (0.100) 
IFRS_SSSR2 0.025*** 0.003 -0.005 0.033* 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.030) (0.018) (0.006) 
IFRS_SSSR2*EOA -0.470*** -0.136** -1.062*** -0.262* -0.481*** 
 (0.102) (0.056) (0.222) (0.154) (0.093) 
SIZE -0.061*** -0.046*** -0.163** -0.107** -0.055*** 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.069) (0.045) (0.010) 
LEV -0.001*** 0.007*** -0.000** -0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CR -0.001 0.001 -0.049* -0.001 -0.003* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.030) (0.004) (0.002) 
INV 0.014*** 0.002* 0.007 0.014*** 0.009 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
NOI -1.290*** -0.014 -0.315 -1.686*** -0.192*** 
 (0.130) (0.068) (0.237) (0.166) (0.065) 
PROFIT 0.012 -0.024*** 0.101*** 0.008 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.022) (0.021) (0.009) 
CFO 0.105*** 0.053*** 0.304*** 0.114** 0.086*** 
 (0.035) (0.011) (0.087) (0.056) (0.023) 
MOWN 0.000 0.005** -0.018 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.016) (0.008) (0.003) 
CONCEN -0.001* -0.000** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
AUDIT 0.014 0.028*** -0.056 0.016 0.010 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.103) (0.055) (0.016) 
Constant 1.363*** 1.009*** 3.637** 2.276** 1.329*** 
 (0.346) (0.196) (1.468) (0.919) (0.222) 
      
Observations 2,082 1,685 397 741 1,341 
Based on firm-year observations 2005-2008 from Chinese listed firms. IFRS_SSSR2 = 0 for 2005-
2006; 1 for 2007-2008. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed 
in STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, 




Table 6.6 reveals that EOA1 is significantly negatively correlated with the interaction 
term EOA*SSSR3 (-0.340***), which indicates that unlock of the non-tradable shares 
significantly reduced earnings persistence overall. Table 6.6 further shows that EOA1 is 
negatively associated with SSSR3*EOA amongst Non-ST, SOEs and Non-SOEs, however, this is 
insignificant amongst STs. The findings suggest that earnings persistence declined after the 
non-tradable shares became practically tradable amongst Non-ST, SOEs and non-SOEs. 
Table 6.6: Estimations of earnings persistence (Model 6.2): firm years 2007-10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var:  All Non-ST ST SOE Non-SOE 
EOA -0.129** -0.117*** -0.205 -0.174*** -0.098 
 (0.059) (0.029) (0.206) (0.044) (0.069) 
SSSR3 0.044*** 0.035*** 0.087** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.038) (0.006) (0.009) 
SSSR3*EOA -0.340*** -0.249*** 0.279 -0.348*** -0.316** 
 (0.085) (0.035) (0.423) (0.047) (0.145) 
SIZE -0.081*** -0.064*** -0.151 -0.083*** -0.081** 
 (0.026) (0.009) (0.128) (0.023) (0.032) 
LEV -0.000*** 0.008* -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
CR 0.002 0.002*** -0.003 0.002*** -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.031) (0.001) (0.005) 
INV 0.005 0.007 -0.271 0.008 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.184) (0.007) (0.016) 
NOI -0.189*** -0.047 -0.188 0.100* -0.291*** 
 (0.055) (0.075) (0.186) (0.059) (0.072) 
PROFIT -0.035*** -0.040*** -0.012 -0.024** -0.037*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.032) (0.012) (0.013) 
CFO 0.001 0.021 -0.091 0.008 0.015 
 (0.029) (0.017) (0.175) (0.036) (0.038) 
MOWN -0.002 -0.000 0.013 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.005) 
CONCEN 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) 
AUDIT 0.010 0.022** 0.028 -0.012 0.016 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.110) (0.010) (0.025) 
Constant 1.829*** 1.438*** 3.066 1.873*** 1.778*** 
 (0.539) (0.187) (2.628) (0.477) (0.670) 
Observations 1,172 994 178 497 675 
Based on firm-year observations 2007-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR3 = 0 for 2007-2008; 1 
for 2009-2010. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA 
as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, 




The evidence implies that earnings were of less persistence after both IFRS-converged 
CAS adoption and SSSR. This was throughout the three phases of SSSR: the first phase of 
negotiation, the second phase of lock-in period and the third phase of unlocking. The second 
testing period from the first to the second phase of SSSR covers the transition from pre- to 
post-IFRS-converged CAS adoption. The decline in earnings persistence around both 
accounting standards and financial market reforms may be caused by the change in the 
accounting method and reporting incentive regarding these two reforms. The findings are 
consistent with the above proposed hypotheses that earnings persistence declined in all three 
testing periods. 
Predictability  
Having probed earnings persistence, earnings predictability is probed. Tables 6.7 - 6.9 show 
that earnings predictability declined after both reforms. The standard deviation of the error 
variance from model 6.1 is estimated as the indicator of earnings predictability (Lipe 1990). A 
positive correlation !! in model 6.3 implies increased SD and decline in predictability, whilst 
a negative !!  implies the opposite. Table 6.7 reveals that SSSR1 is significantly positively 
correlated with SDPred (0.059***), which indicates that the announcement of SSSR 
significantly enlarged the SD of error variance and thus, significantly reduced earnings 
predictability. From column 2 to column 4, whether the impact of SSSR announcement was 
various amongst ST vs Non-ST and SOE vs Non-SOE can be identified. In comparing of impact 
on ST and Non-ST, column 2 shows that the announcement of SSSR has significantly enlarged 
the SD of error variance for non-ST firms (0.009***), whilst  the correlation is insignificant for 
ST firms (-0.002), which suggests that the announcement of SSSR reduced the earnings 
predictability of non-ST firms, but had no significant impact on ST firms. When comparing 
SOEs and Non-SOEs, the announcement of SSSR significantly reduced both SOEs and Non-







Table 6.7: Estimations of earnings predictability (Model 6.3): firm years 2003-06 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
SSSR1 0.059*** 0.009*** -0.002 0.114*** 0.023*** 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.055) (0.034) (0.007) 
SIZE -0.430*** 0.036*** -1.118*** -0.962*** -0.014 
 (0.040) (0.010) (0.132) (0.091) (0.022) 
LEV -0.000 -0.005** -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
CR -0.025*** 0.003* -0.129* -0.054*** 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.068) (0.018) (0.005) 
INV 0.010 -0.002 0.019 0.018 -0.005 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.031) (0.015) (0.025) 
NOI -1.016 0.212 -2.620 -1.887* 0.663 
 (0.621) (0.161) (1.844) (1.073) (0.527) 
PROFIT 0.042* 0.030*** 0.056 0.136** -0.003 
 (0.024) (0.007) (0.066) (0.062) (0.012) 
CFO -0.153*** 0.002 0.057 -0.042 -0.086* 
 (0.057) (0.020) (0.139) (0.101) (0.049) 
MOWN 0.035** 0.003 0.125* 0.069 0.015* 
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.067) (0.046) (0.008) 
CONCEN -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004* -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) 
AUDIT -0.011 0.016 -0.304 0.084 0.008 
 (0.091) (0.018) (0.529) (0.398) (0.039) 
Constant 8.852*** -0.801*** 22.521*** 19.519*** 0.183 
 (0.849) (0.208) (2.774) (1.924) (0.466) 
      
Observations 1,644 1,292 352 570 1,074 
R-squared 0.129 0.095 0.306 0.281 0.034 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2006 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-2004; 
1 for 2005-2006. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in 
STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square 
brackets, as described, is simply in order to convey completely the nature of the significance. 
Table 6.8 presents the results of the change in earnings predictability from the first to 
the second phase of SSSR. This period is from 2005 to 2008: IFRS_SSSR2 is zero from 2005 to 
2006 (phase 1 of SSSR) and IFRS_SSSR2 is one from 2007 to 2008 (phase 2 of SSSR). The 
findings show that IFRS adoption enlarges the SD of error variance (0.032***), which suggests 
that earnings predictability significantly declined in the second testing period. In comparing 
the impact of IFRS adoption on ST or Non-ST and SOEs or Non-SOEs, column 2 to column 5 




category of firms, which indicates that earnings predictability was significantly reduced after 
IFRS convergence and SSSR negotiation.  
Table 6.8: Estimations of earnings predictability (Model 6.3): firm years 2005-08 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var:  All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
IFRS_SSSR2 0.032*** 0.008*** 0.066* 0.037** 0.030*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.036) (0.015) (0.008) 
SIZE -0.097*** -0.039*** -0.249*** -0.138*** -0.079*** 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.073) (0.031) (0.015) 
LEV -0.000 -0.012*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CR -0.003 -0.003*** -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.036) (0.004) (0.004) 
INV 0.007 0.001 0.219 0.003 0.036* 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.135) (0.009) (0.019) 
NOI -0.370*** -0.158* -0.520*** -0.424*** -0.359*** 
 (0.033) (0.082) (0.097) (0.055) (0.053) 
PROFIT 0.014 0.016*** 0.003 0.025 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.042) (0.026) (0.013) 
CFO -0.111*** -0.011 -0.146 -0.178*** 0.047 
 (0.036) (0.016) (0.109) (0.054) (0.052) 
MOWN 0.008 0.001 0.030 0.008 0.011* 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.025) (0.010) (0.006) 
CONCEN -0.000 -0.000** 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
AUDIT 0.008 -0.012 0.048 0.048 -0.006 
 (0.043) (0.015) (0.185) (0.104) (0.042) 
Constant 2.032*** 0.888*** 5.018*** 2.859*** 1.626*** 
 (0.304) (0.108) (1.495) (0.636) (0.328) 
      
Observations 2,371 1,939 432 928 1,443 
R-squared 0.083 0.110 0.115 0.115 0.062 
Based on firm-year observations 2005-2008 from Chinese listed firms. IFRS_SSSR2 = 0 for 2005-
2006; 1 for 2007-2008. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in 
STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, 
as described, is simply in order to convey completely the nature of the significance. 
Table 6.9 reveals whether the unlocking of non-tradable shares has an impact on 
earnings predictability. This testing period covers from 2007 to 2010 after IFRS-adoption. 
SSSR3 equals to 0 from 2007 to 2008, whilst it equals to 1 from 2009-2010. Column 1 shows 
that SSSR3 is positively associated with SDPred (0.040***), which indicates that the unlocking 




firms, column 2 and column 3 presents that earnings predictability of these significantly 
declined after shares became practically tradable (0.010* and 0.136*). Column 4 and column 
5 reveal that earnings predictability of non-SOEs declined (0.071***) after non-tradable 
shares became tradable and there is no significant impact of shares becoming tradable on the 
predictability of SOEs (0.018). 
Table 6.9: Estimations of earnings predictability (Model 6.3): firm years 2007-10  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
SSSR3 0.040*** 0.010* 0.136* 0.071*** 0.018 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.070) (0.023) (0.011) 
SIZE -0.103*** -0.013 -0.221 -0.152** -0.079*** 
 (0.030) (0.015) (0.150) (0.072) (0.026) 
LEV -0.000 -0.024*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
CR -0.002 -0.003** 0.092 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.083) (0.006) (0.007) 
INV 0.017 0.000 0.176 0.023 0.016 
 (0.029) (0.013) (0.348) (0.064) (0.025) 
NOI -0.243*** 0.047 -0.272 -0.159 -0.265*** 
 (0.093) (0.174) (0.248) (0.368) (0.070) 
PROFIT 0.015 0.018* -0.003 -0.006 0.025 
 (0.021) (0.010) (0.092) (0.045) (0.019) 
CFO -0.071 -0.057** -0.011 -0.204 0.017 
 (0.066) (0.028) (0.395) (0.134) (0.061) 
MOWN 0.005 -0.000 0.011 0.000 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.052) (0.018) (0.010) 
CONCEN 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
AUDIT 0.015 -0.005 0.075 0.040 0.010 
 (0.070) (0.029) (0.447) (0.148) (0.063) 
Constant 2.169*** 0.336 4.331 3.240** 1.645*** 
 (0.644) (0.310) (3.104) (1.506) (0.559) 
      
Observations 1,931 1,631 300 855 1,076 
R-squared 0.023 0.046 0.052 0.028 0.036 
Based on firm-year observations 2007-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR3 = 0 for 2007-2008; 
1 for 2009-2010. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in 
STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square 
brackets, as described, is simply in order to convey completely the nature of the significance. 
From Tables 6.7-6.9, it is concluded that earnings predictability significantly declined 




impact on the predictability of Non-ST and SOE in the pre-IFRS period. Regarding IFRS 
adoption and after this, both reforms had a significant negative impact on the predictability 
of STs and non-SOEs. The findings in this section support the hypothesis that earnings 
predictability declined in all three testing periods. 
Smoothness  
Tables 6.10-6.12 shows the regression results of model 6.4, which aimed to test the frequency 
of small positive earnings reporting under the impact of IFRS-converged CAS adoption and 
SSSR. 
Table 6.10: Estimations of earnings smoothness (Model 6.4): firm years 2003-06 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var:  All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
SSSR1 1.205*** 0.864** 2.329** 0.908 1.196*** 
 (0.314) (0.346) (1.107) (0.654) (0.363) 
SIZE -1.333 -2.010 -3.156 -4.339 -0.923 
 (1.089) (1.687) (3.858) (3.355) (1.186) 
LEV -0.034 0.717 -0.043 -0.173 -0.037 
 (0.047) (0.661) (0.070) (0.859) (0.047) 
CR -0.428 -0.408 0.085 -2.044 -0.374 
 (0.410) (0.456) (1.671) (2.090) (0.437) 
INV -0.080 -0.427 -1.876 -0.554 -0.580 
 (0.273) (0.823) (2.668) (1.114) (0.854) 
NOI 26.420 -22.192 233.570 76.512 23.831 
 (23.582) (31.906) (285.962) (114.831) (25.094) 
PROFIT 19.398 18.790 22.369 20.683 19.013 
 (1,153.062) (1,063.767) (3,956.422) (2,010.017) (1,163.768) 
CFO -6.217** -5.437* -5.678 -6.652 -6.487** 
 (2.694) (3.019) (8.919) (6.180) (3.232) 
MOWN 0.176 0.027 -0.485 1.386 0.072 
 (0.380) (0.404) (2.429) (1.182) (0.425) 
CONCEN 0.081*** 0.069** 0.207* 0.043 0.082*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.113) (0.069) (0.026) 
AUDIT -0.934 -0.786 -3.859  -1.430 
 (6,280.682) (6,216.835) (43,052.195)  (4,027.215) 
Observations 421 271 150 117 304 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2006 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-2004; 
1 for 2005-2006. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in 
STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square 




The increased small positive earnings reported is a result of managing earnings 
downwards. Hence, given the hypotheses and findings in the previous sections, finding more 
small positive earnings reports with regard to the first and third testing periods with an 
income-decreasing management incentive is anticipated. Whilst less small positive earnings 
reports in second testing period are expected, which is consistent with income-increasing 
earnings management incentive.  
Table 6.10, from column 1 to column 5, reveals that there is significant and positive 
correlation coefficient between SSSR1 and SPOS. The results indicate that the announcement 
of SSSR significantly improved the frequency of reporting small positive earnings. 
Table 6.11 shows that the impact of IFRS convergence on SPOS is insignificantly 
negative (-0.292). Under different firm specific characteristics, IFRS convergence significantly 
reduced the frequency of small positive earnings reports in SOEs (-0.186**), however, this 
had no significant impact on ST, Non-ST and Non-SOEs. This finding is consistent with the 
prediction that earnings became less smooth under the income-increasing incentive, 













Table 6.11: Estimations of earnings smoothness (Model 6.4): firm years 2005-08 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
IFRS_SSSR2 -0.292 -0.028 -0.566 -0.402 -0.440* 
 (0.215) (0.254) (0.651) (0.483) (0.260) 
SIZE 0.003 -1.132* 1.617 2.320 -0.020 
 (0.511) (0.659) (1.371) (1.623) (0.568) 
LEV 0.011 0.994*** 0.006 0.337 0.016 
 (0.051) (0.331) (0.006) (0.385) (0.051) 
CR 0.170 0.503** -1.594** 0.304 0.153 
 (0.146) (0.231) (0.705) (0.335) (0.158) 
INV -0.446 0.094 -3.650* -3.029 -0.302 
 (0.618) (0.707) (1.989) (1.918) (0.690) 
NOI 0.232 -20.191 12.175 53.160* -5.010 
 (4.799) (16.728) (7.878) (28.090) (6.791) 
PROFIT 29.822 29.710 21.709 19.680 33.967 
 (995.386) (1,497.686) (2,681.930) (2,282.505) (2,530.041) 
CFO -1.770 -2.292 -0.571 -1.941 -1.640 
 (1.442) (1.963) (2.366) (2.753) (1.845) 
MOWN 0.151 0.306 -0.966* 0.438 0.091 
 (0.193) (0.231) (0.560) (0.397) (0.233) 
CONCEN 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.075* -0.012 0.060*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.045) (0.037) (0.019) 
AUDIT -14.892 -15.578 5.742 -20.350 -16.833 
 (701.280) (1,056.201) (27,283.889) (18,182.600) (1,785.090) 
Observations 764 560 204 215 549 
Based on firm-year observations 2005-2008 from Chinese listed firms. IFRS_SSSR2 = 0 for 2005-
2006; 1 for 2007-2008. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in 
STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, 
as described, is simply in order to convey completely the nature of the significance 
Table 6.12 shows that the SSSR3 is positively and significantly associated with SPOS, 
which indicates that the change from the second phase to the third phase of SSSR led to 
significantly improved frequency of reporting SPO overall. Furthermore, the positive and 
significance association remained in Non-ST firms, Non-SOEs and SOEs. 
The results from Tables 6.10-6.12 are consistent with the predication that there was 
increased earnings smoothness in the first and the third testing period when there existed a 
downward earnings management incentive. Moreover, there was decreased earnings 





Table 6.12: Estimations of earnings smoothness (Model 6.4): firm years 2007-10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var:  All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
SSSR3 0.725*** 0.728** 0.408 0.903* 0.621* 
 (0.269) (0.285) (0.876) (0.542) (0.333) 
SIZE -2.087** -1.657* -0.391 -2.868 -2.046* 
 (0.903) (0.913) (2.112) (2.560) (1.044) 
LEV 0.802** 0.664* 0.385 3.819** 0.738** 
 (0.360) (0.364) (0.330) (1.648) (0.371) 
CR -0.020 -0.022 6.972** -0.027 0.145 
 (0.073) (0.073) (3.146) (0.131) (0.200) 
INV 0.414 0.489 -8.295 -2.629 -0.108 
 (1.030) (1.051) (7.659) (2.928) (1.384) 
NOI 1.808 0.485 65.423** 78.909* 0.815 
 (6.118) (6.304) (27.603) (44.665) (5.991) 
PROFIT 21.738 18.930  24.954 21.280 
 (818.058) (1,217.177)  (2,668.071) (1,022.528) 
CFO -0.172 -0.619 5.957* -3.068 -0.298 
 (1.480) (1.638) (3.554) (3.662) (1.716) 
MOWN 0.280 0.265 0.892 -0.104 0.491 
 (0.361) (0.359) (0.830) (0.742) (0.481) 
CONCEN -0.015 -0.018 -0.086 0.040 -0.028 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.086) (0.055) (0.034) 
AUDIT -1.032 -1.139  -19.508 -0.901 
 (1.190) (1.195)  (29,750.146) (1.255) 
Observations 426 337 89 146 280 
Based on firm-year observations 2007-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR3 = 0 for 2007-2008; 
1 for 2009-2010. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in 
STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square 
brackets, as described, is simply in order to convey completely the nature of the significance 
6.5.4 Summary of the principal results 
This subsection summarises the key findings of this chapter, as collated into Table 6.13. In this 
chapter, it has been hypothesised that: in the negotiation phase of SSSR, the level of earnings 
persistence and earnings predictability decreased and earnings smoothness increased, whilst 
the association between SSSR1*EOA and EOAt+1 decreased, the association between SSSR1 
and SDPred increased and the association between SSSR1 and SPOS increased (abstracted 
from H6.1). In the lock-in phase of SSSR, the level of earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability and earnings smoothness decreased, whilst the association between 




increased and that between IFRS_SSSR2 and SPOS decreased (abstracted from H6.2). After 
completion of SSSR, the level of earnings persistence and earnings predictability decreased 
and earnings smoothness increased, whilst the association between SSSR3*EOA and EOAt+1 
decreased. The association between SSSR3 and SDPred increased and the association 
between SSSR3 and SPOS increased (abstracted from H6.3). Consistent with and supporting 
hypotheses H6.1, H6.2 and H6.3 of this chapter, the principal multivariate regression 
estimation results show the following 
Pre-SSSR to SSSR phase 1: 2003-2006 
In the 2003-2006 testing period, there was no impact from the change of accounting 
standards: IFRS-converged CAS came into force with effect from 2007. Over this period, 
it has been found that earnings persistence significantly decreased in the first phase 
(the negotiation phases) of SSSR for 2005-2006 (estimated coefficient between 
SSSR1*EOA and EOAt+1= -0.999***). Earnings predictability also significantly decreased, 
with evidence of a significant positive estimated coefficient between SSSR1 and SDPred 
(0.059***). Earnings smoothness significantly increased, with evidence of a significant 
positive association between SSSR1 and SPOS (estimated coefficient between SSSR1 
and SPOS= 1.205***). The findings are consistent with H6.1 that earnings persistence 
and predictability were reduced and earnings smoothness increased in the first phase 
of SSSR.  
Arrival of IFRS-converged CAS and transition from SSSR phase 1 to phase 2: 2005-2008 
In the 2005-2008 testing period, there was a concurrent transition from the old Chinese 
GAAP to IFRS-converged CAS and from phase 1 of SSSR (negotiation) to phase 2 of the 
SSSR (lock-in). Over this period, it has emerged that earnings persistence significantly 
decreased from the first phase of SSSR (pre-IFRS convergence: 2005-2006) to the 
second (post-IFRS convergence: 2007-2008 with an estimated coefficient between 
IFRS_SSSR2*EOA and EOAt+1= -0.470***. Earnings predictability also significantly 
decreased, with evidence of a significant positive estimated coefficient between 
IFRS_SSSR2 and SDPred (0.032***. Earnings smoothness reduced insignificantly with 
the support of an estimated coefficient between IFRS_SSSR2 and SPOS=-0.292. The 




in the second phase of SSSR (post-IFRS convergence), earnings smoothness was reduced 
as predicted, however, this was insignificant (only significant in SOEs). 
Completion of the SSSR in the post IFRS-convergence period: 2007-2010 
In the 2007-2010 testing period, there was no impact from the change of accounting 
standards: IFRS-converged CAS came into force with effect after 2007. Over this period, 
it has been found that earnings persistence significantly decreased in the final phase of 
SSSR (free trading of previous non-tradable shares) from 2009-2010 (estimated 
coefficient between SSSR3*EOA and EOAt+1= -0.340***). Earnings predictability also 
significantly decreased, with evidence of a significant positive estimated coefficient 
between SSSR3 and SDPred (0.040***). Earnings smoothness significantly increased in 
the final phase of SSSR (estimated coefficient between SSSR3 and SPOS=0.725***). The 
findings are consistent with H6.3 that earnings persistence and predictability were 
reduced, whilst earnings smoothness increased in the final phase of SSSR.  
As regards the changes in earnings levels over the SSSR implementation phases and 
IFRS convergence, there is clear evidence from the univariate findings that these declined in 
2005-2006, significantly increased in 2007-2008 and then significantly declined in 2009-2010. 
The findings support the predictions that managers had an incentive to drive down earnings 





 Table 6.13: Summary of chapter results 
Period Transition from Transition to IFRS-converged CAS? Results 
2003-
2006 Pre-SSSR 
SSSR phase 1: 
negotiation period  
No 
• Persistence: insig (0.531) changes (-0.999***) to negative 
(-0.468***) 
• Predictability: changes (0.059***)  
• Smoothness: changes (1.205***) 
2005-
2008 











• Persistence: negative (-0.303***) changes (-0.470***) 
remains negative (-0.773***) 
• Predictability: changes (0.032***)  
• Smoothness: changes (-0.292) 
2007-
2010 
SSSR phase 2: 
lock-in period 
SSSR phase 3: 
free trading of shares 
Yes 
• Persistence:  negative (-0.129**) changes (-0.340***) 
remains negative (-0.469***) 
• Predictability: changes (0.040***) 
• Smoothness: changes (0.725***) 
Results extracted from Tables 6.4-6.12. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] 
represents improved significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption of one-




6.6 Conclusion  
6.6.1 Main discussion and conclusion  
This chapter has analysed the earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings 
smoothness properties under China’s IFRS-converged CAS adoption in 2007 and SSSR from 
2005. The modified earnings persistence model of Sloan (1996) has been employed to 
investigate the changes of earnings persistence level. In addition, the Kormendi and Lipe 
(1987) approach has been adopted to examine the change of earnings predictablity and the 
modified Barth et al. (2008) small positive approach has been deployed to test the change of 
earnings smoothness under the impact of recent reforms in China. Separate analyses have 
been performed for Non-ST versus ST firms, and for Non-SOEs versus SOEs. A non-
conventional interpretation of the results on earnings smoothness is that they do not signify 
earnings persistence.  
Firstly, earnings persistence was tested by the adoption Arellano-Bond dynamic 
estimation to investigate whether earnings became more persistent under the impact of both 
reforms by examining the association between current earnings and future earnings. In 
addition to earnings persistence, earnings predictability and smoothness were probed by 
examining the standard deviation of error variance from regression 6.1 with fixed panel 
estimation and testing the frequency of reporting small positive earnings with fixed panel 
logit estimation. 
The results obtained have provided strong and consistent support for the chapter 
hypotheses, viz.: the association between future earnings and the interatction term of 
SSSR1*EOA significantly decreased in all three testing periods; the association between the 
standard deviation of error terms and reforms significantly increased, which indicates a 
reduced earnings predictability; and the association between small postive earnings and 
reforms improved in the first and third testing periods, but this was insignificant in the second. 
6.6.2 More discussion according to phase  
To test hypothesis 6.1, the interaction term SSSR1*EOA was introduced in Model (6.2), whilst 




SSSR1 was equal to 1 from 2005 to 2006, having been 0 from 2003 to 2004, which is before 
and after the announcement of SSSR having to apply to all non-tradable holding firms. The 
results suggest that earnings become both less persistent and less predictable during the first 
testing period. Moreover, there was no significant change of earnings smoothness from pre-
SSSR to the first phase of SSSR. The findings support H6.1 – in the first phase of SSSR, earnings 
show reduced persistence, reduced predictability and increased smoothness.  
To test hypothesis 6.2, the interaction term IFRS_SSSR2*EOA was included in Model 
(6.2) to test earnings persistence. Model (6.3) and Model (6.4) allowed for testing earnings 
predictability and earnings smoothness. IFRS_SSSR2 was equal to 1 from 2007 to 2008 and 0 
from 2005 to 2006, which is before and after the IFRS-converged CAS adoption and represents 
SSSR from its first phase to its second phase. The findings in this testing period support 
hypothesis H6.2 – in the second phase of SSSR, earnings show reduced persistence, reduced 
predictability and low smoothness. Under this testing period, firstly, the use of fair value 
measurement under IFRS-converged CAS has induced more volatile than historical cost 
measurement under the old Chinese CAAP. Secondly, the SSSR moved from its first phase of 
negotiation to its second phase of lock-in period. The findings are consistent with managers 
acting upon boosted earnings management incentives and driving earnings down then up 
across the two SSSR phases – so leading to low earnings persistence. 
To test hypothesis 6.3, the interaction term SSSR3*EOA was introduced in Model (6.2), 
whilst Model (6.3) and Model (6.4) allowed for testing earnings predictability and earnings 
smoothness.  SSSR3 was equal to 1 from 2009 to 2010 and 0 from 2007 to 2008, which was 
when SSSR moved from its second phase of the lock-in period to its final phase of the unlocked 
period. The results suggest that earnings became less persistent and less predictable during 
the first testing period. Moreover, there was no significant change in earnings smoothness 
from the second to the third phase of SSSR. The findings are consistent with H6.3 – earnings 
have reduced persistence, reduced predictability and increased smoothness in the final phase 
of SSSR.  
Earnings predictability and earnings persistence declined under the impact of the 
reforms, that is, there was an erosion of these measures of earnings quality through SSSR 




of small positive earnings is seen in the first and the third (final) phases of SSSR 
implementation; and a reduction in the incidence of small positive earnings is seen in the 
second phase of SSSR implementation, concurrent with IFRS convergence. All in line with the 
hypotheses of this Chapter, the findings must be interpreted as being driven by the joint 
impact of both boosted earnings management incentives created by the non-tradable share 
reform and the transition to IFRS-converged CAS. 
This study contributes to the present literature by for the first time investigating the 
earnings persistence and earnings predictability properties in China after IFRS-converged CAS 
adoption. In addition, this is the first work to probe the joint impact of IFRS-converged CAS 
adoption and SSSR on earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings smoothness 
properties. Regarding which, it has been elicited that temporary increased earnings 
smoothness led by earnings management incentive seems to be related with low earnings 
persistence. Moreover, this study is the first to investigate ST and non-ST firms’ earnings 
quality separately after both reforms and it has been revealed that lax accounting standards 
adoption in 2007 and boosted management incentive by non-tradable shares reform 
fluctuated earnings performance in the focal testing periods. Finally, the study findings have 
provided insights for research in emerging markets when investigating IFRS adoption in terms 




Chapter 7: Earnings timeliness 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters presented the analysis of accruals quality, earnings persistence, 
earnings predictability and earnings smoothness. This chapter investigates the other property 
of earnings information, namely earnings timeliness, which has been substantially of interest 
in the prior literature (Ball et al., 2008; Pope and Walker, 1999; García Lara et al., 2005; Ball 
and Shivakumar, 2005; Basu, 1997; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007). The studies fall into two 
main streams, firstly, those investigating whether earnings capture economic consequences 
by examining earnings timely loss recognition (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006; Ball et al., 2008; 
Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Barth et al., 2008). Secondly, there has been examination of the 
measures for conservatism (Basu, 1997; Givoly and Hayn, 2002; Roychowdhury and Watts, 
2007). 
The majority of earnings timeliness studies were conducted in advanced economies 
with more efficient financial markets than emerging ones. Hence, there has been scant study 
of earnings timeliness in China (Haw et al., 2000; Haw et al., 2003). There are studies that 
have compared earnings timeliness between China and other countries, such as the EU, Russia, 
and the USA (McGee et al., 2008a; McGee et al., 2008b; McGee and Yuan, 2008). These 
studies have found that timely loss recognition is longer in China and Russia than in Western 
Anglo-American countries. The studies of Haw et al. (2000, 2003) are both from a managers’ 
incentives perspective, investigating whether they are interfering with the timing of loss and 
gain reporting. 
This chapter investigates earnings timeliness of earnings asymmetric timeliness, based 
on Basu (1997) and Barth et al. (2008), from an investors’ market information usefulness 
perspective by comparing whether the timeliness of earnings has performed differently under 
the impact of China’s recent reforms: SSSR and IFRS-converged CAS adoption. Consistent with 
Chapter 5: earnings accrual quality investigation and Chapter 6: earnings persistence, 




in the analysis of the impacts of IFRS adoption on earnings timeliness in China by applying the 
same datasets.  
First of all, there is investigation of the change of large losses reporting (LNEG) 
frequency from Barth et al (2008), where LNEG is a dummy variable taking on 1, if net income 
scaled by total assets is less than -0.20, otherwise LNEG =1. It is found that the frequency of 
reporting large losses has significantly increased in the first and the third testing period, with 
the predicted downward earnings management incentive; there was no significant change of 
LNEG in the second testing period during the transition of IFRS convergence (SSSR phase 2 to 
phase 3). Secondly, this chapter investigates the timely losses recognition in the stock market 
from the investors’ market information usefulness perspective, with Basu’s (1997) model 
being adopted to test the timely losses recognition by the financial market. The results reveal 
that, in the pre-IFRS adoption period, timely losses recognition significantly improved after 
the non-tradable share reform started in 2005 and that there is significant reduced loss 
recognition under the transition period of IFRS convergence in 2007. In the post-IFRS adoption 
period, timely losses recognition changed insignificantly after non-tradable shares became 
tradable.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 7.2 and 7.3 discuss the 
research objective and hypothesis development, respectively. The research method and data 
collection are provided in section 7.4. Section 7.5 presents the regression results, whilst the 
chapter conclusion is provided in section 7.6. 
7.2 Research objective and questions 
Earnings timeliness is one of the earnings quality properties in accounting information quality 
research (Dechow et al., 2010). The ability of accounting information to incorporate earnings 
in the financial market in a timely manner is determined by the demand of information 
decision usefulness from investors (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006). Conservatism has been 
employed to investigate the timeliness in previous literature (Basu, 1997; Givoly and Hayn, 
2002), with accounting information being considered as conservative when firms recognise 




Ball et al. (2003) adopted Basu (1997) reverse regression to investigate whether there 
was a difference in timely losses recognition across four East Asian regions (Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand), who shared same accounting standards and legal system 
origins. They found that Hong Kong exhibited the highest timeliness, which was consistent 
with its better equity market-oriented reputation, whilst Thailand exhibited the lowest 
timeliness, which can be attributed to the country’s lower development of the equity market 
and this is under strong political influence. They concluded that timely losses recognition is 
endogenously related to the countries’ equity capital markets incentives, but is not driven 
purely by the countries’ accounting standards and law system. Barth et al. (2008) investigated 
the impact of IFRS adoption on accounting quality, employing both Basu’s (1997) model and 
large losses recognition. It emerged that countries adopting IFRS have better earnings 
timeliness, that is, accounting standards play significant role in its improvement. Bushman 
and Piotroski (2006) probed accounting conservatism in 38 countries taking into account 
various institutional factors and concluded that these like legal systems and political 
interventions shape accounting conservatism. Some studies have found that corporate 
governance variables are strongly correlated with earnings timeliness (Bushman et al., 2004; 
Lara and Mora, 2004; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008).   
In this study, the aim is to investigate whether earnings timely recognition was 
improved after China’s recent reforms.  China’s IFRS-converged CAS adoption was happening 
in the ensuing year of its stock market reforms (SSSR), which were underpinned by the desire 
to transform its financial market from a credit-based to an equity-based system (Firth et al., 
2007). However, whether this stock market reform achieved its goal is debatable. Given the 
unique time setting of both reforms, the objective of this chapter is to investigate the impact 
of IFRS convergence and SSSR on earnings timely losses recognition. To address the objective, 
the research question of this chapter is: 
Was there a change in earnings timely losses recognition through the phases of the 





7.3 Hypothesis development 
Ball et al. (2000) defined timeliness as the “extent to which current-period accounting income 
incorporates current-period economic income”, using the change in market value of 
stockholders’ equity as a proxy for economic income. An earlier study by Basu (1997) 
considered conservatism as the extent to which current-period accounting income 
asymmetrically incorporates economic losses, relative to economic gains. Accounting 
recognition is viewed as conservative when firms recognise losses in a timelier manner than 
gains. In Basu (1997) work, economic gains (good news) and losses (bad news) were measured 
by positive and negative share returns, respectively. The timelier the accounting earnings 
incorporate bad news, the better accounting conservatism and hence, the better the 
accounting information quality. According to the definitions of both timeliness and 
conservatism in previous studies, earnings timeliness is not only associated with accounting 
standards quality, but also, with stock market efficiency. 
Earnings timeliness has been extensively explored in the international context in both 
across-country and single-country studies. Regarding the former, Pope and Walker (1999) 
analysed differences in the timeliness of earnings recognition between the UK and US GAAP 
financial reporting regimes. They adopted Basu (1997) model and found that differences in 
timeliness between the UK and US accounting regimes are sensitive to whether extraordinary 
items are included or excluded in accounting earnings in the UK. Ball et al. (2000) applied 
timeliness analysis to seven international GAAP regimes from the political influence on 
accounting policy perspective, using the legal system as a proxy for this influence and 
classifying the seven countries into code law (France, Germany, Japan) and common law 
(Australia, Canada, US and the UK). They suggested that the properties of accounting 
information prepared under common-law accounting standards are of particular 
contemporary interest due to the IAS developed by IASC being widely viewed as reflecting a 
largely common-law approach to timely disclosure. They found that common-law accounting 
income exhibits significantly greater timeliness than that of code-law.  
The studies in the timeliness context are subject to a major limitation as explained in 
the following. These involved the stock returns as a proxy for economic income, which 




necessarily impede the flow of information into stock price, if the information instead flows 
via inside trading. The Ball et al. (2000) study implies that both accounting standards and stock 
market efficiency play an important role in improving timeliness. In line with Ball et al. (2000), 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) investigated accounting conservatism across 38 countries by 
incorporating different institutional factors and found that, institutional factors have a great 
impact on accounting conservatism. Some studies have examined the timeliness in single 
countries, which can avoid the impact of across-country variations. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
investigated timely recognition in private companies in the UK and discovered that accounting 
information is of lower timely loss recognition in private firms in relative to public firms’ 
accounting information. Ding and Stolowy (2006) investigated the change of earnings 
properties in timeliness and conservatism in French listed firms during the 1990s considering 
the substantial changes in the accounting system in 1996. They further compared the 
timeliness and conservatism according to size, international financing, and audit quality. They 
found that the degree of conservatism of accounting incomes increased during the research 
period, because the new accounting system only allowed good news to be recognised 
gradually in the earnings measure. 
This chapter is motivated by the previous work performed by Pope and Walker (1999) 
and Ball et al. (2000), who employed Basu’s (1997) model to determine the impact of a change 
of accounting regimes on earnings timeliness. Both studies’ outcomes suggest a change in 
accounting rules influences firms’ financial statement, which will lead to a change in earnings 
timeliness. Thus, it is of interest to investigate whether earnings timeliness varied after 
China’s IFRS convergence in 2007. This study further considers the impact of China’s SSSSR 
implementation from 2005 on timely loss recognition in addition to the impact of IFRS 
convergence in 2007. As timeliness  involves examining the level of current accounting 
incomes incorporated into current economic incomes, which are measured with the stock 
market returns (Basu, 1997), it is predicted that the stock market reform in China had an 
influence on the outcome of earnings timeliness. 
As previous discussed, SSSR transferred non-tradable shares into being tradable after 
the final phase. Thereafter, the difference between tradable and non-tradable shares was 




phase of SSSR, there was still a large amount of non-tradable shares, so the market was less 
liquid and efficient than subsequently. In the first phase, it is predicted that managers had 
incentives to drive down earnings to reduce the compensation level to pre-existing holders of 
tradable shares. In the second phase, it is conjectured that managers had incentives to drive 
up earnings to boost the share prices to sell shares at high prices when non-tradable shares 
become tradable.  In the third phase, it is predicted that managers had incentives to drive 
down earnings to repurchase shares back at low price and to retain non-tradable 
shareholders controlling position. In accordance with these predictions, there is a downwards 
earnings management inventive in the first phase of the SSSR, an upwards earnings 
management incentive in the second phase, and return to a downwards earnings 
management incentive in the third phase. This chapter tests the impact of the SSSR 
implementation and the transition to IFRS-converged CAS with three hypotheses as follows:  
H7.1: In the first phase of SSSR, there will be increased incidence of large loss reports 
and more timely loss recognition. 
H7.2: In the second phase of SSSR, there will be a decreased incidence of large loss 
reports and less timely loss recognition. 
H7.3: In the third phase of SSSR there will be increased incidence of large loss reports 
and more timely loss recognition. 
The key methodological issue is whether or not more large loss reports and improved 
timely losses recognition indicates enhanced accounting information quality after China’s 
SSSR and IFRS-converged CAS adoption. In this context, increasing timely losses recognition is 
not susceptible to traditional interpretation, since the management market incentives were 
motivated in different directions by SSSR and the market was less efficient, with less liquidity, 
before all shares became tradable.  
7.4 Research method 
As proposed in the study of Ahmed and Duellman (2007), two measures are adopted: the 
large losses report recognition (Barth et al., 2008) and timeliness of loss recognition (Basu, 




7.4.1 Empirical models 
Following the previous studies (Lang et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2008), this 
chapter measures timely loss recognition as the coefficient on large negative net income 
(LNEG) (7.1) and accounting conservatism on the loss recognition reflected in the stock 
returns (7.2). 
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+ 4#											(7.1) 
where, LNEG is a dummy variable taking on 1, if net income scaled by total assets is 
less than -0.20, otherwise LNEG = 0. All other variables are as previously defined in Chapter 5. 
A positive coefficient of )$ in Model (7.1) indicates that firms recognised large losses more 
frequently in post reform period than in pre-reforms one. SSSR in Model (7.2) stands for both 
the SSSR1 (2003-2006) and SSSR3 (2007-2010) periods.  The metric for LNEG is modified from 
Barth et al. (2008), which used IFRS as a dependent variable. DUM is defined in Chapter 5. It 
is contended that SSSR1, IFRS_SSSR2 and SSSR3 should be explanatory variables rather than 
dependent variables, with LNEG being so. Nonetheless, considering LNEG as being a binary 
dependent variable, the regression involves adopting fixed panel logit estimation, rather than 
OLS, as in Barth et al. (2008) study. The LNEG measure from Barth et al. (2008) cannot capture 
the reaction of market to the loss report, for it only focuses on whether the actual loss 
reporting is encouraged.  
To test further the timely recognition of loss reporting by the stock market, in this 
chapter, the model from Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) is employed.  
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Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) suggested that the Basu (1997) reverse regression of 
earnings to measure the timeliness in earnings ignores the effects of conservatism prior to 
the estimation period and thus, does not reflects its total. For this study, the empirical model 
from Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) is adopted to measure timeliness based on the 




measures it over one single year. Estimated timeliness of recognition loss reports (bad news), 
equity returns, and the interaction of reforms with equity returns and a bad news variable to 
estimate whether the reforms have impact on the timely loss recognition by introducing 
dummy variables, as follows:  
!"#!,#$%
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= &' + &&(!,#$% + &()*+!,#$% + &)(!,#$% ∗ )*+!,#$% + &++2$ + &,+2$ ∗ (!,#$%
∗ )*+!,#$% + -!#																																																																																																									(7.3) 
 
where, !"#!,#$% is earnings per share cumulative from year t-j to year t; when t=1, EPS 
is not accumulated and j is equal to 0;	$!#,#$%$& is the market value of equity at the end of 
year t-j-1;  :!,#()  is the 15-month return, which is the buy and hold return starting 3 months 
after the end of the fiscal year t-j-1 and ending 3 months after the end of year t, then adjusted 
by the dividend at the end of fiscal year t, following Harris et al. (1994) and Lev and Zarowin 
(1999), :# = (+!(+!"#)-.!+!"# .  In prior research, market returns from the start of the fiscal year to 
6-months or 5 months (Bartov et al., 2001) and 3 months (Francis and Schipper, 1999) after 
the fiscal year has been adopted. Kothari and Sloan (1992) were the first propose the 
calculation of returns by using the overlapping period based on the notion that price lead 
earnings. They suggested that the returns calculation with overlapping periods provides more 
powerful results. For the current study, earnings timely loss recognition is test by adopting 15 
months returns, where BAD takes one, if :!,#()  is less than zero and 0, otherwise.  
)/  captures the incremental response of bad news relative to good news. Under 
conservative reporting, )/  is expected to be positive and the larger its coefficient, means 
timelier the loss recognition. Increased )0 indicates there was more timely loss recognition 
after the reforms.  Following prior studies, panel data cross section regressions are deployed 
with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors to estimate the regression models. Givoly and 
Hayn (2000) criticised the above measure of conservative reporting for relying on the stock 




7.4.2 Data collection  
The data collection is same with chapter 5. The following table shows the definition of 
variables used in earnings timeliness analysis. The control variables are as previously 
explained in Chapter 5.  
Table 7.1: Definition of the variables 
67!8!,# A dummy variable that takes a value of 1, if net income scaled by total 
assets is less than -0.20, otherwise 0 
!"#!,#$%/$!!,#$%$& Earnings per share cumulative from year t-j to t divided by the market value 
of equity at the end of year t-j-1 
(!,#$%  15-month equity return 
)*+ A dummy variable that takes a value of. 1 if R is less than zero, otherwise 0 
7.5 Results  
This section interprets and discusses the regression results regarding earnings timeliness. 
7.5.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 7.2 represents the summary statistics of the variables used in the earnings timeliness 
analyses. From pre-SSSR to its first phase, the mean of LNEG significantly increases from 0.075 
to 0.160 (0.085***), which means that the frequency of reporting large losses was increased 
in the negotiation period of SSSR over the period 2003-2006; the mean of LNEG then 
decreases significantly (-0.034***) from 0.160 to 0.126 from the first phase of SSSR (pre-IFRS) 
to the second phase of SSSR (post-IFRS) over the period 2005-2008; finally, the mean of LNEG 
decreases insignificantly (-0.008) from 0.126 to 0.118 after IFRS adoption from the second 
phase of SSSR to the third phase. The change of means in the testing period supports the 
above hypothesis that there was an incentive to drive down earnings in the first phase of SSSR, 
hence more large losses reports, with the mean significantly increasing (0.085***). There was 
an incentive to drive up earnings in the second phase of SSSR, hence less large losses reports, 
with the mean significantly decreasing (-0.034***). Regarding the hypothesis that there was 
an incentive to drive down earnings in the final phase, the means for this period show that 




 The mean of BAD significantly increases (0.253***) from 0.443 to 0 696 in the first 
testing period from pre-SSSR to its first phase. This is a dummy variable that takes one if 
market return is less than zero and hence, the increase in BAD indicates the frequency of a 
negative market return was increased after 2005. The mean of BAD then significantly 
decreases (-0.215***) from the first phase of SSSR (0.696) to the second phase of SSSR (0.481), 
which suggests that negative market return was reduced during the transition of phase 1 to 
phase 2. The mean of BAD further significantly declines (-0.331***) from the second phase of 
SSSR (0.481) to the final phase (0.150). Finally, the decrease in BAD in phase 2 and phase 3 
indicates that the frequency of negative market return was decreased after the finish of SSSR 
negotiation.  
The mean of equity return significantly decreases (-0.066***) from 0.010 to –0.056, 
which indicates that the market return significantly decreased and became negative from pre-
SSSR to its negotiation period. The mean of equity return significantly increases (0.055***) 
from -0.056 to –0.001, which indicates that the market return significantly increased and 
became less negative from negotiation period of SSSR to lock-in period. The mean of equity 
return continues to increase (0.132***) from the lock-in period of SSSR (-0.001) to the 
unlocking period of SSSR (0.132), which indicates that the market return significantly 
increased and became positive from the lock-in period to unlocking period. The increased 
equity return in the testing period suggests that the financial market became active and 
average returns increased following the non-tradable shares becoming tradable. 
Variable EPS/ME is used to estimate the sensitivity of earnings per share to share price, 
where a higher EPS/ME indicates a better earnings response to it. The mean of EPS/ME 
increases significantly (0.241) from pre-SSSR (0.201) to the first phase of SSSR (0.442). The 
mean of EPS/ME continues to increase (0.527***) from the first phase of SSSR (0.442) to the 
second phase of SSSR (0.969). The mean of EPS/ME increases significantly to 1.414 (0.444***) 
in the third phase of SSSR. The change of mean in EPS/ME indicates that the ratio of the 
cumulative earnings per share to per share price increased significantly in the testing period 


















 Mean Median St Dev Obs Mean Median St Dev Obs Mean Median St Dev Obs. Mean Median St Dev Obs 
LNEG 0.075 0 0.264 2291 0.160 0 0.367 2443 0.126 0 0.332 2712 0.118 0 0.284 3332 
BAD 0.443 0 0.497 2273 0.696 1 0.460 2425 0.481 0 0.500 2709 0.150 0 0.357 3326 
R 0.010 0.004 0.072 2139 -0.056 -0.064 0.117 2328 -0.001 -0.035 0.349 2440 0.132 0.110 0.149 2846 
EPS/ME 0.201 0.200 0.741 2291 0.442 0.462 1.416 2443 0.969 0.795 1.936 2712 1.414 1.037 2.423 3332 
This table presents summary statistics of variables used in the timely losses recognition analyses (mean, median, standard deviation and the number of observations). 




7.5.2 Regression results 
This section analyses the change in earnings timeliness under the impact of the SSSR and IFRS-
converged CAS adoption in China, and further considers its special institutional background: 
ST rules in the financial market and large proportion of SOEs. 
Large loss recognition  
First of all, the change of large losses recognition is examined by testing the change of LNEG 
(Barth et al., 2008). The results show in Table 7.3 that SSSR1 is significantly positively 
correlated with LNEG (0.462***), while IFRS_SSSR2 is insignificantly correlated with LNEG 
(0.162) and SSSR3 is significantly and positively correlated with LNEG (0.746***). The findings 
suggest that large loss reports increased significantly with the first (negotiation) phase of the 
SSSR implementation (and pre-adoption of IFRS-converged CAS); and with the third (post-lock 
in) phase of the SSSR implementation (and post-adoption of IFRSs-converged CAS). But there 
was no significant change in large loss reports with the transition to the second (lock-in) phase 
of the SSSR implementation combined with the transition to IFRS-converged CAS. The 
association between SSSR3 and LNEG is positive and significant (0.746***), with the overall 
direction being consistent with the hypotheses proposed above in the first and the third 
testing period: there was increased large losses reporting in first phase and also in the third 
phase, but there was no significant decrease in large losses reports in the second phase.  
With regard to firms’ specific characters, Appendixes 1 to 3 show both reforms 
increased ST firms’ large losses recognition. ST firms is significantly positively correlated with 
LNEG under the first phase of SSSR (0.574***), under IFRS-converged CAS adoption 
period/the second phase of SSSR (0.712) and under the third phase of SSSR (0.712***). The 
findings indicate SSSR significantly encouraged ST firms’ large losses recognition. The result in 
the first phase of SSSR and under the IFRS-converged CAS adoption/the second phase of SSSR 
shows there is no significant impact on LNEG in SOEs, whilst LNEG has significantly increased 







Both reforms significantly increased ST firms’ large losses recognition, which may be 
due to the nature of these firms and the limitation of the method for identifying large losses56. 
Theoretically, STs were predicted to report more losses than non-ST firms. For this study, non-
 
56 The LNEG equals to 1, if losses are greater than -0.2. 
Table 7.3: Estimates of LNEG (Model 7.1): firm years 2003-2010  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent var: 2003-2006 2005-2008 2007-2010 
SSSR1 0.462***   
 (0.173)   
IFRS_SSSR2  0.156  
  (0.127)  
SSSR3   0.746*** 
   (0.159) 
SIZE -0.725 -0.562* -0.969** 
 (0.571) (0.308) (0.442) 
LEV 0.062** -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.030) (0.001) (0.001) 
CR -1.355*** -0.646*** -1.078*** 
 (0.300) (0.155) (0.234) 
INV -0.014 0.232 0.792 
 (0.194) (0.341) (0.548) 
NOI -6.776** -18.406*** -16.785*** 
 (2.862) (3.863) (4.205) 
CFO -9.979*** -5.287*** -2.478** 
 (1.702) (1.031) (1.038) 
MOWN 106.665*** -9.300 -12.938 
 (36.239) (9.042) (9.598) 
CONCEN 0.009 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.018) 
AUDIT 0.186 -0.053 -0.318 
 (0.677) (0.594) (0.898) 
Observations 725 1,274 791 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-
2004; 1 for 2005-2006. IFRS_SSSR2=0 for 2005-2006; 1 for 2007-2008. SSSR3=0 for 2007-2008; 
1 for 2009-2010. All variables as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA 
as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this Chapter 
are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square 




operating income (NOI) is adopted to capture whether related party transactions are 
associated with large losses recognition and it is found that NOI is significantly negatively 
correlated with LNEG in all three testing periods. The findings indicate that higher non-
operating income was associated with lower frequency of reporting large losses and that firms 
who used related party transactions were, in general, less likely to report large losses. Firm 
size is significantly negatively correlated with LNEG, which suggests that large firms were 
associated with lower frequency of reporting large losses. Credit ratio is negatively and 
significantly associated with LNEG in all three testing periods, which suggests that firms with 
a high credit ratio were less likely to report large losses than their counterparts with a low 
one. CFO is significantly and negatively correlated with LNEG in the first and the second 
testing period, however, there is no significant relation between the two in the final testing 
period. MOWN is positively correlated with LNEG, whilst the correlation becomes insignificant 
in the second and the third testing periods. The evidences suggest that a high portion of 
management ownership is associated with a high frequency of reporting large losses. The rest 
of control variables do not have a significant impact on LNEG. 
In conclusion, from a large loss recognition perspective, the findings from Table 7.3 
suggest that LNEG significantly increased in the first phase of SSSR; LNEG decreased in the 
second phase of SSSR/after IFRS-converged CAS adoption, however, insignificantly; and LNEG 
significantly increased in the third phase of SSSR. The findings are consistent with the three 
proposed hypothesis that there was an incentive to manage earnings downwards in the first 
phase, thus increasing LNEG; there was an incentive to manage earnings upwards in the 
second phase, thereafter, decreasing LNEG; and there was an incentive to manage earnings 
downwards in the third phase, thereafter, increasing LNEG.  
This study also adopts Basu (1997) model to capture the losses timely recognition in 
the financial market to investigate further whether this recognition was timelier in the 
Chinese financial market under the impact of IFRS-converged CAS adoption and SSSSR.  
Timely loss recognition  
Table 7.4 shows the results of Model (7.3). Table 7.4 reveals that asymmetric timeliness 




indicates that negative returns were recognised in the earnings in a less timely manner in the 
pre–SSSR period. The interaction term of SSSR1*R*BAD is positively and significantly 
(1.036***) correlated with EPS/ME, which indicates that the timely loss recognition improved 
by 1.036*** and the association between R*BAD and EPS/ME becomes 1.538*** in phase 1 
of the SSSR. The findings suggest that the timely loss recognition is significantly improved in 
the first phase of SSSR.  
The second column of Table 7.4 show the change of timely loss recognition in the 
second testing period. The association between R*BAD and EPS/ME in the first phase of SSSR 
is 0.192***. Interaction term of IFRS_SSSR2*R*BAD is negatively and significantly correlated 
with EPS/ME (-0.234***), which indicate that the timely loss recognition significantly 
decreases to -0.042. The findings suggest that the timely loss recognition is significantly 
decreased from the first phase of SSSR (pre-IFRS) to the second phase of SSSR (post-IFRS).  
The third column of Table 7.4 show the change of timely loss recognition in the third 
testing period. The association between R*BAD and EPS/ME in the second phase of SSSR 
negative but insignificant (-0.017). Interaction term of SSSR3*R*BAD is positively correlated 
with EPS/ME (0.802) insignificantly, which indicate that the timely loss recognition increases 
to 0.778 (insignificantly). The findings suggest that the last phase of SSSR does not have 
significant impact on the timely loss recognition.  
The findings in this section supports the hypotheses 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 that there is an 
incentive to drive down the earnings and share prices in the first phase and the third phase 
of SSSR, thereafter, the findings of encouraged timely losses recognition in the first and the 
third phase of SSSR; there is an incentive to manage up earnings in the second phase, 









Furthermore, the impact of both reforms on the timeliness recognition of earnings 
between ST and Non-ST and between SOEs and Non-SOEs in China is compared. Tables 7.4.1, 
7.4.2 and 7.4.3 show the regression results from Model 7.3. Those in 7.4.1 show that the 
timeliness recognition of earnings is significantly negative for STs, non-STs, SOEs and Non-
SOEs in the pre-SSSR period. The correlation coefficient significantly increased across all four 
categories. The findings are consistent with the results from the whole sample tests. 
Table 7.4: Estimates of timely loss recognition (Model 7.3): firm years 2003-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent var: 2003-2006 2005-2008 2007-2010 
    
R (15 months) 0.089 0.046*** -0.010 
 (0.098) (0.014) (0.013) 
BAD 0.003 -0.006 -0.022* 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) 
R*BAD -0.502* 0.192*** -0.017 
 (0.271) (0.062) (0.055) 
SSSR1 0.069***   
 (0.011)   
SSSR1*R*BAD 1.036***   
 (0.242)   
IFRS_SSSR2  -0.024***  
  (0.008)  
IFRS_SSSR2*R*BAD  -0.234***  
  (0.059)  
SSSR3   0.043*** 
   (0.006) 
SSSR3*R*BAD   0.802 
   (1.000) 
Constant 0.009 0.074*** 0.069*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) 
Observations 3,856 4,174 3,365 
R-squared 0.027 0.017 0.045 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-
2004; 1 for 2005-2006. IFRS_SSSR2=0 for 2005-2006; 1 for 2007-2008. SSSR3=0 for 2007-
2008; 1 for 2009-2010. All variables as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed 
in STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents 
improved significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this 
chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of 






Table 7.4.2 shows that IFRS adoption (IFRS_SSSR2*R*BAD) has significantly reduced 
timely recognition of bad news in non-ST firms and SOEs, whilst it has no significant impact 
on earnings timely losses recognition of STs and Non-SOEs. The results indicate that non-ST 
firms and SOEs recognised bad news in a less timely manner than their counterpart firms after 





Table 7.4.1:  Estimates of timely loss recognition (Model 7.3): firm years 2003-2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
R (15 months) 0.089 -0.038 0.343 0.179 0.045 
 (0.098) (0.047) (0.345) (0.245) (0.083) 
BAD 0.003 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.007) (0.053) (0.038) (0.013) 
R*BAD -0.502* 0.045 -0.983 -0.665 -0.396* 
 (0.271) (0.133) (0.884) (0.678) (0.228) 
SSSR1 0.069*** 0.130*** -0.170*** 0.023 0.089*** 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.044) (0.029) (0.010) 
SSSR1*R*BAD 1.036*** 0.358*** 1.544** 1.395** 0.821*** 
 (0.242) (0.120) (0.784) (0.601) (0.204) 
Constant 0.009 0.034*** -0.057* 0.001 0.015* 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.035) (0.024) (0.008) 
Observations 3,856 2,917 939 1,292 2,564 
R-squared 0.027 0.287 0.149 0.041 0.054 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2006 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-2004; 
1 for 2005-2006. All variables as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA 
as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square 






Table 7.4.3 shows that the transition of non-tradable shares to tradable ones in the 
post-IFRS convergence period increased firms’ timely losses recognition, however, 
insignificantly. The increase of timely losses recognition only shows significance in non-ST 
firms. The findings suggest increased timely losses recognition after non-tradable shares 




Table 7.4.2:  Estimates of timely loss recognition (Model 7.3): firm years 2005-08 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
R (15 months) 0.046*** 0.021 0.032 0.036* 0.105*** 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.029) (0.021) (0.027) 
BAD -0.006 0.003 -0.041 -0.021 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.042) (0.023) (0.008) 
R*BAD 0.192*** 0.282*** -0.135 0.220 0.130** 
 (0.062) (0.036) (0.241) (0.153) (0.055) 
IFRS_SSSR2 -0.024*** -0.051*** 0.103*** -0.012 -0.035*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.037) (0.019) (0.007) 
IFRS_SSSR2*R*BAD -0.234*** -0.288*** 0.131 -0.314** -0.220*** 
 (0.059) (0.031) (0.255) (0.149) (0.049) 
Constant 0.074*** 0.152*** -0.230*** 0.031* 0.092*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.033) (0.017) (0.006) 
Observations 4,174 3,320 854 1,507 2,667 
R-squared 0.017 0.098 0.047 0.016 0.033 
Based on firm-year observations 2005-2008 from Chinese listed firms. IFRS_SSSR2 = 0 for 
2005-2006; 1 for 2007-2008. All variables as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations 
performed in STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed 
tests. [*] represents improved significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. 
The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is 
permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, is simply in order to 





To summarise, the results from Table 7.4 and its sub-tables suggest that Chinese firms 
were able to capture more economic losses in a timely manner in the first testing period. They 
were able to capture economic losses in a less timely manner in the second testing period. In 
particular, Table 7.4.1 and Table 7.4.2 show that the ability to capture timely losses was 
improved in all ST, Non-ST, SOE and Non-SOE in first phase of SSSR. However, the ability to 
capture timely losses declined among all Non-ST, SOEs and Non-SOEs in the second phase of 
SSSR, whilst there was a downward earnings management incentive. Table 7.4.3 shows the 
ability to capture bad news in a timelier manner in the third phase of SSSR, however, this is 
only significantly among Non-ST firms. Based on the Basu’s (1997) model, it is concluded that 
loss recognition was timelier in the first phase of SSSR and became reduced in the second 
phase when being combined with the impact of IFRS-converged CAS adoption. The findings 
from Model (8.3) further support the prediction that earnings were manipulated downwards 
in the first and the final phases, whilst they manipulated upwards in the second phase of SSSR: 
Table 7.4.3:  Estimates of timely loss recognition (Model 7.3): firm years 2007-10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
R (15 months) -0.010 -0.031** -0.024 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.028) (0.019) (0.022) 
BAD -0.022* -0.022*** -0.022 -0.031 -0.018* 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.064) (0.031) (0.011) 
R*BAD -0.017 -0.023 0.144 -0.092 0.013 
 (0.055) (0.031) (0.272) (0.135) (0.047) 
SSSR3 0.043*** 0.085*** -0.137*** 0.046*** 0.041*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.029) (0.015) (0.005) 
SSSR3*R*BAD 0.802 1.065* 0.099 1.010 0.350 
 (1.000) (0.587) (3.253) (1.763) (1.056) 
Constant 0.069*** 0.103*** -0.075*** 0.044*** 0.085*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.023) (0.012) (0.006) 
Observations 3,365 2,758 607 1,344 2,021 
R-squared 0.045 0.381 0.061 0.025 0.105 
Based on firm-year observations 2007-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR3 = 0 for 2007-2008; 
1 for 2009-2010. All variables as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA 
as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square 




there were increased loss reports and loss recognition in the first and the final phases, but 
decreases in these during the second phase of SSSR. The findings further suggest that the 
impact of China’s IFRS-converged CAS adoption was a strongly boosted management 
incentive from SSSR. 
7.5.3 Summary of the principle results 
This subsection summarises the key findings of this chapter, as collated in Table 7.5.  
Relating the hypotheses of this Chapter to the models: in the negotiation (first) and 
completion (last) phases of SSSR, the hypothesis is that the incidence of large loss reports will 
increase, and the timeliness of loss recognition will improve. In terms of the Chapter’s 
models/test, suggests that the association between SSSR1 and LNEG will increases, and the 
association between SSSR1*R*BAD and !"#!,#$%$!#,#$%$&	 will also increases. The reverse is true in the 
lock-in (second) phase of the SSSR, where the hypothesis is that the incidence of large loss 
reports will decrease, and the timeliness of loss recognition will reduce. 
Consistent with and supporting hypotheses H7.1, H7.2 and H7.3 of this chapter, the 
principal multivariate regression estimation results show the following: 
Pre-SSSR to SSSR phase 1: 2003-2006 
In the 2003-2006 testing period, it has been found that earnings timeliness significantly 
increased in the first phase (the negotiation phases) of SSSR from 2005-2006 (estimated 
coefficient between SSSR1 and LNEG = 0.462***; SSSR1*R*BAD and	 %&'',(−*(%(,(−*−1	 =1.036***). 
The findings are consistent with H7.1 – that an incentive to drive down earnings in the 
first phase of the SSSR appears to be manifest in an increased incidence of large loss 
reports and more timely loss recognition.  
Arrival of IFRS-converged CAS and transition from SSSR phase 1 to phase 2: 2005-2008 
In the 2005-2008 testing period, there was a concurrent transition from old Chinese 
GAAP to IFRS-converged CAS and from phase 1 of SSSR (negotiation) to phase 2 (lock-
in). Over this period, it has been elicited that earnings timeliness significantly decreased 




IFRS_SSSR2 and LNEG = 0.156; IFRS_SSSR2*R*BAD and 	 %&'',(−*(%(,(−*−1  = -0.234***).The 
findings provide some support for H7.2 – a significant reduction timely loss recognition 
is consistent with upwards earnings management in response to an SSSR-related 
incentive to do so. 
Completion of the SSSR in the post IFRS-convergence period: 2007-2010 
The 2007-2010 testing period is all in the post-IFRS-convergence, and so was free from 
any major direct impact from changing accounting standards. In the third phase of SSSR, 
large losses reporting significantly increased (estimated coefficient between SSSR3 and 
LNEG = 0.746***); but there was no significant change in timely losses recognition 
(SSSR3*R*BAD and	 %&'',(−*(%(,(−*−1 = 0.802). The findings provide some support for H7.3 – a 
significant increase in the incidence of large loss recognition is consistent with 
downwards earnings management in response to an SSSR-related incentive. 
It must be highlighted that the foregoing discussion is based on a non-standard 
interpretation of test results. Conventionally, increases incidence of large loss reports 
and more timely loss recognition are both held to represent improving earnings quality 
– in essence, the usual inference is that management are not trying to hide losses or sit 
on bad news. Interpretation in this Chapter is conditioned by the Chinese context, and, 






 Table 7.5: Summary of the chapter results 




SSSR phase 1: 
negotiation period  
No 
• Large losses recognition: changes (0.462***) 
• Timely losses recognition: negative (-0.502*) changes 
(1.036***) to positive (0.534***) 
2005-
2008 











• Large losses recognition: changes (0.156) 
• Timely losses recognition: positive (0.192***) 
changes (-0.234***) to negative (-0.042) 
2007-
2010 
SSSR phase 2: 
lock-in period 
SSSR phase 3: 
free trading of shares 
Yes 
• Large losses recognition: changes (0.746***) 
• Timely losses recognition: negative (-0.017) changes 
(0.802) to positive (0.785) 
Results extracted from Tables 6.4-6.12. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. 
[*] represents improved significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption of 





7.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, earnings timeliness from both large loss reports and loss timely recognition 
under China’s IFRS-converged CAS adoption and SSSR has been analysed. As previously 
examined in the accrual quality and earnings persistence chapters, the uniqueness of this 
study is that it concerns the potential impacts of SSSR on accounting information quality. The 
findings are consistent with Chapter hypotheses H7.1, H7.2 and H7.3. In the incidence of large 
loss reports increased and the timeliness of loss recognition improved in the first phase of 
SSSR. The timeliness of loss recognition deteriorated in the second phase of the SSSR, 
concurrent with the transition to IFRS-converged CAS (i.e., under the combined impact of the 
two reforms); and the incidence of large loss reports increased again during the third (final) 
phase of the SSSR implementation. This in turn is consistent with SSSR-related incentives to 
manage earnings downwards, then upward, then down again. 
The contributions of this chapter are: firstly, there is no previous investigation of the 
change of earnings timeliness under both IFRS-converged CAS and  SSSR in China; and 
secondly, the consistence of the hypotheses and the findings is questioning whether the 
improved/reduced earnings timeliness truly indicates improved/reduced earnings quality by 
taking into consideration of strong management incentives and less efficient market 
background in China or other emerging countries. Thirdly, the findings in this chapter also 
seem to suggest that any potential mitigating effect on earnings manipulation from the 
adoption of IFRS-converged CAS was overwhelmed by the actions of management in response 
to incentives created by the SSSR implementation. But no firm, quantifiable claim in this 





Chapter 8: Earnings value relevance  
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have provided the analysis of earnings quality in terms of accrual 
quality, earnings persistence and earnings timeliness. Accrual quality refers to analysing the 
reliability of earnings information, whilst earnings persistence pertains to assessing the 
prediction ability of earnings information and earnings timeliness with earnings persistence 
test the conservatism of earnings information. This chapter will present the value relevance 
aspect of the accounting information quality, which involves examining the association 
between a firm’s market value and accounting measures. In other words, it is concerned with 
the association between share price and book value and earnings as well as market returns 
and earnings. The value relevance analysis has the aim of determining whether or not 
accounting numbers have facilitated the firm’s market price and informed users’ decision 
making.  
The basis of value relevance studies is market efficiency. Kothari (2001) suggests that 
firm valuation in finance is accounting-based valuation, being the present value of expected 
future cash flows discounted at the appropriate risk adjusted rate of return. The better the 
market efficiency the more the valuation accuracy. The firm’s current performance shown in 
its financial statements becomes an important input to the market’s assessment of the firm’s 
value due to the expected temporal relation between current financial performance and 
future cash flows. So, contemporaneously, there is an expected relation between financial 
performance and share price and return. Kothari (2001) further suggests that current 
accounting statements are likely to be useful and accurate for financial market valuation 
when this information can capture the future economic outcomes. Nevertheless, in some 
studies that have been focused on identifying share mispricing, has been argued that market 
valuation analysis is based on future revenues, expenses, earnings and cash flows, so financial  
statements prepared by current or past accounting guidelines may not provide adequate 
summary statistics for future market price valuation (Levi, 2008; Barth et al., 1998). Another 
summary paper by Beaver (2002) supports Kothari (2001), in which it is contended that the 




firm’s market valuation after having studied the association between the accounting data and 
future share prices (Lee, 1999; Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Lee (1999) found that 
accounting data as an independent variable in his accounting-based value relevance study 
had relevance in explaining share returns and share price as the dependent variables.  
Wyatt (2008) evaluated the relevance and reliability of financial and non-financial 
information. She criticised value relevance studies for not including judgments about the 
reliability of information and suggested that differences in value relevance could be due 
either to different relevance, or to different reliability, or both. An association of earnings and 
share prices implies that less reliable accounting information may mislead investors. However, 
in an illiquid/inefficient market, a strengthening association between earnings and share 
prices does not necessarily imply an improvement in earnings quality and decision usefulness, 
if both earnings and market prices are subject to manipulation.  
In this chapter, value relevance information is interpreted in the sense of the 
usefulness of accounting data for corporate market valuation. This is investigated in the 
context of China to ascertain whether the value-relevance of accounting information has 
been improved after the recent reforms. The findings from this study are in accord with those 
of Wyatt (2008), as reported in Chapters 5 and 6, whereby lower accruals quality, persistence 
and earnings predictability, reinforces doubts about whether improved value relevance is a 
sign of better accounting information quality. 
The general concern for value relevance study in an emerging stock market is the level 
of market efficiency. China, the largest emerging economy, established the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges in the early 1990s to support Chinese businesses and economic 
development. In emerging market countries, the stock markets are less efficient than 
developed financial markets and hence, the ability of the share prices to capture accounting 
and other information is less certain. There are two points to clarify at this stage: first, highly 
efficient stock markets cannot be assumed to have existed in China, even though the 
assumption of the value relevance analysis requires them to be so, albeit many prior empirical 
studies on value relevance have been silent on the market efficiency matter (Aboody et al., 
2002). Second, the stock market reforms from 2005 onwards and the adoption of IFRS both 




considered to be milestones of Chinese stock market development. That is, these are seen to 
have led to a more market-based financial system that has improved market efficiency in line 
policy makers’ objectives.  
This chapter is organised as follows. The objective and research questions are 
presented in section 8.2, whilst hypothesis development is provided in section 8.3. The 
research methods, data collection and regression results are presented in sections 8.4 and 
8.5. Finally, in section 8.6 there are the chapter conclusions.  
8.2 Research objective and questions 
Prior studies have reported the value relevance of accounting information in different 
countries. Bartov et al. (2001) probed whether the earnings or cash flows value relevance is 
different across the US, UK, Canada, Germany and Japan. They found that earnings in Anglo-
Saxon countries have greater explanatory power for stock returns than cash flows, whilst 
conversely, earnings in non-Anglo-Saxon ones do not. Arce and Mora (2002) investigated the 
differences in accounting practices between earnings and book value and the stock market 
value of the firm among eight European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain and the UK) from 1990-98, with 22,436 non-financial firm-
year observations. They found that earnings are more relevant than book value in investor-
orientated countries, whilst the opposite is the case in creditor-orientated ones. Arce and 
Mora (2002) asserted that accounting practices are affected both by different accounting 
rules and by different institutional factors. Moreover, they argued that the use of a common 
set of standards could mitigate the differences caused by the accounting rules, but not those 
caused by institutional and cultural factors. Both Bartov et al. (2001) and Arce and Mora (2002) 
studies, based on European and US capital market data, reported similar conclusions that 
earnings are more relevant in common law countries with an investor-orientated capital 
market than they are in code law countries with creditor-orientated one. Charitou et al. 
(2000), however, elicited that both earnings and cash flows are value relevant in Japan at 
much the same level as in the US market. For their study, they examined the explanatory 
power of earnings and cash flows on stocks returns by using data from Japanese stock market 
for the period 1984-93, with 6,662 firm-year observations. The Japanese financial market is 




In the Chinese context, Haw et al. (1999) investigated earnings value relevance by 
examining the information content of accounting earnings measured under the old Chinese 
GAAP based on A-shares over the period 1994-1997. They found that adjusted stock returns 
over short- or long-windows were significantly associated with the change of earnings and 
concluded that earnings provide useful information to investors in China. Chen and Wang 
(2004) examined the value relevance of operating earnings and below-the-line items to 
Chinese financial markets. They discovered that below-the-line items are overused to 
facilitate income-increases and frequently account for a large proportion of listed firms’ net 
income. They suggested that earnings components (including non-operating earnings 
component from below-the-line items) are impounded in stock prices as long as the 
components are persistent. Chen and Wang (2004) further explained the reason that stock 
prices impound special items as well as recurring earnings as being that, in China’s unique 
institutional environment the majority shareholders of listed firms are SOEs. Chinese 
investors place a higher valuation weight on below-the-line items, because SOEs are able to 
improve their bottom line earnings through such items whenever they need. That is, it is easy 
for state-owned unlisted parent firms to arrange nonoperating transactions to boost their 
listed subsidiaries’ earnings through below-the-line items. 
To compare the differnce of earnings value relevance under different accounting 
regimes in China, Chen et al. (2001) investigated value relevance in the A-share market as 
compared to the B-share market, 57  finding that accounting information is indeed value 
relevant in China’s domestic market. Whilst Sami and Zhou (2004) examined whether there 
is was a difference in the earnings value relevance under the old Chinese GAAP for A-share 
firms and IFRS for B-share firms. They elicited that the accounting information in the B-share 
market under IFRS is more value relevant than it was in the A-share market under the old 
Chinese GAAP. Liu and Liu (2007) also investigated the difference of value relevance of 
accounting information in China’s different stock segments by bringing H-share firms into 
their study. They similarly found that accounting information is value relevant in the different 
stock market segments and that it is more so in the B- and H-share markets (with accounting 
 




under IFRS) than in the A-share market. Lee et al. (2013) found that IFRS convergence 
significantly improved the value relevance of A-share firms’ accounting information. 
In terms of SSSR Liao et al. (2014) examined its privatisation effect on SOEs’ 
fundamental performance. They elicited that the output, profit, and employment increased 
after SSSR, especially for SOEs, whilst corporate governance and operating efficiency 
remained unchanged. They suggested that the improved performance of SOEs was due to the 
boosted stock market incentives by government agents who operate or control SOEs. They 
benefitted from the increasing of market values of state owned shares, so the government 
and the public investors became better aligned after SSSR. Hou et al. (2012) examined 
whether SSSR has improved the SOEs’ share price informativeness by enhancing corporate 
transparency. They found improved share price informativeness among those firms that were 
more sensitive to the impact of the reform. Both studies’ outcomes suggest that SOEs’ market 
performance improved after SSSR, one focusing on boosted stock market incentives, the 
other on information transparency. The findings are at variance with the suggestion of Wu 
and Patel (2015) that the boosted stock market incentives would lead to more market price 
manipulation, and that empirical findings need to be interpreted carefully.  
There has been no study; however, taking into consideration the timing between SSSR 
and IFRS adoption in China. The abovementioned studies neglected the joint impact of IFRS 
adoption and SSSR on earnings quality by simply separating time into two segments: pre- and 
post-2007 or pre- and post-2005. Lee et al. (2013) researched the value relevance of earnings 
quality under the impact of China’s adoption of IFRS-converged CAS and found that it 
improved after this implementation. In their paper; however, they failed to consider the 
impact from SSSR around the same period. The simple separation between pre-2007 and 
post-2007 to investigate the impact of IFRS adoption in China ignores the boosted stock 
market incentives and possible outcome of improved market efficiency resulting from SSSR 
completion. As a consequence, the findings are questionable as they are susceptible to 
variable bias. Conversely, studies investigating the impact of SSSR on earnings quality by 
separating the times into pre- and post-2005 neglect key transitions: completion of SSSR 
negotiations at the end of 2006; practical tradability of previous non-tradable shares after the 




study is designed to test earnings quality under the impact of China’s mandatory adoption of 
IFRS-converged CAS in 2007 together with the impact of non-tradable shares reform from 
2004 to 2009. As such, this is the first study to investigate earnings quality explicitly in the 
context of both reforms in China. The objective of this chapter is to examine the impact of 
IFRS convergence and the SSSR on earnings value relevance. To achieve this objective, the 
research questions addressed in this chapter are:  
Was there a change in earnings value relevance through the phases of the non-
tradable shares reform and in the transition from the old Chinese GAAP to IFRS-converged 
CAS? 
Was there a change in the earnings response coefficient through the phases of the 
non-tradable shares reform and in the transition from the old Chinese GAAP to IFRS-
converged CAS?  
8.3 Hypothesis development 
Following the previous chapters, in which earnings quality was investigated in terms of 
accruals quality, earnings persistence and timeliness, this chapter tests whether value 
relevance is enhanced after both of China’s stock market and accounting standards reforms. 
Lee et al. (2013) found that IFRS adoption significantly improved the value relevance of 
earnings among A-share firms, and concluded that the change of earnings quality from pre- 
to post-IFRS was due to the change of accounting regulation: IFRS adoption significantly 
increased earnings value relevance in China. Their study extensively considered the 
institutional issues, i.e. unbalanced regional development and the nature of major 
shareholders’ ownership structure under China’s circumstances. They did not, however, refer 
to the impact of SSSR on earnings value relevance. Most firms finished negotiation of SSSR at 
the end of 2006 and only A-share listed firms were subject to it, so the majority of Lee et al. 
(2013) sample was subject to the non-tradable share reform.  
For this study the impact of both IFRS-converged and SSSR is considered, with the 
period being divided into three overlapping sub-periods: (i) pre-IFRS convergence, with the 
arrival of the first phase of SSSR (2003-2006); (ii) adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, and 




SSSR in the post IFRS convergence period (2007-2010). This in order compare any changes in 
earnings value relevance with or without the impact of IFRS adoption and under the impact 
of SSSR in its different stages.  
Whether or not a change in accounting regulation, in particular, IFRS convergence, 
plays a determinant role in earnings quality is contested (Horton et al., 2013; Ahmed et al., 
2013; Capkun et al., 2012; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Barth et al., 2008). In terms of Chinese 
accounting standards, the old Chinese GAAP was rule-based and employed historical cost 
methods for preparing financial accounting information. After the mandatory adoption of 
principle-based IFRS-converged CAS, the major change was the use of fair value accounting. 
For example, under the old Chinese GAAP, a minority’s proportional interest was recognised 
at the carrying value of an acquiree’s identifiable assets and liabilities, whereas under IFRS-
converged CAS, the minority’s proportion interest was in the fair value of the acquiree’s 
identifiable assets and liabilities. As another example, subsequent measurement of 
investment property was at fair value, whereas this model was not permitted under the old 
GAAP. The movement towards fair value accounting from historical-cost accounting was 
expected to result in financial statements being more relevant, timely and transparent. 
A second substantial change is that IFRS-converged CAS required more extensive 
information disclosure. Under the old Chinese GAAP, there was no requirement to disclose 
related party transactions in the financial statements of a parent company, which were 
provided together with the consolidated financial statements. IFRS-converged CAS; however, 
requires such related party transaction information disclosure. Given the emphasis on the use 
of fair value and greater disclosure requirements prescribed under IFRS adopted CAS, it is 
predicted here that the new accounting standards in China would tend, ceteris paribus, to 
increase the value relevance of accounting information and better facilitate investors’ 
decision making. 
 After SSSR, all shares became tradable, thus awakening managers’ stock market 
incentives and improving market efficiency. The difference between tradable and non-
tradable shares was eliminated, and there was greater liquidity after shares are all tradable 
in the stock market after 2008 (Ma et al., 2018; De Bondt et al., 2011). Before the SSSR, the 




prices were influenced by the small portion of tradable shares held by minority shareholders 
with speculative incentives (often following news of political developments). By the end of 
2006, 98% of firms had reached agreement on completing the SSSR reform. However, the 
non-tradable shares remained in lock in for 24 months before becoming actually tradable on 
the financial market. So, it was only after the end of 2008 that the volume of actually tradable 
share increased on the stock market.58 Hence, at that time, the earnings would have been 
expected to have an increased relevance level to all outsider investors, rather than just 
holders of tradable shares. Given the discussion above, this study involves testing the impact 
of both reforms through three phases with three hypotheses as follows (explained in detail in 
the subsequent paragraphs): 
H8.1: In the first phase of SSSR, the association between earnings and share 
prices will strengthen (increase) and share prices will fall.  
The findings from Chapter 5 suggest that the incentive to drive down earnings had 
been acted up by managing earnings downwards in the first phase of SSSR, leading to reduced 
earnings quality. In the context of an illiquid and inefficient share market in this period, with 
an incentive for managers to drive down share prices through downward earnings 
management, the association between earnings and share prices is predicted to increase 
while the level of prices decreases alongside decreasing earnings. 
H8.2 In the second phase of SSSR, the association between earnings and share 
prices will strengthen (increase) and share prices will rise.  
The findings from Chapter 5 also suggest that the incentive to drive up earnings had 
been acted upon by managing earnings upwards in the second phase of SSSR, leading again 
to reduced earnings quality. Again, in the context of an illiquid and inefficient market, with an 
incentive for managers to drive up share prices through upward earnings management, the 
association between earnings and share prices is predicted to increase while the level of 
prices increases alongside increased earnings. 
 




H8.3 In the third phase of SSSR, the association between earnings and share 
prices will weaken (decrease) and share prices will fall.  
The findings from Chapter 5 in the third phase of SSSR indicate that the incentive to 
drive down earnings had been acted upon by managing earnings downwards, again reducing 
earnings quality. In this phase, however, the trading restrictions on previously non-tradable 
shares are gone, and so the level of liquidity in and efficiency of the market improves. Here, 
in the context of an increasingly liquid and efficient market, share price is less manipulatable 
via earnings management. This study predicts, therefore, that the association between 
earnings and share prices is decreased in the final phase of the SSSR implementation. 
The key methodological issue is whether or not improved earnings value relevance 
indicates an enhanced accounting quality after China’s IFRS adoption and SSSR. In this context, 
increasing value relevance is not susceptible to traditional interpretation.  
The objective of non-tradable share reform was to transform non-tradable shares into 
tradable ones so as to solve the problems of capital shortage in SOEs; to promote the 
governance quality and marketability of SOEs; and to allow for the allocation of capital raised 
from the stock market to the SOEs’ government funds (Yang et al., 2015). The reform was 
strongly driven by the incentives of government agents to boost SOEs’ financial performance, 
with a governmental expectation of be able to stimulate improvement their operating 
efficiency without fundamentally changing their ownership structure (Firth et al., 2010). Non-
tradable share reforms had been attempted several times without success. After the earlier 
failures, the State Council suggested that reform should respect market rules, and exercise 
diligence in protecting investors’ rights and interests. Accordingly, SSSR included provision for 
negotiation of compensation to mitigate the impact on the holders of tradable shares of a 
large increase in the tradable share supply. 
Based on the phases of SSSR implementation, for this study, the data are divided into 
three overlapping sub-periods (please refer to Table 8.1, which is Table 1.1 reproduced below 
for convenience). The first is from 2003 to 2006, which was free from the impact of China’s 
IFRS adoption in 2007 and includes, in 2005-2006, the negotiation period in which 




this negotiation period, managers had the incentive to drive down share price, so that SOEs 
minimised the compensation they were obliged to pay to external shareholders. The second 
sub-period is from 2005 to 2008, which included transition from the SSSR negotiation period 
to a post-negotiation lock-in period as well as, in parallel, the transition to IFRS-converged 
CAS. Compensation agreements were reached for most SOEs by the end of 2006, after which 
non-tradable shares remained non-tradable for 24 months until the end of 2008 (the lock-in 
period). During this lock-in period, managers had the incentive to drive up share prices, so 
that SOE received the maximum amount from sale of shares once the lock-in period ended. 
The final sub-period is from 2007 to 2010, containing the transition, in a post-IFRS context, 
from the lock-in period to all A-shares freely being tradable in the market. In the post lock-in 
period, once (some) previously non-tradable shares had been sold, managers had incentives 
to drive down the share price again, so that SOEs could buy back shares at a lower price than 
that at which they were sold, thereby creating gains whilst maintaining (or re-establishing) 
government ownership levels.  
If the above hypotheses are borne out, then improved earnings value relevance 
around the first two phases of the SSSR implementation resulted from management 
incentives to manage earnings and making sure that earnings figures were reflected in the 
stock market. Accordingly, stock price would have declined during 2005-2006, rise again from 
2007-2008, and declined after early 2009. As found in earlier chapters, tested, accounting 
based earnings quality declined during the study period. Hence, improved association of 
earnings and share prices is not evidence that earnings quality is enhanced, but rather, 










8.4 Research method 
Francis and Schipper (1999) suggested that the stronger association between accounting 
numbers and stock price reflects a higher value relevance of accounting information. In line 
with this, value relevance is defined as the association between accounting numbers and 
share prices and returns. Both a price model and the earnings response coefficient (ERC) are 
employed for value relevance analysis. 
8.4.1 Empirical models 
Following the prior research reviewed in Chapter 4, for this study, firstly the Ohlson (1995) 
price valuation model is employed, as follows:  
Table 8.1: SSSR phases and related management incentive predictions  









SSSR phase 1: negotiation period. 
Managers had the incentive to 
drive down share price, so that 
the local SOE hierarchy minimised 
the compensation it was obliged 
to pay to external shareholders 
2007-2008 
SSSR phase 2: lock-in period: 
managers had incentives to drive 
up share prices, so that local SOE 
hierarchy received the maximum 
amount from sale of shares once 
the lock-in period ended 
2007-2010 
Post-IFRS-convergence: 
Possible influences: (i) EQ-
increasing impact of IFRS in 
general, albeit not universal; 
(ii) EQ-decreasing under the 
impact of IFRS-convergence in 
China: weak legal 
enforcement, strong 
management incentives, lack 
of (minority) investors’ 
protection, heavy government 
intervention, not a full 
adoption of IFRS 
2009-2010 
SSSR phase 3: post lock-in period 
and post-sale of SOE shares. 
Managers had the incentive to 
drive down share prices, so that 
the local SOE hierarchy could buy 
back shares at a lower price than 
that at which it sold them, thus 




!!" = ## + #$%!&!" + #%'(!&!" + )!"																						(8.1) 
where, P is per share price three months after the year end59, EPS is earnings per share 
and BVPS is book value per share. All three variables are scaled by year opening share price.  
Given the setting and objectives of this study, intercept and slope dummy variables 
are employed to determine the relationship between regulatory reforms and the association 
between accounting numbers and market prices. Thus, Model (8.1) is modified as follows: 
!!" = ## + #$012 + #%%!&!" + #&%!&!" ∗ 012 + #''(!&!" + #('(!&!" ∗ 012
+ )!"																																																																																						(8.2)								 
where, DUM represents dummy variables SSSR1 (model estimated from 2003-2006), 
IFRS_SSSR2 (model estimated from 2005-2008) and SSSR3 (model run for 2007-2010) in turn. 
These dummy variables are used to capture change in regime within the three overlapping 
time periods described above. The dummy variables are defined as follows, whilst their use is 
summarised and explained in previous Table 5.2. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003, 2004 and = 1 for 2005, 
2006, whilst IFRS_SSSR2 = 0 for 2005, 2006, = 1 for 2007, 2008. SSSR3 = 0 for 2007, 2008; = 1 
for 2009, 2010. 
Panel data firm fixed effect estimators with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
are applied to estimate Model (8.2). The model examines the extent to which share price can 
be explained by earnings and book value of equity. The coefficients #% and #' capture base-
case sensitivity of share price to earnings and book value, whilst the coefficient #& and #( 
capture the impact of movement through the SSSR implementation phases and IFRS adoption 
on the relevance of earnings and book value of equity. 
 
59 For prior research, stock prices [returns] six months after the year end have been adopted [18 month 
returns] (Harris et al. 1994), five months after the year end [17 month returns] (Bartov et al. 2001) and three 
months after the year end [15 month returns] (Francis and Shipper 1999). Kothari and Sloan (1992) first 
proposed the calculation of returns by using the overlapping period based on the notion that prices lead 
earnings, and so return calculations with overlapping periods can provide stronger results. For this study, stock 




Further, there is investigation of the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for value 
relevance (or ‘returns relevance’). Following Harris et al. (1994) and Lev and Zarowin (1999), 
the basic ERC model is as follows: 
5!" = 6# + 6$%!&!" + 6%∆%!&!" + )!"																	(8.3) 
where, 5!" is 15 month return to three months after the year, including both dividend 
and capital gains end adjusted by the dividend, (*!+*!"#)-.!*!"#
; EPS is earnings per share deflated 
by year opening share price; and ∆%!&!" is the change in EPS deflated by year opening share 
price. Model (8.4) examines the association between stock returns and the level and change 
in level of earnings: a stronger association suggests that earnings and the market/investors 
are ‘more similarly’ reflecting events and stimuli; and, given the use of 15 month returns, that 
earnings are better being reflected in market prices. The sum of (6$ + 6%)  reflects the 
average change in the stock price associated with a dollar change in earnings (Lev and Zarowin 
(1999). Lev and Zarowin (1999) suggested that a low slope coefficient refers to a low response 
from the market to reported earnings and implies that investors believe reported earnings 
are possibly transitory or manipulated. A large change in stock price associated with reported 
earnings reflects investors believing that reported earnings are accurate and permanent. 
Hence, a low slope coefficient implies low informativeness of reported earnings, whilst a high 
slop one reflects high informativeness of reported earnings. 
To simplify the interpretation of the model output, Model (8.3) is rearranged as 
follows: 
5!" = 6# + 6$%!&!" + 6%(%!&!" − %!&!"+$) + )!"																	(8.3.1) 
⇒5!" = 6# + 6$%!&!" + 6%%!&!" − 6%%!&!"+$ + )!"																										(8.3.2) 
⇒5!" = 6# + (6$ + 6%)%!&!" − 6%%!&!"+$ + )!"																																													(8.3.3) 
So, Model (8.3) can now be written as: 




In Model (8.4), #$  is (6$ + 6%)  from Model (8.3), which is the coefficient Lev and 
Zarowin (1999) used for ERC; #% from Model (8.4) is (−6%) in Model (8.3). By directly using 
Model (8.4), #$  is directly tested as the ERC, with a higher #$ , under conventional 
interpretation, reflecting higher informativeness of reported earnings. In expression 8.3, 
standard expectations would be that both 6$ and 6% are positive. Hence, in 8.4, #$ = 6$ +
6% would be expected to be positive and #% = −6% would be expected to be negative. 
For this study, Model (8.4) is modified to incorporate a dummy intercept and slope 
variables: 
5!" = ## + #$%!&!" + #%%!&!"+$ + #&012 + #'%!&!" ∗ 012 + #(%!&!"+$ ∗ 012
+ )!"														(8.5) 
where, DUM represents dummy variables SSSR1 (model estimated for 2003-2006), 
IFRS_SSSR2 (model estimated from 2005-2008) and SSSR3 (model run for 2007-2010) in turn. 
Both the price and ERC model for earnings value (returns) relevance analysis are 
included in order to examine the impact of SSSR implementation and IFRS convergence. 
Regressions are run as panel estimations with fixed effects.60  
8.4.2 Data 
The data collection has been extended from that described in Chapter 5. Since this Chapter 
investigates the earnings value relevance, financial firms, utility firms and construction firms 
are all included in the sample. Table 8.3 shows the definition of the extra variables used in 





60 This is after appropriate testing as to the correct form for estimation, with pooled ordinary least squares and 
panel estimation with random effects being found in all cases to be inappropriate. STATA ‘testparm’ is used for 
the Hausman test as regards time fixed effects or random effects. Results for the both value relevance and ERC 
models (for each of the three overlapping sub-periods) yield Prob>F=0.000, so the null that the coefficients for 




Table 8.2: Definition of variables  
P P is per share price three months after fiscal year end 
EPS Earnings per share at fiscal year end 
BVPS Book value per share at year end 
Return 15-month return to three months after the year end, subsuming capital gain 
and dividend(s) 
∆"#$ Change of earnings per share from year t-1 to t 
8.5 Results  
The following three subsections, 8.5.1, 8.5.2 and 8.5.3, provide a comprehensive and 
detailed report on the data and results – both univariate and multivariate regression ones. 
Subsection 8.5.4 then highlights and discusses the key results. 
8.5.1 The pattern of value relevance and ERC  
Figure 8.1 shows that share prices, on average61, do not appear to be positively associated 
with earnings per share over the period 2003-2010. Indeed, mean price and mean EPS move 
in opposite directions as often as they move in the same direction. The graph suggests that 
the average firms’ share prices in the Chinese stock market performed better in the post-2007 
period, and even at the lowest point in 2009, the average share price was higher than the 
highest average price before 2007, in 2004. The average earnings per share increased to its 
highest point in 2007 and then reversed in 2008. The changes of share price in testing period 
are consistent with the predictions that firstly, there was an incentive to drive down the share 
price at phase one during the negotiation period and then, there was an incentive to drive up 
the share price at phase two during the lock-in period. Finally, there was an incentive to drive 





61 The means of share price in Figure 8.1 refer to the change of aggregated means during the testing period 
and clearly, they have different nominal values, representing different proportions of ownership of different 




 Figure 8.1: The pattern of share price and EPS in Chinese A-share firms 
 
Figure 8.2 shows the pattern of market returns and earnings per share. It seems that 
the mean of market returns was better (positively) associated with mean earnings per share 
from 2004-2008 than was the mean price. The market return reached its highest point when 
the share price was its lowest, in 2009. This is consistent with assumption that non-tradable 
shareholders gained high returns after the shares first became tradable by selling high and 
repurchasing low to benefit themselves62. After all the shares transited to tradable, pre-non-
tradable shareholders, as the majority controlling shareholders with their appointed 
managers, had manipulative powers to benefit the group they represented. If this was the 



















   Figure 8.2: The pattern of market returns and EPS in Chinese A-share firms  
  
 
8.5.2 Univariate analysis 
Table 8.4 represents the summary statistics of the variables used in the earnings value 
relevance and ERC estimations. Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 clearly lay out the setting of the 
different phases in SSSR. SSSR phase 1, the negotiation period from 2005 to 2006; phase 2, 
the lock-in period from 2007 to 2008; and phase 3, the free trading of previously untradeable 
shares.  From the pre-SSSR period to phase 1 negotiation period, the mean of share prices 
significantly decreased from ¥9.663 to ¥5.339 (significant at -4.324***63). From phase 1 to 
phase 2 of SSSR, there was a dramatic increase in mean of share price to ¥14.211 (significant 
at 8.872***), which is consistent with the Figure 8.1 the mean of share prices experienced a 
large increase from 2006 to 2008. From SSSR phase 2 to phase 3, the mean of share prices 
increased just from ¥14.211 to ¥14.860 (0.649**[*]).  
 
63 In the interests of brevity, the notation *** represents significance at the 1% level; ** significance at the 5% 
level; and * significance at the 10% level. If (some) significance ‘stars’ are placed in square brackets (e.g. [*]), 
they represent improved significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test was adopted. The hypotheses of this 
chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, 
















Table 8.4 shows that the Chinese stock market experienced a dramatic boost straight 
after IFRS adoption and transition to the second phase of SSSR, which was not the case pre-
IFRS adoption. Moreover, average share price reached its lowest point after SSSR was 
announced and during its first phase: the negotiation period. In this period, it was predicted 
that managers would have an incentive to manage earnings and share prices downward. The 
significant decline in share price (-4.324***), from pre-SSSR1: 2003-2004 to the first phase of 
SSSR: 2005-2006, supports this prediction.  
After transition from the phase 1: negotiation period to phase 2: lock-in period, it was 
predicted that managers would have the incentive to manage earnings upwards. Table 8.4 
reveals that average share price significantly increased 8.872***. It was further predicted that 
share prices would then fall in phase 3 after the end of the lock-in period. Table 8.4 shows a 
significant drop of share prices 0.649***, which is at consistent with the prediction. As can be 
seen in Figure 8.1, average share price declined dramatically in 2009. 
Given the close alignment of the univariate data with expectations, it appears that the 
changes seen in market- and accounting-based performance relate principally to reform of 
the regulatory environment, rather than any fundamental change in economic conditions 
facing listed firms over the period of this study.64 The focus moves on now to testing the 




64 Recall also China’s remarkable insulation from the effects of the global financial crisis – maintaining GDP 



















 Mean Median St Dev Obs Mean Median St Dev Obs Mean Median St Dev Obs. Mean 
 
Median St Dev Obs 
P 9.665 8.59 4.242 2465 5.339 4.340 3.766 2649 14.211 10.785 11.642 2804 14.860 11.02 13.342 3299 
R -0.060 -0.099 0.264 1186 -0.248 -0.308 0.310 2454 0.815 0.615 0.926 2536 0.157 0.039 0.605 2977 
EPS 0.125 0.149 0.633 2611 0.131 0.141 0.583 2781 0.310 0.233 0.725 3111 0.402 0.311 0.554 3857 
BVPS 3.014 2.938 1.797 2611 2.853 2.828 1.936 2781 3.317 3.055 2.428 3111 4.183 3.455 3.321 3857 
!"#!"# 0.137 0.138 0.527 2531 0.098 0.137 0.693 2701 0.290 0.217 0.565 2959 0.283 0.223 0.701 3442 
This table presents summary statistics of variables used in the earnings value relevance analyses (mean, median, standard deviation and the number of observations. All 




8.5.3 Regression results – detailed report 
This subsection provides a comprehensive report on the results, whilst the next one draws 
out and discusses the key ones. Chinese firms’ performance has historically been measured 
based entirely on their profitability. The adoption of fair value measurement and other 
accounting changes with IFRS convergence, together with increased market liquidity after 
SSSR, might, in a conventional setting, be expected to lead to an increase in earnings value 
relevance. The phasing of SSSR, however, is key here and hence, this is separated into: (i) pre-
SSSR, pre-IFRS convergence; (ii) SSSR phase 1 (negotiation phase), still pre-IFRS convergence 
(with associated dummy variable SSSR1); (iii) SSSR phase 2 (lock-in phase) and IFRS 
convergence (with associated dummy variable IFRS_SSSR2); (iv) SSSR phase 3 (SSSR complete, 
free trading of previously non-tradeable shares), post-IFRS-convergence (with associated 
dummy variable SSSR3).  
Pre-SSSR to SSSR phase 1: 2003-2006 
Over the period 2003-2006, there was no impact from a change of accounting standards: IFRS-
converged CAS came into force with effect from 2007. The first column of Table 8.4 presents 
the results of the estimation of value relevance Model (8.2) based on firm-year observations 
from 2003 to 2006. The second and third columns of Table 8.4 show the results of the 
estimation performed separately for Non-ST firm-years and ST firm-years, whilst the fourth 
and fifth columns of the Table 8.4 provide those for the estimation performed separately for 
Non-SOE firm-years and SOE firm-years. The estimated coefficients on SSSR1 as an intercept 
dummy and its interactions as a slope dummy reveal the impact of firms embarking upon the 
first phase of SSSR, i.e. the negotiation phase. 
From the base case (2003-2004) estimation in the first column of Table 8.4, earnings 
(EPS) are negatively and significantly associated with share price (-0.320***), so the higher 
the earnings the lower the share price; and equity book value (BVPS) is positively related with 
share price (0.55***). The result on BVPS is as expected, but that on EPS is contrary to what 
would conventionally be expected. In the Chinese 2003-2004 setting, however, it is consistent 
with the market being illiquid and inefficient, and there being little incentive for managers to 




The estimated coefficient on SSSR1 (-4.564***) shows significant reduction in share 
prices after the transition to the first (negotiation) phase of the SSSR. At the same time, there 
is a significance increase the association between earnings and share price, ‘earnings value 
relevance’, the estimated coefficient SSSR1xEPS being 0.607***. These results support 
hypothesis H8.1, being consistent with management driving down earnings and share prices 
in the first phase on SSSR implementation in China’s illiquid and inefficient financial market. 
The estimated coefficient on SSSR1xBVPS is not significant. For the SSSR negotiation phase 
(2005-2006), the estimated aggregate coefficient on earnings (coefficient on EPS plus that on 
SSSR1xEPS) is significant and positive, being 0.287*** (as set out in summary Table 8.10), 
confirming the establishment of a conventional link between earnings and prices in that phase. 
Whilst the estimated aggregate coefficient on book values remains positive and significant, 
being 0.581*** (Table 8.10). 
The second to fifth columns of Table 8.4 reveal that the foregoing result as regards 
significant reduction in share price during SSSR phase 1, holds for firms whether they are Non-
ST or ST as well as whether they are Non-SOE or SOE. Similarly, regarding the result of base 
case estimation of the coefficient on BVPS, this is significant and positive. Moreover, the 
estimated aggregate coefficient on book values remains positive and significant after during 
phase 1 of SSSR. For the estimated coefficients on EPS in the base case, the foregoing result 
of negative and significant is repeated for ST, Non-SOE and SOE firms, while that for Non-ST 
firms is insignificant. The result as regards the estimated coefficient on SSSR1xEPS, positive 
and significant, is repeated both for Non-ST firms and for SOEs, whilst the coefficient is 









Table 8.4: Estimations of the value-relevance model (Model 8.2): firm years 2003-06 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
EPS -0.320*** 0.283[*] -0.461*** -0.376**[*] -0.265*[*] 
 (0.112) (0.267) (0.124) (0.170) (0.153) 
BVPS 0.590*** 0.511*** 0.736*** 0.731*** 0.478*** 
 (0.060) (0.081) (0.089) (0.096) (0.078) 
SSSR1 -4.564*** -4.654*** -4.540*** -4.617*** -4.578*** 
 (0.151) (0.215) (0.209) (0.252) (0.189) 
SSSR1*EPS 0.607*** 1.385*** 0.081 0.067 1.193*** 
 (0.158) (0.294) (0.183) (0.242) (0.214) 
SSSR1*BVPS -0.009 -0.038 -0.126 -0.102 0.012 
 (0.049) (0.068) (0.078) (0.084) (0.061) 
Constant 8.102*** 8.422*** 7.186*** 8.190*** 8.206*** 
 (0.183) (0.264) (0.210) (0.280) (0.242) 
Observations 5,107 3,822 1,285 1,738 3,369 
R-squared 0.340 0.338 0.439 0.322 0.362 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2006 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-
2004; 1 for 2005-2006. All variables as defined in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Estimations performed 
in STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] 
represents improved significance if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The 
hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is 
permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets as described is simply in order to 
convey completely the nature of the significance. 
 
Arrival of IFRS-converged CAS and transition from phase 1 to phase 2 in the SSSR: 2005-2008 
In this sub-period, there was a concurrent transition to IFRS-converged CAS and from phase 
1 (convergence) to phase 2 (lock-in period). From the beginning of 2007, when IFRS-
converged CAS came into force, non-tradable shares remained untradeable (locked in) for 
two years. Over this lock-in period, management group had the incentive to drive the share 
prices upwards, in order to be able to sell high when the non-tradeable shares became 
tradeable. 
The first column of Table 8.5 shows that in the base case, again, EPS is significantly 
and negatively associated with share price, the estimated coefficient on EPS being -2.002***, 
while here the estimated coefficient on BVPS, albeit positive, is not significant. In the 
transition from phase 1 (negotiation) to phase 2 (lock-in) of the SSSR, contemporaneous with 
IFRS-converged CAS coming into force, there is a significant increase share prices, as 




the association between earnings and price is significantly strengthened, with an estimated 
coefficient for IFRS_SSSR2xEPS at 4.249***; whereas that between book value and price, 
namely IFRS_SSSR2xBVPS is estimated at 0.662***. Hence, during the second phase of the 
SSSR implementation, and with IFRS adoption, there is evidence of both increasing market 
prices and continued strengthening of the association between earnings and prices (earnings 
value relevance) and that between book values and prices, which supports hypothesis H8.2. 
This is consistent with management driving up both earnings and share prices in the second 
phase of SSSR implementation in China’s illiquid and inefficient financial market, and as 
predicted by the incentives introduced by the SSSR implementation process. It cannot be 
asserted, however, that the results are driven entirely by SSSR-related incentives and actions. 
There is the concurrent arrival of IRFS-converged CAS, which may well have an effect. 
Evidence on the impact of IFRS adoption internationally is mixed, and China’s convergence 
with IFRS was far from being full adoption, so the magnitude of the boost to the 
earnings/price and earnings/book value associations resulting from IFRS should be viewed 
with caution given the simultaneous of the SSSR. They cannot, however, fully be discounted; 
and it must be concluded that the results here are produced by a joint SSSR- and IFRS-related 
effect.  
In the post IFRS-convergence/SSSR lock-in phase (2007-2008), the estimated 
aggregate coefficient on earnings is significant and positive, being 2.247*** (as set out in 
summary Table 8.10), whilst the estimated aggregate coefficient on book values becomes 
significant at 0.693*** (Table 8.10), thereby confirming the strengthening of a conventional 
link between earnings and prices in that phase. As regards Non-ST versus ST firms and Non-
SOE versus SOE firms, the second to fifth columns of Table 8.5 are relevant. The foregoing 
2005-2006 base case results of a significantly negative estimate of the coefficient on EPS and 
a significantly positive coefficient on BVPS are borne out in the sub-divided estimation 
samples, except in that the estimated coefficient on BVPS for Non-ST firms is insignificant. 
The result of a significant increase of prices, as between the pre IFRS-convergence/SSSR phase 
1 period and the post IFRS-convergence/SSSR phase 2, is repeated across Non-ST, ST, Non-
SOE and SOE firms taken separately, as is the strengthening of the relationship between book 
values and prices. This is largely the case also regarding the association between earnings and 




The results presented in Tables 8.4 and 8.5 suggest that the impact of the 2007 
transition (IFRS convergence/move to SSSR phase 2) was more consistent/comprehensive, as 
regards earnings value relevance, than that of the 2005 transition (commencing the SSSR in 
the pre IFRS convergence period): the estimated coefficient for IFRS_SSSR2xEPS is positive 
and significant across four of the five columns of results in Table 8.5 – the exception being the 
estimation for ST firms.  
Table 8.5: Estimations of the value-relevance model (Model 8.2): firm years 2005-08 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All  Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
EPS -2.002*** -2.382*** -0.668*** -1.500*** -2.057*** 
 (0.273) (0.503) (0.162) (0.317) (0.417) 
BVPS 0.031 -0.046 0.854*** -0.447*** 0.331** 
 (0.112) (0.150) (0.103) (0.136) (0.162) 
IFRS_SSSR2 4.579*** 3.859*** 4.875*** 5.012*** 4.111*** 
 (0.297) (0.433) (0.204) (0.352) (0.438) 
IFRS_SSSR2*EPS 4.249*** 8.534*** -0.223 3.085*** 5.913*** 
 (0.338) (0.531) (0.253) (0.396) (0.508) 
IFRS_SSSR2*BVPS 0.662*** 0.437*** 0.213**[*] 0.500*** 0.649*** 
 (0.095) (0.135) (0.088) (0.115) (0.139) 
Constant 6.088*** 7.248*** 2.303*** 8.089*** 4.794*** 
 (0.332) (0.483) (0.180) (0.385) (0.493) 
Observations 5,447 4,298 1,149 1,966 3,481 
R-squared 0.340 0.414 0.431 0.213 0.425 
Based on firm-year observations 2005-2008 from Chinese listed firms. IFRS_SSSR2 = 0 for 2005-
2006; 1 for 2007-2008. All variables as defined in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Estimations performed in 
STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets 
as described is simply in order to convey completely the nature of the significance. 
 
Completion of the SSSR in the post IFRS-convergence period: 2007-2010 
In this sub-period, SSSR is completed at the end of 2008. At this point, the SSSR lock-in period 
ends, and previously non-tradeable A shares became tradeable (what is called SSSR phase 3 
in this research). At this point, there was no change in accounting standards, since IFRS-
converged CAS came into force with effect from the beginning of 2007. 
The first column of Table 8.6 presents the results of the estimation of value relevance 




coefficients for both EPS and BVPS are significant and positive (being 0.415*[*] and 0.709***, 
respectively), which is what might conventionally be expected. The estimated coefficient on 
SSSR3 (-2.306***) shows significant reduction in share prices after the completion of the SSSR. 
At the same time, the association between earnings and prices significantly decreases (with 
an estimated coefficient of SSSR3xEPS at -1.400***), as does that between book values and 
process (-0.474*** estimated as the coefficient on SSSR3xBVPS). These results support 
hypothesis H8.3, being consistent with management driving down earnings and prices, but in 
an increasing liquid and efficient market, with a weakening association between 
earnings/book values with market prices. In the post-SSSR implementation period (2008-
2010), the estimated aggregate coefficient on earnings is significant and negative at -
9.8400**[*] (as set out in summary Table 8.10), consistent with the reversal/loss of a 
conventional link between earnings and price. Moreover, the estimated aggregate coefficient 
on book values remains positive and significant, but is reduced to 0.235*[*] (Table 8.10). 
The second to fifth columns of Table 8.6 report estimations based on Non-ST versus 
ST firm-years and Non-SOE versus SOE firm-years. The foregoing 2007-2008 base case results 
for the EPS coefficient are not well duplicated: whilst the estimated coefficient on EPS for 
Non-ST firms is positive and significant, that for ST firms is negative and significant. In addition, 
there is weak significance in the (albeit positive) estimates for SOE firms and no significance 
in the estimates for Non-SOEs. As regards the estimated coefficients for BVPS, the results are 
consistent across all five columns. A significant drop prices occurs between SSSR phase 2 and 
SSSR phase 3, which is also repeated across Non-ST, ST, Non-SOE and SOE firms, when taken 
separately. For Non-ST firms and SOEs, the earnings/price and book value/price associations 
are weakened after 2008, consistent with the main results presented in the first columns. For 
ST firms, whilst the book value/price association fell significantly, as with the main result, the 
earnings/price association strengthened, but as with the base case, this was negative. For 
Non-SOE firms, again, the book value/price association fell significantly, as with the main 






Table 8.6: Estimations of the value-relevance model (Model 8.2): firm years 2007-10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
EPS 0.415*[*] 2.576*** -0.857*** 0.345 0.472[*] 
 (0.247) (0.423) (0.173) (0.313) (0.405) 
BVPS 0.709*** 0.482*** 0.791*** 0.369** 1.003*** 
 (0.109) (0.129) (0.147) (0.154) (0.156) 
SSSR3 -2.306*** -2.788*** -1.348*** -3.238*** -1.300*** 
 (0.336) (0.457) (0.262) (0.497) (0.455) 
SSSR3*EPS -1.400*** -2.813*** 0.596*[*] -1.059[*] -1.189**[*] 
 (0.433) (0.599) (0.319) (0.742) (0.553) 
SSSR3*BVPS -0.474*** -0.244*[*] -0.506*** -0.589*** -0.576*** 
 (0.103) (0.135) (0.120) (0.172) (0.133) 
Constant 11.969*** 12.928*** 7.588*** 14.464*** 10.025*** 
 (0.359) (0.466) (0.236) (0.479) (0.524) 
Observations 4,354 3,560 794 1,716 2,638 
R-squared 0.150 0.221 0.148 0.055 0.241 
Based on firm-year observations 2007-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR3 = 0 for 2007-2008; 
1 for 2009-2010. All variables as defined in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Estimations performed in STATA 
as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square 
brackets, as described, is simply in order to convey completely the nature of the significance. 
Notable amongst the many results presented in the three sub-periods above, and in 
Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6, is that the change in the earnings/price association65 for ST firms is 
less significant and/or contrary to the main results for all firms. This strongly suggests that 
management ability successfully to act on incentives to push earnings manipulation through 
into prices was reduced in respect of firms facing market listing issues. 
Moving from value relevance on to earnings response models 
2003-2006 
The first column of Table 8.7 presents the results of estimation of earnings response Model 
8.5 based on firm-year observations for 2003-2006. The second and third columns of Table 
8.7 show the results of the estimation performed separately for Non-ST firm-years and ST 
firm-years, whilst the fourth and fifth columns of the table show those for the estimation 
performed separately for Non-SOE firm-years and SOE firm-years. As previously, the 
 




estimated coefficients on SSSR1 as an intercept dummy and its interactions as a slope dummy 
reveal the impact of firms embarking upon the first phase of the SSSR (the negotiation phase). 
The coefficient estimated on EPS in the model is known as the earnings response coefficient 
(ERC), which is another important measure of earnings quality, which refers to the extent of 
decision usefulness of earnings in equity valuation (Dechow et al., 2010).  
According to the base case (2003-2004) estimation in the first column of Table 8.8, the 
ERC is significant and positive (coefficient estimated on EPS is 0.066***), as would 
conventionally be expected: an increase in earnings per share is associated with a higher 
equity return. But contrary to conventional expectations, 66  the estimated coefficient on 
lagged EPS is also positive and significant at 0.281***, which suggests that there was not a 
conventional relationship earnings/return relationship at this point. With the transition to the 
first phase of SSSR, the ERC is significantly increased (estimated coefficient on SSSR1xEPS is 
0.054**), and the estimated coefficient on lagged EPS is significantly decreased (by -0.216***) 
– consistent with establishment of a more conventional link between earnings and market 
returns. Also, over this transition, the level of equity returns reduces significantly (the 
estimate coefficient on SSSR1 being -0.159***). These results add further support for 
hypothesis H8.1. The results in the second to fifth columns of Table 8.7 are qualitatively 
similar, except that: the estimated coefficients of EPS, albeit positive, are not significant for 
ST firms or Non-SOEs, whilst that for SSSR1xEPS is negative and significant for Non-ST firms 












Lev and Zarowin (1999) suggested that a large change in stock price associated with 
reported earnings reflects investors’ belief that reported earnings are accurate and 
permanent. Appendix 8.1 shows the results of estimation of the Lev and Zarowin (1999) 
model, Model (8.3) in this study, augmented with SSSR1 as an intercept and slope dummy. 
The estimated coefficient on reported earnings is 0.346*** for 2003-2004, but the declines 
to 0.161*** in phase 1 of SSSR. A conventional ‘Lev and Zarowin (1999)’ type interpretation 
would be that this suggests investors realised that earnings were being manipulated during 
the first phase of SSSR. The estimated negative and significant coefficient on DEPS in the base 
case is, however, itself unconventional; and is offset by +0.261*** during the negotiation 
phase of SSSR. The overall result, therefore, is one of a response ‘swing’ from EPS response 
(ERC) to reduced mistrust in DEPS (which may be regarded as earnings innovation. The SSSR1 
coefficient estimate is again negative and significant, in further support of H8.1. The 
Table 8.7: Estimations of ERC model (Model 8.5): firm years 2003-06 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var:  All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
EPS 0.066*** 0.417*** 0.025 0.014 0.113*** 
 (0.017) (0.054) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026) 
EPSt-1 0.281*** 0.352*** 0.205*** 0.214*** 0.338*** 
 (0.029) (0.047) (0.041) (0.037) (0.042) 
SSSR1 -0.159*** -0.137*** -0.165*** -0.134*** -0.168*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.023) (0.018) (0.016) 
SSSR1*EPS 0.054**[*] -0.110** 0.048*[*] 0.087*** 0.037 
 (0.021) (0.052) (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) 
SSSR1*EPSt-1 -0.216*** -0.142*** -0.159*** -0.184*** -0.238*** 
 (0.031) (0.053) (0.044) (0.040) (0.045) 
Constant -0.105*** -0.209*** -0.117*** -0.141*** -0.102*** 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) 
Observations 3,725 2,788 937 1,251 2,474 
R-squared 0.161 0.191 0.179 0.152 0.173 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2006 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-2004; 1 
for 2005-2006. All variables as defined in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Estimations performed in STATA as 
panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, 
if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so 
adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets as described is 




estimation results shown in the second to fifth columns of the table in Appendix 1, for Non-
ST, ST, Non-SOE and SOE firms, respectively, are qualitatively similar.  
2005-2008 
Table 8.8 shows the results of the estimation for Model (8.5) for 2005-2008. In the first 
column for estimation based on all firm-years from 2005-2008, the estimated coefficient on 
EPS (the ERC) at 0.076**, is positive and significant, as would conventionally be expected. This 
is augmented by 0.192*** after the 2007 transition to IFRS-converged CAS and the second 
phase of SSSR. The estimated coefficient on lagged EPS is also positive and significant, but this 
is overwhelmed by a larger negative and significant increment after the 2007 transitions. 
These results are consistent with a strengthening association between earnings and market 
returns as well as an increasingly conventional link between earnings and market returns. 
During this transition, the level of equity returns increased significantly (the estimate 
coefficient on IFRS_SSSR2 being 1.113***), results that add support for hypothesis H8.2. The 
results are qualitatively similar in the second to fifth columns of Table 8.8, except that: the 
estimated coefficients of EPS, albeit positive, are not significant for ST firms or Non-SOEs; the 
estimated coefficient on lagged EPS is not significant for Non-SOEs; the estimated coefficient 
on SSSR1xEPS is positive, but insignificant, for ST firms; and the estimated coefficient on 
SSSR1x(lagged EPS) is insignificant for ST firms. As commented upon earlier in this sub-section, 
attribution of the results either to IFRS-convergence alone or to SSSR progress alone is 
problematic. Hence, it is concluded that these results are produced by a joint SSSR-related 
and IFRS-related effect.  
The results of the ‘Lev and Zarowin-based’ estimations for 2005-2008 are set out in 
the table in Appendix 8.2. They overall show a response ‘swing’ from EPS response (ERC) to 
earnings innovation (DEPS) response and as in the estimations of Model (8.5) over this sub-








Turning to the results of the estimation of Model (8.5) based on firm-years from 2007-2010 – 
the post-IFRS-convergence period in which SSSR implementation transitioned from its second 
to the third (complete) phase. In the first column of the table, the estimated results for the 
coefficients of EPS and lagged EPS in the base case convey a conventional relationship 
between earnings and returns, these being 0.362*** (positive and significant) and -0.350*** 
(negative and significant), respectively. With the transition to the third phase of SSSR (its 
completion and free trading of previously-untradeable shares), however, this conventional 
relationship is eroded and, indeed, reversed: the coefficient on SSSR3xEPS is -0.454***, 
leaving the aggregate ERC in 2009-2010 at -0.092**[*] and the coefficient on SSSR3x(lagged 
EPS) is +0.471***. Also, in the transition returns fall, with the estimated coefficient of SSSR3 
being at -1.04*** and these results add support for hypothesis H8.3. These are qualitatively 
similar in the second to fifth columns of Table 8.9, except that the estimated coefficients for 
Table 8.8: Estimations of the ERC model (Model 8.5): firm years 2005-08 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All  Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
EPS 0.076**[*] 0.296*** 0.042 0.033 0.166*** 
 (0.038) (0.066) (0.050) (0.056) (0.054) 
EPSt-1 0.085*** 0.231*** 0.058*[*] 0.046 0.148*** 
 (0.030) (0.063) (0.035) (0.042) (0.043) 
IFRS_SSSR2 1.113*** 1.108*** 1.182*** 1.127*** 1.095*** 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.049) (0.039) (0.029) 
IFRS_SSSR2*EPS 0.192*** 0.418*** 0.032 0.141** 0.265*** 
 (0.045) (0.071) (0.063) (0.067) (0.062) 
IFRS_SSSR2*EPSt-1 -0.370*** -0.736*** -0.099 -0.279*** -0.459*** 
 (0.046) (0.075) (0.071) (0.074) (0.061) 
Constant -0.280*** -0.371*** -0.288*** -0.306*** -0.291*** 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.035) (0.026) (0.021) 
Observations 5,072 3,956 1,116 1,727 3,345 
R-squared 0.448 0.476 0.465 0.440 0.458 
Based on firm-year observations 2005-2008 from Chinese listed firms. IFRS_SSSR2= 0 for 2005-
2006; 1 for 2007-2008. All variables as defined in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Estimations performed in 
STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets 




earning-based variables across ST firms, albeit of the same sign as for other firms, are not 
significant. 
The results of the ‘Lev and Zarowin-based’ estimations for 2007-2010 are provided in 
the table in Appendix 8.3. Overall, these show an erosion in response to (or trust in) earnings 
innovation (DEPS) as well as in the estimations of Model (8.5) over this sub-period, with 
negative and significant coefficients for IFRS_SSSR2. 
Table 8.9: Estimations of the ERC model (Model 8.5): firm years 2007-10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
EPS 0.362*** 0.879*** 0.074 0.251*** 0.567*** 
 (0.039) (0.064) (0.053) (0.051) (0.065) 
EPSt-1 -0.350*** -0.465*** -0.128 -0.433*** -0.293*** 
 (0.052) (0.064) (0.099) (0.093) (0.064) 
SSSR3 -1.104*** -1.036*** -1.185*** -1.098*** -1.076*** 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.075) (0.059) (0.040) 
SSSR3*EPS -0.454*** -0.893*** -0.138 -0.401*** -0.560*** 
 (0.067) (0.097) (0.114) (0.114) (0.092) 
SSSR3*EPSt-1 0.471*** 0.801*** 0.139 0.535*** 0.450*** 
 (0.063) (0.092) (0.110) (0.106) (0.090) 
Constant 0.802*** 0.633*** 0.886*** 0.810*** 0.743*** 
 (0.024) (0.039) (0.042) (0.038) (0.036) 
Observations 3,971 3,234 737 1,449 2,522 
R-squared 0.407 0.449 0.376 0.380 0.430 
Based on firm-year observations 2007-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR3 = 0 for 2007-2008; 1 
for 2009-2010. All variables as defined in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Estimations performed in STATA as 
panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, 
if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so 
adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets as described 
is simply in order to convey completely the nature of the significance. 
In general, the findings from the estimation of the earnings response coefficient 
models (Model 8.5 and Model 8.3 (augmented)) are in accord with those from estimation of 
the value relevance model (Model 8.2), thus both supporting hypotheses H8.1, H8.2 and H8.3. 
The exception being ST firms, where the results are weaker and sometimes even to the 
contrary, which might not be surprising given the circumstance of their being firms facing 




The results are extracted from Tables 8.5-8.10. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] 
represents improved significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed 
tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets as described is simply in order to convey completely the nature of the significance 
Table 8.10: Summary of the results 







SSSR phase 1: 
negotiation period  
No 
• Reduction in share prices (-4.564***) 
• EPS: negative (-0.320***) changes (0.607***) to positive (0.287**) 
• BVPS: positive (0.590***) changes (-0.009) and hence, remains positive 
(0.581***) 















• Increase in share prices (4.579***) 
• EPS: negative (-2.002***) changes (4.249***) to positive (2.247***) 
• BVPS: insignificant (0.031) changes (0.662***) to positive (0.693***) 




SSSR phase 2: 
lock-in period 
SSSR phase 3: 
free trading of 
shares 
Yes 
• Reduction in share prices (-2.306***) 
• EPS: positive (0.415*[*]) changes (-1.400***) to negative (-0.984**[*]) 
• BVPS: positive (0.709***) changes (-0.474***) and hence,  remains 
positive (0.235*[*]) 




8.5.4 Summary of principal results 
This subsection summarises the key findings of this Chapter, as collected into Table 8.10 
(above). In this chapter, it has been hypothesised that: in the negotiation phase of SSSR, the 
association between earnings and share prices will increase, while the level of prices will fall; 
in the lock-in phase of the SSSR, the association between earnings and share prices will 
increase, and the level of prices will also increase; and after completion of the SSSR, the level 
of prices will decrease, with the association between earnings and share prices also 
decreasing. Consistent with and supporting hypotheses H8.1, H8.2 and H8.3 of this chapter, 
the principal multivariate regression estimation results show the following. 
Market share prices reduced significantly in the first phase (the negotiation phases) 
of the SSSR from 2005-2006 (estimated coefficient on SSSR1 = -4.564***). Then, 
they rose significantly after IFRS convergence and in the second phase (the lock-in 
phase) of SSSR of 2007-2008 (estimated coefficient on IFRS_SSSR2 = +4.579***). 
Finally, they fell significantly again in the third phase of SSSR (completion – 
previously untradeable shares became tradeable) from 2009-2010 (estimated 
coefficient on SSSR3 = -2.306***). 
In the 2003-2006 base case, there was a significantly negative association between 
earnings and market prices (estimated coefficient on EPS = -0.320***), which is 
contrary to expectations in conventional circumstances. In the first (negotiation) 
phase of SSSR, a conventional association between earnings and prices was 
established (estimated coefficient on SSSR1xEPS = +0.697***), with a positive 
relationship between book values and prices being maintained. With IFRS 
convergence and the second (lock-in) phase of SSSR, this conventionally-expected 
association between earning and prices was strengthened (estimated coefficient 
on IFRS_SSSR2xEPS = +4.249***), again, with the positive book values/share prices 
relationship holding. However, in the third phase of SSSR (free trading of 
previously untradeable shares), the conventional-expected relationship between 
earnings and prices was weakened and indeed, reversed (estimated coefficient on 
SSSR3xEPS = -1.400***), whilst the conventionally-expected positive book 




Similarly, as regards the relationship between earnings and market-based returns, 
ERC was strengthened in the negotiation phase of SSSR (estimated incremental 
ERC = 0.054**[*]); further strengthened after IFRS convergence in the lock-in 
phase of SSSR (estimated incremental ERC = 0.192***); and weakened, indeed, 
becoming negative, after its completion (estimated incremental ERC = -0.454***). 
In relation to the changes in price levels over the SSSR implementation phases and 
convergence with IFRS, the foregoing results regarding these provide clear support for the 
hypotheses of the chapter: fall in prices in the negotiation phase of SSSR (part of H8.1), 
increase in prices after IFRS convergence during the lock-in phase (part of H8.2), and a fall in 
prices after the completion of SSSR (part of H8.3). 
But as explained earlier in the chapter, the earnings/price and ERC relationships, and 
associated hypotheses are more complex. Care has been taken in discussing the results in this 
chapter to describe positive earnings/price relationships and ERCs as ‘conventional’ or 
‘conventionally’ expected (or similar). Conventional expectations and interpretations assume 
efficient stock markets and thus, limited scope for market price manipulation. With that 
assumption, a strengthening earnings/price or ERC may be interpreted as improving earnings 
quality and hence, seen as being positive. In the context of the current study, however, 
manipulation of earnings over all three implementation phases of SSSR was hypothesised, 
and indeed, was found in the results of earlier chapters. Given that the Chinese stock markets 
were relatively illiquid and inefficient prior to 2009, a strengthening earnings/price or ERC 
during the negotiation and lock-in phases of the SSSR cannot be taken to indicate increasing 
earnings quality, but rather, that earnings manipulation had infiltrated into market prices. So, 
increased earnings value relevance over the first two phases of SSSR did not mean improved 
earnings quality in the Chinese context; consistent with the prediction of managers making 
sure that manipulated earnings are ‘swallowed’ by the stock market.  
From 2009 onwards, with previously untradeable shares now tradable, a weakening 
earnings/price association or ERC in an increasingly liquid capital market (with improving price 
discovery and informational efficiency) indicates that management, whilst still manipulating 




8.6 Chapter conclusion  
 
8.6.1 Main discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter, the value relevance model of Ohlson (1995) (adapted) and the ERC model of 
Lev and Zarwoin (1999) (and other authors) (adapted) have been employed in order to 
investigate the market price and market returns relevance of accounting earnings amongst 
the population of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2003-2010 (inclusive). Separate analyses 
have performed for Non-ST versus ST firms, and for Non-SOEs versus SOEs. A non-
conventional interpretation of the results on the value and returns relevance of earnings has 
been made, given: (i) the hypothesized incentives; (ii) the evidence of earnings manipulation 
presented in earlier chapters; and (iii) the lack of liquidity in the Chinese stock markets up to 
the end of 2008. Hence, this study has been methodologically developed by building upon 
and extending the existing literature. 
The results obtained provide strong and consistent support for the chapter 
hypotheses, viz: the association between earnings and share prices increased, while the level 
of prices decreased, in the negotiation phase of SSSR; the association between earnings and 
share prices increased, while the level of prices also increased the lock-in phase of SSSR; and 
the level of prices decreased, whilst the association between earnings and share prices also 
decreases after the completion of SSSR. The exception, where results are weaker and 
sometimes contrary to this, is for ST firms, which not surprising given their circumstances as 
firms facing ongoing listing issues. 
Therefore, reverting to the rationale underlying the hypotheses and building on the 
results, the following conclusions are suggested:   
In the first phase of SSSR, the empirical evidence is consistent with there being 
an incentive among Chinese A-share listed firms to drive down both earnings 
and share prices in the context of an illiquid and inefficient share market. What 
is more, the evidence suggests that managers acted upon this incentive and 




In the second phase of SSSR, coincident with adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, 
the evidence is consistent with there being an incentive among Chinese A-
share listed firms to drive up earnings and share prices in the context of a 
market of low liquidity and questionable efficiency. Moreover, the evidence 
again suggests that managers acted upon this incentive and did so 
‘successfully’. 
In the third phase of SSSR, and after the adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, the 
evidence is consistent with there being an incentive among Chinese A-share 
listed firms to drive down earnings and share prices, but in the context of an 
increasingly liquid and efficient market. The evidence again suggests that 
Managers the evidence again suggests that acted upon this incentive, but in 
an increasingly liquid market, were unable to preserve a conventional link 
between earnings and prices. 
As noted in the chapter sub-section containing the results, it cannot be asserted that 
findings regarding the transition to the second (lock-in) phase were driven entirely by SSSR-
related incentives and actions. There was the concurrent arrival of IRFS-converged CAS, which 
surely had an effect. Evidence on the impact of IFRS adoption internationally is mixed, and 
China’s convergence with IFRS was far from full adoption, so the possible impact on the 
earnings/price and earnings/book value associations resulting from IFRS convergence in China 
must be viewed with utmost caution. It cannot, however, fully be discounted; and it should 
be understood that the results in this study have been produced by a joint SSSR-related and 
IFRS convergence-related effects. An obvious contention, for example, would be that pre-
conceptions/expectations as regards the benefits of IFRS convergence made it easier for 
managers to impose their desired impact of earnings management into share prices. Alali and 
Cao (2010) suggested that IFRS adoption improves value relevance but reduces reliability. 
There has been no study, however, that has questioned whether or not improved market 
recognition of accounting information in the context of reducing reliability really does mean 
an improvement in earnings quality.  
The results of this chapter have shown that, statistically, earnings value relevance 




phases (the negotiation phase and the lock-in phase), and with convergence to IFRS in the 
second phase. Thereafter, as previously non-tradable shares became tradable in the Chinese 
stock markets, and with consequent increases in market liquidity, earnings value relevance 
significantly decreased. The results for ERC are consistent with these earnings value relevance 
results. Hence, there is consistent evidence of an increase in statistical value and returns 
relevance of earnings in the first and second phases of SSSR implementation, and over the 
period of IFRS convergence, but there was a decrease after completion of SSSR. Contrary to 
conventional interpretation of these statistical facts, which would view increasing value and 
returns relevance of earnings from 2004-2008 as unequivocally a good thing, in the context 
of SSSR-related earnings management and illiquidity of the Chinese stock markets over this 
period, the increased value and returns relevance of earnings most likely represents a loss of 
reliability of share prices. Given that the idea of providing principle-based, clear and 
consistent information to better inform markets and investors (and to improve capital 
allocation efficiency) is at the heart of IFRS (Pope and McLeay, 2011; Epstein, 2009; Alali and 
Cao, 2010), a failure of the compulsory adoption of IFRS-converged CAS to thwart the success 
of managers’ SSSR-related earnings management activities for 2007-2008 can be seen. Indeed, 
as posited above, it may have assisted them. 
IFRS convergence was a milestone of Chinese accounting reform and SSSR a major 
reform of China’s firm capital ownership in the journey towards a market-based economy. 
Earlier chapters have established that there was a decline in accounting-based earnings 
quality over the period of implementation of the SSSR, notwithstanding the adoption of IFRS-
converged CAS in 2007. Given that both reforms must be recognised as having an impact upon 
earnings value/returns relevance, if the improved earnings value/returns relevance from 
2005-2008 is taken evidence of price manipulation (rather than higher earnings quality) and 
the decreased earnings value relevance after 2009 is evidence of a more liquid market (again, 
rather than higher earnings quality), then we must be careful to recognise also that an implicit 
finding that SSSR-related incentives dominated any earnings management mitigating effect 
of IFRS convergence is being made. The findings and conclusions in this and previous chapters 
support the notion in the literature that accounting standards in isolation play only a limited 
role in increasing/decreasing earnings value relevance (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). For 




substantially be affected by concurrent reforms. In the case of China, the impact of IFRS 
convergence is conditioned on the concurrent SSSR implementation, and vice versa.  
The contents of this chapter have added support to the notion of a pair of agency 
relationships, through which there is a coincidence of interest (or pain in common) between 
the Chinese central government and non-SOE-hierarchy (private) investors. The local SOE 
hierarchies were the agents of the central/local government in implementing SSSR. Through 
a desire to preserve value in SOEs, make profits in trading previously untradeable shares, and 
retain previous levels of SOE ownership/control, local SOE hierarchies managed earnings and 
prices. By so doing, they thwart the central/local government’ intention of bringing capital 
market discipline and efficiency via SSSR. At the same time, they were the agents of all 
investors in running firms and their manipulations hugely increased the agency cost between 
themselves and the private investors.  
8.6.2 More discussion according to the phases  
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, there exists a unique agent problem in China due to 
government intervention from the start of the country’s “market economy”. Majority listing 
firms are SOEs from stock market establishment in the 1990s. Those SOEs are under 
central/local government control, with their managers being appointed by central/local 
government to play the agent role in the SOEs and representing majority-non-tradable 
shareholders’ (controlling shareholders) interests. Thereafter, the management group and 
holders of non-tradable shares fell into the same interest group as the SOE hierarchy. So, in 
this study, it was predicted that the management incentive was operated on behalf of the 
holders of non-tradable shares three hypotheses, according to the three phases of SSSR, were 
proposed.  
The first phrase of the SSSR, from 2005-2006, required firms to negotiate 
compensation for the holders of tradeable shares in recognition of the impact of a large 
number of previously-non tradeable shares becoming tradeable. During this phase, managers 
and the holders of non-tradable shares had a strong inventive to manipulate earnings to drive 
down the firms’ share price – to reduce the amount of compensation payable and avoid 




results have shown that share price dropped significantly and earnings value relevance and 
returns relevance statistically significantly increased over this phase of SSSR implementation. 
However, the increase in the price and returns relevance of earnings is interpreted as above: 
with incentives to reduce the compensation payable to the holders of tradeable shares and 
in the context of an illiquid market, managers were able to drive manipulated earnings into 
share prices. 
The second phase of the SSSR implementation was the lock-in period of 2007-2008, 
the commencement of which coincided with the compulsory adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, 
mandatory from 1st January 2007. During this phase, in which non-tradeable shares remained 
non-tradeable, it was hypothesised that there are incentives for management to drive up 
earnings and share prices in order to maximise the level of income from sales of originally 
non-tradable shares once they became tradable after the lock-in period, thereby hoping 
better to (be seen to) serve the SOE hierarchy. The adoption of IFRS-converged CAS at the 
beginning of this phase, albeit not full IFRS adoption, may have hampered management’s 
ability to manage earnings and prices. Alternatively, it might, as discussed above, have 
assisted management. The results for 2005-2008 reveal that share prices climbed significantly 
from 2007 to 2008 and earnings value relevance rose significantly over the same period. As 
in the previous paragraph, the increase in the price relevance of earnings is interpreted to 
mean that, with incentives to increase eventual income from the sale of shares and in the 
context of an illiquid market, managers were able to drive manipulated earnings 
(manipulation as evidence in earlier chapters) into share prices. As discussed above, it appears 
that, if the impact of IFRS-converged CAS was to hamper management’s ability successfully 
to manage earnings, it was perhaps not sufficiently strong; and, further, the pre-conceptions/ 
expectations as regards the benefits of IFRS convergence might have made earnings and price 
manipulation easier. 
The final phrase of the SSSR commenced at the beginning of 2009. From this point, 
two years after IFRS-convergence, the SSSR lock-period ended, and previously non-tradeable 
shares became tradable. It was hypothesized that, once previously non-tradeable shares had 
been sold onto the market at inflated prices, as described above, there was an incentive for 




acquire shares for less than the price at which they were sold, creating share trading profits, 
whilst preserving (re-establishing) previous levels of SOE ownership and control. Hence, the 
association between earnings and share prices decreases in this testing period. The results 
show that share prices did, indeed, drop significantly for 2009-2010, whilst over the same 
period earnings value/returns relevance significantly decreased. In this final phase, share 
markets were ‘post-SSSR reformed’ and more liquid, with the processes of information and 
price discovery leading to greater efficiency. In this context, the weakening of price/returns 
response to EPS represents a positive outcome of the SSSR, i.e. whilst management is, albeit 





Chapter 9: Conclusions and discussions  
9.1 Introduction 
This first chapter sub-section section summarises China’s institutional background, research 
objectives, research questions, hypotheses and research methods. Findings and conclusions 
are covered in section 9.2, and overall discussion and contributions are presented in section 
9.3. Finally, section 9.4 discusses the limitations of this study and makes suggestions for the 
further work. 
9.1.1 The setting and context 
China has had formally constituted accounting and reporting standards, influenced to some 
extent by international GAAP (latterly IFRS), since the 1970s. The Chinese accounting setter 
was and is, however, under government control, so accounting standards – whether old CAS 
or, later, IFRS-converged IFRS – were developed and implemented principally to serve the 
governments interests and agenda, rather than the interests of private investors. China’s 
adoption of IFRS-converged CAS in 2007 might be viewed prima face as an attempt to 
stimulate and improvement in the quality of Chinese financial reporting, but many pre-
existing and continuing institutional factors, including the important SSSR, have significant 
influence on accounting information quality both before and after IFRS convergence.  
The adoption of IFRS has fascinated accounting researchers who have explored 
whether or not the quality of accounting information has actually been improved by IFRS. The 
existing research has investigated the impact of IFRS adoption on reporting information 
quality in different countries by comparing the variation of accounting quality, either 
comparing between pre- and post-adoption in a single country, or as between different 
countries. By comparing two periods in different countries, researchers can explain whether 
or not (and the extent to which) institutional factors influence the impact of IFRS adoption on 
accounting information quality. This thesis argues that, when investigating the change of 
accounting information quality after IFRS adoption in a single country, it is important to 
consider other significant reforms - especially in emerging economies where there often 




of accounting quality in China, a developing economy which is also one the world’s largest 
and fastest growing economies. 
In China, government interests are the major factor to drive variation in accounting 
quality after IFRS adoption. Accounting and auditing setters are under the supervision of 
government and the accounting standards serve the government interest (Aiken and Lu, 
1993). This thesis argues that accounting information quality varies according to firms’ 
financial market-based incentives, notwithstanding a principle-based accounting system 
being employed. The SSSR reform was implemented over 2004-2009. Whilst the SSSR 
negotiation period being completed over 2005-2006, there was a lock-in period over 2007-
2008, and previously non-tradeable shares of most firms only became tradeable in the market 
from early 2009. Wan (2005) points out that SSSR provides a perfect situation for the holders 
of non-tradable shares to sell off the shares and cash out any gains by selling previously non-
tradable shares at an early stage of the free float period; but that there would, however, be 
enormous pressures on the financial markets in following years, from 2011, say. During the 
course of the SSSR reform, the group enjoying the most benefit is the pre-existing privileged 
group, being SOEs and SOEs-related elites; whilst private market investors remain relatively 
underprivileged due to lack of access to inside information. Therefore, whilst transforming 
non-tradable shares to become tradable gives illusion of market liberalization, in fact it 
presented an opportunity for the informed elite to make gains through the process of 
privatization of public assets, trading shares with inside information (Wan 2005). This thesis 
focuses on the SSSR to deduce the nature of major financial market incentives faced by firms 
– over a period with a transition in accounting standards. The use of the SSSR phases as 
‘dummy variables’ to proxy the change of SOEs’ financial market incentives provides some 
key advantages. The holders of non-tradable shares have certain level of state association, so 
it can be used to observe the pattern of the accounting information quality with respect to 
government interests in the Chinese financial market. Also, firms required to engage with the 
SSSR started to implement the reform around 2005, and the majority announced a 
completion and free trading of previously untradable share by early 2008 – so the relationship 
between SSSR-related incentives and earnings quality can be observed both pre- and post-
IFRS-convergence (i.e., with and without the effect of the new, principle-based standards). 




phase of the SSSR coincided with the transition to IFRS-converged CAS; and the completion 
of the SSSR (fee trading of previously-untradeable shares) was in the post-IFRS-convergence 
period. 
Therefore, this thesis investigates jointly the impact of both IFRS convergence and the 
SSSR implementation on accounting information quality in China: the SSSR must be 
considered, since the market and accounting reforms were implemented in tandem. And the 
findings must be interpreted with care, since both SSSR-related management incentive and 
IFRS-convergence are both potentially fundamentally important as regards any change in 
accounting information quality – around 2007 especially. To facilitate consideration of the 
impact of both the SSSR implementation and adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, this study 
establishes three (overlapping) sub-periods for analysis: (i) 2003-2006 – arrival of the first 
(negotiation) phase of the SSSR, pre-IFRS-convergence; (ii) 2005-2008 – transition from phase 
1 to phase 2 (lock-in) of the SSSR, and transition to IFRS-converged CAS; and (iii) and 2007-
2010 – completion of the SSSR implementation, post-IFRS-convergence. 
9.1.2 The objectives, research questions and high-level hypotheses 
The overall objective of this research is to investigate how earnings quality in China evolved 
against a backdrop of convergence towards IFRS and of split share structure reform and to 
determine whether the advent of IFRS-converged CAS and the SSSR were complementary in 
this regard, or whether the impact of one dominated that of the other. 
The following set of research questions is adopted, taking a broad view of earnings 
quality measurement, given the obvious shortcoming in taking a single/narrow view, 
particularly in the complex Chinese context. What impact, if any, did IFRS convergence and 
the SSSR have on earnings quality as measured by: (i) alternative models of accruals quality; 
(ii) earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings smoothing; (iii) incidence of 
recognition of large losses, and timeliness of recognition of bad news; and (iv) value relevance 
of earnings and earnings response? 





H1: In the first phase of the SSSR implementation, from 2005 to 2006, managers 
of Chinese A-share listed firms have an incentive to drive down both earnings 
and share prices. As a consequence, earnings and market prices will fall, and 
earnings quality will be reduced.  
H2: In the second phase of the SSSR implementation, from 2007 to 2008, 
coincident with China’s adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, managers of Chinese A-
share listed firms have an incentive drive up earnings and share prices. As a 
consequence, and despite IFRS convergence, earnings and market prices will rise, 
and earnings quality will be reduced. 
H3: In the third phase of the SSSR implementation, from 2009 to 2010, after 
adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, managers of Chinese A-share listed firms have 
an incentive to drive down both earnings and share prices. As a consequence, 
earnings and market prices will fall, and earnings quality will be reduced. 
9.1.3 Empirical models 
Chapter 5 adopts both the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and Modified Jones Model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) to investigate the accrual quality and detect the income-increasing and 
income-decreasing accruals management activities. Chapter 6 applies the Sloan (1996) model 
to investigate the earnings persistence by testing the association between current earnings 
and future earnings; the standard deviation of the errors from earnings persistence model to 
detect the earnings predictability (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Francis et al., 2004; Dechow et 
al., 2010); and the Barth et al. (2008) model to investigate the earnings smoothness. Chatper 
7 investigates the earnings large losses reports under the model of Barth et al. (2008) and the 
timely loss recogniton model of Basu (1997). Finally, Chapter 8 investigates earnings value 





9.2 Summary of findings and conclusions 
This section summarises the findings and conclusions from the empirical chapters of this 
thesis. Table 9.1 shows significant findings by earnings quality model and by study sub-
period. 
9.2.1 Accrual quality  
The findings in Chapter 5 (at Table 9.1) suggest that in the first phase of SSSR, managers acted 
upon an incentive to reduce earnings and reduced the extent of income-increasing 
discretionary accruals manipulation, and so accrual quality reduced. In the second phase of 
SSSR, the results suggest managers acted upon an incentive to increase earnings and 
manipulated earnings upwards via both income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals 
manipulation, and earnings/accruals quality reduced again. In the third phase of SSSR, the 
findings are consistent with managers acting upon and incentive to decreasing earnings and 
reduced the extent of income-increasing discretionary accruals manipulation – and, yet again, 
earnings/accruals quality was also reduced. 
9.2.2 Earnings persistence, predictability and smoothing 
The findings here provide further evidence in line with that summarised under Table 9.1. In 
the first phase of the SSSR, among Chinese A-share listed firms, earnings were of low 
persistence and predictability, and were highly smoothed. In the second phase of the SSSR, 
earnings were again of low persistence and predictability, with no significant change as 
regards their smoothness. In the third phase of SSSR, among Chinese A-share listed firms, 
earnings were yet again of low persistence and predictability, and of increasing smoothness. 
The findings in the first and the last phases of SSSR with regard to increased earnings 
smoothness suggest that there is increased incentive to manage earnings downwards from 
above zero rather than manage earnings upwards from below zero since there is no significant 
change of small negative earnings in the first and the final phase of SSSR.  
9.2.3 Loss recognition  
The findings here also provide further evidence in line with that summarised under Table 9.1. 




more timely loss recognition so consistent with downwards earnings management. In the 
second phase, conversely, there was a reduction in the incidence of loss reports and in the 
timeliness of loss recognition, suggesting upwards earnings management. In the final phase, 
there was a second reversal, back to downwards earnings management, with increasing 
incidence of large loss reports and timeliness of loss recognition. 
9.2.4 Value and returns relevance of earnings 
With regards to earnings value relevance, this study finds that in the first phase of SSSR, there 
was an incentive among Chinese A-share listed firms to drive down both earnings and share 
prices in the context of an illiquid and inefficient share market. What is more, managers acted 
upon this incentive and did so ‘successfully’. In the second phase of SSSR, coincident with 
adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, there was an incentive among Chinese A-share listed firms 
to drive up earnings and share prices in the context of an illiquid and inefficient market. Again, 
managers acted upon this incentive and did so ‘successfully’. In the third phase of SSSR, and 
after the adoption of IFRS-converged CAS, there was an incentive among Chinese A-share 
listed firms to drive down earnings and share prices, but in the context of an increasingly 
liquid and efficient market. Managers acted upon this incentive, but in an increasingly liquid 
market, were unable to preserve a conventional link between earnings and prices. 
The overall findings suggest that accounting-based earnings quality reduced whilst, 
(under conventional interpretation) market-based accounting information quality increased 
in the first two testing periods. In the collective study of Dechow and Schrand (2004), they 
summarized the reliability and quality of financial statements prepared under managers are 
the decisive factors of revealing firms’ underlying economics, which is a function for earnings 
quality. Nevertheless, the findings of this study suggest that the earnings quality of financial 
statements is low, though, the responsiveness of stock prices to earnings are high in first two 
periods, which suggests that investors are not aware firms’ underlying earnings performance 
and quality under the less liquid and efficient financial market. Therefore, managers were 
able to channel the manipulated earnings to the financial market.  
In sum, the reforms provided opportunity to reposition/retrench the financial 




SOE shares to become tradable provided the incentive and opportunity to profit from stock 
market reform/activity whilst retaining control. The evidence suggests that IFRS-convergence 
in China from 2007 could not (and did not) significantly curtail earnings management in 
response to SSSR-related incentives. Some evidence, indeed, is suggestive that earnings 
management activities were less constrained under IFRS-converged CAS – which allows debt 
restructuring and assets impairment through fair value measurement and exempts SOEs’ 
related party transaction. Due to the Chinese government’s intervention and political 
preferences as regards SOEs, both reforms extended the political power in the stock market 
but in a guise of market liberalization. The nature of Chinese political system determines the 
fictitious outcome of market liberalization (Chan, 2016), which determined the contradiction 
of those reforms that government has intention to accept the economic benefit of liberalized 
stock market on one hand, meanwhile, it is not desirable to keep a slack hand on its heavily 




Table 9.1: Summary of the overall result 
Period 2003-2006 2005-2008 2007-2010 
SSSR transition From pre-SSSR to SSSR negotiation phase From SSSR negotiation phase to SSSR lock-in 
phase 
From SSSR lock-in phase to SSSR 
completion 
IFRS context Pre-IFRS-converged CAS Transition to IFRS-converged CAS Post-adoption of IFRS-converged CAS 
 Predictions Downward earnings and price 
management; reduced earnings quality 
Upwards earnings and price management; 
reduced earnings quality; despite transition to 
IFRS-converged CAS 
Downwards earnings and price 
management; reduced earnings quality; 
despite use of IFRS-converged CAS 
 Significant findings: 
 
Working capital accruals 
quality: Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model 
No sig. result Diminished working capital accruals quality Diminished working capital accruals quality 
Use of discretionary 
accruals: Modified Jones 
Model (Dechow et al., 
1995) 
Reduction in upward manipulation of 
earnings via discretionary accruals; net 
shift in balance away from income-
increasing accruals towards income-
decreasing accruals 
Increase in income-increasing discretionary 
accruals; and decrease in income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals; net shift in balance 
towards income-increasing accruals and away 
from income-decreasing accruals 
Reduction in upward manipulation of 
earnings via discretionary accruals; a net 
shift in balance away from income-
increasing accruals towards income-
decreasing accruals 
Persistence of earnings Reduced earnings persistence Reduced earnings persistence Reduced earnings persistence 
Predictability of earnings Reduced earnings predictability Reduced earnings predictability Reduced earnings predictability 
Earnings smoothing Increase in earnings smoothing from above 
(downward earnings management) 
No sig. result Increase in earnings smoothness from 
above (downward earnings management)  
Large loss recognition Increase – consistent with downwards 
manipulation of earnings 
No sig. result Increase – consistent with downwards 
manipulation of earnings and prices 
Timeliness of loss 
recognition in 
Increase – consistent with downwards 
manipulation of earnings and prices 
Decrease – consistent with upwards 
manipulation of earnings and prices 
No sig. result 
Share price: Ohlson 
(1995) model 
Decrease – consistent with downwards 
manipulation of earnings and prices 
Increase – consistent with upwards 
manipulation of earnings and prices 
Decrease – consistent with downwards 




Strengthening – in the context of illiquid 
and inefficient financial market; and while 
earnings quality decreases 
Continued strengthening – still in the context 
of illiquid and inefficient financial market; and 
while earnings quality decreases 
Weakening – in the context of an 
increasingly liquid and efficient market; 








Strengthening – in the context of illiquid 
and inefficient financial market; and while 
earnings quality decreases; consistent with 
manipulation of prices 
Continued strengthening – still in the context 
of illiquid and inefficient financial market; and 
while earnings quality decreases; consistent 
with manipulation of prices 
Weakening – in the context of an 
increasingly liquid/efficient market; while 
earnings quality decreases; consistent 
reduced ability to manipulate prices and 




9.3 Overall discussion and contribution 
Prior literature has found mixed evidence about the change in accounting quality after IFRS 
adoption in different countries – including China. But studies which investigate the impact of 
adopting IFRS-converged CAS have been silent on the concurrent SSSR. The SSSR proposal 
was made at the time after local governments’ widespread use of bank loans and special 
financing vehicles to circumvent the legal prohibition of deficit and borrowing had reached 
intolerable levels (Chan, 2016). The mushrooming debt load of local governments, confirmed 
by nationwide special audits, resulted in predictions of potential a fiscal and banking crisis by 
the international financial press. In these circumstances, government accounting acquired a 
clear purpose of monitoring and reducing domestic financial risk by giving SOEs (government) 
greater access to fundraising channels, include bank loans and capital from the equity market. 
After the SSSR implementation was initiated, IFRS convergence followed almost immediately.  
The adoption of IFRS converged CAS can be explained in terms of responding to the 
need of better managing firms’ debt and equity capital to reduce fiscal risk, and to assist the 
success of the SSSR – acting on a clear mandate from the Ministry of Finance and following 
an international trend of IFRS adoption. But the outcome of IFRS convergence, in terms of 
information quality, due to China’s unique political and economic circumstances and the 
earnings/prince management incentives created by the SSSR, should always have been in 
doubt. In the end, the SSSR-related incentives to manage earnings dominated; and earnings 
management may even have been less constrained under IFRS-converged CAS than it was 
under old Chinese GAAP. 
Chinese ‘de-governmentalizing’ reforms in financial markets to pursue a free market 
model came with an ostensible desire to improve of earnings quality via the adoption of IFRS-
converged CAS. Throughout the reforms, the Chinese government sent signals of financial 
market liberalisation by privatizing public assets, deregulating financial markets and adopting 
marked-based accounting standards. In practice, however, the reforms have delivered 
volatility both on the stock market and in financial statements – and have sustained the 
Chinese elite whilst negatively affecting ordinary investors. Private investors relative lack of 
information throughout the SSSR implementation and the privileged position of holders of 




value. The IFRS adoption and the acceptance of fair value measurement in China can only ever 
exist in name, as a symbol of China’s commitment to global capitalism, unless China can 
disconnect the underlying political and economic architecture (Zhang et al., 2012). 
The main contribution of this study is to add to the following existing literature, which 
has been silent as regards to the joint impact on earnings quality in China of accounting 
standards reform and market reform. In particular, this thesis contributes to the existing 
literature in the following ways. 
1. This is the first study to take into account both SSSR and IFRS reforms with a 
wide range of analysis. This research adds to the literature in terms of 
accounting quality under the joint impact of the SSSR and IFRS-converged CAS 
adoption in China, on which prior research has been silent, so missing the 
compound/confounding effect of this adoption on earnings quality. 
2. Earnings quality is investigated across a broader range of dimensions than in 
previous studies. The existing published research in China has failed to 
investigate earnings persistence and timely recognition of losses in the Chinese 
capital market, commonly only probing one dimension of earnings quality. This 
study considers accounting-based measures of quality, namely accruals quality, 
earnings persistence, earnings predictability, earnings smoothness, and large 
loss recognition. It also involves investigating market-based measures, i.e. 
timeliness of loss recognition, earnings value relevance and earnings response. 
These accounting-based and market-based earnings quality measures assess, 
respectively, the reliability and the relevance properties of earnings. This 
wide/inclusive approach to earnings quality assessment adds strength to the 
investigation and richness to the findings. 
3. The interpretation of model results extends from and in some cases is contra 
to conventional interpretation. It involves analysing/interpreting results and 
accounting quality consistent with China’s unique institutional and stock 
market features, for which traditional interpretation of model results is not 
always sufficient/appropriate. For example, prior research studies 




simply interpreted results in accordance with usual practice. That is, they have 
deduced improved earnings quality from an increased association between 
earnings per share and market share price. This study, in Chapter 8, interprets 
such an increase in association to support the notion that, in illiquid and 
inefficient stock markets (as China’s markets were for the majority of the study 
period), earnings manipulations have been driven through to share prices.  
4. The unique Chinese setting of widespread state ownership and political control 
is combined with agency theory, stakeholder theory, property rights theory 
and behavioural finance theory, with, in Chapter 3, a complex and interesting 
‘double agency’ setting being posited. This setting leads to a coincidence of 
interests as between the Chinese central government and private investors – 
since each suffers as a result of a (separate but connected) agency problem 
with the local SOE hierarchies. 
5. The hypotheses tested within this study were formulated based on incentives 
to local SOE hierarchies arising out of the SSSR process, and on IFRS 
convergence. The principal focus is, therefore, regulatory/political, rather than 
the more common one, that of firm-level earnings management incentives and 
firm-level earnings targets. 
6. This study contributes in providing a warning to regulators and policy makers 
concerning confounding events accompanying standards’ development/ 
adoption. This is also in relation to international and Chinese-domestic 
investors as regards the earnings quality of Chinese listed firms.  
In sum, this study will add further empirical evidence to the accounting literature on the 
association between earnings quality and IFRS adoption in the context of strong Chinese 
institutional and country factors. Moreover, the findings will help policy makers, regulators 
and professional bodies to understand better the effect of accounting and market regulatory 
reforms in China, thereby facilitating their development of the Chinese accounting regulation 




9.4 Limitations and future research suggestions 
There are limitations/caveats to this study with regard to the confounding effect of IFRS-
convergence during the implementation of the SSSR. First, the state-owned or state related 
firms represent most of Chinese listed firms, meaning the vast majority of Chinese listed firms 
faced both the transition to IFRS-converged CAS and the SSSR, and leaving only a small sample 
– insufficient for analyses (of the types employed in this thesis) in isolation. Therefore, no 
findings are made as to the impact of IFRS-convergence absent direct SSSR-related incentives 
on the firm. Secondly, not all firms subject to the SSSR implementation were on exactly the 
same timetable -so, for example, commencement of implementation of the SSSR at the firm 
level, although clustered in early 2005, was not on 1st January 2005 (or any other particular 
date) for all firms; likewise the transition to phase 2 of the SSSR (clustered in early 2007) and 
the completion of the SSSR and market trading of previously untradeable shares (clustered in 
early 2009). Therefore, the impact of transitions through the SSSR implementation phases 
permeate through the market over (short) periods, rather than occurring on entirely cross-
market consistent dates. Perhaps most important, however, arising out of the suggestive 
nature of the overall conclusion (above): “SSSR-related incentives to manage earnings are 
found to have dominated; and earnings management may even have been less constrained 
under IFRS-converged CAS than it was under old Chinese GAAP.” What is not covered in the 
current thesis is the extent to which (if at all) different elements of IFRS-converged CAS might 
have reduced versus exacerbated the ability of managers to manipulate earnings and prices. 
It is extremely unlikely that every element of IFRS-converged CAS, as compared to its 
counterpart (if any) in old Chinese GAAP, made earnings management easier and more 
effective; or that every element made earnings management harder and less effective. 
In addition to the foregoing, another limitation of this study arises in the application 
of “standard” empirical models. For example, in both earnings smoothing and large loss 
recognition tests, this study adopts the models of Barth et al. (2008) which defines small 
positive earnings (SPOS) to be equal to one if net income scaled by total assets is between 0 
and 0.01 (and zero otherwise) and large negative report (LNEG) to be equal to one if net 
income scaled by total assets is less than -0.20 (and zero otherwise). These definitions may 
not be applicable (or optimal) in the Chinese context – given difference economic economy 




Finally, in the value relevance chapter, this study interprets results and draws 
conclusions with a maintained assumption (over the first two of the three phases of the SSSR 
implementation) of lack of liquidity and efficiency in the market. Findings of an increase in 
association between managed earnings and share prices is taken to support the notion that, 
in illiquid and inefficient stock markets (as China’s markets were for the majority of the study 
period), earnings manipulations have been driven through to share prices, and is recognised 
as contribution in previous section. But it must also be recognised as limitation or, at least, a 
point of debate. There is no previous study (of which I am aware) which has interpreted the 
empirical findings of a value relevance study under a maintained assumption of market 
inefficiency. The conclusions in Chapter 8 are drawn in line with the findings in (earlier) 
chapters 5 and 6 which show that accounting-based earnings quality declined over the phases 
of the SSSR implementation – reasoning that reducing earnings quality alongside improving 
value relevance (over the first two phases of the SSSR implementation) means that prices 
were also manipulatable and, indeed, being manipulated. That is, that the finding of increased 
value, in this setting and contra to usual interpretation, is not an indicator of improved 
earnings quality, rather it is consistent with lack of market efficiency. Conversely, in the final 
phase of the SSSR implementation, the finding of reducing value relevance, alongside earlier 
findings of continued reduction in accounting earnings quality, is interpreted as supporting 
the notion that the market prices are not so easily manipulatable in an increasingly liquid and 
efficient market. What is demonstrated (consistently, and at generally acceptable levels of 
significance) is that over 2003 to 2008, accounting earnings quality reduced while value 
relevance increased; and that over 2009-10, value relevance decreased while accounting 
earnings quality reduced. And one (single but important) difference between these two 
periods was the onset on trading in previously non-tradable shares in SOEs. But “generally 
acceptable levels of significance” do not, ultimately, prove anything. And it is legitimate, 
indeed important, to discuss and argue methodology – in this case, can/should value 
relevance tests be conducted only with a maintained hypothesis of market efficiency? The 
“reverse” interpretation of improved/reduced value relevance, dropping the maintained 
hypothesis, may, certainly, arouse controversy. 
This study suggests that future research should explore Chinese financial reporting 




quality by focusing on specific accounting standards, e.g., accounting standards for tangible 
and intangible assets and fair value measurement, or as regards specific industries, e.g., the 
high technology industry. This would provide more insight into the efficacy/ability of IFRS-
converged CAS to help deliver on political/economic desires and imperatives. Second, future 
research might fruitfully search for Chinese institutional and/or firm-specific factors and 
model form (not necessarily linear) which best explain variation in accounting quality as 
between firms and over time. This thesis employs standard models existed in prior literature, 
with some development/deviation from conventional deployment and interpretation. Future 
research may further develop method(s) designed to suit emerging economies, where effect 
of IFRS convergence/adoption is strongly conditioned on country factors and concurrent 
institutional reforms. 
Better understanding the quality of earnings in China and other major developing 
economies, and improvement of that quality, is highly economically significant on an 
international scale. It is, therefore, an important area for ongoing academic research; and 
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Appendix 2.1: Detailed differences between IFRS and IFRS converged CAS  
 IFRS IFRS-converged CAS 
Preparation and 
Presentation of Finance 
Statements (IAS 1) 
Prudence is only one of qualitative 
characteristics of financial 
statement; information should also 
be neutral, free from bias.   
Emphasise on prudence in the 
recognition, measurement and 
reporting of transactions or 
events for accounting purpose  
Consolidated and 
Separate Financial 
Statements (IAS 27) 
Subsidiaries, associates and jointly 
controlled entities to be accounted 
for in the separate financial 
statement of parents either at cost 
or in accordance with IAS 39 
Subsidiaries to be stated at cost; 
associates and jointly controlled 
entities to be accounted using 
the equity method 
Investments in 
Associates (IAS 28) 
Either using proportionate 
consolidation or equity method 
Only allows equity method  
Interests in Joint 
Ventures (IAS 31) 




Certain specific exceptions 
measure under the same 
accounting policy for all its 
investment properties; 
Land use rights held for rental 
purpose required to measure at 
the fair value model   
No request  for specific 
exceptions; 
Land use rights held for rental 
purpose are measured at the 
cost model  
Property, Plant and 
Equipment (IAS 16) 
Allows both the cost model and the 
revaluation model  
Only allows the cost model  
Agriculture (IAS 41) The fair value model is required for 
biological assets 
The cost model shall be used for 
biological assets;  
Intangible Assets (IAS 
38) 
Both the cost model and the 
revaluation model that fair value 
can be determined by reference to 
a price quoted in an active market  
Only allows the cost model  
Impairment of 
Assets(IAS 36) 
Only prohibits the reversal of 
impairment of loss for good will 
Prohibits the reversal of all 
impairment losses  
Employee Benefits (IAS 
19) 
Requires the recognition of a 
defined benefit liability and an 
expense throughout the expected 
service period of the related 
employees  
Does not address  the accounting 





Plans (IAS 26) 
Applies to all retirement benefit 
plans and prescribes the 
accounting and reporting by 
defined contribution plans and 
defined benefit plans 
Does not deal with the 




Requires to recognise share-based 
payment transactions in which the 
entity receives goods or services in 
its financial statements, including 
transactions with employees or 
other parties  
Only covers the accounting for 
share-based payment 
transactions for which services 
are received; and does not 
address if equity settled with 






Measurement (IAS 39) 
Debt restructuring  Debt restructuring is consistent 
with IAS 39; the principles of de-




Allows direct costs incurred in 
securing a construction contract to 
be included as part of the contract 
cost if they can be separately 
identified and measured reliably  
Requires such costs to be 
expensed as incurred  
Accounting for 




Asset-related grants: allows to 
recognise either as deferred 
income or the deduction of the 
grant from the carrying amount of 
the asset; 
Biological asset-related grants: 
measures at fair value less 
estimated point-of-sale costs as 
income;  
Only allows recognise asset-
related grants as deferred 
income; does not proved specific 
requirements on grants related 
to biological assets.  
Borrowing Costs (IAS 
23) 
Recognises either expensed as 
incurred or capitalised provided 
the capitalisation criteria are met  
Only allows capitalisation 
approach  
The Effects of Changes 
in Foreign Exchange 
Rates (IAS 21) 
Allows a reporting entity to present 
its financial statements in any 
currency  
All enterprises are required to 




Reverse acquisitions  Not covered 
Leases (IAS 17) Leasehold interest in land shall be 
classified as an operating lease 
unless it meets criteria and can be 
account for as an investment 
property under fair value model  
Leasehold interest in land are 
accounted for as intangible 
assets unless it meets criteria 
and can be account for as an 




No specific requirements with 
respect to assets, liabilities, income 
and expenses arising from 
insurance contracts 
There are specific requirements 
that apply to income, reserves 
and costs 
Exploration for and 
Evaluation of Mineral 
Resource (IFRS 6) 
Permits either the cost or 
revaluation model. 
Does not prevent the reversal of 
impairment losses  
Only allows the cost model and 
capitalisation of exploratory 
drilling costs; 
Impairment losses are not 
allowed to reverse in future   
Cash Flow Statements 
(IAS 7) 
Allows enterprises to use either the 
direct method or the indirect 
method in reporting CFO; interest 
received and paid and dividends 
received and paid are classified as 
cash inflow from investing 
activities and cash outflow from 
financing activities. 
Only allows the direct method; 
received and paid interest or 
dividends are required to be 
classified as operating, investing 
or financing activities in a 
consistent manner. 
Interim Financial 
Reporting (IAS 34) 
Condensed financial statements( 
income, cash flow and balance 
Does not require a statement of 










sheet) and condensed statement of 
changes in equity required  
presented; all condensed 
statements shall conform to the 
annual statements 
 
Earnings per Share (IAS 
33) 
Requires disclosure of the basic 
and diluted EPS amounts for profit 
and loss from continuing and 
discontinuing operations 
Only requires the calculation of 
EPS based on net profit or loss 
for the current period  
Segment Reporting (IAS 
14) 
Segment reporting only applies to 
enterprises whose equity or debt 
securities are publicly trade or in 
the process of issuing equity or 
debt in public securities markets 
Requires segment information if 
enterprise has different 
operations or operates in 
different location 
Related Party 
Disclosures (IAS 24) 
SOEs are not exempted  SOEs are not regarded as related 
parties because they are state 
controlled and exempted from 
related party disclosures  





Appendix 5.2: Delisted ST firms 
Stock Code Stock Name Year Listing Status 
000013 *ST Shihua 2004-09-17 delisted  
000047 ST Zhongqiao 2003-05-30 delisted  
000405 ST Xinguang 2004-03-19 delisted  
000412 ST Wuhuan 2003-09-17 delisted  
000535 *ST Houwang 2004-04-29 delisted  
000583 *ST Tuopu 2007-05-18 delisted  
000621 *ST Bite 2004-09-24 delisted  
000660 *ST Hua'nan 2004-09-09 delisted  
000699 *ST Jiazhi 2007-03-16 delisted  
000730 *ST Huanbao 2004-09-22 delisted  
000765 * Huanxin 2005-07-01 delisted  
000769 *ST Dafei 2005-09-22 delisted  
000827 *Changxing 2004-01-14 delisted  
000832 *ST Longdi 2006-06-28 delisted  
600065 *ST Lianyi 2007-12-07 delisted  
600092 *ST Jingmi 2006-11-24 delisted  
600181 *ST Yunda 2007-05-25 delisted  
600646 ST Guojia 2003-09-22 delisted  
600659 *ST Huadiao 2004-12-07 delisted  
600669 *ST Ancheng 2004-09-15 delisted  
600670 *ST Sida 2004-09-22 delisted  
600672 *ST Jiaoying 2005-08-02 delisted  
600700 *ST Shuma  2005-09-15 delisted  
600709 ST Shengtai 2003-05-26 delisted  
600752 *ST Haci 2005-09-23 delisted  
600762 *ST Jinli 2007-11-19 delisted  
600772 *ST Longchang 2006-11-24 delisted  
600788 *ST Longman 2005-03-24 delisted  
600799 *ST Longke 2005-12-30 delisted  
600852 *ST Zhongchuan 2005-09-15 delisted  
600878 *ST Beike 2004-09-15 delisted  

















Appendix 5.3: Estimations of accrual quality: |DA| (Model 5.5): firm years 2003-2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
SSSR1 -0.022 -0.050*** 0.009 -0.006 -0.041** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.027) (0.024) (0.017) 
SIZE 0.253*** 0.356*** 0.159*** 0.047 0.441*** 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.060) (0.060) (0.052) 
LEV -0.001 0.038*** -0.000 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
CR -0.012 -0.001 -0.061* -0.012 -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.033) (0.014) (0.010) 
INV -0.010 -0.006 -0.013 -0.009 -0.028 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.064) 
NOI 0.116 0.103 0.169 0.229 0.119 
 (0.128) (0.138) (0.339) (0.411) (0.133) 
PROFIT -0.018 -0.032 0.029 -0.021 -0.018 
 (0.024) (0.036) (0.031) (0.039) (0.031) 
CFO 0.116* 0.470*** -0.067 -0.044 0.594*** 
 (0.066) (0.113) (0.079) (0.081) (0.116) 
MOWN 0.778 0.952 1.141 0.713 2.097 
 (0.810) (1.065) (1.194) (0.822) (8.748) 
CONCEN 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
AUDIT 0.029 0.125 -0.640*** -0.252 0.071 
 (0.091) (0.098) (0.245) (0.263) (0.095) 
Constant -4.919*** -7.255*** -2.763** -0.581 -9.021*** 
 (0.835) (1.147) (1.251) (1.254) (1.117) 
      
Observations 2,314 1,766 548 788 1,526 
R-squared 0.057 0.098 0.076 0.010 0.120 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2006 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-2004; 1 
for 2005-2006. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA 
as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, 
if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so 
adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, 












Appendix 5.4: Estimations of accrual quality: |DA| (Model 5.5): firm years 2005-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
IFRS_SSSR2 -0.037* -0.031**[*] 0.153 -0.057 -0.007 
 (0.034) (0.014) (0.143) (0.064) (0.032) 
SIZE 0.293*** 0.100*** 0.687*** 0.311*** 0.264*** 
 (0.027) (0.011) (0.106) (0.047) (0.026) 
LEV 0.000 0.011** 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CR 0.004* 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.024) (0.006) (0.007) 
INV -0.026* -0.002 -0.088 0.018 -0.014** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.080) (0.031) (0.007) 
NOI 1.006*** -0.126 1.316*** 1.223*** 0.170 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.291) (0.179) (0.143) 
PROFIT -0.116*** 0.032* -0.068*** -0.050** -0.083** 
 (0.042) (0.018) (0.146) (0.077) (0.039) 
CFO 2.737*** 0.828*** 2.868*** 2.344*** 4.441*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.101) (0.056) (0.066) 
MOWN 0.850** 0.281*** -0.474** 0.946** 2.761 
 (0.341) (0.120) (1.965) (0.417) (1.994) 
CONCEN 0.004** 0.005*** -0.001 -0.000 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
AUDIT -0.102 -0.033 -0.194 -0.070 -0.100 
 (0.150) (0.053) (0.866) (0.355) (0.122) 
Constant -6.174*** -2.008*** -13.869*** -6.494*** -5.675*** 
 (0.562) (0.241) (2.163) (0.990) (0.550) 
Observations 8,818 7,053 1,765 3,696 5,122 
R-squared 0.271 0.058 0.279 0.270 0.480 
Based on firm-year observations 2005-2008 from Chinese listed firms. IFRS_SSSR2=0 for 2005-2006; 
1 for 2007-2008. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA 
as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, 
if a one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so 
adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, 





Appendix 5.5: Estimations of accrual quality: |DA| (Model 5.5): firm years 2007-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
SSSR3 -0.043*** -0.057*** 0.048 -0.028 -0.042[*] 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.069) (0.017) (0.034) 
SIZE 0.431*** 0.287*** 0.621*** 0.072*** 0.455*** 
 (0.045) (0.040) (0.111) (0.036) (0.063) 
LEV 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
CR 0.012** 0.001 0.031** -0.002 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (0.009) 
INV -0.068** -0.036* -0.305*** -0.002** -0.105*** 
 (0.033) (0.024) (0.185) (0.036) (0.040) 
NOI -0.455*** -0.147 -0.514*** -0.108** -0.119 
 (0.108) (0.418) (0.158) (0.069) (0.183) 
PROFIT -0.110*** -0.009 -0.171* -0.010 -0.146** 
 (0.041) (0.037) (0.088) (0.031) (0.059) 
CFO 3.325*** 0.682*** 4.145*** 0.675*** 4.124*** 
 (0.061) (0.080) (0.105) (0.063) (0.077) 
MOWN 1.165[*] 0.010 -0.143 -0.038 29.488*** 
 (0.580) (0.422) (2.240) (0.290) (4.233) 
CONCEN -0.003* 0.006*** -0.024*** 0.007*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) 
AUDIT 0.051 0.052 -0.176 0.360* -0.209 
 (0.181) (0.131) (0.708) (0.140) (0.251) 
Constant -8.859*** -5.946*** -11.856*** -1.327* -9.286*** 
 (0.948) (0.856) (2.227) (0.748) (1.339) 
Observations 2,774 2,255 519 1,187 1,587 
R-squared 0.059 0.067 0.060 0.035 0.115 
Based on firm-year observations 2009-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR3=0 for 2007-2008; 1 for 
2009-2010. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA as 
panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, if a 
one - rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so 
adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, is 












Appendix 6.1: Estimations of small negative earnings (Model 6.4): firm years 2003-10 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent var: 2003-2006 2005-2008 2007-2010 
    
SSSR1 1.055   
 (0.828)   
IFRS_SSSR2  1.638*  
  (0.922)  
SSSR2   1.198 
   (0.819) 
SIZE 4.419 4.906 3.198 
 (3.803) (3.485) (3.881) 
LEV -0.084 -4.730** -0.607 
 (0.490) (2.275) (1.223) 
CR 0.482 -0.158 0.503 
 (0.665) (1.310) (0.708) 
INV 10.722 11.334** 3.547 
 (9.037) (4.805) (3.117) 
NOI 57.913 -102.748** -25.214 
 (65.484) (49.988) (36.445) 
CFO 7.652 -14.604* -4.750 
 (8.371) (7.581) (6.075) 
MOWN 2.379 0.960 0.503 
 (1.877) (1.025) (1.302) 
CONCEN 0.037 0.229** -0.055 
 (0.058) (0.097) (0.071) 
    
Observations 421 764 426 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1=0 for 
2003-2004; 1 for 2005-2006. IFRS_SSSR2 =0 for 2005-2006; 1 for 2007-2008. SSSR3 = 
0 for 2007-2008; 1 for 2009-2010. All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
Estimations performed in STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects logit at the firm 
level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the 
basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, if a one - rather than 
two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption 
of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as 












Appendix 7.1: Estimates of LNEG (Model 7.1): firm years 2003-06 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var:  All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
SSSR1 0.462*** 0.294 0.574** 0.653** 0.292 
 (0.173) (0.293) (0.235) (0.312) (0.225) 
SIZE -0.725 -1.505 -0.783 -1.058 -0.851 
 (0.571) (1.197) (0.653) (0.980) (0.842) 
LEV 0.062** 0.370*** 0.046* 0.034 0.230** 
 (0.030) (0.103) (0.027) (0.032) (0.091) 
CR -1.355*** -2.904*** -0.751** -0.913** -2.230*** 
 (0.300) (0.667) (0.328) (0.459) (0.493) 
INV -0.014 -0.414 -0.005 -0.039 -0.887 
 (0.194) (1.382) (0.194) (0.214) (1.200) 
NOI -6.776** -12.605* -6.705** -4.369 -13.068** 
 (2.862) (7.454) (3.128) (3.055) (5.932) 
CFO -9.979*** -11.074*** -9.962*** -11.370*** -8.177*** 
 (1.702) (2.782) (2.206) (2.773) (2.253) 
MOWN 106.665*** -512.881 62.937* 168.634 -66.184 
 (36.239) (1,205.587) (37.577) (411.022) (114.267) 
CONCEN 0.009 0.024 -0.003 0.005 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) 
AUDIT 0.186 -0.384 0.537  0.073 
 (0.677) (1.254) (0.933)  (0.731) 
Observations 725 323 402 269 456 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-2004; All 
variables as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA as panel regressions with 
fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, 
on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed 
test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is 
permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, is simply in order to convey 















Appendix 7.2: Estimates of LNEG (Model 7.1): firm years 2005-08 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
IFRS_SSSR2 0.156 0.366 0.063 -0.021 0.202 
 (0.127) (0.218) (0.184) (0.215) (0.166) 
SIZE -0.562* -1.982*** -0.738* -1.205** -0.452 
 (0.308) (0.627) (0.437) (0.556) (0.453) 
LEV -0.001 2.166*** -0.001 -0.001 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.359) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) 
CR -0.646*** -0.157 -0.556*** -0.323** -1.072*** 
 (0.155) (0.166) (0.188) (0.131) (0.270) 
INV 0.232 -0.016 0.536 0.927 -0.439 
 (0.341) (0.588) (0.578) (0.839) (0.659) 
NOI -18.406*** -5.614 -25.268*** -29.582*** -14.646*** 
 (3.863) (5.255) (5.694) (8.779) (4.362) 
CFO -5.287*** -6.126*** -5.396*** -4.455*** -6.210*** 
 (1.031) (1.685) (1.480) (1.547) (1.473) 
MOWN -9.300 -14.525 3.874 -4.642 -17.539 
 (9.042) (14.070) (16.840) (11.766) (15.707) 
CONCEN -0.008 0.031* -0.026* 0.007 -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) 
AUDIT -0.053 -15.510 0.743 -16.307 0.744 
 (0.594) (495.364) (0.749) (1,214.059) (0.703) 
Observations 1,274 645 629 455 819 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2010 from Chinese listed firms. IFRS_SSSR2=0 for 2005-2006; 1 for 
2007-2008. All variables as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA as panel 
regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, if a one- rather 
than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed 
tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, is simply in order to convey 















Appendix 7.3: Estimates of LNEG (Model 7.1): firm years 2007-10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SOE SOE 
      
SSSR3 0.746*** 0.901*** 0.712*** 0.673*** 0.796*** 
 (0.159) (0.242) (0.243) (0.254) (0.207) 
SIZE -0.969** -3.868*** -0.030 -2.201** -0.287 
 (0.442) (1.036) (0.669) (0.979) (0.526) 
LEV -0.000 1.830*** -0.001 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.436) (0.004) (0.003) (0.015) 
CR -1.078*** -0.546** -1.848*** -1.276*** -0.906*** 
 (0.234) (0.245) (0.507) (0.485) (0.262) 
INV 0.792 -0.352 1.934 1.812 0.579 
 (0.548) (0.636) (1.456) (1.264) (0.649) 
NOI -16.785*** 2.021 -35.454*** -34.012*** -11.669** 
 (4.205) (5.937) (8.817) (10.863) (4.632) 
CFO -2.478** 0.142 -8.660*** -0.330 -5.312*** 
 (1.038) (1.434) (2.378) (1.343) (1.633) 
MOWN -12.938 -57.037 127.495 -14.647 -965.768 
 (9.598) (36.796) (181.316) (9.781) (700.120) 
CONCEN -0.007 -0.004 -0.016 0.015 -0.027 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.039) (0.029) (0.025) 
AUDIT -0.318 -14.735 14.512 -14.791 0.124 
 (0.898) (913.898) (939.767) (1,905.655) (1.033) 
Observations 791 456 335 290 501 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR3=0 for 2007-2008; 1 for 2009-
2010. All variables as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Estimations performed in STATA as panel regressions 
with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, 
on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test 
is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is 
permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets, as described, is simply in order to convey completely 















Appendix 8.1: Estimations of the ECR model with SSSR1 (Model 8.3): firm years 2003-06 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: All Non-ST ST Non-SEO SEO 
      
EPS 0.346*** 0.770*** 0.230*** 0.228*** 0.451*** 
 (0.032) (0.061) (0.044) (0.041) (0.046) 
∆"#$ -0.281*** -0.352*** -0.205*** -0.214*** -0.338*** 
 (0.029) (0.047) (0.041) (0.037) (0.042) 
SSSR1 -0.159*** -0.137*** -0.165*** -0.134*** -0.168*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.023) (0.018) (0.016) 
SSSR1*EPS -0.162*** -0.252*** -0.111** -0.096** -0.200*** 
 (0.029) (0.044) (0.047) (0.039) (0.042) 
SSSR1*∆"#$ 0.216*** 0.142*** 0.159*** 0.184*** 0.238*** 
 (0.031) (0.053) (0.044) (0.040) (0.045) 
Constant -0.105*** -0.209*** -0.117*** -0.141*** -0.102*** 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) 
Observations 3,725 2,788 937 1,251 2,474 
R-squared 0.174 0.171 0.170 0.174 0.180 
Based on firm-year observations 2003-2006 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR1 = 0 for 2003-2004; 
1 for 2005-2006. All variables as defined in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Estimations performed in STATA 
as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved 
significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are 
directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets 





















Appendix 8.2: Estimations of the ECR model with IFRS_SSSR2 (Model 8.3): firm years 2005-08 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var: 2005-2008 Non-ST ST Non-SEO SEO 
      
EPS 0.161*** 0.527*** 0.101 0.079 0.314*** 
 (0.046) (0.085) (0.061) (0.067) (0.066) 
∆"#$ -0.085*** -0.231*** -0.058* -0.046 -0.148*** 
 (0.030) (0.063) (0.035) (0.042) (0.043) 
IFRS_SSSR2 1.113*** 1.108*** 1.182*** 1.127*** 1.095*** 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.049) (0.039) (0.029) 
IFRS_SSSR2*EPS -0.178*** -0.317*** -0.066 -0.138* -0.193*** 
 (0.046) (0.069) (0.083) (0.071) (0.062) 
IFRS_SSSR2*∆"#$ 0.370*** 0.736*** 0.099 0.279*** 0.459*** 
 (0.046) (0.075) (0.071) (0.074) (0.061) 
Constant -0.280*** -0.371*** -0.288*** -0.306*** -0.291*** 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.035) (0.026) (0.021) 
Observations 5,072 3,956 1,116 1,727 3,345 
R-squared 0.404 0.423 0.447 0.383 0.424 
Based on firm-year observations 2005-2008 from Chinese listed firms. IFRS_SSSR2 = 0 for 2005-
2006; 1 for 2007-2008. All variables as defined in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Estimations performed in 
STATA as panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents 
improved significance, if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this 
chapter are directional, so adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of 





Appendix 8.3: Estimations of the ERC model with SSSR3 (Model 8.3): firm years 2007-10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent var:  All Non-ST ST Non-SEO SEO 
      
EPS 0.012 0.413*** -0.053 -0.182* 0.274*** 
 (0.064) (0.092) (0.110) (0.098) (0.097) 
CEPS 0.350*** 0.465*** 0.128 0.433*** 0.293*** 
 (0.052) (0.064) (0.099) (0.093) (0.064) 
SSSR3 -1.104*** -1.036*** -1.185*** -1.098*** -1.076*** 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.075) (0.059) (0.040) 
SSSR3*EPS 0.017 -0.092 0.001 0.134 -0.110 
 (0.059) (0.070) (0.140) (0.107) (0.072) 
SSSR3*CEPS -0.471*** -0.801*** -0.139 -0.535*** -0.450*** 
 (0.063) (0.092) (0.110) (0.106) (0.090) 
Constant 0.802*** 0.633*** 0.886*** 0.810*** 0.743*** 
 (0.024) (0.039) (0.042) (0.038) (0.036) 
Observations 3,971 3,234 737 1,449 2,522 
R-squared 0.407 0.449 0.376 0.380 0.430 
Based on firm-year observations 2007-2010 from Chinese listed firms. SSSR3 = 0 for 2007-2008; 1 
for 2009-2010. All variables as defined in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Estimations performed in STATA as 
panel regressions with fixed effects at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of two-tailed tests. [*] represents improved significance, 
if a one- rather than two-tailed test is adopted. The hypotheses of this chapter are directional, so 
adoption of one-tailed tests is permissible/appropriate. The use of square brackets as described is 
simply in order to convey completely the nature of the significance. 
 
 
 
